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 Philosophers and religious believers have commonly held that suffering is a basic feature 
of human existence, while responding to this problem in different ways. Philosophers have often 
tried to mitigate suffering in their own lives through the pursuit of knowledge, virtue, and 
autonomy, but with penetrating insight, Kierkegaard argues that this offers no real escape from 
their affliction. Rather than depend on one's own efforts or understanding to resolve suffering, 
one ought to turn to Christianity with faith that one will attain salvation by receiving God's grace. 
In this study, I examine Kierkegaard's philosophical attempt to understand human suffering by 
analyzing his notion of despair, with the aim of determining why he thinks it should motivate the 
adoption of a religious way of life. He believes that a phenomenological investigation of human 
existence reveals that despair is central to our condition. In his view, it arises through the tension 
of being a free person situated in an impersonal world that operates coercively under principles 
of necessity, and thereby signifies our paradoxical nature as embodied spirits. Despair intensifies 
as our spiritual capacities of thought, imagination, and volition become realized over the course 
of our development. As freedom becomes realized, and we become more conscious of ourselves, 
we are likely to resist subordination to external forces beyond our control. Because freedom and 
the world that absorbs us are at odds, and both constitute us as human beings, despair is best 
understood as a state of disintegration in the person. Kierkegaard believes that to eliminate 
despair, the conflicting elements of our nature need to be harmonized so that integrity is 
achieved, but this is a paradoxical feat that cannot be accomplished without divine assistance. 
However, I challenge his claim that personal integrity requires religious faith, and argue that a 
person should be able to attain it on his own through an ethical way of life, which balances 
firmly held ideals and rational principles with concrete living. I also call into doubt his claim that 
despair is universal to humankind, and argue that he cannot consistently maintain that it is a state 
that the person brings upon himself through a misuse of will. His premises entail the disturbing 
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 A spirit of optimism tends to resonate throughout society in the West, despite being 
occasionally disrupted by a national calamity, or curbed by economic or political crises. While 
this general mood brings cheer to many of us, and encourages those who are weary to bear with 
their plight with the hope of better times ahead, there is reason to think that as a matter of fact, all 
is not well in the world. One does not have to probe too deeply into the human psyche to 
understand why many would question this attitude that is impressed on us in through popular 
culture from a young age. A cursory glance at the state of the world would reveal that poverty, 
disease, mental illness, maltreatment, oppression, and violence are rampant in human life, some 
of which seems eminently preventable. Although we have taken measures to mitigate sources of 
suffering through advancements in areas like science and technology, we have hardly succeeded 
in controlling them completely. Without question, the call for racial and gender equality has 
made many of us more conscientious, and led to improvements in our situation as a whole, but 
political and economic injustice is still prevalent due to the radically unequal distribution of 
wealth. Those who are more globally conscious might be concerned about wars, famines, and 
exploitation of labor occurring overseas, even as the suffering experienced in these regions is 
difficult for most of us to imagine. Such anxieties call into question the overarching narrative of 
human progress and prosperity that is customarily accepted without serious questioning, and are 
prone to drive those affected by them to despair.  
 It would be unfair to accuse those who doubt the popular narrative of stubborn 
faultfinding, or to discredit them by attributing their view to depression. Many raise these 
worries out of alarm for the human condition and a desire to set things aright, and not because 
they intend to spread gloom or be contrarians for the sake of it. Their pessimism might not be 
easily put to rest by the cool reassurance of others, who risk trivializing the issues in 
recommending confidence in our capacity to resolve the problems that continue to beleaguer us. 
At worst, these individuals might recommend blithe forgetfulness of them, which would only 
ensure that they would fail to be addressed adequately. Many of one's misgivings might be moral 
in nature and pertain to the actions of human beings, including one's own personal failings, but 
they might also stem from an awareness of danger and insecurity lurking in existence that none 




all of us, without us being able to do much about it. Some might respond to these worries by 
arguing that it is all a matter of perspective, and that the worldview of the unflagging optimist 
has just as much merit as that of someone more critical or pessimistic about the human condition 
or existence in general. Each side can offer reasons in defense of their view, but there remains 
the question of which evaluation is more truthful and has a preponderance of evidence on its 
side. Addressing this complex issue should be of concern to those who intend to approach life 
with honesty and insight into human existence, and so will likely be done by those want to live a 
good life. 
 
Life out of Balance 
 Those who examine traditional sources of wisdom will likely conclude that sages and 
religious leaders have tended to side against the popular narrative in their reflections on human 
suffering and the ambiguities of life. A common refrain in major philosophical and religious 
circles has been that suffering is an elemental feature of human existence, regardless of nation or 
epoch. Many of the teachings propagated in the East intend to enlighten individuals about this 
phenomenon in hopes of liberating them from it, along with the despair that it can foster. 
Buddhists, for instance, believe that the first truth of existence is duhkha. This is a Sanskrit word 
often translated as 'dissatisfaction,' but with an etymology that suggests a wheel out of kilter.1 To 
get a sense of what this could mean, one might imagine riding in a carriage with a wheel that is 
out of alignment. A trip through the countryside might begin as pleasurable, but the wobbling 
and bouncing of the carriage eventually becomes irritating and disruptive, and eventually the trip 
is no longer very pleasing. Buddhists think that such a metaphor conveys a basic truth about 
human life. "Something basic and important isn't right. It bothers us, makes us unhappy, time 
after time ... no matter how hard we try to cultivate pleasure and keep it coming our way, 
eventually the pleasure recedes and the disturbance and vexation return. Nothing we do can keep 
them entirely at bay."2 Of course, Buddhists can appeal to the obvious problems mentioned 
earlier to support this point, but there is a more profound psychological basis to their worry. In 
their view, even those blessed with happiness and good fortune are beleaguered by nagging 
suffering, even though it appears that everything goes well for them. Whether it is bad moods or 
                                                
1 See Hagen, Buddhism Plain and Simple, p. 25. I have also borrowed from the metaphor Hagen uses when 
describing the meaning of this term.  




minor frustrations that contribute a disproportionate amount of suffering to our day, 
dissatisfaction lingers in us all, however subtly. Since to be a self is to suffer, they believe that 
the dissolution of the self would end its suffering. The goal of Buddhist practice is to eliminate 
the conditions that give rise to duhkha by awakening a non-dual state of consciousness in which 
the distinction one makes between oneself and things other than oneself dissolves. When the self 
no longer demarcates itself from anything external to it, it ceases to exist as a separate entity, and 
liberation, or nirvana, is attained.3  
 The idea that suffering is a predominate feature of human life can also be found at the 
origin of Western philosophy, but in a dualistic form that maintains a strict division between the 
knower and objects or entities known. In Plato's Phaedo, Socrates contends that the human being 
is a composite of a mortal body and an immortal soul, comparing the body to a prison that keeps 
the soul mired in the earth.4 The task of the philosopher, he thinks, is to work on separating the 
soul from the body in this life so that he or she will be prepared for its release to the afterlife 
when the body dies.5 To secure a heavenly migration to the eternal realm of the intelligible 
Forms, where one is liberated from the suffering of human existence, one must gain wisdom and 
virtue through the exercise of reason. To care for one's soul, one should come to know the true 
and good, and avoid associating with the body, which corrupts the soul and besets it with all 
sorts of ills and annoyances. This means renouncing bodily pleasures, worldly desires, and 
appetites that would keep the soul attached to this impure earthly realm, and paying little heed to 
the senses, which mislead one in the pursuit of truth. The philosopher hopes that by purifying his 
soul in this life through contemplation and the cultivation of reason, he will exist in a divine state 
much better than his current one upon death, and be free of the body once and for all. If he does 
not practice this method of detachment to approach the true and divine with clarity of thought, 
his soul will remain mired in the earth, and be imprisoned in a different body in its next 
incarnation.6 It would therefore continue to suffer  
 Finally, those in the Judeo-Christian tradition explain the evils and suffering that burden 
humankind through the myth of the Fall, appealing to divine revelation rather than philosophical 
speculation. According to Genesis, after God created the world, he created a paradise for human 
                                                
3 Ibid., Chapter 11 (pp. 133-137)   
4 Plato, Phaedo, 62b 
5 Ibid., 64c-67a 




beings to dwell in, called the Garden of Eden. God told the first man and woman, Adam and Eve, 
that they could eat from any tree in the garden except the tree of knowledge of good and evil. If 
they gained this wisdom by eating from this tree, they would die. A cunning serpent persuaded 
Eve to eat from it, telling her, "when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like 
God, knowing good and evil."7 After Eve and Adam ate from the tree, they realized they were 
naked, and fear and shame came over them. Meting out punishment for their disobedience, God 
told Adam, "cursed is the ground because of you; in pain you shall eat of it all the days of your 
life; thorns and thistles it shall bring forth for you; and you shall eat the plants of the field. By the 
sweat of your face you shall eat bread, till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; 
for you are dust, and to dust you shall return.”8 After doing this, God confirmed that the serpent 
was not lying when he said that they would become like Him with their knowledge. To keep 
them in check, he exiled them from the Garden, which prevented them from eating from the tree 
of life and living forever. Since all human beings are descendants of this couple, the allegory 
suggests that we are also separate from the home originally intended for us in paradise, burdened 
by the sins of our ancestors who have transferred their unhappy condition to us.  
 Within Christianity, and under the influence of Plato, Saint Augustine expanded on this 
idea with his doctrine of original sin. According to his interpretation of the Fall, out of pride and 
love of self, Adam had turned away from God and toward himself with his transgression.9 His 
willful act of defiance transformed human nature, which was created wholly good and subject to 
God, so that it became corrupted and mortal.10 By inheriting his punishment, we instead became 
subject to fleshly lusts, sensual desires, and turbulent emotions that move and disturb us against 
our will. This includes carnal desires, anger, avarice, and cravings for status and power, which as 
philosophers like Plato are accustomed to point out, "move in an ungoverned and inordinate 
manner, and consequently need the regulation of mind and reason."11 Since we are a composite 
of a body and a rational soul, which struggles to contain the various earthly lusts, our nature is 
set against itself, and the body's insubordination to the will brings guilt and shame upon us.12 
Augustine therefore endorses a "downward fall," where after falling away from God and into the 
                                                
7 Genesis 3:5 
8 Genesis 3:17-19 
9 See City of God, Book Fourteen, Section 13, p. 415 (Dods Translation) 
10 Ibid., Section 12, p. 414 
11 Ibid., Section 19, p. 421 




dregs of earthly life, discord in the human being exists due to his recalcitrant bodily nature and a 
will that has been weakened. Although the human being is out of kilter in this life, by accepting 
Christ's offer of redemption, the Christian has faith that God will heal his divided nature so that 
the original harmony he enjoyed in paradise will be restored in heaven, and the will would have 
the body under its incontestable dominion once again. 
 A different and intriguing interpretation of the allegory of the Fall can be found in 
Kierkegaard, who claims that the Fall awakened reflection and deliberate decision in the human 
being for the first time (EUD: 125). On his view, this event did not happen only once with 
Adam, but repeats itself in the life of the human being when he chooses to sin (EUD: 127). He 
does not disagree with Augustine that sin gives rise to lusts and corruption in the human being, 
and that God allows this to continue as a form of punishment. Neither does he disagree with 
Plato that the embodied human being suffers "imprisonment" in a "fragile earthen vessel" in 
being separated from his home in the eternal (EUD: 337). However, he departs from both of 
them in emphasizing that knowledge of good and evil incites restless questioning about life. This 
is more like an upward fall than a downward fall, since through this knowledge, the higher 
capacities of thought are realized for the first time.13 In paradise, where everything was perfect 
and blessed, the human being had no need to question anything at a deeper and more abstract 
level, or to think critically about his existence and the state of the world. Because there were no 
problems to resolve, and was no breakdown or confusion in the order of things, "no one would 
have asked where everything came from" (EUD: 126). Kierkegaard describes the anxiety of the 
reflective individual who has been exiled from this fortunate state and initiated into the sorrows 
of earthly life: 
 
Troubled, he asked: What is the good, where is the perfect to be found? If it exists, where is its source? 
But the doubt that had come along with the knowledge coiled itself alarmingly around his heart, and the 
serpent that had seduced him with the delectable now squeezed him in its coils ... Doubt would explain to 
him first one thing, then another, and in the explanation itself it would lie in wait for him in order to 
disquiet him still more. (EUD: 127) 
 
                                                
13 Kierkegaard is not the first person to have stated this position. It is likely that he adopted it from Hegel, who used 
the allegory of the fall to describe the emergence of spirit from nature, in which it becomes conscious of itself and 




For Kierkegaard, the kind of separation from God that occurs through sin leaves one disoriented 
in self-reflection, and spurs an inward search for a greater meaning and deeper understanding of 
existence. Doubt cannot put to rest the existential questions it raises, or find closure in the 
answers it arrives at, since these answers only lead to more questions for it. Kierkegaard 
elaborates on the insecurity of reflection under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus, who 
claims that reflection is "infinite," and its interrogating can only be stopped through a 
"resolution," or an act of will (CUP: 112-113). For example, one might think that life on earth 
can be explained as the outcome of cosmic events tracing back to the Big Bang, but continue to 
ask for an explanation for that event, and so on ad infinitum, until one decides to terminate one's 
chain of reasoning and be done with it. But without an adequate final explanation for the 
phenomenon in question, it is ultimately explained, or "without why," and the groundlessness of 
it unsettles reflection, which insists on getting answers and closure. Kierkegaard claims that such 
nagging doubts about one's condition reveal one's need for God, who might do what one cannot 
of one's own accord by ending the discomfort and incertitude of reflection. Consequently, the 
only way to relieve these paralyzing doubts in this life is through the resolution of faith (EUD: 
136-137). 
 
Human Life as Despair 
 Under the "higher" Christian pseudonym of Anti-Climacus, in Sickness Unto Death, 
Kierkegaard conceives of the human being's fallen condition in terms of despair.14 To despair 
means to be without hope, but the Danish word for this concept that Anti-Climacus uses, 
fortvivlelse, has a different etymology that clues the reader into the unique meaning it has for 
him.15 Tvivl is the Danish word for doubt, while the prefix for is used to intensify the meaning of 
the root. Fortvivlelse is literally, then, intensified doubt. Furthermore, tvivl is etymologically 
related to the number two, which suggests that a kind of doubling occurs in this state of 
intensified doubt. In ordinary instances of doubt, there is a difference between the belief one 
currently holds and the belief that it might be mistaken or inadequate, which indicates duality 
                                                
14 According to Kierkegaard, Anti-Climacus is “higher” in the sense that he represents what it means to be a 
Christian to an extraordinary degree (JP VI: 6439). While Kierkegaard believed he was able to elucidate the 
Christian ideal presented in Scripture, he did not think that he met the rigorous demands of being a Christian 
stressed by Anti-Climacus in his own life. For this reason, he declined to pen the works under his own name (JP VI: 
6446).  




and conflict in one's cognitive state. For Anti-Climacus, in the case of fortvivlelse, there is a 
duality that concerns the disposition of the whole person, and not mere uncertainty about what to 
believe. He defines despair [fortvivlelse] as a "misrelation" or disequilibrium in the human being, 
who is a "synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and 
necessity" (SUD: 13-14). He adds that this synthesis is "a relation between two" that is capable 
of "relating itself to itself," and when it becomes active in this sense, the human being becomes a 
self, or spirit (SUD: 13). Minimally understood, it follows that in despair, there is discord 
between the spiritual and animal aspects of the human being, who in the infinitude of reflection, 
is nevertheless finitely situated in the natural world. The task of this dissertation will be to 
analyze the nature of despair in Kierkegaard's thought, using Anti-Climacus' definition of despair 
as a misrelation among the different components of the self. 
 In this regard, Anti-Climacus agrees with Plato and Augustine in their dualistic 
assessment of the ills of human existence. But like Kierkegaard, he departs from them with the 
suggestion that an intense form of doubt and troublesome reflection besets the person who has 
become conscious of being in despair. On this view, the awakening of the human being's higher 
spiritual capacities brings him to despair, just as his eyes became opened to suffering and his 
nakedness upon learning of good and evil after the Fall. As reflection intensifies and becomes 
increasingly self-enclosed, he loses the harmonious relationship with the world that he had 
enjoyed in the earlier part of life, and becomes dissociated from that finite aspect of himself that 
resides in it. While Aristotle distinguishes man as the rational animal, for Anti-Climacus and 
Kierkegaard, it would be more apt to view him as the sick animal, where this illness stems from 
his spiritual nature as it becomes actualized in the natural world.16 This nature would include his 
rational capacities insofar as they are used in any act of self-reflection or questioning, and 
consequently, reason contributes to his spiritual illness in no small part.  
 The definition of despair as a misrelation between the spiritual and bodily aspects of the 
self allows us to break ground in our investigation into its nature, but it still brings little clarity to 
the meaning and significance this term has for Anti-Climacus. In arguing that all human beings 
are in despair, he clearly divests the term of its ordinary meaning in Danish or English, and uses 
it in a technical sense (SUD: 22). Since despair impacts those who seem like ordinary, happy 
people, it cannot be a psychological disposition characterized by feelings of hopelessness or 
                                                




depression as is commonly understood, even if it occasionally presents itself this way. He 
opposes his view of despair to the “customary view” that despair appears rather infrequently in 
the general population. Those with this "superficial" conception of the problem typically believe 
it is up to each individual to discern whether or not they are in despair, and that we have to take 
them at their word when most of them claim not to be (SUD: 22-23). As a self-proclaimed 
“physician of the soul” who diagnoses despair as a spiritual sickness, Anti-Climacus perceives 
matters quite differently (SUD: 23). Just as a sick individual might believe they are healthy when 
a physician knows they are not, so too can they be mistaken about not being in despair. This 
might happen in several different ways. Many remain entirely ignorant of their despair because 
they are buried in worldly distractions or busywork that helps them take their mind off it. There 
are still others who are not completely ignorant of it, but have a faint idea of its presence in their 
lives. Rather than confront it directly and learn the truth about it, however, they settle with this 
rudimentary understanding (SUD: 48). Anti-Climacus believes that most people find ways to 
repress despair from conscious awareness, and that self-deception occurs in all of these cases. 
While palliative measures serve most people quite well, he believes that a person can be cured of 
despair only by boldly facing up to it. In giving an account of despair, he intends to bring his 
reader to a deepened awareness of it so that by coming to accept it, they might take the measures 
necessary to overcome it.  
 This raises the question of what relation Anti-Climacus' technical notion of despair bears 
to our customary one, and whether he thinks despair shares much in common with the more 
natural types of sickness. In his view, freedom is an essential component of selfhood. With that 
being the case, despair emerges of our own free will and not by necessity. It is therefore always a 
condition that we are responsible for as individuals, and indicates a fall on our part. This means 
that despair does not happen to a person in the way that we might speak of someone catching a 
cold or developing cancer. Of the despairing individual, he writes, “every moment he is in 
despair, he is bringing it upon himself” (SUD: 17), which he does by either not wanting to be 
who he is or wanting to be someone he is not (SUD: 13). Anti-Climacus believes this because he 
is convinced that God establishes every self as a relation that is “in the proper relationship,” and 
only through our own poor choices could it ever become a misrelation (SUD: 16). This state of 
discord in the self never befalls it; once despair arises through some misuse of the will, it is the 




to be itself in one way or another. While there might be cases in which individuals bear some 
responsibility for contracting a natural sickness, such as when they neglect their bodies, they do 
not sustain this condition like they do with despair. Anti-Climacus believes that the individual 
can choose to bring the relation back into order at any moment by willing to be the person he 
was established to be, but he argues that the vast majority of us do not do this because we do not 
want to abide in God, in whom we nevertheless "live and move and have our being."17 He 
therefore understands despair to be universal to the human condition, and a basic fact about 
ourselves that we all cope with in some way (SUD: 22). 
 Anti-Climacus says little about what it means to bring despair upon oneself in a way that 
makes one responsible for it. It is wildly implausible to think that we could be willing despair at 
every moment of our lives if it is understood as a repeated intentional act that we are consciously 
aware of. Most people rarely even think about despair, much less intend it like they do with 
things like working, brushing their teeth, or being with their family, yet he nevertheless believes 
they spend the entire duration of their lives in this state. To make sense of Anti-Climacus' notion 
of despair, it is best to interpret it as the basic disposition of the self that shapes one’s entire way 
of life, including one's worldview and conception of oneself.18 As a deep-rooted disposition of 
the human being that is intentional, all other intentions arise from it, including the ordinary 
intentions of everyday life that seem totally unrelated to despair in the traditional sense of the 
word. This refusal of authentic selfhood would therefore encompass all of one’s thoughts, 
desires, and behaviors, as well as the choices one make. It would even lurk beneath one’s 
happiest moments, when it seems otherwise furthest from one's mind.  
 Because despair is a firmly held disposition that the individual wills at a primordial level, 
Anti-Climacus rejects that it is a psychological or physiological affliction as it is understood on 
the customary view. A person who has become conscious of being in despair will likely 
experience painful feelings of depression, anguish, or hopelessness, but these episodes would be 
the result of a prior misuse of freedom. If she experiences them, it is because she was already in 
despair, and the troubling consequences of it have surfaced to awareness (SUD: 24). He thinks 
this strange phenomenon is possible because despair originates in the eternal component in the 
                                                
17 See Acts 17:28. Kierkegaard phrases our refusal in these terms in one of his upbuilding discourses, but as a 
Christian, Anti-Climacus would agree (EUD: 134).  
18 In characterizing despair as the basic disposition of the self, I am drawing on Kant's notion of Gesinnung, or cast 
of mind. Kant describes this disposition in the human being as "the supreme inner basis for the adoption of all his 




human being, unlike any of the natural sicknesses that originate in time. When someone who was 
previously healthy gets a fever, for instance, we cannot say that this person already had a fever, 
since the fever began at a certain moment in time (SUD: 24). This is also the case for transitory 
psychological states like depression, happiness, and the like, but it is not the case for despair, 
which is categorically different due to its primordial and eternal origin. 
 Since despair is an entrenched act of the will that produces a misrelation in the self, it is 
an error to classify despair in Kierkegaard’s work as a mood.19 As temporal phenomena, moods 
are constantly in flux, and often arrive contrary to our intentions or wishes. Although we might 
choose to indulge in certain moods on occasion, they tend to arise involuntarily and of their own 
accord. We are also passive to them in a way that is foreign to Anti-Climacus’ notion of despair. 
As Heidegger rightly observes, a mood “assails” us.20 For Anti-Climacus, however, despair does 
not do this. It is true that in misusing our will, we become vulnerable to awful feelings or moods 
that we rightly attribute to being in a state of despair. In calling these psychological states 
despair, Anti-Climacus agrees with the customary view. But to characterize despair as a mood or 
an affect would be to ignore the active, voluntary component that is essential to it. It is 
conceivable that someone could feel despondent or miserable without being in despair, 
supposing they happen to suffer from these feelings rather than being complicit in willing them 
into existence.21 In fact, Anti-Climacus believes that despair rarely manifests itself in 
psychological symptoms when it is present. This is one of the main reasons why so many people 
go through life without ever becoming aware of being in despair. While they appear to others as 
mentally healthy and think of themselves in this way, Anti-Climacus believes that in truth, they 
are spiritually ill. Conversely, those who are deemed mentally ill by society might be closer to 
spiritual health if their difficulties have put them on the verge of faith, with the hope that God 
will intervene to relieve them of their misery.  
 There is another key difference between the customary view of despair and Anti-
Climacus' view that one must consider before getting clear on what he thinks it means to despair. 
On the customary view, to despair is to be without hope more generally, but Anti-Climacus 
believes that despair is essentially a religious matter, and is the opposite of faith. In his 
                                                
19 See for example McCarthy, The Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard, Chapter IV. 
20 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 176. 
21 This would be the case if someone were suffering under these emotions while still having faith in God. One 
possible cause of this type of suffering would be a chemical or hormonal imbalance in the body. The person of faith 




endorsement of Christianity, he believes that to use one's freedom appropriately and eliminate 
despair, one must have faith (SUD: 131). He defines this as a state in which "in relating itself to 
itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it" 
(SUD: 131). In prescribing faith as a cure for despair, Anti-Climacus suggests that in truth, it 
would be impossible for an individual to want to be herself without first knowing herself as a 
spiritual being who is not self-sufficient, but who is fully dependent on God. The thought seems 
to be that, in order to live authentically and without engaging in self-deception, you must finally 
accept that you have been brought into existence as an individual in relation to God, and have 
faith that He will end the suffering you brought upon yourself by rejecting Him, along with the 
kind of person He intended you to be. This is certainly a contentious conclusion that is likely to 
leave the reader with a host of questions and doubts about the tenability of his position, 
especially if one is not inclined toward Christianity. Why think that everyone is in despair? 
Supposing Anti-Climacus is even correct that despair is a misrelation or dysfunction in the self 
generated by the will, why does he need to introduce religious notions like God and faith in 
positing a solution to it? Might a self-reflective individual defeat despair as Anti-Climacus 
conceives of it by willing to be herself in relation to something or other, without assuming that it 
must be an omnipotent God, and without adopting any form of religious belief?22 Even if we 
grant that there is an immense creative power beyond ourselves that established us in existence, 
why should we care about it, and why should it have any bearing on how we conduct our lives?23  
 
An Outline of My Project 
 Kierkegaard’s response to such worries can be found in other works in his authorship, 
some of which, at least prima facie, do not deal so emphatically with religious themes. Through 
the fictional characters portrayed in the pseudonymous Either/Or, Kierkegaard intended to show 
how despair of the type described by Anti-Climacus is implicit in those ways of life that are not 
essentially religious in character. In this work, Judge William discusses two types of "life-views" 
that he calls esthetic and ethical. A life-view, he says, consists in "a conception of the meaning of 
                                                
22 Theunissen endeavors to give Anti-Climacus’ analysis of despair a secular interpretation instead of treating it as a 
spiritual condition that requires an intervention from God to resolve (Kierkegaard's Concept of Despair, p. ix). In 
Chapters 5 and 6, I explain that the idea that despair can be resolved through one's own powers commits one to a 
serious distortion of Kierkegaard's texts, and that on his view, we must depend on an external act of divine grace for 
this.  




life and its purpose" (E/O II: 179), and he believes every human being has a need to adopt such a 
comprehensive principle to bring unity and coherence to the many experiences of his life (E/O II: 
183). Because a life-view is prone to change over time and is something one is well aware of 
having, it is not a basic disposition like despair. It is, however, an attitude toward existence that 
provides the individual with a conceptual framework for understanding the particular events that 
occur over the course of his life, along with his central task and core values. As the Judge 
describes it, esthetic life-views aim at sensual enjoyment in the earlier phase of human life, and 
interesting material for observation in the later, reflective phase, while ethical life-views aim at 
the cultivation of virtue through the fulfillment of duties and responsibilities toward oneself and 
society. While the lifestyles of most of us might not exactly resemble those of the figures 
portrayed in Either/Or, given that they only represent paradigmatic cases of esthetic and ethical 
ways of life, Kierkegaard suggests that, in one way or another, a great many of us have life-
views that can be described in these terms.  
 As we will see in the following chapters, by using these figures to provide an insider's 
look into the character of the esthetic and ethical ways of life, Kierkegaard attempts to show that 
despair is common to both life-views, and is therefore a central problem of the human condition. 
Often these efforts are overt, such as when the Judges admonishes his friend, A for living in 
despair by neglecting the duties that he thinks are essential to selfhood, and by indulging in 
esthetic reveries that bear little relation to reality. At other times the presence of despair in 
human life is merely suggested, such as in A’s essays on boredom and tragedy as distinctive 
features of human existence. While A appears to resign himself to despair based on his morbid 
insights into existence, the Judge believes that by living ethically, he has become victorious in 
his own struggles with it. Although Kierkegaard concludes the work by allowing the Judge the 
upper hand over A, there is reason to suspect that he does not escape from despair in the way he 
would like. The failure of an ethical approach to the problem becomes evident in Kierkegaard’s 
later works, where he puts forward the religious way of life, or the life of faith, as a third option 
available to those who wish to overcome despair. In interpreting any way of life outside of 
Christianity as a refusal to be oneself, Anti-Climacus offers a religious starting point to those 
who have recognized the inability of the esthetic or ethical life-views to contribute lasting unity 




 In his pseudonymous writings, Kierkegaard does not understand the three life-views as a 
set of alternatives that the individual can arbitrarily choose from at any random point in his life. 
The life-views should instead be understood as basic attitudes that gradually emerge at different 
stages of one's personal development. These "stages of life" are also defined in esthetic, ethical 
and religious terms in his works. The order of the stages follows a necessary sequence that is not 
up to the individual, but he can hinder or encourage his passage through them through the 
choices he makes. On a standard interpretation of the stages, a person proceeds through the 
esthetic stage of life before moving onto the ethical stage and finally ending at the religious 
stage.24 This is a progression in which a person arrives at a more truthful conception of himself 
and his relationship to the world, to others, and to God as he matures as an individual. 
Kierkegaard suggests that the human being begins at the esthetic stage, with little self-knowledge 
or volition, but that he can choose to adopt an ethical or religious life-view later in life after 
gaining more knowledge and experience. Anti-Climacus is unique among the pseudonyms in 
conceiving of the stages of life as forms of despair rather than as life-views, although I will argue 
that the three life-views can be reclassified under his scheme. On this picture, the human being 
begins life ignorant of himself and his despair, while despair intensifies into weakness and then 
defiance as his will becomes empowered and he gains greater knowledge of himself and 
existence. In weakness, the individual does not want to be who he is, while in defiance, he wants 
to be someone he is not. At the end of this process, which most people will never get to, the 
individual rests in faith by willing to be himself before God.  
 Anti-Climacus argues that the movement through the different forms of despair has a 
dialectical character that results from the self continually refusing to be itself. With his notion of 
the dialectical, he follows Hegel in assuming that human existence consists of a restless process 
of development in which existential tensions are resolved through negations of previously held 
positions, which go on to generate new tensions that demand resolution. For Anti-Climacus, 
these tensions ensue over time because the self is a synthesis of contradictory components that 
nevertheless seeks unity and coherence in its existence.25 I will explain how this dialectic works 
in the following chapters, but in the broadest sense, the esthetic way of life is abolished upon 
                                                
24 Stephen N. Dunning, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 4. 
25 I am in agreement with Rudd, who neatly summarizes this idea when he writes: "According to Kierkegaard, the 
factor that drives us from one stage of life to the next is an—at first unconscious and inchoate—desire for 





entering the ethical stage, and the ethical way of life is abolished upon entering the religious 
stage, while each of these stages preserve and transform certain profitable aspects of the 
preceding stage in the self's effort to achieve integrity. But where Hegel believes that this 
dialectical process of negation is a logical movement generated in the act of thinking about what 
exists, Kierkegaard argues throughout his work that logic only provides the concepts, forms, and 
rules through which we think about existence and discern connections between things, and 
cannot itself produce an actual movement in it.26 Any existential movement produced through 
negation occurs through the will of individuals whom God has endowed with a will, and not in 
thought, which only guides the will by conceptualizing reality and making judgments about it. It 
should also be noted that on Kierkegaard's view, despair intensifies through the growth of human 
freedom in the natural world, where this freedom is a quality of distinct agents that move through 
the stages of life in a self-willed fashion, refusing to be who God made them to be. It is never 
that of an impersonal deity that acts according to logical necessity throughout the entirety of 
world-history, using human beings as its members as Hegel claims.  
 Despite such crucial differences, there are other similarities in their brands of dialectic, 
which they believe can be supported through a phenomenological investigation that studies the 
different shapes consciousness assumes as one comes to know oneself over the different periods 
of human life. As Taylor points out, "Hegel and Kierkegaard develop alternative 
phenomenologies of spirit that are designed to lead the reader from inauthentic to authentic or 
fully realized selfhood.”27 For Hegel, this investigation of the structures of consciousness centers 
on the spiritual life of God, and describes how God comes to know himself over the course of 
history through the rational activity of human beings. For Kierkegaard, it centers upon the 
spiritual life of the individual, and describes how he comes to know himself through learning that 
he must have faith that God will heal his despair, which he brought upon himself by misusing his 
will. Although Kierkegaard and Hegel fundamentally disagree about what self-realization entails, 
and about how to categorize the different stages that human beings pass through in their 
                                                
26 For elaboration of this idea and a rundown of Kierkegaard's dialectical method, see chapter II in Malantshuck, 
Kierkegaard's Thought, especially pp. 170-172. On this point, Kierkegaard agrees with the empiricist notion that 
reason alone cannot motivate an action. See for example Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 3.1.1. In Chapter 1, I 
claim that Kierkegaard is an empiricist, although not of the naturalistic sort.  




development, they both agree that this process can be delineated through a dialectical logic that 
culminates in Christian religiosity.28  
 By presenting the theory of personal development Kierkegaard provides through the 
pseudonyms, I examine his argument that despair is a central feature of each stage of human life 
prior to the religious stage, where faith is attained at the final moment of the journey toward self-
realization. Given that Anti-Climacus contends that despair is “a sickness of the spirit" (SUD: 
24), an understanding of his notion of spirit, or the self, is a prerequisite for any deeper 
investigation into what he takes to be the nature of despair. For this reason, in the first chapter, I 
explain what it means to be a self on his view, and how the self can be understood dialectically 
as a synthesis of the eternal and temporal, the infinite and finite, and freedom and necessity. I 
have already introduced Anti-Climacus' definition of this sickness as a misrelation between the 
spiritual and embodied aspects of the self that is brought on by one's refusal to be oneself, but in 
the remainder of the dissertation, I interpret despair as a state of disintegration in the self. As we 
will see, for Anti-Climacus, its lack of integrity has a distinctive phenomenology behind it that is 
best conceived in terms of self-alienation, even though it is not essentially a psychological 
condition and does not necessarily involve feelings of alienation. In the second chapter, I explain 
that in the earlier phase of the esthetic stage of life, where one is in thrall to worldly or sensual 
enjoyment while being ignorant of being a self, the self is alienated from the eternal and infinite 
components of itself. In avoiding deeper spiritual concerns, it lacks an awareness of its freedom 
and has little if any volitional capacity. In the third and fourth chapters, I look at the later phase 
of the esthetic stage, where the self becomes alienated from its temporal and finite components 
due to its not wanting to be who it is. When this happens following an earthly loss or difficulty, 
the self gains a degree of independence by choosing to distance itself from associations with the 
world, and by not conforming to the life of the crowd. As freedom emerges in the life of the 
individual, he becomes self-enclosed in heightened reflection, and is likely to think deeply about 
himself and his problems, or to approach existence through esthetic contemplation. At this more 
advanced stage, the psychological states customarily linked with despair, such as feelings of 
depression and misery, are likely to beset the individual for an extended period for the first time. 
                                                
28 As Malantshuck explains, while there is a logic involved in the progression of the stages according to 
Kierkegaard, it is a much more informal variant than the one described by Hegel, who thought the process could be 
rigorously formalized and designated as a science. See Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 169. Throughout this project, I 




 Once despair becomes an obvious problem for the individual, he might decide to take 
measures to overcome it by changing his "life-view," or his basic attitude toward life. In the fifth 
and sixth chapters, I explain that as despair intensifies and the self arrives at greater knowledge 
of itself and its freedom, it might will to be itself by transforming itself in its existence, and 
becoming the principal authority over its life. In earnestly affirming his autonomy and his 
capacity for critical thought, he might decide to hold beliefs, values, ideals, and principles that 
are out of keeping with the social groups he belongs to, and pursue a way of life that is unique to 
him. After reconsidering his interests and concerns with the aim of self-improvement, it is likely 
that he will adopt an ethical life-view or a stoical attitude, and commit himself to virtue in a 
manner that is rare among his contemporaries. However, as we will see in chapter five through 
the figure of the Judge in Either/Or, someone might commit himself ethically without breaking 
significantly with the beliefs, norms, and general practices of his culture. His deliberate decision 
to embrace the established order would seem to bring him into harmony with the world and 
society, so that he would no longer be alienated from them. While self-determined individuals in 
the ethical stage might believe they have conquered despair, in chapter six, we will see that Anti-
Climacus argues that they cannot correct the imbalance within themselves of their own accord. 
In their self-sufficient posturing, they remain alienated from the temporal and finite components 
in themselves, and will to be someone that that they are ultimately not. In order for such an 
individual to become who he is, he must finally admit his total dependence on God to heal the 
division in his nature, but this individual has too much pride and self-will to acknowledge his 
need for God's grace. 
 In summary, Anti-Climacus understands despair as a metaphysical rupture in the self that 
only God can repair, rather than an epistemic problem resulting from ignorance of one's true 
nature as the Buddhist claims. It is also not a problem that can be resolved by fleeing from bodily 
existence and into an abstract realm of ideas through the exercise of reason, as the Platonist 
claims. After the individual severs his connection from God through sin, there arises a break in 
the fabric of reality that cannot be rectified through human knowledge or ability. On his view, 
nothing short of faith in Christ's atonement will resolve the discord that compromises the 
individual's existence. My general task in the dissertation will be to explain why Kierkegaard, 
through his pseudonyms, argues that the overwhelming majority of human beings are in despair, 




that we are not approaching life with the right attitude or living in the way that we ought to be. 
He aims to help us correct this by making us aware of our inadequacy as self-willed individuals 
who are not doing God's will. In choosing to turn away from God and toward ourselves by 
relying on our own capabilities, the suggestion is that we've lost sight of the highest good in 
existence, and are somehow to blame for this fall. By examining what Kierkegaard takes to be 
the failures of esthetic and ethical life-views, and how individuals who lack faith are supposed to 
be misusing their will over the course of their development, I hope to shed some light on why he 
believes we need faith to overcome despair and become self-actualized individuals.  
 Despair is a difficult topic to confront at length, and not all readers are likely to agree 
with Kierkegaard's negative assessment of ordinary ways of living. He is sometimes accused of 
misanthropy for sounding off on the wretchedness of people, and the mediocrity of the general 
run of humanity.29 Yet those who advance this criticism downplay his admiration for the 
greatness and potential of each and every human being. He does not see himself as conveying 
esoteric wisdom, but believes nearly everyone is capable of self-actualization if they will it (TA: 
22). While Anti-Climacus concedes that it might seem bleak to see all of humanity as being in 
despair for not willing this, and to make despair the focus of inquiry in the way he does, he 
insists that his view is not bleak, and that his interests are not morbid:  
 
  It is not somber, for, on the contrary, it tries to shed light on what generally is left somewhat 
  obscure; it is not depressing but instead is elevating, inasmuch as it views every human being  
  under the destiny of the highest claim upon him, to be spirit. (SUD: 22)  
 
Anti-Climacus argues that our destiny can be fulfilled only after we recognize that in this life, we 
are spiritually ill and in desperate need of help that we cannot offer ourselves. One of 
Kierkegaard’s principal objectives as an author was to assist in healing persons of despair by 
bringing them to an awareness of their spiritual nature, or in other words, the truth about 
themselves. As a student of Socrates, he thought of himself as a midwife who would meet his 
reader on her own terms through the pseudonyms, and gradually lead her from ignorance in the 
esthetic way of life to knowledge of herself and her despair (POV: 7). Part of this maieutic 
strategy executed "in service of the truth" involved the esthetic and ethical pseudonyms in 
                                                
29 Adorno, for example, accuses Kierkegaard of misanthropy based on the social thought detailed in Works of Love. 




Either/Or (POV: 37), but it also included the use of Anti-Climacus, an idealized “physician of 
the soul” who sees the remedy for despair in the Christian faith (SUD: 23). Kierkegaard's project 
can therefore be seen as a form of therapy in which the spiritual health of the individual is the 
primary aim. Because the human being is spirit, this health is arguably the most important thing 
for us to achieve. 
 It would seem all too easy to quickly dismiss Anti-Climacus’ view as radical and 
unconvincing for its religious thrust. It is tempting to reject Kierkegaard’s curative effort on the 
grounds that he wrongly projects the melancholy he dealt with in his personal life onto the rest of 
humanity. It might easily be doubted that a turn to religion is always necessary to overcome 
despair, assuming one is in despair at all. There is no question many would find belief in 
Christianity unappealing on rational or religious grounds, and discredit it as a solution to despair. 
Kierkegaard does not take the need for faith for granted, however, but intends to show the appeal 
that Christianity ought to have for people through compelling philosophical insight into the 
human condition. He should not be dismissed without first examining his view and determining 
where or if he goes wrong. In assessing Kierkegaard's view, I will decide whether he offers a 
plausible account that is likely to persuade someone who lives an esthetic or ethical way of life 
to adopt a religious existence characterized by the renunciation of worldly goods and pursuits. 
This will include a discussion of whether his criticisms of these ways of life are viable without 
reference to any “outside” religious perspective, or carry force only if his religious position has 
already been accepted.  
 Like Kierkegaard's own work, this dissertation will deal heavily with metaphysical 
themes, but despite its theoretical character, it is motivated foremost by practical and ethical 
concerns. In order to figure out how one should live, what one should aim for, and what basic 
attitude one should adopt to properly orient oneself in existence, one should have made some 
progress in understanding oneself, and this requires a great deal of self-interpretation. On 
Kierkegaard's existentialist conception of the human being, one does not arrive at this 
understanding once and for all or as a matter of course, but rather through personal striving on a 
life-long journey of self-discovery. I believe that Kierkegaard's thought is highly instructive in 
this regard, and will guide the reader through the process of self-interpretation that he describes 






The Constitution and Dialectic of the Self  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 As I mentioned in the introduction, because despair for Anti-Climacus is essentially a 
"sickness of the spirit" (SUD: 24), an examination of his notion of spirit should precede any 
inquiry into his notion of despair. He begins The Sickness Unto Death by claiming: “A human 
being is spirit,” and that “Spirit is the self” (SUD: 13). He defines the self in a notoriously 
obscure passage that recalls the idiom of Hegelian dialectics.30 There he writes:   
 
 The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation’s relating itself to itself in the relation;  
 the self is not the relation but is the relation’s relating itself to itself. A human being is a synthesis of  
 the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis. 
               A synthesis is a relation between two. Considered in this way, a human being is still not a self. (SUD: 13) 
 
The self is described as a relation between contradictory elements that, in reflecting on itself, 
relates itself to itself as a particular human being. To complicate matters even further, he goes on 
to claim that a second relation between the psychical [Sjel] and the physical constitutes the 
human being as a synthesis.31 He also contends that the self is a "derived, established relation" 
that, in relating itself to itself, must also relate itself to "the power that established it" (SUD: 13-
14). This means that the self did not originally create itself in its existence, but was put it into 
existence by a greater power transcending it. In relating to this other power, the self is able to 
demarcate itself in its existence by discerning limits to its powers and capacities. 
                                                
30 Compare Anti-Climacus’ definition of the self to that of Hegel: "The realized purpose, or the existent actuality, is 
movement and unfolded becoming; but it is just this unrest that is the self; and the self is like that immediacy and 
simplicity of the beginning because it is the result, that which has returned into itself, the latter being similarly just 
the self. And the self is the sameness and simplicity that relates itself to itself." Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 
12.  
31 As Taylor points out, “Sjel” is a difficult word to translate accurately into English, and is more literally rendered 
by the word “soul.” While the word has some religious connotations in Danish, it refers principally to the mind, or 
the mental processes of the individual. See Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 88. Lowrie translates this 
word into English as “soulish” in his translation of The Sickness Unto Death, but this sounds rather awkward. I will 




 In this cryptic passage, which the rest of the chapter will attempt to shed sorely needed 
light on, Anti-Climacus defines the self by three basic attributes.32 It is (a) a bipolar relation, or 
synthesis of contradictory elements (b) that is actively self-relating and reflective, and (c) that is 
dependent upon a greater power that established it. His conclusions about the constitution of the 
self might seem like a matter of stipulation, since he does not claim to arrive at them by way of a 
discursive argument that could be rendered in a syllogistic format. Instead, he claims to have 
discerned them by means of a “psychological exposition” of human existence. His methodology 
should not be construed as psychological in the manner of the empirical sciences, or as 
disinterested and impersonal in the way that scientific analysis aims to be.33 Instead, he presents 
a phenomenological argument that attempts to describe the formal structures of the self "from the 
inside," through the first-person standpoint of the individual interested in his or her own personal 
existence. Importantly, he characterizes his investigation as Christian. The thought seems to be 
that anyone who introspects upon his or her experience as a human being can intuit these 
structures under the guidance of Christian principles. He therefore offers a phenomenology of 
human life from the Christian perspective.  
 While non-Christians or secularists will likely deem his religious presuppositions to be 
problematic, similar conclusions about the nature of the self and of despair are drawn in 
Either/Or quite independently of religious considerations. In that work, the structure and 
constitution of the self is gradually disclosed through philosophical reflections on despair as it 
emerges in ways of life that Kierkegaard describes as ethical and aesthetic. In the following 
chapters, I will argue that his portrayal of human existence in that more literary work serves as 
an indirect defense of Anti-Climacus’ religious starting point by providing non-question-begging 
reasons to accept it.34 By attempting to show how lives lived outside of Christianity are ones of 
                                                
32 John D. Glenn, Jr. clearly lays out these three attributes of self when interpreting this passage in light of 
Kierkegaard’s other works. See Glenn, “The Definition of the Self and the Structure of Kierkegaard’s Work,” p. 5. 
However, this view is in no way controversial. Most commentators who have discussed this passage in depth also 
point out the same three underlying features, in one way or another.  
33 Kosch explains that at the time that The Sickness Unto Death was written, psychology was not yet established as a 
scientific discipline. Neither was the discipline a prospect for the foreseeable future. “The words Kierkegaard uses  
(psychologisk, psychologie) were used to indicate something roughly coextensive with Hegelian ‘philosophy of 
(subjective) spirit’…Hegel’s Encyclopaedia section on subjective spirit included discussions of the soul, the nature 
of consciousness, reason, representation, thought, inclination and drives." See Kosch, Freedom and Reason in Kant, 
Schelling, and Kierkegaard, p. 207. 
34 Kierkegaard claims to be strictly opposed to Christian apologetics, even though he can't help but sneak in his own 
defense in the unfamiliar guise of the pseudonyms, as I will attempt to show throughout this work. Anti-Climacus, 




despair, even on their own terms, Either/Or aims to show the appeal that Christianity should 
have to those who recognize they are in despair and who want to overcome it once and for all. 
 Kierkegaard commentators generally agree that Anti-Climacus’ analysis of the self is 
brusque and opaque.35 Some have argued that Kierkegaard parodies Hegelian dialectics in this 
notorious passage, but unlike the Postscript, The Sickness Unto Death does not generally have a 
satirical tone.36 He issues it as an earnest work intended for edification and spiritual awakening. 
Furthermore, Kierkegaard considered himself a dialectician, and the indebtedness of his thought 
to Hegelian philosophy has already been well established in other scholarship.37 Taking this 
passage seriously, the objective of this chapter will be to unravel its meaning with help from 
other material in Kierkegaard’s corpus. This will serve as the groundwork for my efforts to trace 
the developments of selfhood and of despair in Kierkegaard’s work in later chapters. By drawing 
from a wide variety of his writings from his pseudonymous and non-pseudonymous authorship, I 
intend to show that a coherent, albeit complex conception of the self can be gleaned. In contrast 
to those interpreters who would characterize this conception as chiefly philosophical or 
anthropological, in section 1.2, I argue that it should be understood as a religious conception that 
has a historical basis in Scripture. Section 1.3 will be dedicated to examining the constituents of 
the self described by Anti-Climacus. It will be focused on elucidating the nature of the eternal 
and temporal, which are the basic components of the self that are paradoxically united within it 
in a dialectical relation. In section 1.4, I explore the way in which the self emerges from nature 
as a free agent through the activation of reflection and the will. I explain that for Kierkegaard, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Christendom is de facto a Judas No. 2 ... he who defends it has never believed it. If he believes, then the enthusiasm 
of faith is not a defense—no, it is attack and victory" (SUD: 87).  
35 Beabout, for instance, writes that the passage where Anti-Climacus defines the self “is so algebraic, so abstract, so 
Hegelian, that I am sure many readers have put down the book immediately, perhaps never to pick it up again.” See 
Freedom and Its Misuses: Kierkegaard on Anxiety and Despair, p. 85. Although some of what Anti-Climacus goes 
on to write later in Sickness Unto Death helps explain this passage, it is a short work that offers little explanatory 
detail. For this reason, supplemental material is needed to grasp many of the concepts and ideas included in it.  
36 Several authors have regarded Anti-Climacus' definition of the self as a parody of Hegel. See for instance Judith 
Butler, “Kierkegaard’s Speculative Despair,” pp. 363-364. See also Fred Reinhard Dallmayr, G.W.F. Hegel: 
Modernity and Politics, p. 187. In his Journals, however, Kierkegaard denies using the pseudonym of Anti-
Climacus for humorous effect. "With Climacus," a former pseudonym he employed, "everything drowns in 
humor...Anti-Climacus is thetical" (JP VI: 6439). 
37 Dunning, for example, has written a work that reveals the major influence Hegel had on Kierkegaard. He argues, 
“Kierkegaard was quite unconscious of the extent to which he continued, even after breaking with Hegelianism, to 
think in terms that permit—and often seem to demand—a Hegelian structural analysis.” Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of 
Inwardness, p. 5. See also Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel Reconsidered. As for Kierkegaard’s own 
view of the matter, in his Journals, he calls himself a “dialectician with an unusual sense for rhetoric” (JP V: 5981). 
He also claims that “only a dialectician can portray Christianity,” and he felt tasked with this project throughout the 




the human being is tasked with achieving unity between the eternal and temporal aspects of 
himself through a passionate mode of self-relational activity that mobilizes the imagination. We 
will see that throughout his works, Kierkegaard depicts a self that is not ready-made, but is 
instead tasked with becoming spirit in time through its embodiment in the world. In realizing its 
freedom concretely through a historical process of development, in an intense state of 
inwardness, it works to shape itself into what it already in some sense is—that is, eternal.  
 
1.2 Kierkegaard's Religious Conception of the Self  
 There has been some disagreement among commentators about the role religion plays in 
Kierkegaard's conception of the constitution of the self, and whether or not Kierkegaard's 
thought should be understood as ontological. Elrod, for instance, claims: “For Kierkegaard, the 
God question is an existential question, not an ontological one. Discussions of God appear in his 
descriptions of the ethico-religious stage of existence, not in his ontology.”38 While Elrod is 
correct that Kierkegaard tends to emphasize the practical or lived dimensions of theistic belief 
rather than its more theoretical underpinnings, this does not mean that ontological inquiry is 
absent from his authorship. Kierkegaard intends to inculcate a deepened understanding of human 
existence into his reader in order to motivate the appropriate kinds of actions or responses to take 
in it, and because of this, ontological inquiry is ubiquitous in his works. In this section, I argue 
that the revealed God of Christianity lies at the foundation of Kierkegaard's ontology as the 
omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient being who created human beings and the rest of the 
world ex nihilo. In this sense, he offers a religious conception of selfhood that stems from a 
deeply personal investigation of his inner life.  
Kierkegaard does not ascribe this foundational status to God without reservation, 
however. Under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus, he objects to traditional philosophical 
arguments for the existence of God, such as the ontological and teleological arguments, and 
claims that God’s existence must remain "an objective uncertainty" for human beings (CUP: 
204).39 He certainly does not intend to discredit theistic belief with these standard objections, but 
rather to keep theists out of a mindless state of complacency in their belief. Climacus insists that 
                                                
38 Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Works, p. 70, note 133.  
39 Kierkegaard believes that without this objective uncertainty, one cannot have the passion that is essential for faith. 
Under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus, he writes, "If I want to keep myself in faith, I must continually see to it 
that I hold fast the objective uncertainty, see to it that in the objective uncertainty I am “out on 70,000 fathoms of 




one “demonstrates the existence of God by worship—not by demonstrations,” indicating the 
importance of faith in the absence of decisive proof of God's existence (CUP: 546). Climacus 
also stresses that God is an idea postulated first and foremost out of the passion of human need, 
and not to fill in the gaps in any explanatory framework. He claims that the individual naturally 
assumes the existence of God when the tension and uncertainty of human life "brings passion to 
despair and assists him in grasping God with “the category of despair” (faith), so that the 
postulate, far from being arbitrary, is in fact necessary defense, self-defense" (CUP: 200). While 
this idea will be more closely examined in later chapters, the claim is that the idea of God 
provides the self with stability, meaning, and purpose in the midst of insecurity caused by the 
difficulties of existence. God cannot, however, be made an object for human knowledge as 
would normally be expected in ontological study, and so his ontology rests on the uncertainty of 
faith.  
Several scholars have considered Kierkegaard to be offering an anthropological 
conception of the self with his work.40 This interpretation is liable to be misleading, and is 
simply mistaken if anthropology is understood as an empirical approach to studying humankind 
based on the attitudes, beliefs, and practices observed in various cultures or communities. While 
he does provide anthropological insights insofar as he studies human nature, Kierkegaard firmly 
rejects any secular or scientific theory that would explain the human being in terms of his or her 
physical, social, or even psychological constitution. Because the human being is a normatively 
governed subject, and norms are abstract principles that are not sensuous in character and do not 
exist as concrete objects in the natural world, he does not believe that the evidence gathered from 
human experience supports a reduction of that experience to empirical elements or processes.41 
Similarly, the anthropologist relies on a conceptual framework that is not actually present in the 
natural world or society to empirically investigate human beings, and so is unable to account for 
this framework empirically. Rather than proposing an origin of human existence that would take 
                                                
40 The Hongs have suggested that Kierkegaard offers an anthropological account of human existence with despair as 
a central feature. See their historical introduction to Sickness Unto Death, p. x. See also Gouwens, Kierkegaard as 
Religious Thinker, Chapter 2. Admittedly Kierkegaard does describe certain areas of his thought as 
“anthropological,” but anthropology was conceived of much differently in his time than in the contemporary age. In 
its current usage, the term does not accurately capture the intention of his study of human existence. 
41 See for example Papirer VII1 A200 (D619), where Kierkegaard argues that a gifted scientist, in his impartial 
theorizing about a phenomenon in the world or about nature in general, will be unable to understand himself as a 
particular individual, since he cannot understand the moral aspect of his life. "Spiritually he does not become 




the individual to be a contingent moment in the life of the human race as a naturalist would, or as 
a trivial event in the cosmic process, he holds that her existence is singular and extraordinary as a 
result of her being self-aware before God.  
Consequently, Kierkegaard is not interested in arriving at impartial insights about 
humanity in general in his authorship, but rather in understanding the plight of the single 
individual who exists before God. While Kierkegaard certainly wrote deeply personal reflections 
to get clear on his own spiritual condition, it would be unfair to say that his motivations were 
entirely selfish, and that he had no concern for the spiritual journey of other individuals.42 
Following Socrates, who was a major inspiration to him, Kierkegaard thought of himself as a 
midwife tasked with reaching out to his reader and assisting him in coming to know himself, 
along with his desperate need for God (POV: 7). One part of his maieutic strategy involved 
adopting the role of a “physician of the soul” under the pseudonym Anti-Climacus (SUD: 23). In 
analyzing despair as a spiritual illness that can beset human beings, Anti-Climacus assumes that 
religious concepts are needed to understand the existence of his reader adequately, and to address 
the more personal concerns about existence that science and philosophy, in their disinterested 
efforts at objectivity, often fail to address. Criticizing the "loftiness of indifferent knowledge," he 
writes: "All Christian knowing, however rigorous its form, ought to be concerned...Concern 
constitutes the relation to life, to the actuality of the personality" (SUD: 5-6). He therefore 
embarks on a therapeutic project with the aim of helping the reader understand himself so that he 
is equipped to care for himself in the right way. Although he is a Christian author, he is also 
situated in the Socratic tradition insofar as he stresses the importance of caring for the soul by 
living a good life and diligently seeking the truth about one's condition. But in contrast to 
Socrates, who thought knowledge of these matters could be attained through reason, Anti-
Climacus believes that one can only achieve self-knowledge by cultivating a relationship with 
God based on faith in divine revelation, and by realizing one's total dependence on Him.  
                                                
42 In The Lonely Labyrinth, Thompson argues that Kierkegaard was a profoundly sick man whose whole authorship 
should be seen a form of self-therapy. Thompson believes it is his own health that Kierkegaard seeks, not the health 
of the reader, and that he does this by experimenting with the different life-views of the pseudonyms in a desperate 
attempt to discover a cure for his sickness. See p. 13 & 208. In his portrayal of Kierkegaard as a morbidly self-
absorbed individual who succeeds in cutting himself off from all human connection, Thompson forgets that 
Kierkegaard identified as a Christian from the very beginning of his authorship, including the period in which he 
was writing the pseudonymous works. This is obvious in his decision to publish religious discourses concurrently 
with each of them. Thompson also disregards the maieutic strategy Kierkegaard claimed to be adopting in using the 





1.2.1 The Dependence of the Self Upon God 
Anti-Climacus describes the self as a “derived, established relation” that can exist only 
“in the relation to the power that established it” (SUD: 13-14). In claiming that the self depends 
on something other for its existence, Anti-Climacus makes a decisive break with the tradition of 
German idealism, which maintains that the self posits itself in its existence of its own powers.43 
On the idealist view, in the final moment of knowledge, one understands that there is nothing 
outside of the self or consciousness—anything that might be thought to be foreign to the self, 
such as a formal law or material object, is in truth, a product of the self's own spontaneous 
activity of thinking. Perhaps the most decisive expression for this basic position was given by 
Fichte, who could pithily summarize it by announcing, "I am thoroughly my own creation."44 For 
Anti-Climacus, however, human experience reveals that the self is not the ground of its activity 
of thinking or living, but that it is grounded in a greater power (or collection of powers) that 
brought it into being and that posits it as a self. On his view, this other sustains the human being 
and enables its activity by providing it with the physical, psychical, and spiritual conditions for 
its existence, which it cannot bring about of its own accord.45 The self therefore has a 
predominantly passive character in being delivered into existence as a thinking, feeling, desiring, 
                                                
43 David Kangas explains that idealists including Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel all held positions that are variants of 
this basic insight. For a brief introduction to their accounts, see Kangas, The Instant, pp. 1-4.  
44 The Vocation of Man, p. 73. It should be noted that, for the German idealists, the self that posits itself is not the 
empirical ego (or individual subject) that Kierkegaard campaigns for in his account of human existence. It is rather 
the transcendental self (or universal subject) that encompasses all empirical egos, and of which they all share in 
common. In this view, in its infinitude, the transcendental self posits finite selves in existence while ultimately 
remaining identical with them. For Kierkegaard, however, the notion of a universal subject, like a unicorn or flying 
pig, is an abstraction with no corresponding reality. As he says under the pseudonym Climacus: “The fantastical I-I 
is not infinitude and finitude in identity, since neither the one nor the other is actual; it is a fantastical union with a 
cloud, an unfruitful embrace, and the relation of the individual I to this mirage is never stated" (CUP: 197). 
Climacus therefore rejects the Hegelian thesis that the universal and particular can be mediated in existence, 
claiming: “Existence is always the particular; the abstract does not exist. To conclude from this that the abstract does 
not have reality is a misunderstanding…” (CUP: 330). As we will see, Kierkegaard is willing to admit the reality of 
the abstract with his notion of infinitude and possibility, but against the idealists, he does not believe that thought, 
which concerns universals, can account for the particular existence of anything actual. 
45 There are important objections to the view that the phenomenology of selfhood reveals that the self is given to 
itself in its existence, and that it is not its own ground. For instance, Neuhouser argues that as a unity, consciousness 
does not seem, from the inside, to have its origin in anything outside itself. See Foundations of Hegel's Social 
Theory, as cited in Kosch, Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, p. 203. While acknowledging 
that such evidence might point to problems for this view, I will follow Anti-Climacus in assuming that the self is 
able to do things like thinking, willing, and imagining, but that from the inside, it cannot seem to support or sustain 
itself in these activities without depending upon a great power for the conditions under which it does them. It 
therefore does not seem that the self originally gives itself its own existence in a self-positing act, even though one is 
able to do things like think for oneself and decide on the kind of person one will be from within one's given 




and embodied human being. In emphasizing the primacy of such givenness to human existence, 
later existential thinkers, such as Heidegger and Sartre, have similarly understood this 
dependency as a basic phenomenological datum for their studies.46 In the first part of this 
section, I explore Kierkegaard's reasons for rejecting the idealist conception of God, which he 
thinks extinguishes the radical differences between God and the human being. Although the self 
for Kierkegaard should understand that it is ultimately passive and impotent in relation to God, in 
this latter part of the section, I explore his idea that it mysteriously grants the human being 
freedom and independence apart from it, including her own capacities of thought and volition.    
The ambiguity of Anti-Climacus's claim that the self exists in relation to a power that 
established it might suggest that he believes this greater power (or collection of powers) could be 
interpreted in many different ways, whether it is in naturalistic or spiritualistic terms. Following 
the strategy of Climacus discussed in the previous section, Anti-Climacus dogmatically takes this 
power to be God, departing from the phenomenological approach that characterizes a large 
portion of his work. The relationship to God is therefore the primary attribute of selfhood under 
his view, and in this respect, he can be said to endorse a religious conception of it. One might 
accept his conclusion that the self does not give itself its existence while remaining skeptical 
about the existence of God, as is the case with Sartre and Heidegger. Those unwilling to accept 
this conclusion in any form might object that it makes no sense to claim that the self can be given 
its existence by a greater power, since any notion of giving requires that there be something 
already there to receive the gift. But this would be impossible under Anti-Climacus' view, since 
the self, as a derived being, cannot exist before being given its existence by an original being, or 
God. Hence, there is something incoherent about the idea that the existence of the self can be 
understood in terms of givenness or passivity as he thinks. 
Although Anti-Climacus does not use this expression specifically and so might avoid this 
difficulty, Kierkegaard adopts it in the discourse "Every Good Gift and Every Perfect Gift is 
                                                
46 Heidegger, for instance, describes this dependency of the human being (whose mode of existence he refers to as 
Dasein) in terms of thrownness. "As being," Heidegger writes, "Dasein is something that has been thrown; it has 
been brought into its "there", but not of its own accord." He goes on to claim that, "in being its Self, Dasein is, as a 
Self, the entity that has been thrown. It has been released from its basis, not through itself but to itself, so as to be as 
this basis." See Being and Time, pp. 329-330. Although he tends to stress the active component of human existence, 
Sartre expresses a similar thought when he writes, "man is condemned to be free: condemned, because he did not 
create himself, yet nonetheless free, because once cast into the world, he is responsible for everything he does." 




From Above." In an evocative description of the spiritual life of the individual that recalls the 
language of the empiricist tradition, but without naturalistic sentiment, he writes:   
 
 …the inner being looks not at the gifts but at the giver. For the inner being, the human distinction  
  between what might be called gift and what language is not inclined to designate as gift vanishes  
  in the essential, in the giver; for the inner being, joy and sorrow, good and bad fortune, distress and  
  victory are gifts; for it, the giver is primary. Then the inner being understands and is convinced that  
  God is a Father in heaven and that this expression is not metaphorical, imperfect, but the truest and  
  most literal expression, because God gives not only the gifts but himself with them in a way beyond  
  the capability of any human being, who can be present in the gift only in a feeling or mood, not  
  essentially, cannot penetrate infinitesimally the total content of the gift, cannot be completely present  
  in the whole gift, even less completely present in the least part of it. (EUD: 99) 
 
For Kierkegaard, human existence is rather unlike a gift in the conventional sense. It is not a gift 
that we receive from outside of ourselves as a pure spirit and go out to collect as the objection 
supposes, but is one that we are present in peripherally as God "releases it from his hand, as it 
were" (SUD: 16). Following the traditional monotheist account of creation, he holds that God 
does not form human beings out of pre-existing matter (ex materia) or out of His being (ex Deo), 
but rather creates them out of nothing (ex nihilo), along with everything else in the natural 
world.47 Although the multitude of individuals in creation are impotent in themselves and have 
no actuality of their own in being created from nothing, God "encompasses" them to preserve 
them in existence and support their activity (WOL: 252).48  
 In this passage, he also offers a subtle criticism of idealism on phenomenological 
grounds. The phenomenology of human life indicates that existence originally greets us in its 
                                                
47 Explaining how God creates individuals apart from Him, Kierkegaard writes, “for individuality is not mine but is 
God’s gift by which he gives me being and gives being to all, gives being to everything. It is simply the 
inexhaustible swell of goodness in the goodness of God that he, the almighty, nevertheless gives in such a way that 
the receiver obtains individuality, that He who created out of nothing nevertheless creates individuality, so that 
creation over against him shall not be nothing, although it is taken from nothing and is nothing and yet becomes 
individuality” (WOL: 253).  
48 Kierkegaard describes the way in which God encompasses the self in the gift of human existence in one of his 
Christian discourses. Remarking on the inability of the self to do anything without God's assistance, he states: “At 
the Communion table you are able to do nothing at all, not even this, that you hold fast the thought of your 
unworthiness and in this make yourself receptive to the blessing…Alas, no, you are capable of nothing, not even of 
holding your soul by yourself at the peak of consciousness that you stand totally in need of grace and the blessing. 
Just as someone else supported Moses when he prayed, so also at the communion table you must be supported by 
the blessing; when you are to receive the blessing, it must encompassingly support you as it is communicated to 




overwhelming givenness. As finite beings, we are not able to comprehend the totality of 
existence within our partial frame of thought, as its greatness inevitably overflows our capacities. 
Although we can certainly think through the content given to us, we do not first constitute or 
rationally determine this content in pure thought, as idealists like Hegel have held with their self-
positing thesis. Neither do we arrive at experience with transcendental capacities of our own, as 
Kant had argued in his defense of a priori knowledge. Instead, we are originally receptive to our 
concrete existence as individuals in a feeling or mood, and only from the periphery of that 
starting point can we engage in abstract thinking and reflection upon existence.49 To conceive of 
the self as distinct from this gift or originating outside of this feeling or mood would be to 
understand it altogether abstractly, and apart from its concrete existence as a living human being. 
For Kierkegaard, we are essentially living human beings in our particularity under the living 
God. This is not a naturalistic form of empiricism that begins with items of perception in the vein 
of Hume, but is rather a spiritualistic form that takes God as its point of departure, who remains 
undisclosed to us. 
 For this reason, Climacus charges German idealists with error when, for the sake of 
constructing a totalizing theory of existence, they turn their own existence as individuals into an 
object of disinterested speculation and assume they are treating it adequately. By taking up a 
"view from nowhere" as impartial subjects who survey their own lives with an objective or 
"scientific" attitude, they proceed as if they occupied a timeless standpoint at a remove from their 
concrete existence.50 From this God's-eye perspective, their own personal existence becomes one 
piece of content for thought among others, and has no greater significance than that. Of course, 
                                                
49 Heidegger follows Kierkegaard in agreeing that as individuals, we always find ourselves in a general feeling or 
mood at any given moment in our existence, whether it is fatigue, elation, or the like. He develops this idea in 
sections 29-31 of Being and Time with his notion of "attunement" (Befindlichkeit), which is the basic state-of-mind 
in which the human being (more precisely, Dasein) finds itself "thrown" into its existence. It should be noted that 
Kierkegaard's notion of human existence as gift resembles Heideggerian thrownness, since the human being is 
present in the gift in such a way that he does not choose it as God releases it from his hand. Of course, describing 
human existence as a gift is not as bleak as describing it in terms of thrownness.  
50 The "view from nowhere" is a phrase coined by Thomas Nagel in his description of the point of view that 
scientific inquiry aims to achieve in its striving toward objectivity. Describing this process, Thomas Nagel writes of 
‘a polarity. At one end is the point of view of a particular individual, having a specific constitution, situation and 
relation to the rest of the world. From here the direction of movement towards greater objectivity involves, first, 
abstraction from the individual’s specific spatial, temporal and personal position in the world, then from the features 
that distinguish him from other humans, then gradually from the forms of perception and action characteristic of 
humans, and away from the narrow range of a human scale in space, time, and quantity, towards a conception of the 
world which, as far as possible, is not the view from anywhere within it. There is probably no end-point to this 
process, but its aim is to regard the world as centreless, with the viewer as just one of its contents." See "Subjective 




this tendency occurs in other disciplines as well: "The way of objective reflection now leads to 
abstract thinking, to mathematics, to historical knowledge of various kinds, and always leads 
away from the subjective individual, whose existence or nonexistence becomes, from an 
objective point of view, altogether properly, infinitely indifferent" (CUP: 193). But for Climacus, 
this strategy is fantastic when taken to extremes as it is in totalizing thinkers like Hegel, since in 
his impartial theorizing, the particular thinker remains an existing subject in his living 
concretion. His abstract thinking must therefore proceed from "somewhere" and in time, and he 
cannot become entirely indifferent to himself in the way that objective thinking aims at making 
one become in the final moment.  
 Climacus is certainly not arguing that objective thought is impossible or illegitimate, but 
rather that one cannot escape from one's situation as an individual subject to become entirely 
objective and impersonal in one's thinking, regardless of how universally valid one believes one's 
thinking to be. In defense of this claim, he states that when it becomes fantastic, the way of 
objective reflection "will lead to the contradiction that only objectivity has come about, whereas 
subjectivity has gone out, that is, the existing subjectivity that has made an attempt to become 
what in the abstract sense is called subjectivity, the abstract form of an abstract objectivity” 
(CUP: 194). Insofar as this human being has not vanished from existence entirely in his 
abstractions, he has not achieved the purely objective standpoint that he thinks he has, and so can 
only approximate to objective knowledge. From his finite situation in existence, he has no 
guarantee that his knowledge is infallible and complete. Hence, such thinking always begins 
from within one's concrete existence as an individual, rather than from a timeless, godlike 
standpoint outside of it.  
If God gives himself in allowing the self to exist as a concrete individual in the way that 
the foregoing passage states, then it seems difficult to see how a distinction between the self and 
God might be drawn in existence. This problem arises elsewhere in Kierkegaard's authorship. 
Adhering to Scripture, Kierkegaard affirms, “God is spirit,” which might initially seem 
incompatible with Anti-Climacus' claim that a human being is spirit (JP II: 1943).51 Climacus 
also defines spirit as subjectivity, and refers to both God and human beings as subjects (CUP: 33, 
200). Climacus and Anti-Climacus certainly do not intend to intrude on the otherness of God by 
suggesting any kind of identity relation between them, however. Although human beings depend 
                                                




on God for their existence, Anti-Climacus contends that Christianity maintains there is an 
“infinite qualitative difference” between God and man (SUD: 126). He laments that, following 
the lead of monists or idealists like Spinoza and Hegel, thinkers in his day had “pantheistically 
abolished” this difference in an effort to conceive of God as essentially continuous with human 
beings, society, and the natural order (SUD: 117).52 He writes: 
 
No teaching on earth has ever really brought God and man so close together as Christianity…But neither 
has any teaching ever protected itself so painstakingly against the most dreadful of all blasphemies, that 
after God has taken this step it should be taken in vain, as if it all merges into one—God and man... 
(SUD: 117) 
 
Rejecting that speculative reasoning could succeed in rendering God immanent to human 
existence on religious grounds, Anti-Climacus stresses the radical separation of God from human 
beings and the external world. As a proponent of Christian revelation, he believes that God's 
transcendence cannot be located within a system of existence as Hegel or Spinoza held, and that 
to understand God's nature through logic or theory would be to undermine revelation by making 
Him rationally intelligible in all of his workings. Under this view, as the absolute and infinite 
being, the being of God cannot be contained within the scope of human thought, since this 
thought must proceed from within the limitations of finite human existence rather than from an 
unlimited, God's-eye standpoint on the universe. On this point, Climacus claims that we can 
indeed obtain a conception of God through revelation, and postulate his actual existence out of 
need (CUP: 483-484). We do not, however, have immediate knowledge of God's existence as 
some monists have traditionally held. Although his transcendence can be alluded to, it cannot be 
systematized or adequately conceptualized.53 For Climacus, the immanentist notion that the 
                                                
52 The purported unity of man and God within a single, rational system of existence is suggested throughout Hegel’s 
work, although he is sometimes more clear on this than at other times. For instance, he claims, “God is God only so 
far as he knows himself; his self-knowledge is, further, a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of God, 
which proceeds to man's self-knowledge in God." See Hegel's Philosophy of Mind, para. 564, p. 298.   
53 This gesture towards God's radical transcendence was made by negative (or apophatic) theologians such as 
Meister Eckhart, Dionysius the Areopagite, and Clement of Alexandria. These mystical thinkers attempted to arrive 
at knowledge of God by way of negation, or by expressing what God is not. In other words, any positive (or 
kataphatic) concept that might initially be deemed applicable to God, such as greatness or goodness, must be 
rejected as inadequate when one comes to know God in truth, because God as he exists in Himself surpasses all of 
our conceptions of Him. In Kierkegaard as Negative Theologian, David Law draws some interesting parallels 
between Kierkegaard and these figures by pointing out apophatic motifs in Kierkegaard's thought. Nevertheless, it is 
crucial that the kataphatic elements of Kierkegaard's thought not be overlooked, and this is why one must disagree 




infinite reality of God's activity could become comprehensible to human beings as a system is 
absurd in its pretensions, since we can never attain this standpoint of omniscience in the manner 
of an infinite being that thinks sub specie aeternitatis.54 To believe this synoptic vision is feasible 
for one to attain is to confuse oneself with God. 
 Nevertheless, God’s radical transcendence and otherness would appear to present a 
difficulty for any attempt to define both God and the human being as spirit, while conceiving of 
the human being as a gift of Himself. To begin to see how Kierkegaard attempts to resolve this, 
we must first distinguish between two qualitatively distinct types of spirit. In an important 
journal entry, Kierkegaard describes the nature of God as the “unconditioned,” as “being-in-and-
for-itself,” and as “pure subjectivity” who has “nothing of objective being in himself” (JP II: 
1449).55 As being-in-and-itself, God exists essentially and depends on no other for his existence, 
and as being-for-itself, he has the freedom, power, and knowledge to impose His will in 
existence in whichever way He sees fit. To say that God has no objective being in Himself means 
that as absolute subject, God expels or absolves Himself from all of that existence which is finite, 
mutable, worldly, or natural.56 As absolute subject, God also has a synoptic vision of existence as 
a whole. None of these qualifications apply to the existence of the human being. Since the human 
being is a derived subject whose existence is given to him, he has his being in another—that is, 
                                                                                                                                                       
he is more apophatic than the negative theologians" (p. 207). For Kierkegaard, the nature of God Himself is not 
infinite negativity but love, and a positive expression of His will is indeed given in Scripture, as explained in 
writings like Works of Love. Yet this cannot be known, but must be taken on faith. The negative theologians 
generally try to abolish the infinite qualitative difference between themselves and God through a mystical union 
obtained through esoteric insight into God's hidden and secret nature. This would be a way to attempt to maneuver 
one's way into God's transcendence through knowledge (even if it is knowledge of the unknown), where all speech 
fails. Yet for Kierkegaard, because a radical break or separation between man and God has commenced through sin, 
this union cannot be attained. This attempt at mystical union with God presupposes nothing other than pantheism, 
which means that at the state of purported union, the mystic simply confuses the self with God.  
54 Climacus does not reject the idea that existence is a system, but simply thinks it is impossible for an existing 
human being to step outside their immediate position in the world to understand the whole of existence that way. “A 
system of existence cannot be given. Is there, then, not such a system? That is not at all the case…Existence itself is 
a system—for God, but it cannot be a system for any existing spirit” (CUP: 118). 
55 Already from this passage, one can see how Kierkegaard's monotheistic conception of God differs from Hegel's 
pantheistic conception. For Hegel, the being of God as Spirit is expressed positively in the natural world and in 
human society, including the events of history. The objective history of the universe and of humankind is not 
separate from God, but is an integral part of His very being as rational and self-positing activity. For Hegel, the 
infinite reality of God contains the finite reality of natural existence in itself as a subsumed element, which is 
repeatedly posited and then negated by Spirit in its process of coming to know itself in actuality. Kierkegaard, 
however, believes this attempt to mediate transcendence and immanence through speculative reasoning is a form of 
pantheism, and that in its idealizing, it is incapable of dealing with the concrete existence of human beings, as Marx 
also argued with his materialist conception of human existence (for different reasons).  
56 Herein lies the difficulty and seeming impossibility of the incarnation of God in Christ, which Climacus describes 
as an "absolute paradox" for the understanding (CUP: 217). This is in contrast to Hegel, who thought that the infinite 




God, and not in himself. In his earthly environment, where he comes up against limits as an 
embodied creature among other creatures, the human being is constituted by objective elements 
that exist at a remove from their divine origin in being created ex nihilo. As the sacred ground of 
all being that establishes the finite conditions under which human beings live and think, God is 
not subject to such constraining factors. But since God endows individuals with subjectivity in 
giving Himself, they harbor a trace of the divine nature within them, with the possibility of 
arriving at an idea of God. Kierkegaard refers to this divine trace as the "image of invisibility" 
that God implants in human beings when, according to Genesis, he creates them in His own 
image (UDVS: 192).57 When compounded with objective elements of existence, which includes 
psyche and body, this trace makes man a conditional spirit (or what one might call "impure 
subjectivity"), but it does not and cannot make him unconditionally spirit. Only God is spirit in 
this pure sense. 
 As an alternative to pantheism, Kierkegaard provides a Christian account of creation that 
helps illustrate how God can create a human being as spirit while preserving an infinite 
qualitative difference between them. Because God wants to let human beings stand and act on 
their own, and to think for themselves about how they will live, in bestowing the gift of selfhood, 
Kierkegaard contends that he freely chooses to constrain the expression of his own omnipotence 
in existence. This self-imposed limitation allots a space for us to grow as individuals and be “the 
most fragile of all things—a being independent of that very omnipotence” (JP II: 1251). In 
establishing room for a human being to become himself or herself in freedom apart from Him, 
Kierkegaard explains that divine omnipotence  
 
 …must contain the unique qualification of being able to withdraw itself again in a manifestation  
  of omnipotence in such a way that precisely for this reason that which has been originated through   
  omnipotence can be independent…Only omnipotence can withdraw itself at the same time it gives  
  itself away, and this relationship is the very independence of the receiver. God’s omnipotence is  
  therefore his goodness. For goodness means to give oneself away completely, but in such a way that  
  by omnipotently taking oneself back one makes the recipient independent. (JP II: 1251)  
                                                
57 See Genesis 1:27. Genesis does not suggest that this divine image relates to human subjectivity, however. This is 
an interpretation that follows from Kierkegaard's conception of God as absolute subject. He explains how God, as 
subject, reproduces himself in human beings (but not other living things) by endowing them with subjectivity: “God 
is spirit, is invisible, and the image of invisibility, of course, is in turn invisibility. Thus the invisible Creator 
reproduces himself in the invisibility, which is the qualification of spirit, and the image of God is explicitly the 





By giving the individual her existence while refusing to be directly or immediately present to 
her, God establishes the conditions necessary for her to be independent in her very dependence 
upon Him.58 Along with granting her freedom of thought and will, this withdrawal establishes a 
radical separation between the human being and God that allows him to maintain His 
transcendence from the natural world, rather than remain immanent within it as pantheists claim. 
In a paradoxical fashion, God can therefore be considered to be present in the life of the 
individual in His absence.  
 Consequently, in Kierkegaard's mystical ontology, God does not reside within creation as 
a totalitarian power that dictates every action or event in human existence, whether this is 
construed in terms of forces of necessity as rationalists often do, or in terms of an inscrutable, 
predestining power as religious believers (including many Christians) often do.59 Instead of 
selfishly treating individuals as pawns or playthings, God renounces autocratic rule by 
absconding from creation in order to produce separate individuals who live in the world, while 
also existing in an indirect relation to Him as free persons acting on their own accord.60 Climacus 
confirms this when he says that "no one is as resigned as God, because he communicates 
creatively in such a way that in creating he gives independence vis-a-vis himself. The most 
resigned a human being can be is to acknowledge the given independence in every human being 
and to the best of one’s ability do everything in order truly to help someone retain it” (CUP: 
260). In granting the human being the ability to think and will on its own as a self, the individual 
is "for-itself" as a being that relates itself to itself, but it cannot be conceived as existing "in-
                                                
58 As Climacus puts it: “No anonymous author can more slyly hide himself, and no maieutic can more carefully 
recede from a direct relation than God can. He is in the creation, everywhere in the creation, but he is not there 
directly, and only when the single individual turns inward into himself (consequently only in the inwardness of self-
activity) does he become aware and capable of seeing God" (CUP: 243-244).  
59 As Malantschuck points out, "Kierkegaard quickly perceived that the doctrine of predestination in its strictest 
form does justice neither to man nor to Christianity’s conception of God. Since God, according to the doctrine of 
predestination, determines everything, “the origin of evil" [JP II: 1302] must also be traced back to God, and as for 
human beings, by denying the possibility of “human freedom" [JP II: 1231] this doctrine renders it impossible for a 
person to be responsible before God. According to Kierkegaard, “the concept: predestination” “must be regarded as 
a thoroughgoing abortion" (JP II: 1230). See Malantschuck, Kierkegaard's Concept of Existence, p. 12.  
60 In posing his own alternative to pantheistic and theosophical accounts of the creation of the human being, G. K. 
Chesterton offers an account that closely resembles Kierkegaard's. Chesterton explains that the pantheist deity "is 
like a giant who should have lost his leg or hand and be always seeking to find it; but the Christian power is like 
some giant who in a strange generosity should cut off his right hand, so that it might of its own accord shake hands 
with him. We come back to the same tireless note touching the nature of Christianity; all modern philosophies are 
chains which connect and fetter; Christianity is a sword which separates and sets free. No other philosophy makes 




itself" in the way that God does, since in being created ex nihilo, any existence it has is derived 
from Him (SUD: 14).  
 Kierkegaard admits that this act of creation is "incomprehensible" in its finer details (JP 
II: 1251). Although he does not elaborate on why this is the case, there are obvious difficulties in 
understanding how the human being might be capable of its own activity of thought or volition 
while being utterly passive in its dependence on God. First, because God creates human beings 
without them having any choice in the matter, and in such a way that they are not free to not be 
free, there must at least be some kind of determinism at work in his account. This does not mean 
that all the actions of the person are causally determined by prior events or powers external to 
him that are governed by necessary principles. Depending on how one defines freedom, it might, 
however, challenge the idea that a human being truly has freedom after all. Second, the type of 
agent causality typically desired in a libertarian account of individual freedom requires the agent 
to be an uncaused cause of at least some of her actions, so that they are not causally determined 
in the above sense. However, it is difficult to make sense of Kierkegaard's position under the 
libertarian conception of human freedom. In the event that an act of God causes the human being 
to exist as he claims, the human being does not exist as an uncaused cause of her existence. If 
she is not an uncaused cause of her existence, then it would seem that she cannot be an uncaused 
cause of any of her actions, since she acts in existence. If it were somehow possible for God to 
create her this way, He would be causing the human being to exist as an uncaused cause, which 
sounds paradoxical. At this point, Kierkegaard would have recourse to the notion of divine 
withdrawal, but he would have to claim that the mechanism of this form of causation is simply 
inconceivable to human thought, which he indeed affirms in the above passage.   
 Alternatively, he might consider taking a compatibilist approach to human freedom and 
claim that she can be the cause of her actions, even though these are causally determined and she 
does not exist as an uncaused cause. But if he did this, then it would then be possible to trace 
these actions to an original and external cause, which in his view, would be God. If the passivity 
of the human being means that all her acts are ultimately caused by God, this would not only 
create complications in making sense of human responsibility or the choice to do evil; it would 
also fail to preserve the infinite qualitative difference that exists between them by locating both 
within a single causal system that is immanent in existence and conceivable through abstract 




systematic relation between them through causal lines, Kierkegaard would likely adopt the 
libertarian conception of human freedom. In doing so, he would admit it is inconceivable how 
God, in withdrawing from creation, could create us in such a way that we are the original cause 
of our actions as individuals, while nevertheless drawing our activity and potency from Him. 
This is less worrisome for those who accept that we are limited in our capacity to think this 
problem in being derived spirits constituted by the physical and psychical.  
 
 1.2.2 The Tripartite View of the Self as a Religious Conception 
 Anti-Climacus’ conception of the human being as a composite of psyche, body, and spirit 
(pneuma) has roots in Christian theology, which proceeds from the teachings of divine 
revelation. In his journals, Kierkegaard admits that this division is not an original discovery, and 
that he borrows from an “ancient idea” in making it (JP I: 52). Many scholars who have done 
exegesis of this passage seem to have missed that the ancient idea in question is a Christian view 
of man as tripartite. This overlooked view is supported by several verses of scripture and has 
storied history in the Christian tradition.61 Although it was endorsed by many of the earliest 
church fathers, including Irenaeus, Origen, and Clement of Alexandria, it ended up being 
suppressed in most theological circles due to the tremendous influence of the Greek schools of 
philosophy, which generally followed Plato’s dichotomous view of man as a composite of soul 
and body.62 Following the dichotomous view of the Greeks, interpreters of scripture commonly 
regarded psyche and pneuma as synonymous terms for spirit, rather than as separate aspects of 
the human being. Anti-Climacus appears to reject the Greek’s philosophical conception of man 
in favor of a theological conception that carefully distinguishes the two. St. Paul provides the 
clearest scriptural support for this distinction, writing, “…the word of God is living 
and active, sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing to the division of soul and of spirit, of 
joints and of marrow, and discerning the thoughts and intentions of the heart.”63 Drawing on the 
Pauline conception, Anti-Climacus uses psyche to designate our primitive mental faculties, 
                                                
61 See J. B. Heard, The Tripartite Nature of Man. One verse that has been offered as evidence of this tripartite 
distinction is 1 Thessalonians 5:23. “ And the very God of peace sanctify you wholly; and I pray God your whole 
spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ” (KJV). This 
interpretation is also suggested by the Old Testament in Genesis 2:7. “And the LORD God formed man of the dust 
of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath [pneuma] of life; and man became a living soul [psyche]” 
(KJV). 
62 Heard, The Tripartite Nature of Man, pp. 4-5, 65-66.  




drives, and desires, including the kinds of sensible and perceptual capacities that we share with 
other animals, while reserving pneuma for the spiritual aspect of the human being, which he 
takes to be the self with its reflective, imaginative, and volitional capacities.64  
 By endorsing a trichotomous view of man, Anti-Climacus rejects a substance ontology 
that would divide man into two different kinds of substance that possess intrinsic being. 
Descartes famously made this move by adopting Plato’s dichotomous view in his Meditations, 
where he argued that the human being is a union of soul and body. For Descartes, the soul is an 
immaterial substance through which we think, while the body is a material substance that 
interacts with the soul and allows it access to the physical world. Under this dichotomous view, 
there is no real distinction between psyche and pneuma, since both describe the same activity of 
the mind or soul. Descartes’ position has been supposed to lend support for religious orthodoxy, 
even though he arrives at his conclusions about the nature of God and the soul through 
philosophical arguments that he supposes to be valid independently of revelation. 
 Anti-Climacus agrees with Descartes that a human being is a composite of soul (psyche) 
and body, and that these are distinct kinds of things that spring from the creative activity of God. 
However, he redefines Descartes' notion of the soul so that it would include our sensible or 
perceptual faculties, but not the higher capacities of thought or will. For Anti-Climacus, the 
psyche is a part of our constitution as natural creatures and an immanent aspect of life in the 
world, but it cannot account for the ability we have to step back from the natural world and our 
immediate drives, impulses, or desires and decide for ourselves how we want to act. This 
"reflective distance" also allows us to think critically about ourselves and our behavior, to use 
language and understand signification, to grasp abstract ideas and meanings, to imagine new 
possibilities, to make choices that we can claim as our own, and so on.65 In other words, as spirit, 
we are able to transcend our immediate environment in ways that non-human animals cannot, 
while nevertheless remaining within our concrete station in existence. However, it would be a 
mistake to ascribe no mental life at all to animals as the Cartesian view does, since they exhibit 
basic signs of intelligence, along with a sensory responsiveness to their surroundings that 
includes the ability to feel pleasures and pains. Although the dichotomous view of the human 
being acknowledges human transcendence, the tripartite conception has the advantage of 
                                                
64 I provide in-depth discussion of the difference between soul and spirit in the next section. 





accounting for immediate and spontaneous mental activity that occurs naturally without 
involving spiritual acts of transcendence. This would make sense of the notion that there is 
something special about human beings that makes them different from other animals, while 
granting that there are psychological and physiological dimensions to animal life that are also 
found in human beings.   
 Although Anti-Climacus uses reason along with phenomenological reflection to describe 
the configuration of the relation between psyche, body, and spirit, he does not originally obtain 
his tripartite conception of spirit through philosophical argumentation. Like Pascal, he takes his 
God to be the revealed God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and “not of the philosophers and 
savants.”66 Therefore, he believes his conception of God and the self to be received from a 
source outside of the self, rather than formulated by human reason through its own powers. For 
Anti-Climacus, and in Kierkegaard's thought in general, human beings therefore assume a 
passive role in obtaining the revelation of God’s word empirically through its transmission 
within the community. But because the human being is not wholly passive in being allotted a 
sphere of autonomy by the withdrawing God, he must think for himself about whether God's 
revelation is worth taking up and endorsing as a free agent, and risk being offended by its 
conflict with the understanding.67 While we might inquire into the meaning of revelation and 
seek to understand it through reason, the veracity of this historical doctrine cannot be verified a 
priori or through any kind of logic or argumentation. While Kierkegaard does seem to embellish 
the biblical notion of man with his own speculations, the attributes of the self that he discusses 
are consistent with those described in Scripture. They therefore suggest a religious conception of 
the self that locates it in relation to the eternal in existence.   
 
1.3 The Eternal and Temporal Constituents of the Self 
 In the passage introduced at the beginning of the chapter, the self was defined as a bipolar 
relation constituted by the eternal and temporal, the infinite and finite, psyche and body, and 
                                                
66 Pascal, Pensées, p. 285. 
67 In a work following Sickness Unto Death, Anti-Climacus develops in painstaking detail the notion that the 
genuine Christian must pass through the possibility of being offended by Christian revelation on the path toward 
faith. He insists that whether one will believe that a particular human being (Christ) is God or be offended by his 
claim to be God is a decision made in freedom. “Faith is a choice, certainly not direct reception—and the recipient is 




freedom (later: possibility) and necessity, which relates itself to itself (SUD: 13).68 In defining 
the self as self-relating in its dependence on God, Anti-Climacus conceives of the self as a 
productive activity rather than as a substance in which feelings or thoughts inhere as accidents, 
like many in the philosophical tradition had previously done.69 As Barnett puts it, “It is 
something one does.”70 Although its existence is given to it as constituted, the self, or spirit, is 
tasked with synthesizing opposing elements so that they compose a unified whole. With the 
exception of the relation between psyche and body, each pair of these elements does not 
constitute its own relation such that there are three separate relations at stake; rather, they all 
belong to a single bipolar relation of which the eternal and the temporal are the foundational 
elements. The eternal aspect of the self corresponds with infinitude and possibility at one pole of 
the relation, while the temporal aspect corresponds with finitude, necessity, and the psyche-body 
relation at the other. Although eternity and temporality are ontologically distinct and strictly 
separate from one another, they are held together and mutually engaged in a dynamic interplay as 
they relate to each other in the self. This means that the self, as a paradoxical unity of 
contradictory elements, is a fundamentally divided self, split in two while remaining essentially 
one. We will see in the following chapters that this division is liable to contribute to great 
                                                
68 Although he originally defines the self as a synthesis of freedom and necessity, in a later explanation of the 
constituents of the synthesis, Anti-Climacus appears to change or even correct his position by referring to this as a 
synthesis of possibility and necessity (SUD: 35-42). If this synthesis is in fact of freedom and necessity, then Anti-
Climacus account of the self, or spirit, leads to intractable problems. For instance, later in the work, he claims: "The 
self is freedom" (SUD: 29). As Taylor points out in his analysis of Kierkegaard’s concept of the self, it would seem 
impossible for freedom to be both the synthesizing third as well as a synthesized element, especially given the claim 
in another pseudonym that two contradictory principles can be synthesized only through a third element (CA: 43). 
Taylor notes: "By the identification of spirit with one of the elements to be synthesized, the third necessary for the 
synthesis seems to have disappeared." See Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 89. He works around this 
difficulty by understanding freedom to be the synthesizing factor, rather than a synthesized element. I believe that he 
is justified in this assumption, since Anti-Climacus consistently refers to the self as a synthesis of possibility and 
necessity later in the work. To avoid confusion, I have followed Taylor’s recommendation in my own analysis of the 
self as a synthesis. In the next section, I explain that freedom should be conceived as the self-relational activity that 
manages the components of the self, rather than a managed component.  
69 Taylor explains that prior to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, philosophers commonly accepted a 
substantialist view of selfhood in attempting to explain how the self can experience changing states over time while 
remaining the same. However, later thinkers like Spinoza, Locke, Hume, and Hegel came to challenge this position. 
Taylor convincingly argues that, following Hegel, Kierkegaard rejects the notion of the self as a substance in which 
accidents inhere in favor of a dialectical conception of the self as a "dynamic process by which possibilities are 
actualized." See Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 115. In making this move, Kierkegaard wishes to 
avoid concluding that the self is originally unchangeable and what it is essentially, and instead put forward the idea 
that it has the existential task of becoming unchangeable and actualizing its essence in existence through a single-
minded pursuit of goodness (UDVS: 29-30). In the later Christian portion of his authorship, it becomes clear that he 
believes the possibility of attaining the highest good can only be actualized through the relationship with God. For 
Taylor's argument, see pp. 96-116.   




dialectical tension and instability in the life of the human being, and so is a main factor in 
leading up to despair. 
 In section 1.4.3, I will explain the capacity of the self to shape itself through self-
relational activity involving these two conflicting poles of existence. But before examining what 
it means to be self-relating, in this section, I will explain how the self is originally given to itself 
as constituted by the elements of these poles, and how they are united in human consciousness. 
Unfortunately Anti-Climacus discusses these ontological constituents in minimal detail, so the 
task of this section will be to provide a fuller account of their characteristics by drawing on other 
material from Kierkegaard’s corpus, which can be shown to consistent with his position. 
 
1.3.1 The Eternal and The Temporal  
 Unfortunately, despite its tremendous significance for human life, the eternal is one of the 
most obscure concepts in Kierkegaard's authorship.71 Nevertheless, it is not a term that is entirely 
without sense. The eternal is the divine and otherworldly aspect of the self, and is that which 
makes the human being spirit. It is in no way to be understood solely as a feature of human 
beings, however. According to Climacus, its purest expression is in the being of God, who is the 
eternal simpliciter (CUP: 217). To disambiguate these two senses of the eternal, I will distinguish 
between "the eternal" within the self, or the image of God in us, and "the Eternal" in its original 
form, or God. Kierkegaard believes that the Eternal is that which essentially is, and so is the 
ground of all being (WOL: 261).72 Supposing that the Eternal, or God, does in fact exist and is 
not only an idea, which Kierkegaard does not think can finally be proved, it would exist by its 
very essence, and so it would be impossible for it not to be. Kierkegaard also describes it as 
"changeless" in contrast to objects or states of affairs in the world (CUD: 52). Because these are 
                                                
71 In her discussion of the concept of the eternal in Kierkegaard's writings, Hemati, for instance, agrees: "Although 
Kierkegaard does not offer a clear and unambiguous explanation of the concept and its significance, the notion of 
eternity is undoubtedly an essential element of his philosophy." The Concept of Eternity in Kierkegaard's 
Philosophical Anthropology, p. 1. Taylor also notes that "Kierkegaard uses the word "eternal" in a bewildering 
variety of ways," and that ascribing eternity to both man and God is a lingering source of confusion in his writings. 
See Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 91. 
72 It is debatable whether Kierkegaard believes the eternal is a substance. Clearly it shares some of those features 
typically associated with a substance, such as changelessness and permanence, and as self-sufficient, its existence in 
no way depends on the existence of anything else. Kierkegaard does not refer to the eternal as a substance in any of 
his works, however. This might be because he emphasizes its active and creative qualities, which end up being lost 
when using the term. He also does not intend to speak of God or the self as containing accidents, properties, or 
attributes in the manner of material substances, which are generally regarded as paradigmatic instances of them. 
Other Kierkegaard scholars have been more comfortable making this interpretative move. See for instance Hemati, 




liable to change over time, and it is possible for them not to be, it is not in their essence to exist 
like it is for God, who in his divine immutability is eternally the same. For this reason, Climacus 
can describe God as the One who "himself is outside existence and yet in existence, who in his 
eternity is forever concluded and yet includes existence within himself" (CUP: 119). The air of 
paradox in this statement makes interpretation difficult, but in it, Climacus is distinguishing the 
eternal existence of God from the temporal existence of creation. The idea is that God, as a 
supremely perfect being who is fully eternal, exists apart from any entity or process of becoming 
in the world, and so remains unaffected by any change or condition that occurs in existence in 
time. In his omnipotent and omniscient oversight of existence, He can be said to include 
existence within Himself, while withdrawing or detaching from it in order to give the 
multiplicity of created beings independence in relation to Him.  
 In section 1.1, I explained that God is absolutely and qualitatively different from that of 
human beings, who have only a trace of the eternal within them in being created by God as 
spiritual beings, or subjects. While we are certainly affected by change as we experience the 
world as thinking, acting, and embodied beings in time, Anti-Climacus believes that, in 
possessing something eternal in us as selves in virtue of our relation to God, there is nevertheless 
a part of our identity that remains the same throughout every change (SUD: 21). In contrast to 
visible or sensible phenomena in the world, Kierkegaard calls this changeless aspect of the 
human being its "invisible glory," as it signifies a likeness to God and kinship with him (UDVS: 
193).73 The changelessness and rest of the eternal should not be confused with inactivity or 
indolence, however, whether it is with respect to its presence in God or the human being.74 
Kierkegaard believes that, in constantly putting His creative powers to work in existence, "God 
is pure act" (JP II: 2008). While the effects of God's continuous activity leads to manifold 
changes among objects and states of affairs in the world, His activity itself, as an expression of 
                                                
73 Because of the infinite qualitative difference between God and the human being, Kierkegaard has a paradoxical 
notion of what it means to bear likeness to God in truth. He claims that the glory for the human being is to humble 
himself before God in worship, rather than to exalt oneself. “To worship is not to rule, and yet worship is what 
makes the human being resemble God…The pagan was not aware of God and therefore sought likeness in the 
ruling. But the resemblance is not like that…The human being and God do not resemble each other directly but 
inversely, only when God has infinitely become the eternal and omnipresent object of worship and the human being 
always a worshipper, only then do they resemble each other” (UDVS: 193). 
74 As Kierkegaard puts it: "Wherever the eternal is, there is rest; but there is unrest where the eternal is not present. 
There is unrest in the world, but above all there is unrest in a person’s soul when the eternal is not present in it and 
he is only “full of unrest” (UDVS 258). Kierkegaard uses the term "soul" in this discourse, but he is referring to 




his immutable will, does not change, and He is in no way affected by external influences in the 
way that human beings are. For this reason, Climacus cites approvingly Aristotle's 
characterization of God as the unmoved mover of existence (PF: 24). Similarly, with respect to 
the eternal in the human being, Anti-Climacus states: "In the life of the spirit there is no standing 
still (really no state, either; everything is actuation)" (SUD: 94). This will be expanded upon in 
the course of this project, but the basic idea is that the human being lives more spiritually as his 
own reflective, imaginative, and volitional activity increases, and he lives less spiritually when 
his actions are dictated by outside forces that he is passive towards, such as sensual desires that 
the world provokes, or the influence of other people. The continuity of our activity as selves is 
therefore frequently disrupted by external factors that emerge in time, which cannot happen to 
God, since He is non-temporal. 
 Kierkegaard also associates the Eternal with plenitude and possibility. Under the 
pseudonym of Vigilius Haufniensis, Kierkegaard identifies the Eternal with presence, stating, 
"The present is the eternal, or rather, the eternal is the present, and the present is full" (CA: 86). 
Haufniensis also claims that the Eternal should not be understood abstractly, as the idealists of 
his age had been accustomed to do, but "concretely" (CA: 151). This concrete presence of the 
Eternal in existence must not be understood as being equivalent to the present moment of time in 
human life, however. Because the human being has a past and future in being constituted by the 
temporal, he cannot appreciate the constant presence of the Eternal outside of time in its richness 
and fullness. Commentators have tended to avoid interpreting this passage, probably due to its 
opacity. I believe, however, that this sacred fullness ought to be understood as a plenitude of 
being, much like the Parmenidean conception of being. In a passage that describes the being of 
God as both absolute subject who oversees all of existence and as the fullness of being, 
Kierkegaard writes:75 
 
In a truer sense than the most watchful human justice is said to be everywhere, he, never seen by any 
mortal being, is omnipresent, everywhere present, at the least and at the greatest, at what can only 
                                                
75 Earlier in this chapter, I explained how Kierkegaard, in a journal entry, defined God as "pure subjectivity" or "the 
unconditioned" who has "nothing of objective being in himself" (JP II: 1449). Yet this conception of God as 
absolute subject does not seem compatible with Kierkegaard's conception of the eternal as the fullness of being, 
since it is a contradiction that an unconditional subject with no objective or finite being in itself nevertheless 
contains all of being within itself. Kierkegaard would likely respond to this paradox by admitting that the nature of 
God simply cannot be grasped clearly and distinctly by human thought, although we can get a sense of what sorts of 




figuratively be called an event and at what is the unique event, when a sparrow dies and when the Savior of 
the human race is born. At every moment he holds all actuality as possibility in his omnipotent hand, at 
every moment has everything in readiness, changes everything in an instant, the opinions of people, 
judgments, human loftiness and lowliness; he changes everything––himself unchanged. (MLW: 271)  
 
Departing from Parmenides, who could make no sense of something coming into being ex nihilo 
due to his inability to conceive of nothing, Kierkegaard believes that possibilities of all kinds 
come into being from nothing through God's omnipotent activity, and that this nothing can be 
thought about. He thereby joins Aristotle in admitting change into existence based on the 
actualization of possibilities. As Kierkegaard puts it, in constructing the world and its objects 
from the infinite possibilities He has at his disposal, God "put on the visible world as a garment; 
he changes it as one changes a garment––himself unchanged" (MLW: 271). Although we cannot 
perceive the invisible God directly in experience, we can recognize his work by looking towards 
visible or material things through which he might be said to "clothe" or conceal himself. 
Similarly, we cannot perceive the eternal element in ourselves directly, but we can discern its 
continual presence on the basis of our life in the world, through which we can recognize 
ourselves to be the same self despite undergoing various changes in time.  
 In contrast to the Eternal, the temporal is the realm of all change, flux, and multiplicity in 
existence. It encompasses everything that exists in a process of becoming, which transitions 
between potentiality and actuality. Like the Eternal, it is also not to be understood solely as a 
feature of human beings. Kierkegaard takes it to be what situates the human being and other 
entities in the world, and so he treats it as synonymous with worldly or earthly existence.76 The 
temporal is the medium through which one comes into being as a self, but it is not that through 
which one is a self. Kierkegaard argues that the temporal is a "self-contradiction," and so it 
cannot exist in the fullest sense (EUD: 163). Elaborating on this point, he writes: “The temporal 
has three times and therefore essentially never is completely nor is completely in any one of the 
periods; the eternal is” (WOL: 261). The suggestion is that the temporal, in consisting of past, 
present, and future, both is and is not; since the past no longer exists and the future does not yet 
                                                
76 There is ample evidence of this throughout Kierkegaard's corpus. For instance, he writes that those who love 
things in the world while lacking self-reflection in the relationship are "in an earthly, in a temporal sense, 
dependent" (WOL: 52). Elsewhere, he writes that death liberates the human being from the temporal, where he is 
imprisoned in a "fragile earthen vessel" and has "the status of an alien," and releases him into the eternal and 




exist, and these modes must be fused with the existent present in order for transition to occur, the 
temporal must consist of a union of being and non-being. This, however, is a contradiction, since 
it requires an identity of opposites. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard believes that human life, as 
dialectical, takes place precisely within this contradiction. In his Journals, he writes, “As long as 
I live, I live in contradiction, for life is contradiction” (JP I: 705). Climacus explains that the 
Eternal itself is not a contradiction, but that a contradiction arises from the unity of the eternal 
and the temporal in the human being (CUP: 205). As we will see in the next section, rather than 
accept this Heraclitean thesis as the ultimate truth of existence, he believes that the task for the 
human being is to get out of contradiction by becoming eternal.  
 Like Plato, Kierkegaard often disparages the temporal by suggesting that it has no real 
existence, value, or meaning apart from its relation to the Eternal.77 Under the pseudonym of 
Vigilius Haufniensis, for instance, he writes: 
 
The Christian view takes the position that non-being is present everywhere as the nothing from which 
things were created, as semblance and vanity, as sin, as sensuousness removed from spirit, as the temporal 
forgotten by the eternal; consequently, the task is to do away with it in order to bring forth being. (CA: 83) 
 
The temporal contains the world and everything that arises and perishes within it. In originating 
ex nihilo by God's will, these things come into being from nothing, and are liable to pass out of 
being into nothing. Although temporal phenomena are not illusory so long as they are grounded 
in the Eternal (or are "remembered" by it through God's omniscience), they have an insubstantial 
or transitory nature that makes them lack existence in the fullest sense. In advancing this 
immaterialist thesis, Kierkegaard therefore claims that a temporal object "exists only in its 
characteristics" and not in itself, while the Eternal "exists in itself" in having the characteristics it 
has (WOL: 261).  
                                                
77 Plato's influence on Kierkegaard's thought can be readily seen on several different occasions in his authorship. For 
instance, he compares the individual seeking communion with God to the individual aspiring to knowledge of the 
eternal realm of forms in Plato's allegory of the cave: “But the person in whose soul the eternal is implanted seeks 
and aspires. If the visible does not deceive him, as the person is deceived who grasps the shadow instead of the 
form, if temporality does not deceive him, as the person is deceived who procrastinates along the way—if this does 
not happen, then the world does not quiet his longing. Then it helps him only by means of repulsion to seek further, 
to seek the eternal, God’s kingdom, which is above in the heavens” (UDVS: 209). But ironically, for Kierkegaard, 
the individual must pursue God in time from within his concrete situation as an individual, even though recollection 





 One should note that in describing the temporal in the above passage, Haufniensis makes 
the seemingly paradoxical claim that non-being, in some sense, exists. To better understand how 
this might be so, one can consult the account Climacus gives of what it means for something to 
change in the manner of coming into existence: 
 
“If, in coming into existence, a plan is intrinsically changed, then it is not this plan that comes into 
existence; but if it comes into existence unchanged, what, then, is the change of coming into existence? 
This change, then, is not in essence but in being and is from not existing to existing. But this non-being that 
is abandoned by that which comes into existence must also exist…for every change has always 
presupposed a something” (PF: 73-74).  
 
Here Climacus draws a distinction between the essence of a thing and its existence, and claims 
that a thing can have an unchanging essence without actually existing, and without existence 
being a necessary feature of its essence. For example, the essence of a unicorn is that of a horse 
with a horn protruding from its head, but this does not entail that any unicorn actually exists. As 
a matter of fact, they do not, although it is possible they exist in a world different from ours, or if 
God willed it. To explain how one and the same thing could come into existence by transitioning 
from non-being to being, Climacus ascribes to possibilities a derivative ontological status. He 
does not want to claim that a possibility is a thing that does not exist in any respect, since then 
there would be no thing to come into existence, or to think about as possibly existing. If non-
being were considered as nothing at all, then Parmenides would be right to say that non-being is 
unthinkable for us. Climacus claims, "such a being that nevertheless is a non-being is possibility, 
and a being that is being is indeed actual being or actuality, and the change of coming into 
existence is the transition from possibility to actuality” (PF: 74). It is this indeterminate 
nothingness of possibility that permeates existence in the temporal, as possibilities become 
actualized by the will of God in the event that anything comes to exist in time as determinate. I 
will elaborate on this idea in the next chapter when discussing how the domain of possibility 
begets anxiety or even despair according to several of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms.  
 Kierkegaard also believes that, because the world is a temporal phenomenon, "the 
worldly in its essence is not one thing since it is the nonessential; its so-called unity is no 
essential unity but an emptiness that the multiplicity conceals" (UDVS: 29-30). The world for 




conceived in a logical way as "everything that is the case" or "the totality of facts" as it is for 
Wittgenstein.78 It should also not be thought of as a determinate thing. It is rather to be 
interpreted phenomenally as the empty region surrounding the individual in which determinate 
objects appear before consciousness. Alternatively, it can be understood as the spatiotemporal 
framework that contains determinate objects, without being one itself. Because the temporal is a 
component of the human being, he is ineluctably bound to the world. It might be conceived as a 
correlate to human consciousness, since it attends human consciousness throughout its entire 
duration. As a groundless domain that lurks beyond the fullness and unity of the eternal, it can be 
described as a kind of "nothingness" that imperils human beings in actuality, and ultimately 
brings them to their death (CUD: 47). While he criticizes those who succumb to this nothingness 
by being absorbed in fleeting affairs that draw them away from the Eternal, he praises spiritually-
minded persons who persist in existence by renouncing the vain pursuits and empty pleasures of 
worldly life or sensuality. Adamant about actualizing themselves rather than disappearing into 
nothingness, they live with a lasting awareness of the Eternal in existence.79  
 While the eternal aspect of the human being corresponds with infinitude and possibility, 
the temporal aspect corresponds with finitude and necessity. The finite consists of the 
multiplicity of factual givens that comprise our changing condition in the world. It would include 
things like our earthly environment, our perceptions, our social or cultural context, our political 
institutions, and so on. Anti-Climacus recognizes that the finite is an important aspect of human 
existence, but he also believes that the self can be "tricked out of its self" when it becomes overly 
attached to anything finite (SUD: 33). For instance, in one's association with others, he claims 
that one can easily be too caught up in the behavior of the crowd and become "a copy, a number, 
a mass man" instead of being one's own person (SUD: 34). Similarly, necessity consists of the 
basic regularities and principles that play a significant role in determining our finite 
circumstances as human beings. Necessity is a constraining factor, and limits the scope of human 
action by inscribing one’s existence within an infinite range of possibilities (SUD: 36). It 
therefore provides the self with a definite "place" or foothold within the temporal insofar as this 
is allotted by the Eternal (SUD: 36). Kierkegaard never suggests that we should understand 
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79 Kierkegaard repeatedly associates the worldly and temporal with nothingness in his authorship, indicating his 
belief that what occurs in time lacks genuine being in contrast to that which is eternal, although the eternal is able to 




necessity as pertaining to inviolable laws that govern human action or events in the natural 
world, and that can be discovered through reason. The necessity he describes pertains to 
existence in the natural world, and is imposed in creation by God's will through an act of divine 
freedom (UDVS: 205). On this point, he claims that all of nature is subject to the necessity 
ordained by God, and so non-human animals and natural entities cannot do otherwise when they 
act. But because human beings are endowed with freedom as derived spirits, and proceed 
through existence dialectically as a synthesis of freedom and necessity, their actions are not fully 
necessitated in the way that those of other natural or living beings are. Through our capacity to 
negate our given position in existence, we are able to oppose God's will if we want. The temporal 
is therefore part and parcel of our conditioned existence, as opposed to the unconditioned being 
of the eternal component in us.  
 Considered as a feature of the human being, the temporal consists of a relation psyche 
and body. This relation is distinct from the relation between the eternal and temporal, and is 
contained within the temporal aspect of it.80 It is through having a psyche and body that we 
encounter living and non-living things as creatures in the natural world. Haufniensis and Anti-
Climacus believe that the body is intimately associated with the psyche, and so they tend to 
consider them together by characterizing the human being as a psychosomatic unity.81 
Unfortunately, in these works, Kierkegaard does little to clarify what he means by psyche, except 
to suggest that it is closely aligned with the "sensate" aspects of the human being as opposed to 
the more spiritual aspects, such as man’s capacity for self-reflection or volition (SUD: 43). In 
light of this omission, I suggest that the psyche be understood as a primitive, non-cognitive 
mental faculty that humans share with other living things. It is what allows the living being a 
perceptual awareness of its physiological condition, along with characteristics of objects in its 
                                                
80 One prevalent approach in the secondary literature has been to conceive of the psychical as an expression of the 
eternal pole of the synthesis and the infinite, and the body as an expression of the temporal pole. See for example 
Beabout, Freedom and its Misuses, p. 87. On this view, the self consists of only a single relation. In his definition of 
the self, however, Anti-Climacus suggests that there is a second relation that relates to the primary relation between 
the eternal and temporal. He states that these two basic components "relate to the relation and in the relation to the 
relation; thus under the qualification of the psychical the relation between the psychical and the physical is a 
relation” (SUD: 13). Haufniensis more clearly characterizes the eternal-temporal and psyche-body relations as 
separate syntheses that are formed different in different ways (CA: 85). Because psyche and body are associated 
with our creaturely existence and not our spiritual form, which human beings alone have in common with the 
Creator, it would be a mistake to include their relation under the aspect of the eternal.  
81 Anti-Climacus, for instance, claims: "Every human being is a psychical-physical synthesis intended to be spirit" 
(SUD: 43). Haufniensis argues that human freedom is lost "somatically-psychically" if spirit does not rein in psyche 




surrounding environment, but not reflective self-awareness.82 Sensations, desires, impulses, the 
ability to feel pleasures and pains, and the system of drives and instincts would all occur in the 
psyche, which operates in response to natural events. The psyche is engaged with states of affairs 
in the natural world, and is constantly in flux as a result of this outward directedness toward 
temporal events. Because they are constantly changing relative to external conditions, psyche 
and body exist outside of the realm of the eternal, although they are nonetheless incorporated in 
the human being through the self's synthesizing activity. As we will see in section 1.4.3, they can 
perhaps best be understood as the "raw materials" of human life that the self works with in 
relating itself to itself. 
 Because the human being harbors a trace of the eternal within him as a synthesis of spirit-
psyche-body, he can surpass the natural limitations of his temporal condition to a considerable 
degree, and open himself to new and practically infinite possibilities in existence. Anti-Climacus 
claims that human beings generate ideas and possibilities through their imagination, which he 
describes as an "infinitizing" power (SUD: 31). He refers to it as the fundamental capacity of 
spirit, or more specifically, “the capacity instar omnium” (SUD: 31). Kierkegaard elaborates on 
this in another pseudonym when he suggests that the imagination mediates between the 
"ideality" associated with the eternal aspect of the self and the "reality" of the temporal aspect, or 
what I will sometimes refer to as "actuality" (PF: 168). We use the imagination to imagine ideas 
and possibilities, but we also employ it in realizing them in existence. In performing these acts, 
we bring the infinite, or "ideality" into relation with the finite, or "reality."  One might consider a 
thought or idea to be finite, since these are determinate things, but the claim is that they originate 
from an indeterminate state, and so are not a part of the furniture of reality in the way that 
concrete things are. In this sense, they are infinite, and must be brought into relation with the 
finite to become concrete and real. Conversely, we also use the imagination in conceptualizing 
the world and forming ideas, judgments, and beliefs about things in it, which involves bringing 
the finite into relation with the infinite. Of course, as a synthesis of necessity and possibility, 
human beings cannot live purely out of the imagination in a realm of sheer possibility, and our 
concrete situation typically shapes or influences our thinking. Furthermore, the finite condition 
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of human beings restricts what kinds of possibilities can be actualized in existence, although we 
are able to imagine innumerable possibilities that might not be realizable for us.  
 The self is therefore a relation consisting of eternal and temporal poles that interact while 
retaining their distinctiveness. It synthesizes the infinite and finite, freedom (or possibility) and 
necessity, and psyche and body so that they are gathered together in a single consciousness. 
Anti-Climacus claims that the finite aspect is the “limiting” constituent while the infinite aspect 
is the “expanding” constituent of the self as a synthesis (SUD: 30). By possessing a trace of 
infinitude within itself, the self can surpass the limitations of its finite condition through its 
ability to imagine possibilities without particular limit. By possessing finitude within itself as a 
unity of psyche and body, the self can actualize many of these possibilities in existence, while 
being restricted in this by the necessary component of its existence. In the next section, I explain 
how these different constituents of the self attain a unity in consciousness.  
 
1.3.2 Consciousness as a Paradoxical Unity of the Eternal and Temporal  
 Kierkegaard holds that the eternal and temporal are united in consciousness, which, as he 
states in an unfinished pseudonymous work, "is spirit" (PF: 169, trans. modified). He defines 
consciousness as the site in which the eternal and temporal coincide, and compares the spiritual 
existence of the human being to the merely natural existence of the bird, which lacks 
consciousness or an awareness of duration: 
 
Since, then, the human being is consciousness, he is the place where the eternal and the temporal 
continually touch each other, where the eternal is refracted in the temporal. Time can seem long to the 
human being because he has the eternal in his consciousness and measures the moments with it, but time 
never seems long to the bird. This is why the human being has a dangerous enemy that the bird does not 
know—time, an enemy, yes, an enemy or a friend whose pursuits and whose association he cannot avoid 
because he has the eternal in his consciousness and therefore has to measure it. (UDVS: 195) 
 
In order to make better sense of this passage, one must first consult the writings of Haufniensis, 
who elaborates at length on the point of contact between the eternal and temporal in the human 
being through his Christian conception of time. Haufniensis notes how time, when it is 
considered abstractly as an "infinite succession" of moments, is usually described in terms of 




to be implicit in time itself, because the distinction appears only through the relation of time to 
eternity and through the reflection of eternity in time" (CA: 85). His reasoning is that in order for 
past and future to be distinguished in time, they must stand in relation to a present moment. But 
in time itself, there is never a present moment, not only because it is outside of the Eternal, but 
also because each moment of this empty or "infinitely contentless" succession vanishes just as 
quickly as it arises. This means that for human beings, no moment ever truly is (CA: 86). Yet 
when this infinitely rapid succession and the eternal, or the present, "touch each another" in 
consciousness, a pivotal moment is established that can serve as a dividing line through which 
time is measured in terms of past, present, and future (CA: 86-87). Haufniensis calls this moment 
of contact "the instant," and he describes it as "the first reflection of eternity in time, its first 
attempt, as it were, at stopping time” (CA: 88).83 For Haufniensis, the instant is a Christian 
category that signifies the incarnation of God in Christ, or the apprehension and penetration of 
time by the Eternal.84 He therefore describes it as "the fullness of time" in comparison to the 
fleeting moment of the sensuous life, which he regards as emptiness and vanity forgotten by the 
Eternal.85  
 Haufniensis believes that the instant, as a transfiguration of the moment of sensuality, 
gives rise to temporality and duration in human life. He defines temporality as what eventuates 
when "time constantly intersects eternity and eternity constantly pervades time" (CA: 89). As the 
Eternal continually disrupts the infinite succession of time in the instant, we are provided with an 
intimation of the Eternal in existence. The instant is not the full presence of the Eternal, however, 
since we are still situated within time in a process of becoming. For this reason, he states that the 
instant is an "atom of eternity" rather than the whole of it, which the Christian who believes in 
eternal life seeks to be ushered into at the end of his earthly life (CA: 88). For this reason, 
                                                
83 To distinguish this pivotal Christian event from the moment of sensuous life, I will use "the instant." Translation 
modified from original. 
84 Haufniensis claims to be adopting a Pauline notion of time in his account of the instant (CA: 88). In Corinthians 
15:51-52, Paul writes, "we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the 
trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable." For Haufniensis, the instant therefore has apocalyptic 
implications, signaling the impending destruction of the world.  
85 Peddlers of traditional wisdom often say that one should live in the moment, meaning that one should embrace the 
experience of the present while paying little heed to the past or future. It has consequently become a popular view in 
New Age thought. This, however, is certainly not the moment that Haufniensis has in mind in his Christian 
conception of the instant. Haufniensis refers to the moment of sensuous life as a "parody" of the presence of the 
eternal, which is to come in the future (CA: 86). In his view, the moment of the sensuous life is meaningless, while 
the instant, in signifying the "fullness of time" for those of the Christian faith, demands hope and repentance in an 
expectation of salvation from such meaninglessness (CA: 90). Elsewhere, Kierkegaard writes, "compared with 




Haufniensis believes that with respect to temporality, the Eternal resides in the future rather than 
the present or past, which both spring from it. Kierkegaard offers a clearer explanation of this 
point when he writes: 
 
The eternal is, but when the eternal touches time or is in time, they do not meet each other in the present, for 
then the present would itself be the eternal. The present, the moment, is so quickly past, that it really is not 
present; it is only the boundary and is therefore transitional; whereas the past is what was present. Consequently 
if the eternal is in the temporal, it is in the future (for the present can not get hold of it, and the past is indeed 
past) or in possibility. The past is actuality; the future is possibility. Eternally the eternal is the eternal; in time 
the eternal is possibility, the future. Therefore we call to-morrow the future, but we also call eternal life the 
future. (WOL: 233-234)  
 
Like Haufniensis, Kierkegaard argues that the present moment of time for human beings is not 
truly present at all, since it is so fleeting, and so what is truly present must originate in the future. 
We cannot rest in the total presence of the Eternal so long as we are in the world, but we can 
expect it as a possibility on the horizon through consciousness, which reaches beyond the present 
moment of time when the imagination projects future possibilities for actualization. In this way, 
the Christian can hope that he will be saved from the menace of nothingness and perishability by 
becoming eternal in time. On this view, redemption is to come and not yet immanent for us.  
 Just as in the case of non-being, the human being is not aware of the eternal as a definite 
item in existence, or as a determinate being amongst other beings. Considered as a feature of 
consciousness, it is the invisible, unchanging, and unconditional aspect of existence that sets into 
relief all visible change amid external conditions or worldly phenomena. To put the matter 
dialectically, we would not be able to register changes among objects or states in ourselves, or 
measure time, if there were not an enduring aspect of existence that we could use as a point of 
reference in remembering how things in the world have changed from one moment to the next. 
Philosophers had commonly located this changeless aspect in material substances that persist in 
being while undergoing modifications in time, but Kierkegaard does not believe that temporality, 
in its association with non-being, could contain things that bear their own separate and original 
existences. For this reason, he locates the changeless aspect of existence in the self and not the 
world. The self has the eternal within it in the form of possibility as it moves forward into the 




 Now, unlike the human being, the bird has no awareness of the eternal in existence, and 
so it has no way of registering the succession of time or its tenses. Since it is not spirit, there is 
no real continuity or duration in the bird's existence––it lives entirely in the moment without 
being conscious of the different moments of its life. The eternal, on the other hand, is "the 
essential continuity" in consciousness, which means that it functions as the stronghold of the self 
in providing it with a stable identity over time (SUD: 105). By possessing the eternal in his 
consciousness, which continually disrupts the ephemeral succession of time in the instant, the 
human being is able to apprehend time and integrate the different moments of his life. In doing 
so, he is able to comprehend the duration of his life as a unified whole, and arrive at a sense of 
his own identity as a person. He achieves this unity by actively relating the present moment to 
the past and future through recollection and imaginative anticipation. The continuity generated 
by the eternal in its relation to time gives one's life substance and meaning that it would not have 
if it were a series of fragments or disconnected moments, as it is for the bird. As Taylor puts it, 
only for human beings can time be "a synthesis of persistence and change."86  
 The life of the human being is capable of attaining diachronic coherence through the 
realization of one's spiritual capacities, wherein one relates past, present, and future in 
consciousness.87 Climacus, however, does not think that we are capable of maintaining an 
absolute continuity in our existence due to the manifold changes we experience as psychical-
physical beings in time (CUP: 313). Time disrupts continuity as different moments succeed one 
another throughout the duration of our lives. With respect to our actual condition in the world, in 
which we are constantly in a process of becoming as changing persons, our identity is never 
fixed or settled, even if it becomes relatively stable through our anticipation of the Eternal. On 
the other hand, both he and Kierkegaard acknowledge that unity is the basis of the contradiction 
inherent in human existence, and that identity underlies our nature as spirit. In the foregoing 
journal entry where Kierkegaard refers to human life as contradiction, he likens the principle of 
identity to "the line the etchers call the base––the drawing is the main thing. As long as I live in 
time, the principle of identity is only an abstraction" (JP I: 705). As Løkke and Waaler note in 
their interpretation of this passage, the base line of a drawing fundamentally shapes it without 
being visible in the final product, and is an image of essence in contrast to the existence of the 
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drawing.88 In this entry, Kierkegaard is suggesting that each individual originally possesses an 
abstract identity or essence as spirit, and that this is conceptually prior to his concrete existence 
as a human being. However, this identity does not carry over into temporal existence smoothly 
due to the contradiction and tumult present in it. With this plan or "blueprint" that God has given 
him in mind, the individual is tasked with realizing his spiritual identity concretely, and forging 
continuity and consistency by living in the way God commands of him. In privileging existence 
over essence as a higher form of truth, and criticizing the abstract or objective thinker who, in his 
essentialist thinking, remains aloof from his life as an individual, Kierkegaard puts greater 
weight on practice, or how the individual accomplishes the "drawing" of his life by living out his 
thought. As we will see, by living in a self-disciplined and self-abnegating way, Kierkegaard 
believes that one is capable of achieving a stable identity in existence under the auspices of the 
eternal. However, he believes that in this life, temporality inevitably blocks individuals from 
fully realizing their spiritual essence and finalizing their identity, and as free beings, we do not 
have to strive for this if we do not want to. But in this case, as Climacus says, one would be 
refusing to do his part to "become what one is" (CUP: 130).  
 The Eternal and temporal are related insofar as they continually touch one another in 
consciousness in the instant, but they otherwise remain separated by an ontological gulf. The 
Eternal is not the infinite duration of time, since that would mean it is situated entirely within 
time as an everlasting process. Kierkegaard stresses that the Eternal must instead be understood 
as existing outside of time:  
 
Eternity…is the opposite of the whole of temporality, and with all the powers of eternity it resists 
temporality’s becoming more. Just as God said to the water “Up to here and no further,” so eternity says 
to temporality, “Up to here and no further; you are, no matter how long you continue to be, a moment, 
neither more nor less; this I, eternity, guarantee, or this I, eternity, compel you to be. (CD: 98) 
 
The Eternal and temporal are in conflict as opposing and even contradictory forces. However, 
Kierkegaard believes that the worldly or earthly powers of the temporal that root themselves in 
one's being as a psyche-body unity exhibit a radical dependence on the Eternal, since God 
ultimately presides over all temporal affairs; they can do nothing that He does not permit. The 
convergence of the eternal and the temporal in the human being therefore produces great 
                                                




dialectical tension, and signifies that we are not yet what we essentially are. This paradoxical 
union generates movement in our lives, as we are in the process of becoming what we are by 
negotiating between them in the activity of synthesis. While defining human existence as 
contradiction in this way might seem to pose an insurmountable difficulty for his view, 
Kierkegaard believes that it suits the many dualities that feature in human life, including those 
already outlined. He writes: “The view which sees life’s doubleness (dualism) is higher and 
deeper than that which seeks unity” (JP I: 704). For the Christian, union with the Eternal is, of 
course, an ultimate ideal to be realized. But because we have severed ourselves from God 
through sin, this union with the ground of being requires the incarnation of God in Christ, even 
though the individual can aspire toward it by living as Christ taught.  
As we can see, although the human being exists temporally, Kierkegaard disparages 
temporality throughout his authorship. Kierkegaard claims that the temporal, like a creeping 
plant with a “parasitic” and “insidious” nature, has the ability to ensnare the individual and 
corrupt the self (CD: 98-99). However, it can only take the upper hand over the eternal in the 
individual if he, by his own neglect, allows this to happen: 
 
When a person does not draw his power from the eternal and acquire by communion with the eternal the 
power to hold temporality down, temporality steals his power from him and through this stolen power it 
now becomes some enormous something; it becomes his impatience, his despair, perhaps his downfall. 
Pride strikes its own master, but temporality is just as ungrateful; it becomes something by stealing the 
power of eternity from a person and then in return remains with him and makes him its slave. (CD: 99) 
 
The temporal consists of the totality of earthly forces, but the potency of these forces ultimately 
derives from the activity of the eternal. In its association with nothingness or non-being, the 
temporal attempts to infringe upon the eternal in the human being and draw him away from it, 
but it ultimately cannot so long as he keeps it borrowed power in check. If he does not resist its 
temptations, the temporal threatens to compromise his underlying unity and integrity as a self, as 
he disregards his eternal calling by being immersed in the interminable succession of worldly 
events, or succumbs to the nothingness of sensuality and insubstantiality. As Kierkegaard puts it 
under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus, the life of temporality is "piecemeal" (CUP: 491); 
the episodes that constitute a life lived away from the eternal are disparate and atomistic, and 




its dispersion and fragmentation in the play of the temporal, and bring itself into a unity that it 
otherwise loses in being absorbed in the multiplicity of worldly phenomena.  
 Passages of this sort are by no means isolated occurrences in Kierkegaard’s work. In a 
separate discourse, for instance, he describes the individual located in the midst of the temporal 
as being in the “the hands of an alien power,” which they must gain themselves away from by 
cleaving to God, their ultimate possessor (EUD: 172). Although the self is a synthesis of the 
temporal and the eternal, one can see that he vastly privileges the eternal component of the self. 
But paradoxically, one does not align oneself with this eternal component by abstracting from 
existence and maintaining a cool distance from it, as speculative thinkers, Platonists, and the like 
have done in attempting to relate to the world sub specie aeternitatis; since the eternal is 
concrete, this must be accomplished by humbling oneself as an individual through action and 
commitment in life in the world, and admitting the temporal as an essential aspect of oneself. For 
Kierkegaard, Christ demonstrated through his incarnation that God wants to meet us on earth, in 
all our fragility, poverty, and brokenness as human beings, and not in exalted mystical or 
philosophical contemplation.89 However, in his endorsement of the asceticism of Christ, he 
believes that one ought to be cautious about how one responds to things in the world and the 
desires they provoke, and in this sense, a certain distance should be maintained. It is therefore 
important that both poles of the self are in balance as one relates to the Eternal in existence. 
 The eternal component within consciousness bears important normative implications for 
human life. As a Christian, Kierkegaard insists that it is our existential "task" (or telos) to 
become aware of the eternal within ourselves and to develop this greater part of our nature in 
order to gather ourselves out of wretched contradiction in the temporal (WOL: 236). Although 
we each essentially possess an invisible image of the eternal as living subjects, it is initially 
present in us as potential to be realized in existence. Climacus puts this by saying: "A human 
being according to his possibility is eternal and becomes conscious of this in time" (CUP: 579). 
Hence, although we are endowed with the eternal in consisting of possibility and infinitude, since 
we are situated in the temporal, we do not yet actually exist as eternal, and our existence is not 
yet concluded so long as we are not so. We are heading toward completion as selves, however, 
insofar as we exist in a process of becoming what we essentially are through the imagination's 
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"Admittedly it seems very natural that in order to love God one must soar high up into heaven where God dwells, 




mediation between ideality and reality in the instant. While the eternal resides in our 
consciousness in the form of possibility and gives continuity to our lives in its association with 
time, the presence of the Eternal awaits us as a future outcome that could only become actualized 
for us after death.  
 For Climacus, the eternal life the self aims at through its development does not include 
any temporal unfolding or movement, although the self is a paradoxical synthesis of temporality 
and eternity in this life.90 He explains that it would be a mistake for a person to think that this 
synthesis is retained in eternity, since the purpose of the process of becoming (or coming into 
being) is to eliminate the temporal aspect of the self. “As an existing person, then, he need not 
form existence out of the finite and the infinite, but, composed of the finite and the infinite, he, 
existing, is supposed to become one of the parts, and one does not become both parts 
simultaneously, because one is that by being an existing person" (CUP: 420). Kierkegaard often 
disparages the temporal, and considers it a stepping-stone or building block on the way to eternal 
life. However, if the individual renounces the temptations of sensuality and worldliness, and 
lives up to his spiritual nature by holding fast to God from within his concrete position in the 
world, the temporal has the positive value of being the channel through which the individual can 
actualize himself and win changelessness by becoming eternal.91 Kierkegaard does little to 
elaborate on what it means to become changeless, but minimally, Haufniensis suggests that is a 
final state of rest achieved only after death, once the temporal process of the human being has 
                                                
90 Climacus understands changelessness to be the purpose of development or change: “The motionless belongs to 
motion as motion’s goal [Maal], both in the sense of τέλος [end, goal] and µέτρον [measure, criterion]” (CUP: 312). 
He also clearly attributes immortality to God and the human being (CUP: 171). Given these claims, it seems 
problematic to suppose that what is changeless or motionless can be alive. Life would seem to require movement, 
changing states, and responsiveness to an environment at the very least, but these traits are not characteristic of the 
eternal. Kierkegaard therefore has the difficulty of how explaining how the eternal can be a form of life, which he 
never seems to resolve. The same problem arises when he defines life as contradiction, while claiming in the 
pseudonyms that the eternal is free of all contradiction. In this case, the eternal should be free of all life. The account 
that he gives of immortality throughout his authorship sounds much like a state of inertia, and not of perpetual 
vitality. This is not too surprising, given that he believes "Christianity means precisely that death is a person’s 
essential consolation" (JP I: 723). It is therefore not obvious that the culmination Climacus describes is compatible 
with the Christian idea of eternal life, although he believes it is.  
91 There is the difficulty that if the self were to actually become eternal in time, it would seem that it already must 
have been eternal, since it is inconceivable that what is timeless has a beginning in time. Climacus acknowledges 
this worry and simply claims that how this is possible is "inaccessible to all thinking" (CUP: 573). This paradox 
does not lead him to abandon his position, however, since it reflects the paradoxical structure of the self as a 
synthesis. If Kierkegaard can show through these pseudonyms that the self is constituted in such a manner, then it is 
less surprising that what is impossible or inconceivable by any human stretch of the imagination might take place if 
God willed it. To his credit, it is difficult to conceive of how what is timeless can take form and shape in time, or 
how what is eternally one and simple can give rise to a multitude of objects and complexity, without this being 




concluded (CA: 152). Referring to the incarnation of the Eternal in Christ, which he believes has 
made salvation from the temporal possible for human beings by engendering the fullness of time, 
he writes: "In eternity...all contradiction is canceled, the temporal is permeated by and preserved 
in the eternal" (CA: 154). Climacus calls this state of salvation from contradiction "an eternal 
happiness" (CUP: 27). In resting in the fullness of the divinity as eternal, without suffering the 
pains, unsatisfied desires, and turmoil of time as we do here, he says that one "must be assumed 
to possess everything essentially" (CUP: 73). In having attained its end and the highest good by 
becoming itself before God, the self would no longer exist as a troublesome synthesis as it does 
in this life, and would be safe and secure in blessed union with Him.92  
  
1.4 Becoming a Self: Freedom, The Will, and Reflection in the Self 
 Anti-Climacus claims that the relation between the eternal and the temporal constitutes 
the human being in its existence in the world, but that this relation is not the self per se. He 
states, “the self is not the relation but is the relation’s relating itself to itself” (SUD: 13) For Anti-
Climacus, to be self-relating, and therefore a self in the truest sense, is to be capable of reflection 
on oneself as a conscious being, to use one's will to shape who one is, and to commit to a certain 
way of life with knowledge of oneself (SUD: 29). Before delving into a more precise account of 
what he means by self-reflection, a careful reader of Kierkegaard might recognize an apparent 
inconsistency between Anti-Climacus' view and that of Haufninensis on the nature of the self as 
a relation. Anti-Climacus appears to suggest that spirit emerges through self-reflection, and 
hence is not an original feature of the relation, while Haufniensis claims that any relation 
between two contradictory elements originally requires a third, bridging element to sustain it, 
and that this third is spirit (CA: 85). These views are not incompatible, however, if we follow 
Anti-Climacus in making the distinction between spirit in potentiality and spirit in actuality 
                                                
92 If the self attains changelessness by becoming eternal, and is no longer a synthesis, then one might think that 
Kierkegaard is suggesting that the self becomes God when it reaches its end, and that its individuality is annihilated. 
In that case, the infinite qualitative difference between the human being and God would dissolve after death. This is 
not, however, what he intends to claim. He reiterates, "between God and a human being there is an eternal essential 
qualitative difference, which only presumptuous thinking can make disappear in the blasphemy that in the transitory 
moment of finitude God and a human being are certainly differentiated, so that here in this life a human being ought 
to obey and worship God, but in eternity the difference will vanish in the essential likeness, so that God and human 
beings become peers in eternity, just as the king and the valet” (WA: 100). Yet Kierkegaard does not explain what 
this differentiation in eternity would consist in. Perhaps his point is that our temporal aspect of the self would be 
neutralized in eternity, but would not be eradicated or completely forgotten by God. But as Climacus explains, an 
eternal happiness must remain an elusive notion for us in this life: "nothing else can be said of eternal happiness than 




(SUD: 30). A human being that is not self-reflective is originally spirit, but in potentiality. She 
has the potential to become reflective and to will as a self, and indeed has a spiritual essence, but 
she has not yet realized her essence in existence so as to become spirit in actuality.  
 For Anti-Climacus, becoming one's essential self is a task, and is indeed the telos of 
every human being. As he puts it: "every moment that a self exists, it is in a process of 
becoming, for the self κατά δύναµιν [in potentiality] does not actually exist, is simply that which 
ought to come into existence" (SUD: 30). By distinguishing between a human being and a self, 
he wants to stress that an individual does not begin to exist as a full-blooded self as a matter of 
course, but that this must be achieved through a lived process in which one, in becoming self-
reflective and imagining possible ways of being, wills to be who one essentially is. The more one 
does this, the more consciousness intensifies, and as this occurs, one becomes more of a self.93 
This section will contain a phenomenological examination of this process of arriving at self-
knowledge and becoming a self in Kierkegaard’s work. In reconciling the views of Haufniensis 
and Anti-Climacus, I intend to show that, in a paradoxical way, the self both emerges in time 
through the process of human life and has an eternal nature through consciousness as it moves 
forward into the future.  
 
 1.4.1   The Latency of Spirit: Unreflective Self-consciousness 
 Anti-Climacus contends that a human being who is spirit in potentiality but not in 
actuality occupies an elementary or non-dual state of consciousness that he refers to as 
“immediacy.” This is a Hegelian concept that Kierkegaard adopts for his own purposes 
throughout his works. Mackey nicely defines this concept as Kierkegaard uses it as “direct 
experience, experience as it is simply given and simply had before the onset of reflection.”94 
                                                
93 Stokes argues against the view that for Kierkegaard, the self is a scalar concept, in which one can be more or less 
of a self. On his interpretation, Kierkegaard did not believe there is a single self that achieves a greater degree of 
intensity the more it becomes itself, but instead held that an individual is constituted by two distinct selves, one 
temporal and one eternal, that exist in relation to one another. See The Naked Self, pp. 179-180 & footnote CR. 
However, this reading is at odds with what Kierkegaard and Anti-Climacus actually say on the matter. Anti-
Climacus writes: "The more consciousness, the more self; the more consciousness, the more will; the more will, the 
more self. A person who has no will is not a self..." (SUD: 29). Elsewhere, Kierkegaard claims that the soul, or self, 
has the peculiar quality of being something one can possess and gain at the same time due to its being a self-
contradiction that is constituted by the eternal and temporal. While the individual eternally possesses his soul, he 
must gain it in time by renouncing worldly possessions and external powers that control him, and take control over 
himself (EUD: 163-165). If Stokes' view were right, one would not have to gain one's soul in time, since it would be 
possessed from the very beginning.  




Although immediacy is typically conceptualized and differentiated into discrete objects through 
reflection, in his initial state, the human being is inseparably united with immanent conditions in 
his environment in a state of awareness unmediated by conceptual thought. He perceives 
fluctuating states occurring within himself as a psyche-body unity, along with changing 
conditions in his environment, but he has not distinguished himself from them so as to become 
aware of himself as a self in relation to them. Describing this state, Anti-Climacus writes:  
 
 The man of immediacy is only psychically qualified…his self, he himself, is an accompanying  
 something within the dimensions of temporality and secularity, in immediate connection with  
 “the other”, and has but an illusory appearance of having anything eternal in it. The self is bound  
 up in immediacy with the other in desiring, craving, enjoying, etc., yet passively; in its craving, this  
 self is a dative, like the “me” of a child. (SUD: 51) 
 
In immediacy, the self is outside of itself in doing things like desiring, seeking, or fleeing various 
things in its environment. There is no real differentiation between self and other within 
consciousness, and the self does not understand itself as a unified subject that retains sameness of 
identity over the different moments of its life. In its entanglement in the surrounding world, the 
self is a passive witness of events, while psyche and body are active in being moved by natural 
events unfolding by necessity.  
 Although spirit does not act on psyche and body at this early stage of consciousness, this 
does not mean that the self in immediacy does not exist or that the eternal is not present in 
consciousness. In this passage, Anti-Climacus says that the self is there to accompany psyche 
and body in the realm of temporality, which it is able to do qua human being. Because the self 
exists in immediacy in harmony with psyche and body, consciousness is present in the human 
being, albeit in a latent form. Anti-Climacus does not believe any distinction can be drawn 
between consciousness and self-consciousness, and so it can be assumed that consciousness of 
phenomena at this stage entails a dim consciousness of oneself as a bare subject of awareness 
(SUD: 29). One might call this bare awareness of the multiplicity of phenomena being joined 
together into a single experience the immediate unity of apperception.95 Because the self has not 
                                                
95 In referring to the unreflective form of self-consciousness as "the immediate unity of apperception," I am drawing 
on Kant's notion of "the transcendental unity of apperception" while modifying it in certain ways. See Critique of 
Pure Reason, A107-A11. Unlike Anti-Climacus, who understands spirit as wholly passive in its initial state, Kant 




yet become aware of itself as being aware of itself and the surrounding world over time, this is 
not yet a reflective form of self-consciousness. Hence, the original state of immediacy involves 
only an unreflective form of self-consciousness. 
 Kierkegaard argues that a young child would be an example of someone who lives in this 
state of immediacy, or as spirit in potentiality. Although the psychical and physical constituents 
of the child are actively embroiled with conditions in the natural world, it is not yet capable of 
self-reflective activity, and so there is no separation between the self and the psyche-body 
relation. As Haufniensis explains, in this state, which he refers to as the state of innocence, 
“spirit is present, but as immediate, as dreaming” (CA: 43). Describing this condition, 
Kierkegaard writes, 
 
 …the life of childhood and youth is a dream-life, because the innermost being, that which  
 in the deepest sense is the person, is sleeping. The child is turned entirely outward; its inwardness  
 is outwardness, and to that extent it is wide awake. But for a person to be awake is to be turned  
 inward eternally in inwardness; therefore the child is dreaming, and it dreams itself sensately together  
 with everything, indeed, almost as if it confuses itself with the sense impression. (CD: 108) 
 
The child is outside of itself in being immersed in the flow of sensuous life. As psyche and body 
interact with entities in the surrounding world, the child enjoys "the interplay of the powers of 
feelings, of urges, of inclinations, and of passions, in short, the interplay of the powers of the 
spontaneous life" (WOL: 41). In its natural spontaneity, the child is an instrument of external 
forces and events, without these being disturbed by the intervention of spirit or self-reflection. 
Due to its lack of spiritual activity, it does not have a sense of its identity as a self. For example, 
it does not critically examine what kind of person it is or what it is doing, and it is not yet in a 
                                                                                                                                                       
rules, in such a way that it beholds its own identity before it. Anti-Climacus suggests that this endeavor occurs when 
the self becomes reflective and volitional, but not when it is in its initial state as spirit in potentiality. Against Kant, 
he suggests that in this initial state, the manifold of appearances is being actively combined into a single experience 
through temporal processes, but not through the self's own activity. The self is therefore not conscious of its own 
identity as a self at this point, and is being created by external forces that endow it with any identity it might be said 
to have. In his study of narrative self-identity in Kierkegaard, Davenport offers a typology of levels of consciousness 
suggested by Kierkegaard, with the transcendental unity of apperception at the baseline. Davenport believes animals 
and human beings possess this form of consciousness insofar as they are able "to recognize experiences across time 
as belonging to the same animal" (Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Morality, p. 46). Since Kierkegaard does not 
believe that non-human animals are spirit, I do not believe he would agree with Davenport's suggestion that they 
could be endowed with consciousness, much less a transcendental form of it. Consciousness would require that they 
possess an aspect of the eternal within them to measure the different moments of time, but Kierkegaard believes 




position to evaluate its desires and decide whether or not it should resist or endorse some of 
them. Having recognized no real distinction between self and the external world, it perceives 
itself to be the world, to the extent that there can be said to be any world at all for a being who 
has not yet conceptualized the world as such.  
 Haufniensis compares the state of consciousness in innocence to that of dreaming. He 
points to a crucial difference between dreaming and wakefulness, saying, “Awake, the difference 
between myself and my other is posited; sleeping, it is suspended, dreaming, it is an intimated 
nothing” (CA: 41-42). He has the insight that in the experience of dreams, we do not normally 
draw a strict distinction between our own acts and what merely happens to us.96 Events occur 
randomly and without reason, and although we might be doing things or making choices during 
these events, we do not experience ourselves as being firmly in control of what we do. Until the 
individual “awakens” from this state of immediacy by learning of the difference between self and 
world, and becoming actively involved in his own personal existence through his capacities for 
reflection and willing, he is only spirit in potentiality.  
 
1.4.2   Self-Discovery: Reflective Self-consciousness 
Eventually in the course of human development, a human being is separated from 
immediacy and becomes self-relating, or spirit in actuality. Anti-Climacus generally refers to this 
capacity of the self to relate itself to itself as reflection, although reflection importantly includes 
the work of the imagination, recollection, and the understanding.97 These capacities are 
especially important in allowing the self to retain a continual identity over time, and in 
discriminating between objects in immediacy. Whereas the young child identified itself with 
things in the surrounding environment, when the self becomes active through the awakening of 
reflection, it begins to realize that it is “essentially different from the environment and external 
events and from their influence upon it” (SUD: 54). He believes that through reflective self-
consciousness, the self understands, however vaguely or dimly at first, that there is “something 
eternal in the self” through which it can step back from its immediate situation and gauge itself 
                                                
96 One exception could be made in the case of lucid dreaming, when an individual realizes that they are dreaming 
within a dream, and so experiences a kind of awakening within it. When this happens, the "awakened" person is able 
to exercise control over what occurs within his dream. It seems that awakening is associated with the feeling that we 
possess a will, and so have some control over our actions and what is happening. There is also continuity and 
rational coherence among events proceeding in waking life, which is rarely the case in dreams.  
97 Anti-Climacus identifies the imagination with reflection. "The self is reflection, and the imagination is reflection, 




against temporal phenomena, including itself as a human being (SUD: 55). In the first phase of 
reflective awareness, the self delineates itself from external objects, while in the second and 
preeminent phase, the self delineates itself from itself. Through this capacity for detachment, or 
what I will sometimes refer to as transcendence, the self is able to engage in abstract or 
conceptual thought about the world and its contents, and finally is able to think about itself, its 
actions, and even its own thoughts critically. In performing these acts, it arrives at a sense of its 
identity as a self.  
The separation from immediacy that occurs through the self's activity of reflection 
generates distance between self and world, and correspondingly, between the self and itself as a 
human being in the world. This opens up a dimension of inwardness through which the self can 
gain a hold of itself in its earthly existence, and win continuity, consistency, and independence in 
relation to the temporal flux of the outside world. This sphere of inwardness, which puts the self 
in relation to the realm of ideality and possibility, provides a space for thought and the 
imagination to roam separately from the reality of the world, instead of being naively immersed 
in it. The reflective distance engendered does not mean that the self closes in on itself in thought 
and has no further contact with the world. Although a rupture between self and world has 
commenced, the self continues to relate itself to the world and others as a thinking and embodied 
being, while relating itself to itself in its thoughtful concern for itself. When this separation 
between self and world occurs through the self's own activity, duality is experienced within 
consciousness for the first time. 
 Through reflective self-consciousness, the self knows itself as an object of its own 
awareness, but in a peculiar sense. Because the self exists as a subject with the invisible aspect of 
the eternal within it, it does not cognize itself as an object amongst visible, temporal objects, 
whether these objects are regarded as material entities, sensory representations, mental images, 
or the like. Anti-Climacus describes the self as it is experienced phenomenally from the point of 
the view of the individual not as a definite entity, but as a "naked abstract self" or even an 
"infinite self" in order to signify its pure and indeterminate character (SUD: 55). Anti-Climacus 
opposes the "abstract self" that reflection produces in the domain of ideality and possibility to the 
"concrete self," or what he refers to as the “fully dressed self” of immediacy (SUD: 68). This is 
the determinate aspect of the self through which it is situated in the world as a psyche-body 




society and the external environment, a personal history, and so on. This manner of speech is 
indeed confusing, and might lead one to think that Anti-Climacus is suggesting there are two 
different selves contained within a single individual.98 Although the self is a fundamentally 
divided self as a synthesis of the eternal and temporal, or the infinite and finite, there is little 
reason to believe that this is the case. He alludes to different selves in order to describe different 
aspects of a single self that, in relating itself to itself, is both the subject and object of its own 
awareness. The abstract self refers to the self as a pure subject of awareness that transcends its 
finite condition at any given moment in order to think about it or influence it through the will. 
This aspect of the self is not original or discovered, but is generated through reflection that 
proceeds from within one's concrete existence. The concrete self, on the other hand, refers to the 
self in its empirical character, or as it exists as an object of thought for the abstract self. For this 
reason, Anti-Climacus generally refers to the individual as a single self, unless he intends to 
draw attention to one of these aspects over another in examining its self-relational activity.  
It is important to note that, in his discussion of a naked or infinite self, Anti-Climacus is 
not claiming that the self exists as a pure abstraction, although in its transcendental capacity, it is 
phenomenally figured as such in consciousness. Sometimes Kierkegaard scholars make the 
mistake of interpreting him in this way by taking the infinite self to be the true form of the self. 
As a result, they accuse him of offering a vision of a self that exists in total isolation, whether it 
is from God, other individuals, or the world in general. Mackey, for instance, has forcefully 
advanced this criticism, stating, “it often seems that Kierkegaardian subjectivity—far from being 
concrete and existential, is but an abstraction vibrating in a vacuum.”99 This interpretation, 
however, clashes with Anti-Climacus's relational account of the self, in which the self exists 
concretely in relation to the world, God, and other beings. In his view, the single, "actual self" is 
not finite or infinite, for as a synthesis of both, it possesses both finite and infinite aspects (SUD: 
55). Anti-Climacus stresses that the infinite self “is really only the most abstract form, the most 
                                                
98 In recent times, Patrick Stokes has argued that Kierkegaard distinguishes between a phenomenally given self and 
a narratively constituted person, and that these are separate forms of selfhood that interact with each other. While the 
phenomenal self is eternal and exists only in the present moment, or synchronically, the person (or human being) 
exists over a span of time, or diachronically. See The Naked Self, Chapter 7. In awkwardly positing two different 
selves that somehow interact to make up the life of the single individual, Stokes appears to want to downplay the 
paradoxical nature of the self, or even to show how this paradox might be resolved. He also ignores that for 
Kierkegaard, the self becomes eternal in time, rather than beginning to exist as eternal (even though it is essentially 
that). In this life, the eternal resides in consciousness as a possibility that the human being is tasked with actualizing.  




abstract possibility of the self,” and that the individual who has not accepted the finite and 
concrete aspect of himself has failed to exist as a self (SUD: 68). The abstract self corresponds 
with essence in the realm of ideality and possibility, and is like the "base line" of the artist's 
drawing, in which the actuality of the drawing is what truly matters in the end.  
In the same way, Kierkegaard prizes the individual who, through an awareness of his 
essence or the image of eternity in him, aims to existentially transform himself into the person he 
ought to be by living well, or producing the right kind of "drawing" of his life. It would be a 
mistake to identify entirely with one aspect of the self, which the man of immediacy does when 
he identifies himself merely by externalities or finite conditions, or as Anti-Climacus puts it, by 
“the clothes he wears,” instead of taking into account the more abstract qualities of the self and 
its capacity for transcending these conditions (SUD: 53). But it would also be wrong to conceive 
of oneself altogether abstractly, as speculative thinkers often do. Nevertheless, the self cannot 
become actualized as spirit to any appreciable extent until it becomes able to understand itself at 
the level of ideality, rather than only understanding itself as a psychical being that is embodied in 
the world. Only in this way will one be able to break free from mindless social conformity and 
the snares of sensuality or worldliness, so that one can come to know the extraordinary potential 
one has as an individual before God. For Kierkegaard, the hope is that in knowing oneself in this 
way, the individual will resolve to live a genuinely Christian way of life apart from these 
damaging influences. 
There are different gradations of reflective self-consciousness, depending on how fully 
the separation from immediacy has progressed. For instance, Anti-Climacus believes that most 
people live mostly within immediacy, and so only have what he describes as “an admixture of a 
little dash of reflection” (SUD: 58). Their thinking is generally directed toward states of affairs in 
the world and more mundane concerns about themselves and the community, rather than toward 
deeper and more spiritual concerns. In this case, one would have a vague idea of being an 
enduring self with an eternal and infinite aspect while engaging in this kind of thinking, but this 
would not be brought to heightened awareness or scrutiny. The kind of objective reflection 
Climacus discusses would also seem to fit broadly within this category. It takes the form of 
calculation, scientific reasoning, problem solving and the like, and so would require a 
tremendous amount of abstract thinking about the world in general. It would also demand a 




possibilities in existence. Because objective thought is disinterested, however, none of this would 
involve a significant appreciation for himself as an existing subject, or an application of these 
ideas to his personal life. Without this kind of self-awareness or appropriation of one's thought, 
the objective thinker takes his own personal existence to be insignificant with respect to 
proceedings in the universe or the world at large, and so does not feel the gravity of being a 
single individual within it.  
 Climacus refers to the type of reflective self-consciousness that involves a deepened 
awareness of oneself as an individual as subjective reflection. In expressing the difference 
between objective and subjective reflection, he explains: 
 
Whereas objective thinking is indifferent to the thinking subject and his existence, the subjective thinker 
as existing is essentially interested in his own thinking, is existing in it. Therefore, his thinking has 
another kind of reflection, specifically, that of inwardness, of possession, whereby it belongs to the 
subject and to no one else. Whereas objective thinking invests everything in the result and assists all 
humankind to cheat by copying and reeling off the results and answers, subjective thinking invests 
everything in the process of becoming and omits the result... (CUP: 72-73) 
 
Climacus believes that the subjective thinker will be interested in learning about truths that 
pertain to him as an individual, rather than objective truths that overlook this. Although she will 
be self-interested in a spiritual sense, her reflective activity is not in service to the self-interest of 
immediacy, which would include egotistical desires for material wealth, power, status, pleasure, 
and so on. In her continual spiritual seeking, the subjective thinker will instead consider 
existential issues related to discovering her purpose in life and the meaning it has for her. 
Because she is in a process of becoming, she will do this without coming to a firm conclusion or 
being certain about having a final answer. The self-interest of the subjective thinker could 
involve, among other things, rumination over questions about her death, immortality, and 
salvation, a focus on ethical action, thoughts about her relationship with God, and an 
acknowledgment of guilt and a resolve to do better. Anti-Climacus laments that many people are 
not consistently mindful of these crucial issues, although he believes that all human beings are 






1.4.3   The Awakened Self: Freedom and the Will in the Self 
 When the individual knows himself in his infinite aspect and engages in subjective 
reflection, he recognizes that, in an important respect, he is essentially free from any external 
condition that would determine him or define him as a self. Anti-Climacus claims: “The self is 
freedom,” where freedom is understood as the activity of relating oneself to oneself (SUD: 29). 
In the last section, I explained that this self-relational activity involves reflection, which along 
with the imagination, is "the first condition for what becomes of a person" (PC: 186). But for 
Anti-Climacus, the will is just as important to selfhood as self-relational activity, and is "the 
second and in the ultimate sense the decisive condition" (PC: 186). In other words, a person is 
spirit in actuality if and only if he or she has reflection, imagination, and a will, along with a 
being a subjective thinker. In this section, I will discuss the way in which the self can exercise its 
will in existence upon discovering its freedom as an "infinite self." This is not only an expression 
for the self as a pure subject of awareness, but also for the self as a free agent that is able to 
imagine possibilities and realize them in existence as spirit in actuality. In other words, as an 
infinite self with a capacity for transcendence, one is able to act upon oneself in one's concretion, 
or to mold or shape oneself in existence in a manner of one's choosing. For Anti-Climacus, the 
realization of selfhood does not arrive by necessity or come naturally "as a matter of course," and 
so the will is needed to push the self into higher stages of existential development (SUD: 58). 
Only in freedom does he believe that one can become one's true self by willing to be oneself 
before God.  
 In Anti-Climacus' view, the will develops later in human life after the emergence of 
reflective self-consciousness, and does not feature in the earlier stages of selfhood when the 
individual is spirit in potentiality.100 With the unreflective form of self-consciousness, the self is 
passively absorbed in the world in a state of immediacy, and so it does not act of its own accord. 
The psychical and physical aspects of the human being are mobilized by objects and events 
unfolding in the world, which means he has certain desires, feelings, and natural dispositions that 
move him to act. These are stimulated by external conditions, rather than purposefully selected 
by him as an agent who has come to himself in self-knowledge. Anti-Climacus therefore 
                                                
100 Anti-Climacus appears to adopt this position when he writes that consciousness is "decisive with regard to the 
self. The more consciousness, the more self; the more consciousness, the more will; the more will; the more self. A 
person who has no will at all is not a self; but the more will he has, the more self-consciousness that he has also" 
(SUD: 29). As I explained in the last section, those in the earlier stages of immediacy are only conscious to a 




suggests that a distinction can be drawn between desires, which are involuntary affects that 
convey a physical or psychological need of something temporal, and the will, which is a self-
relational activity through which one decides what he will desire and what he will make of 
himself as a person.101 The will might be thought of as a non-naturalistic form of desire, but 
these are nevertheless categorically distinct, since only spiritual beings have a will. To avoid 
confusion and keep these terms separate, I will refer to naturalistic desire as "desire" while 
referring to non-naturalistic desire as "will."   
 To better understand this distinction I am making between desire and the will, it will be 
helpful to consult the works of Harry Frankfurt, who in writing on persons in recent times, has 
brought themes intimated in Kierkegaard to remarkable clarity. Frankfurt achieves this by 
drawing a distinction between wantons and persons, which closely parallels Kierkegaard's 
distinction between what I have referred to as spirit in potentiality and spirit in actuality. For 
Frankfurt, the wanton is someone who, like the young child described earlier, "does not care 
about his will," and whose "desires move him to do certain things, without its being true of him 
either that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by other 
desires."102 Frankfurt distinguishes the wanton, who only has such "first-order desires," from a 
person, who has "second-order volitions" when he wants or does not want certain desires to be 
his will.103 Frankfurt argues that second-order volitions are a type of desire made possible by the 
reflexive structure of the mind of persons, which allows us to desire that certain desires move us 
to act, while desiring that others do not. This reflexive structure, he claims in a move strikingly 
similar to the one made by Kierkegaard, is evident in "our peculiar knack of separating from the 
immediate content and flow of our own consciousness and introducing a sort of division within 
our minds...which enables us to focus our attention directly upon ourselves."104 Describing how 
consciousness enables this type of "monitoring oversight," he writes: 
 
                                                
101 In contrasting spiritual inwardness with desire, Kierkegaard writes: “Inwardness is the eternal, and desire is the 
temporal, but the temporal cannot hold out with the eternal. Desire glows less and less fervently, and at last its time 
is over, but the time of inwardness is never over. Inwardness, its need for God, has then conquered, and the 
supplicant does not seek God in the external world, does not create him in his desires, but finds him in his inner 
being" (JP II: 2114). As we will see, inwardness consists of an intensification or empowerment of the will, rather 
than its dissolution.  
102 Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, p. 16. 
103 Ibid. 




When we divide our consciousness in this way, we objectify to ourselves the ingredient items of our 
ongoing mental life. It is this self-objectification that is particularly distinctive of human mentality. We are 
unique (probably) in being able simultaneously to be engaged in whatever is going on in our conscious 
minds, to detach ourselves from it, and to observe it—as it were—from a distance. We are then in a 
position to form reflexive or higher-order responses to it. For instance, we may approve of what we notice 
ourselves feeling, or we may disapprove; we may want to remain the sort of person we observe ourselves to 
be, or we may want to be different. Our division of ourselves situates us to come up with a variety of 
supervisory desires, intentions, and interventions that pertain to the several constituents and aspects of our 
conscious life.105 
 
In a similar way, for Anti-Climacus, one's consciousness is divided and the self and its desires 
are objectified with the awakening of reflective self-consciousness. In his terms, the "infinite 
self" separates itself from the immediate contents of consciousness or its "finite self" in order to 
monitor what is happening within it and in the world in general, and to respond in a manner that 
it sees fit. The infinite self is not the universal subject of German Idealism, although by 
separating itself from particular conditions in its internal and external environment, it becomes 
capable of conceiving of them under universal concepts, ideas, and rules. For Anti-Climacus, the 
infinite self is an individual agent that thinks about its situation from a universalized perspective 
and decides what it will desire and how it will act. "With the help of this infinite form," he 
writes, the self can contemplate its condition and use its will to "make his self into the self he 
wants to be, to determine what he will have or not have in his concrete self" (SUD: 68).106 The 
concrete self would include what Frankfurt describes as the ingredient items of one's mental life, 
such as one's first-order desires, psyche and embodied condition. For both Frankfurt and 
Kierkegaard, the self can therefore transform or shape itself in a manner of its choosing through 
its reflective capacity, while continuing to engage with its concrete existence as a human being in 
the world.  
                                                
105 Ibid. 
106 It should be noted that Anti-Climacus says this of the self in despair, who in defiance, wills to be "master of itself 
or to create itself" by using his will to transform himself into whatever he wants to be. It might, then, seem like 
using the will to shape oneself as a human being is what one ought not to be doing in avoiding or eliminating 
despair. However, this is not correct, since not willing to be oneself (which means living as the wanton or spirit in 
potentiality) is also a form of despair. It must be recognized that for Anti-Climacus, those who despair in defiance 
are one step closer to eliminating despair, since they will to be themselves. But this is still despair because in willing 
to be the self that they want to be, they do not will to be the self that God wants them to be. In order to overcome 
despair, then, one must willingly choose to be who God wants one to be, and this might not initially align with the 
ideas one has concerning who one wants to be. In this way, one accepts that God is ultimately the master over 




 But while Frankfurt understands the "higher-order" volitional activity of persons to be a 
reflexive mode of desiring that originates from processes immanent in the natural world, for 
Anti-Climacus, the will of the person is non-naturalistic. As transcendent, it is genuinely of a 
higher order.107 In Kierkegaard's view, the reflective and volitional activity of the self is not a 
derivative mode of activity that originates in lower-level processes occurring in the natural 
world, although the self awakens in response to these conditions that affect it as a psyche-body 
unity. It is rather a separate, higher-level activity originating from the eternal component in the 
self that disrupts one's natural spontaneity, which had formerly swept up the self in it in the state 
of immediacy. As Haufniensis explains, the fact that spirit disrupts the immediate harmony 
between itself and the world in becoming active in reflection and willing makes it an ambiguous 
power: 
 
Inasmuch as it [spirit] is now present, it is in a sense a hostile power, for it constantly disturbs the relation 
between psyche and body, a relation that indeed has persistence and yet does not have endurance, 
inasmuch as it first receives the latter by spirit. On the other hand, spirit is a friendly power, since it is 
precisely that which constitutes the relation. (CA: 43-44, trans. modified)108 
 
Spirit is originally inactive and abstract in holding psyche and body together as a unity, and for 
this reason, Anti-Climacus describes the relation between them as a "negative unity" (SUD: 13). 
However, once it awakens from its wanton slumber and begins to relate itself to itself through its 
own acts as an "infinite self," the relationship between spirit and the psyche-body unity becomes 
unstable. Rather than being moved to act by the strongest desires, earthly passions, or impulses 
that spring up in him, the individual now has possession of himself, and can decide which of 
these desires will move him to act. Since he has separated himself from his first-order desires as 
                                                
107 By taking the second-order volitions of persons to be reflexive desires, Frankfurt suggests that these volitions 
derive from events in the natural world. This allows him to avoid having to posit an irreducible distinction, or a 
genuine duality, between the will of persons and their first-order desires, or between the person and conditions in the 
natural world. However, this would mean that the "higher-order" activity of persons is something of a misnomer for 
Frankfurt, since first-order desires and second-order volitions can be said to occur from within the single order of the 
natural world. For Kierkegaard, who holds that existence is characterized by irresolvable duality, the will of persons 
arises at the level of the eternal, which is essentially different from the level of the temporal, where desiring and 
sensuality come into play.  
108 Ludwig Klages is an opponent of Haufniensis on this point. Like Haufniensis, Klages conceives of the human 
being as consisting of a tripartite division of spirit, body, and psyche, where psyche and body were intimately 
intertwined. However, he did not think that spirit constituted the relation between psyche and body, but instead 
conceived of it as an alien and destructive power hostile to it. In his view, spirit could be said to "hijack" the living 
unity of soul and body. See Spirit as Adversary of the Soul. For Kierkegaard, however, it would be more proper to 




an infinite self, he can also decide not to allow any of these to move him to act, and to instead 
commit himself to some interest that is not already present in his motivational repertoire.109 With 
his naturalistic model, Frankfurt suggests that this is not the case, and that the individual is 
limited to the menu of options nature and culture offer him when deciding how he will act. But 
as an infinite self, Anti-Climacus suggests that he can use his imagination to choose an option 
that is not on this menu, and move himself to act based on a thought or idea that inspires him. 
For example, Kierkegaard thinks that in drawing its power from the eternal, it should be in the 
interest of spirit to "hold temporality down" by curbing sensuality and the pleasures of the flesh, 
which were previously enjoyed without inhibition (CD: 99). This commitment to suppress or 
extinguish at least some of one's first-order desires could not come from the faculty in the self 
that contains first-order desires, since then this faculty would contradict itself. It must therefore 
come from a different part of the self.110  
 With the awakening of self-relational activity, the tripartite relationship between spirit, 
psyche, and body is marked by conflict because the human being acts at the intersection of time 
and eternity. There are now two competing levels of activity or spontaneity occurring within the 
self that are not in essential agreement. The lower spontaneity belongs to a temporal world-
process that unfolds in the state of immediacy, which spirit in potentiality is in accord with. This 
natural process, which we are passively absorbed in during the first period of life, encompasses 
the psyche-body relation of the human being, and would include things like perception, desiring, 
and the vital functioning of its organic life. The higher spontaneity that emerges in reflection 
institutes a personal process driven by the will. This process attains its goal or telos when the 
individual becomes himself in truth as spirit in actuality. In using one's will to participate in the 
personal process of becoming oneself, the temporal world-process is momentarily disrupted and 
apprehended in consciousness. In cognizing objects and events in the world, and using one's 
imagination to consider ideas and possibilities that one might realize, one can decide what to 
                                                
109 Thanks to David Sussman for raising this idea in comments on this draft. I am also using his phrasing, which 
frames the issue nicely.   
110 Plato makes this argument in defense of the tripartite division of the soul in the Republic. In determining whether 
the soul consists of one part or many parts, he claims that it is impossible for something to undergo opposites in the 
same part of itself, in relation to the same thing, at the same time (436a-b). Since the soul can desire drink while at 
the same time forbidding itself to drink, it cannot be that these actions take place in the same part of the soul (439b). 
Therefore, the soul must have at least two parts. For Plato, it is the rational part of the soul that opposes the 





make of oneself as a human being. In choosing what one will do in existence, or what one wants 
to desire, or what kind of person one will be, the temporal process can be disrupted in various 
ways. For instance, in occupying a detached position from oneself as an infinite self, one might 
resist certain desires, moods, or feelings that naturally arise, or shift one's attention away from 
certain thoughts in favor of others, or redirect one's energies toward a different course of action. 
Although such exercises of self-control that reflection enables can create discord within the self 
and be a source of unease, by exerting its will, the self takes a stance on its own existence as a 
human being, and "puts its foot down" by demonstrating its agency in the world. In becoming 
active through self-reflection and willing, the self is no longer a mere "negative unity," but 
makes itself concrete as a "positive third" in the relation (SUD: 13). The individual who reaches 
this stage of consciousness is capable of thinking critically about himself and living in the world 
as his own person, instead of being a mere instrument of temporal or societal forces who goes 
through life like a leaf blowing in the wind.   
 Kierkegaard would also disagree with Frankfurt's claim that the self creates or constitutes 
itself through its willing, since he believes that the self, in being given its existence by God, 
already exists as constituted prior to willing.111 Nevertheless, as I explained in section 1.1, 
Kierkegaard believes that God grants the human being freedom in creating him from nothing. 
Anti-Climacus defines the self's freedom as “the dialectical aspect of possibility and necessity” 
(SUD: 29). This suggests that there is a dynamic relationship between these two components of 
the self, as possibilities are realized in existence, and the necessary conditions that circumscribe 
his empirical existence are transferred into the realm of possibility through the self's synthesizing 
activity. Anti-Climacus believes that the imagination, as the fundamental capacity of spirit and 
the source of reflection, is the medium through which the self relates to infinitude, possibility, 
and ideality. Through the imagination, the individual can imagine different possible ways he 
might be or act, and can use his freedom as an infinite self to shape or mold his life on the basis 
of these ideas and possibilities (SUD: 31). In being interested in his existence as a subjective 
thinker, he might decide to become a different kind of person than the one he was in immediacy, 
when he acted out of his natural spontaneity or in imitation of others, and not in freedom. The 
                                                
111 Frankfurt claims that when someone decides to desire something, "The decision determines what the person 
really wants by making the desire on which he decides fully his own. To this extent the person, in making a decision 
by which he identifies with a desire, constitutes himself... It is these acts of ordering and of rejection...that create a 




individual who has achieved reflective self-consciousness is therefore capable of demonstrating 
real and independent agency in existence, and can be self-determining on a regular basis if he 
takes up the task of becoming himself earnestly. However, although one has considerable room 
to use one's freedom to make of oneself what one would like, there is a particular kind of person 
God wants one to be, and this shape of the self is discovered at the end of the journey toward 
becoming one's true self.112 As we will see later, if the person one wants to be does not align with 
the person that God wants one to be, then one is in despair. 
 Kierkegaard does not believe that self-determination means to be able to choose 
arbitrarily, or in isolation from the worldly conditions that determine our nature as human beings. 
He emphasizes that since the self is subject to necessity in being concrete, the will has a 
“continually progressive history,” and that a person "can go so far that he finally loses even the 
capacity of being able to choose” (JP II: 1268). He concedes that our actions and character is 
determined significantly by the temporal aspect of our nature, which includes a historical 
condition, a social context, our relationships with others, our physical and psychological 
constitution, and so on. Because of this, our character and behaviors can often be very difficult to 
change through acts of will. This view can be illustrated through the case of the compulsive liar 
who wants to reform himself. It would take diligent effort for him to break his habit, and he 
could not simply choose to become an honest person overnight upon realizing that it is a 
possibility for him. In fact, the desire to lie might be so ingrained in him that he finds himself 
unable not to lie, despite him not wanting this desire to move him to act.113 Supposing the 
exercise of freedom did not depend on necessary conditions that impact his life, or the lower 
spontaneity, the compulsive liar might become an honest person overnight without encountering 
                                                
112 Kierkegaard writes, "at every person’s birth, there comes into existence an eternal purpose for that person, for 
that person in particular. Faithfulness to oneself with respect to this is the highest thing a person can do" (UDVS: 
93). This essentialist view of the self differs from the Sartrian view that the self is entirely what we make of it, and 
that it has no real essence apart from that. It also lends a kind of objectivity and normativity to Kierkegaard's 
account of the self, and keeps his notion of freedom from being entirely subjective. For Kierkegaard, there is a fact 
of the matter about who we are and how we should live, although as sinners, we are fleeing from it and engaging in 
self-deception to avoid becoming who we essentially are. 
113 Frankfurt would say that in this case, the desire to lie would be a force that is not his own, just as the unwilling 
drug addict is overcome by a force that is not his own when he takes the drug he is addicted to. See The Importance 
of What We Care About, p. 18. He refers to desires that make us act in ways that we do not want as "alien intruders 
by which we are helplessly beset." See Taking Ourselves Seriously, p. 8. Kierkegaard would not agree with this 
assessment, however. In his view, we must take responsibility for what constitutes us as finite beings, and ultimately 
consent to these desires when they move us to act. He thinks we must accept all our desires as parts of ourselves, 
however ugly or unwanted they might be, and however much they should be resisted. In his account of personhood, 
Frankfurt therefore identifies the self too strongly with what Kierkegaard refers to as the "infinite self," while failing 




further difficulty. As it stands, part of his character is finitely determined in such a way that this 
would be impossible.  
 But by endowing the will with a history, Kierkegaard does not admit that temporal 
conditions fully determine our actions or character. While they influence reflection, imagination, 
and willing, and constrain them in various ways, Anti-Climacus does not believe that these 
higher faculties of spirit can be reduced to them. Since the self is free as a synthesis of possibility 
and necessity, it can use its imagination and choose among possibilities that do not eventuate out 
of necessity. Haufniensis explains that this includes the possibility of sin, or disobedience of the 
will of God. The kind of freedom the human being possesses, he states, “is infinite and arises out 
of nothing” (CA: 112). Hence, it does not originate from determinate processes occurring in the 
natural world, but rather from an indeterminate domain of possibility. In its infinitude, the self is, 
to a certain extent, free from external determination, and can shape itself in a manner of its 
choosing by surpassing what it is at the finite level at any given moment. As an infinite self, one 
causally influences events in the natural order from a position outside of it by deciding how he 
will act, or by committing to a certain way of life. As a finite self, however, one is also 
positioned within the natural order. The dialectical process of selfhood thereby unfolds 
successively in time as the human being oscillates between transcendence and immanence, 
without ever fully coinciding with himself or staying put at one of these positions for more than a 
moment.114 Because the self is divided in this way, it can be an object to itself, and both make 
itself and be made by itself.  
 Both in his own works and in the pseudonyms, Kierkegaard suggests that we should not 
understand ourselves as separated entirely from the world as free-floating selves, just as we 
should not understand ourselves as being entirely absorbed in it as mere things.115 Describing 
this state of being in-between worldliness and otherworldliness, Anti-Climacus writes: 
 
To become oneself is to become concrete. But to become concrete is neither to become finite nor to 
become infinite, for that which is to become concrete is indeed a synthesis. Consequently, the progress of 
                                                
114 Climacus appears to have this circular movement in mind when he states that a human being “thinks and exists, 
and existence separates thinking and being, holds them apart from each other in succession” (CUP: 332).  
115 Kierkegaard emphasizes that the self remains in immediacy as long as it exists, and cannot reflect itself out of it 
or go outside of it. “Even the most persistent abstractedness in a human being still cannot wholly renounce 
immediacy; on the contrary, he becomes continually more conscious of it in trying to escape it, if for no other 
reason. The immediate is his foothold, and no matter how he may soar, no matter how extravagant he becomes in 




the becoming must be an infinite moving away from itself in the infinitizing of the self, and an infinite 
coming back to itself in the finitizing process. (SUD: 30) 
 
The process of "infinitizing" occurs when the self detaches itself from the finite component of its 
being and ascends into ideality through the imagination, while the "finitizing" process occurs 
when the self descends back into reality to realize its ideas or possibilities concretely through an 
endeavor of the will. In this case, the infinite component of the self is the active principle in the 
relation, and it works upon the finite component of the self to impel change or movement within 
it. The finite component, in its correspondence with psyche and body, is not inert before being 
acted upon by the self, but is moved by forces and events in the world, and it continues to be so 
even when moved by the "infinitizing" of the self. In temporality, the self is therefore the site of 
its own internal self-relational activity as well as the external activity of the world that affects it 
as a psyche-body unity. The activity of the world cannot reach the infinite aspect of the self, but 
it can reach the finite aspect, just as the infinite self can.  
 Although the powers of the eternal and temporal are united in the self as a synthesis, they 
are nevertheless in fierce conflict within this union, vying for control over the concrete aspect of 
the human being, which is bound up in existence. The human being therefore occupies a 
precarious position. He must decide whether to live in worship, seeking God for consolation in a 
time of distress, or to relinquish the freedom God gave him by falling prey to sensuality or 
worldliness. Interpreting a key passage from the gospels, Kierkegaard writes:  
 
You cannot serve God and mammon, not God and the world, not good and evil; and the reason a human 
being can serve only one master is undoubtedly that these two powers, even though the one power is the 
infinitely stronger, are in mortal combat with each other. This enormous danger...that a human being is 
placed between these two enormous powers and the choice is left up to him, this enormous danger is what 
entails that one must either love or hate, that not to love is to hate. These two powers are so inimical that 
the slightest leaning to one side is regarded from the other side as the unconditional opposite. (WA: 34) 
 
Kierkegaard believes that the existing individual is pulled in two directions, between being and 
nothingness, and it is up to him to decide what power will prevail in their contest over him. His 




and ironically, even value it as the medium through which he becomes eternal.116 As a Christian, 
he believes that self-renunciation and self-discipline is needed to quench the passions and 
appetites that the world stirs, so that the individual can embody his faith in the midst of a hostile 
world as Christ did.  
 
1.4.4   Pulling Oneself Together: The Integration of the Eternal and Temporal in the Self 
 Spirit synthesizes the different components that make up the self in such a way that they 
become concretized, or in other words, existentially realized in the life of the individual. The 
structure of the self is summarized in the chart below. 
 
                        
                                   
     Figure 1: The Constitution of the Self 
 
                                                
116 Kierkegaard states that the Christian should become aware of "precisely how valuable that is which is discarded 
in reflection" (POV: 93). According to his dialectical conception of personal development, life in the temporal is not 
discarded in the sense of being eradicated, but is preserved and transformed as one becomes a Christian and has 
one's faith tested amid life in the world. On his view, the self is built up in time, and so one needs the temporal to 
become eternal. Kierkegaard elaborates on this while condemning the meager, state-sponsored Christianity of his 
time: "One does not become a Christian through reflection, but in reflection to become a Christian means that there 
is something else to discard. A person does not reflect himself into being a Christian but out of something else in 
order to become a Christian, especially when the situation is Christendom, where one must reflect oneself out of the 
appearance of being a Christian" (POV: 93). But for Kierkegaard, the religious way of life is primarily characterized 
by existential action or practice rather than theoretical reflection on religious matters. He states that the goal of his 
authorship was to articulate "the religious completely cast into reflection, yet in such a way that it is completely 




Before discussing the way in which spirit unites contradictory components in the act of 
synthesis, it would be helpful to compare the dualism Kierkegaard advocates to that of Descartes. 
The Cartesian view, which makes no distinction between soul and spirit, notoriously leads to 
difficulties concerning the nature of the relationship between soul and body. In her response to 
the Meditations, Princess Elizabeth objected that if soul and body are two essentially different 
types of substance characterized by thought and extension respectively, then it is difficult to 
conceive of how they can causally interact with one another.117 It would seem that they would 
have to be linked in some way, but the nature of this link would remain inscrutable. In recent 
times, this has been called “the problem of heterogeneity.”118 Critics of dualism argue that it 
must be addressed in any case where there exists an irreducible distinction between 
heterogeneous aspects of reality that nevertheless interact with one another.119 
 In his correspondence to Elizabeth, Descartes responded to the problem by explaining 
that, through the understanding, we have a “primitive notion” of the union of soul and body.120 
While we can conceive of soul and body clearly and distinctly, we cannot conceive of their union 
clearly and distinctly, although we experience it through our senses in daily life and otherwise 
take it for granted. The difficulty, Descartes says, is that to conceive of their union, “it is 
necessary to conceive them as one single thing and at the same time to conceive them as two, 
which is contradictory.”121 Although the precise mechanism of the union between soul and body 
remains a mystery to the understanding for Descartes, he considers it to be a brute fact of 
experience that we have an idea of, and does not believe it is worth puzzling over by attempting 
to conceptualize it any further than that. 
 Kierkegaard runs into the same difficulty as Descartes in accounting for the union 
between eternity and temporality on a conceptual level, and so has the same type of response at 
                                                
117 Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes, The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia 
and Rene Descartes, p. 62 
118 See Richardson, "The `Scandal' of Cartesian Interactionism," pp. 20-21. 
119 Kierkegaard appears to sympathize with the worry expressed by Elizabeth based on remarks he makes under the 
pseudonym of Vigilius Haufniensis, who conceives of man as a synthesis of the eternal and the temporal. He 
contends that such a synthesis is “unthinkable” if these two components are not united in a third element, since they 
are contradictory (CA: 43). He writes, “…a synthesis that is a contradiction cannot be completed as a synthesis 
without a third factor, because the fact that the synthesis is a contradiction asserts that it is not” (CA: 85). The third 
factor that reconciles the eternal and temporal and sustains the synthesis in existence, he says, is spirit (CA: 43). Yet 
Haufniensis does not explain how a third would be capable of uniting two contradictory things, which he would 
need to do in order to resolve the problem effectively. Thanks to David Sussman for raising this objection.  
120 Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes, The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia 
and Rene Descartes, p. 69 




his disposal. As Dunning points out, Kierkegaard endorses a dialectic of paradox when dealing 
with human existence, wherein “a genuine unity is achieved, but one that accentuates rather than 
supersedes the contradiction between the two poles.”122 This paradoxical unity that constitutes 
the human being is intractable to a logical analysis carried out in abstraction, and so would be 
anathema to the objective thinker. In Kierkegaard’s view, however, it is a fact of everyday life 
that can be discerned through a phenomenological analysis of the self like the one provided in 
this chapter. It would be fair to say that a large portion of Kierkegaard's authorship is an attempt 
to think through this contradiction as it works itself out over the different stages of human life. 
While Kierkegaard's dialectic is paradoxical, this does not mean that he is inconsistent when 
drawing connections among the various features of human experience. Malantshuck explains that 
Kierkegaard regarded consistency as a crucial component in his dialectical method, and that he 
strove for coherence in his thinking despite the complexities entailed by thinking through a 
paradox.123  
 Kierkegaard follows Hegel in affirming a dialectical understanding of existence. Hegel 
does not subscribe to a dialectic of paradox, however, but rather a dialectic of mediation, in 
which the unity of the subjective and objective aspects of the human being can be understood 
through logical analysis.124 During the process of mediation, all contradictions between opposing 
principles of existence, such as infinitude and finitude or subject and object, are resolved or 
annulled as they achieve a higher unity in consciousness. Hegel contends that mediation occurs 
in the relationship between the subject and object of consciousness in three moments, as Spirit 
posits itself in its existence. In the first moment, Spirit negates itself as subject in order to make 
itself into an object of consciousness. In the second moment, Spirit negates itself as object and 
returns into itself as subject. He explains: 
 
  …this positing at the same time contains the other moment, viz. that self-consciousness has  
                                                
122 Dunning, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness, p. 8. 
123 For a good exposition of Kierkegaard's dialectical method, see Malantschuck, Kierkegaard's Thought, Chapter 2. 
124 Unlike Hegel, Climacus assumes that the opposites that constitute the human being are synthesized rather than 
mediated. Taylor notes that Kierkegaard carefully chooses this term to distinguish his conception of the self from 
that of Hegel. In his Logic, Hegel explicitly disavows the term as suitable for explaining his philosophy, writing, 
“the very expression synthesis easily recalls an external unity and mere combination of entities which are in and for 
themselves separate." See The Logic of Hegel, p. 589. Yet as Taylor explains, Kierkegaard adopts the term because 
he believes that the self is precisely such a unity of separate and opposing elements. See Journeys to Selfhood, p. 
170. Kierkegaard believes this synthetic unity can be given a phenomenological analysis, but since thinking and 




  equally superseded this externalization and objectivity too, and taken it back into itself so that it is in    
                communion with itself in its otherness as such. This is the movement of consciousness, and in that     
                movement consciousness is the totality of its moments.125   
 
The “otherness” of the object described by Hegel is not a true otherness, but is one generated 
from the negative activity of self-positing. In the third moment, which is one of communion, the 
contradiction between the two poles is reconciled and new content comes into being. This leads 
to a new contradiction that ensues due to Spirit ceaselessly negating the content it produces in 
order to produce a more fully realized form of its existence. In this way, the cycle repeats itself, 
and internal contradictions within the being of Spirit continue to develop and resolve themselves 
throughout the act of self-positing. With this, Hegel claims to have given a logical explanation 
for his brand of dialectic.  
 According to Hegelian logic, although the object appears to the subject as radically other 
in the earlier stages of the development of consciousness, the man of knowledge, with rational 
insight into the nature of Spirit, learns that they are in truth identical. The object is the finite 
expression of the infinite life of the subject. For Hegel, this means that the inner ultimately is the 
outer, albeit in an inchoate and unrealized state.126 While the phenomenal appearance of 
differentiation or division between subject and object remains, with the attainment of absolute 
knowledge, these differences become mediated in such a way that the reflective subject comes to 
know itself through the object, along with knowing the object to be something posited by it. 
Through such knowledge, the subject no longer conceives of itself as separate from the object of 
consciousness, but rather recognizes its essential unity with it. 
 In his departure from Hegel's dialectic, Kierkegaard does not have recourse to the 
negative activity of mediation to explain how the opposing constituents of spirit are integrated in 
consciousness. Instead, in looking at the evidence gathered from his own experience as an 
individual, he believes that the unity between the eternal and temporal, infinite and finite, and 
                                                
125 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 479. 
126 See for instance this passage from Hegel: See for instance this passage from Hegel: "The inner is determined as 
the form of reflected immediacy or of essence over against the outer as the form of being, but the two are only one 
identity. This identity is first, the substantial unity of both as a substrate pregnant with content, or the absolute fact 
[Sache], in which the two determinations are indifferent, external moments. By virtue of this, it is a content and that 
totality which is the inner that equally becomes external, but in this externality is not the result of becoming or 
transition but is identical with itself. The outer, according to this determination, is not only identical with the inner 
in respect of content but both are only one fact" (Science of Logic, p. 524). Quotation borrowed from a footnote by 




possibility and necessity is obtained through passion. As Climacus explains, "Only momentarily 
can a particular individual, existing, be in a unity of the infinite and the finite that transcends 
existing. This instant is the moment of passion” (CUP: 197). Rejecting Hegel's claim that, in the 
life of Spirit, a strict identity exists between the subject and object of consciousness, Climacus 
states: “An existing person cannot be in two places at the same time, cannot be subject-object. 
When he is closest to being in two places at the same time, he is in passion; but passion is only 
momentary, and passion is the highest pitch of subjectivity” (CUP: 199). Passion therefore binds 
the infinite or "abstract" aspect of the self to the finite aspect as the human being experiences 
different moments over time. As we have seen, the changes that occur at the level of finite 
existence in the world continually disrupt one's identity and keep one's actual self from being 
entirely the same from one moment to the next, despite one's retaining an identity or essence that 
ought to be actualized through the infinite aspect of the self. With the aid of recollection and the 
imagination, passion works to counteract this separation that arises between the two aspects of 
the self by helping to integrate the different moments of one's life, so that one understands them 
as forming a unified whole. This action taken by the self to gather itself and recover its losses 
from the nothingness of the temporal helps one achieve a stable and continuous identity in one's 
concrete existence, and keeps the self from drifting away from itself in the errant course of 
temporality. In passion, one becomes what one essentially is by being steadfast as a single 
individual, as opposed to losing oneself in the natural flux by taking leave of one's nature as 
spirit. 
 Kierkegaard explores the nature of passion, along with the connection between self and 
world that it establishes under the pseudonym of Johannes De Silentio in Fear and Trembling. 
Silentio describes passion as a volitional activity that is within the power of the human being. He 
provides an unusual definition of passion as "the power to concentrate the whole substance of his 
life and the meaning of actuality into one single desire" (F&T: 42-43). It is therefore an intense 
focus of attention on a specific idea, end, or purpose that one is interested in existentially 
realizing above all else. In the case of the Christian, for instance, this would involve a single-
minded pursuit of an eternal happiness. Silentio argues: “If a person lacks this concentration, this 
focus, his soul is dissipated in multiplicity from the very beginning” (F&T: 43). His point is that 
a resolution to aim at a single good unifies the human being by integrating the eternal and 




changeless criterion through which he can understand himself amidst the aimless confusion and 
vacillation of temporal existence.127 Anti-Climacus follows up on this idea when he claims that 
the individual who has several different or conflicting desires of comparable standing has little to 
integrate his life as a whole. Without a firm principle to dedicate himself to and order his life by, 
he is at risk of being disintegrated in the chaos of the temporal, and being a slave of immediate 
inclination or impulse (SUD: 107). In addition to being an activity of the individual through 
which it shapes itself in its existence, passion has a passive dimension. In passion, the self exerts 
itself upon being seized by an idea or possibility that mobilizes its activity. Passion is also 
passive insofar as the individual is delivered over into existence without having chosen it, and 
yet he finds himself compelled to act and freely choose how to live. This too has an air of 
paradox that "perfectly fits" the individual in the grips of passion, as contradictory elements are 
brought to a unity in his life (CUP: 230).  
 Silentio agrees with Climacus that passion constitutes "the essentially human" existence 
(F&T: 121). This view would seem to run into significant problems, since it is common for 
human beings to have many different and even competing desires without ceasing to be human 
or failing to have the sense of being the same person over time. In his Journals, Kierkegaard 
even acknowledges that a lack of pointed concentration is the rule rather than the exception: 
 
…there are many people, surely by far the majority, who are able to live without any real consciousness 
penetrating their lives. For them it is certainly possible that they never come in passionate concentration to 
the decision whether they should cling expectantly to this possibility or give it up; they live on this way in 
unclarity. (JP III: 3130) 
 
Perhaps the best way to resolve this difficulty and admit passion as the binding power in human 
life would be to distinguish between earthly passion and spiritual passion. Spiritual passion 
would originate from the self's own will, and in having a stable, enduring character, it would be 
directed toward one single end throughout one's life. Earthly passion, on the other hand, would 
lack these features, and would consist in vacillating from one desire to the next depending on 
one's needs at the moment. Both types of passion would be concentrated on specific ends at a 
given moment, but only spiritual passion would be internally directed and continually 
                                                
127 Silentio claims that out of all the different passions that might unite a human life, faith is the highest (F&T: 67). 




concentrated on the same thing over time. This would make it capable of sustaining consistency 
and continuity in the self, or as Kierkegaard puts it, "purity of heart."128 One might worry that 
this dogged pursuit of one thing makes Kiekegaard's account of passion inhuman, and that it 
would mean obsession or monomania constitutes the authentically human existence.129 In his 
view, however, what distinguishes human beings from the inhumanity of the rest of creation, and 
gives us our dignity and integrity as individuals, is the eternal element in us. Since the Eternal is 
One and unchangeable, we can only approach it by being steadfast in willing one thing. By 
aligning oneself with the Eternal in this way, one can one muster up the energy needed to resist 
the pull of the temporal, along with the many distractions and diversions that keep one from 
getting a grip on oneself and gaining integrity as spirit. In other words, he would think the life 
that is absorbed in temporal affairs is inhuman, since worldly forces outside of the self are what 
primarily move the human being to act, just as they move what is not human to act. Without 
spiritual passion, one is not in possession of oneself, and so one is not able to become oneself. 
 
1.4.4.1 The Actualization of Spirit Through Inwardness 
Kierkegaard believes that human beings, as spirit, gain a greater degree of inwardness 
and become self-possessed as they become passionately committed to an idea, goal, or project 
that they want to realize in existence. Inwardness is perhaps the central concept in Kierkegaard's 
understanding of selfhood. His emphasis on this idea distinguishes his thought from many 
philosophers of human subjectivity, who often overlook this dimension of human life. 
Haufniensis explains that inwardness is difficult to delineate precisely due to its intangible and 
personal nature, but he roughly defines it as “earnestness” (CA: 147). Those with a high degree 
of inwardness are therefore wholeheartedly committed to a set of beliefs and values that they 
strive to live in accordance with. This resolution helps them integrate the infinite and finite 
aspects of themselves, and maintain balance in their life. They are not content in intellectualizing 
                                                
128 Kierkegaard stresses the importance of single-minded resolution at several points in his authorship, but nowhere 
is this position better formulated than in "Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing." In this edifying discourse, he argues 
that if a person is to will one thing in truth, he must will the Good rather than anything of this world. Only the good 
is one thing in its essence and the same in every one of its expressions…If a person is in truth to will one thing, the 
one thing he wills must indeed be of such a nature that it remains unchanged amid all changes; then by willing it he 
can win changelessness. If it is continually changed, he himself becomes changeable, double-minded, and unstable. 
But this continual changeableness is precisely impurity" (UDVS: 29-30). In his explicitly Christian works, he 
identifies this Good with God. 




in a disengaged way as an infinite self that refuses to use its will, or accepting a position 
nonchalantly as a matter of propositional assent; they also do not allow themselves to keep an 
ironic distance from what they believe in. Inwardness therefore demands the activity of the will 
and the imagination, as the individual earnestly shapes his life under an idea or possibility that 
guides him in existence. 
Inwardness would also require what was earlier referred to as subjective thinking, where 
existential truths concerning oneself as an individual are favored over objective or disinterested 
truths about states of affairs in the world. This would involve a rigorous mode of examining 
oneself and one's character, including, as Evans puts it, "the larger patterns of action in a 
person’s life that form a history."130 The heightened form of self-awareness that characterizes 
inwardness should not be confused with a withdrawn absorption into self, or a refusal of action 
that bears external results. The individual who maintains a deepened inwardness will likely 
exhibit signs of this outwardly through a fervent dedication to a certain way of life. Gouwens, 
however, errs in claiming that inwardness has “as much to do with the external actions and 
publicly observable dispositions of a person as with the alleged “contents” of private 
consciousness.”131 Climacus contends that inwardness is deeply subjective, and is hidden in 
one’s inner being "as an essential secret" (CUP: 80). Any visible signs suggesting the presence of 
inwardness within an individual, such as expressions of piety or a solemn demeanor, are no proof 
it is there.  
 While inwardness is gained in time as the self builds itself up in becoming itself, the 
temporal phenomena that would suggest a high degree of inwardness lack significance in 
comparison to the eternal element within the person, which is the site of inwardness. Haufniensis 
refers to inwardness as “constituent of the eternal in man” (CA: 151). He concludes this from the 
fact that those lacking inwardness end up preoccupied with finite concerns, or with objective 
thinking of all kinds, rather than with their own existence as an individual or their relationship 
with God. Climacus describes inwardness as the place where one forges a relationship with God 
in seclusion from the rest of the world. "Nature, the totality of creation, is God’s work, and yet 
God is not there, but within the individual human being there is a possibility...that in inwardness 
is awakened in a God-relationship, and then it is possible to see God everywhere" (CUP: 246). 
                                                
130 Evans, Kierkegaard's Christian Psychology, p. 37. As quoted in Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, p. 
57. 




This does not mean that God becomes known or understood by the individual, or that He 
becomes immediately present to him by revealing Himself in consciousness. Climacus insists 
that it is the idea or conception of God that the individual holds fast to in deepened inwardness 
and not the reality of God, as monists, mystics, and speculative thinkers often suggest (CUP: 
483-485). Indeed, because of the infinite qualitative difference between them, the being of God 
must remain radically unknowable, and is an objective uncertainty for any person of faith. 
Haufniensis shares this view and expands upon Climacus' point when he explains that the 
"thought of God’s existence...has an omnipresence that for the prudent individuality has 
something embarrassing about it, even though he does not wish to do anything evil. To live in a 
beautiful and intimate companionship with this conception truly requires inwardness" (CA: 140).  
 For Kierkegaard, inwardness is the highest achievement of personal development. It 
arises in the fullest sense when the reflective individual becomes passionately engaged with 
existence through his relationship to God. Kierkegaard argues that the individual who lacks 
belief in God cannot truly possess a great degree of inwardness or earnestness. He writes, "all 
life and its greatest scene are basically still a game" when God is left out of the picture, but when 
he is included in the game, "then life is earnest" (UDVS: 336). The suggestion is that only God 
or the eternal can lend ultimate significance to one's dealings or projects. If human life is just a 
fleeting moment in an indifferent cosmos that will ultimately pass without remembrance or 
consequence, then earnestness is groundless. Someone who is committed to a political ideal or 
who lives under strong moral principles might have passion as Silentio defines it, but if he does 
not believe that God supports his efforts and keeps them from being undertaken in vain, he 
cannot be said to be earnest in the sense that the eternal demands of him. 
 Haufniensis claims that philosophers often make the mistake of considering spiritual 
qualities too abstractly, and as a result, they lack inwardness, despite their lofty and detached 
reflections: 
 
Usually immediacy is posited in opposition to reflection (inwardness) and then the synthesis (or 
substantiality, subjectivity, identity, that in which this identity is said to consist: reason, idea, spirit). But 
in the sphere of actuality this is not the case. There immediacy is also the immediacy of inwardness. For 





Speculative thought, such as that of the Hegel, tends to place inwardness under the category of 
reflection rather than that of immediacy, while proposing to bridge the gap between immediacy 
and reflection through a mediating factor. Haufniensis, however, believes that inwardness is, in 
truth, an attribute of immediacy in the individual who has become passionately involved in his 
existence through reflection on it. The individual who has cultivated inwardness does not remain 
aloof from life or himself by cozily perching himself in thought about all of existence or world 
history, as he believes objective thinkers are accustomed to doing. Instead, he draws closer to his 
existence as an individual by applying his thoughts and ideas directly to his life. Climacus 
describes the quality of the state of consciousness that this intimacy with existence yields when 
one has the passion of faith, stating, “the speculative thinker should make himself objectively 
light, but whoever is impassionedly, infinitely interested in his eternal happiness makes himself 
as subjectively heavy as possible” (CUP: 57). Because it is disinterested in the particular 
existence of the single individual, the contemplative or objective standpoint results in a state of 
consciousness that is thin, detached, and airy. Through this more impersonal mode of 
consciousness, the objective thinker attempts to take up occupancy in an ideal realm outside of 
his concrete existence, and maintain a perspective of strict universality toward things. On the 
other hand, the individual with inwardness enters a turbulent state of conscious that is thicker and 
of greater intensity as a result of attaching himself to his particularity. With an idea passionately 
kept in mind, he immerses himself in existence rather than fleeing from his situation as an 
individual, which Climacus believes the objective thinker inevitably does in his abstract 
theorizing.  
 Climacus emphasizes that inwardness requires existential action, but this is not 
necessarily external action that has demonstrable results in the world. The action of inwardness 
primarily involves vigilance with respect to oneself and one’s relationship to God, such that an 
inner transformation can occur rather than an outer transformation. Climacus explains:  
 
…the development of subjectivity consists precisely in this, that he, acting, works through himself in his 
thinking about his own existence, consequently that he actually thinks what is thought by actualizing it, 
consequently that he does not think for a moment: Now, you must keep watch every moment—but that he 





This vigilance is maintained in a passionate mode of self-reflection, in which one takes concern 
in living in the right way and determining one's action accordingly. The activity of inwardness 
therefore takes place in self-consciousness, and would include things like ethical concern, acts of 
self-renunciation or self-discipline, and thoughts related to spirituality. In his later religious 
writings, Kierkegaard makes a greater effort to stress the need for external expressions of 
inwardness through the imitation of Christ.132 He explains how self-sacrifice patterned on the life 
of Christ issues in acts of love and compassion that are likely to go unrecognized, or be derided 
by others in the world. In these works too, it is the “hidden” or invisible aspect of action that has 
ultimate significance for Kierkegaard, and not the visible aspect, or the external outcomes of 
one's actions.  
 The solitary pursuit of self-awareness that Kierkegaard outlines in his account of 
inwardness is by no means easy, and involves great suffering. Climacus contends that such 
religious suffering is an act of inwardness, and should not be understood altogether passively as 
suffering often is. He explains, “the action of inwardness is suffering, because the individual is 
unable to transform himself. It becomes, as it were, a feigning of self-transformation, and that is 
why the highest action in the inner world is to suffer” (CUP: 432). In Climacus' view, the 
religious individual suffers because, as an eternal being stuck in the tumult of time, he cannot 
make himself fully eternal and achieve a restful state of blessedness, despite his earnest intention 
to do so. He must therefore bear the paradox of living spiritually in a sinful world that is 
inhospitable to his spiritual needs, without being able to take himself out of temporality as he 
would like. As we have seen, for Climacus, the goal of the process of becoming oneself is to 
become eternal in time, and by doing so, to escape the clutches of temporality by dissolving it 
from within. The individual realizes that he cannot do this of his own limited powers, and so he 
must depend on God, who he believes to have entered the world through Christ to offer him 
redemption from his sin. Because the site of salvation is within existence due to Christ's 
incarnation, one is not able to escape temporality through contemplation, speculation, 
philosophical reflection, or the like, which are spiritual strategies that are sometimes pursued in 
the hope of finding inner peace or communion with God. In Climacus' view, rather than 
discovering the eternal in abstraction or otherworldly detachment, the Christian intends to 
achieve communion with the Eternal in a paradoxical way by attaching himself to his concrete 
                                                




existence as an individual. In this way, he hopes to become eternal in time through Christ's 
atonement, admitting his faults as a lowly human being and waiting for the world to pass away. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 A generally consistent account of the self’s structure and constitution emerges from 
Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works, which in no way undermines his own views as expressed in 
his self-authored works. These authors contend that God first creates the human being as a 
paradoxical synthesis of the eternal and temporal, the infinite and finite, possibility and 
necessity, and psyche and body. While the individual initially lives in sheer immediacy as spirit 
in potentiality, he is tasked with becoming spirit in actuality by using his freedom to relate 
himself to himself in the instant. When reflection begins, spirit gains the ability to realize itself in 
existence by shaping the constituents of this synthesis and converting possibilities of being into 
actuality. In exercising his will in existence, the genuinely spiritual person will cultivate passion 
and inwardness in order to integrate the eternal and temporal aspects of the self, and thereby 
become who he is in truth. The division between these two contradictory aspects of existence 
signifies a metaphysical dualism that pervades Kierkegaard’s work. Kierkegaard’s dialectic of 
paradox departs from Hegel’s non-dualistic dialectic of mediation, which proposes an identity 
between subject and object, along with a resolution of paradox.  
  Climacus vociferously attacks speculative philosophy and Hegelian logic throughout his 
Postscript. In a passage that recalls Parminedes' chariot ride to the abode of the goddess, where 
the truth of being would be revealed to him in its fullness, he makes a comment that he thinks 
would apply to these thinkers, or to those who have actualized their nature as spirit to only a 
minimal degree: 
 
 Eternity is infinitely quick like that winged steed, temporality is an old nag, and the existing person  
 is the driver, that is, if existing is not to be what people usually call existing, because then the existing 
 person is no driver but a drunken peasant who lies in the wagon and sleeps and lets the horses shift  
 for themselves. (CUP: 311-312) 
 
We can think of the imagination as the seat the self occupies in conducting the movements of the 
infinite and the finite in its journey toward self-actualization––and by this means, to God. The 




higher stages of self-development by centering his reflection upon an idea and realizing it in 
existence. The somnolent individual remains snagged in the lower stages of immediacy and 
crudely fails to live under ideals. The former driver expresses his freedom, while the latter 
betrays a lack of it in his dispersion in worldliness and sensuous living. In the following chapters, 
I examine Kierkegaard's claim that a person will pass through aesthetic and ethical stages in their 
journey, before finally arriving at the religious stage in a state of freedom before God. As we will 
see, the movement toward self-actualization that Kierkegaard describes in his account of the 




























The Self in Ignorance 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, we saw that Anti-Climacus believes that, unlike other living 
things in the natural world, all human beings have a spiritual essence through which they bear an 
affinity to the eternal. While temporal processes that unfold out of necessity determine the 
actions and growth of other animals, which are composites of psyche and body but not spirit, the 
freedom the human being possesses as spirit sets him apart from this natural development. His 
opposition to the world as spirit puts him on an alternative track of personal development, in 
which his activity of thought, volition, and imagination allow to be independent and self-
determining despite living within the world as a psyche-body composite. It was explained how 
Anti-Climacus defines spirit, or the self, as a self-relating synthesis constituted by the eternal and 
temporal, infinite and finite, psyche and body, and possibility and necessity, whose existence 
depends upon a greater power that established it. In relating itself to itself through the will, the 
imagination, and reflection, the self must deal with the difficulty of integrating two contradictory 
components of its being on its journey toward self-actualization, while other animals, as purely 
temporal creatures, do not.  
 Anti-Climacus contends that when a person fails to negotiate this tension in the proper 
way by living in a manner unsuitable for a spiritual being, he falls into despair. As a dysfunction 
or misrelation of the self, it can fall under three general forms: (1) the despair of not being aware 
that one is a self, (2) the despair of not willing to be oneself, or (3) the despair of willing to be 
oneself (SUD: 13-14).133 He calls the first form despair in ignorance (SUD: 45). It occurs in the 
earliest stage of life in a state of immediacy, when an individual exists in harmony with his 
natural condition with an unreflective form of self-consciousness. The second and third forms of 
despair emerge through reflective self-consciousness, when an individual has matured to the 
point where he has become aware of himself as essentially different from objects in the 
surrounding world, along with his immediate desires, emotions, attitudes, and so on. The 
                                                
133 Beabout argues that these three forms of despair correspond with the three forms that the self can take in living in 
the esthetic, ethical, or religious stages of life. See Freedom and its Misuses, p. 86. This is incorrect, however, since 
each of these stages can include different forms of despair depending on how the individual conducts himself in it, 
as I will show. The esthetic individual, for instance, might despair in ignorance, or he might despair in not wanting 




knowledge of separation that occurs through reflection disrupts the harmony the self had enjoyed 
when in thrall to the psyche-body relation, and establishes the condition under which the self can 
exercise its freedom in existence through the will. That despair can be classified with respect to 
the categories of immediacy and reflection shows it is essentially a pathology of consciousness, 
whether in its unreflective or reflective form. Anti-Climacus' definition also entails that despair 
has a normative dimension. If a human being does not know himself as he should, or does not 
will to be the self he ought to be, then he is in despair. The only way for the self not to be in 
despair on this view is for it to know itself and will to be itself before the power that established 
it, and which makes these normative demands on it. As a Christian author, he believes this power 
to be God, while the state opposite to despair he calls faith.  
 Before examining the more advanced forms of despair that pertain to selves in heightened 
reflection, in this chapter, I explain why Kierkegaard seems to think that the life of immediacy, 
in which one is unaware of being spirit or a self, is despair. By looking at the phenomenological 
analysis of the self and despair he gives under the pseudonymous Anti-Climacus and the authors 
of Either/Or, I show that this way of life is despair because the self is disintegrated as a result of 
being submerged in the nothingness of the temporal, which means being in a state of separation 
from God, or the Eternal. This imbalance in the self is caused by the narrow pursuit of sensual 
pleasures in the earliest stage of human life, and later, by unreflectively following the crowd or 
other people instead of fulfilling one's essence as spirit. His account of despair therefore involves 
a teleological dimension that not all commentators have picked up on.134 On his view, the self is 
disintegrated because it has not achieved its telos, which is to integrate its contradictory 
components by attaining the proper relationship with The Eternal, or the power that brought it 
into existence. This telos stems from one's essence as spirit, and fulfilling it through knowing 
oneself and willing rightly would be an ultimate source of meaning and satisfaction in one's life. 
                                                
134 As Kosch points out in her analysis of despair in Either/Or, other commentators have also argued that the 
individual despairs because there is an ethical telos that he is thwarting in living in the way he does (Freedom and 
Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, p. 146). She rejects this interpretation because she believes it means 
reconstructing Kierkegaard's view under Aristotelian or Hegelian lines, which is inherently problematic due to 
claims he makes under the pseudonym of Judge William that contradict their views. I claim that such a 
reconstruction is unnecessary. There is no reason to think that a teleological account of human life must follow the 
teleology of thinkers like Aristotle or Hegel to the letter, or that they have monopolized the concept. As I explained 
in the last chapter, Hegel and Aristotle were major influences on Kierkegaard's thinking, but Kierkegaard departs 




Until the self attains proper balance by wanting to be itself in relation to God, it is without a 
stable identity, and to live in this way is to be in despair.135  
 After explaining the views on this early form of despair that Kierkegaard sets forward 
through the pseudonyms, I challenge many of his basic claims. Because those in ignorance are 
typically happy and do not believe they are in despair, there are major difficulties in calling it 
despair. In Either/Or, Kierkegaard hopes to erase any doubts by showing that human life is 
despair from its earliest stages, while employing minimal Christian presuppositions in order to 
persuade those unconvinced of its truth. However, I argue that his diagnosis will likely only 
appeal to those already willing to accept that all human beings are wretched due to some inherent 
flaw in their nature, whether it is because one is a Christian who believes in hereditary sin or for 
some other reason. It will also only be plausible to those who are already willing to accept a 
teleological account of the self that posits the realization of one's essence as a condition for 
functioning well as a human being. As a result, his strategy risks being question-begging; 
without ethical or religious presuppositions about the essence of the self, which those who 
endorse any kind of teleological account of selfhood are likely to hold, his argument loses much 
of its impact. I also argue that if the ignorant individual is in despair, it is implausible that he 
brings it upon himself through a choice as Anti-Climacus claims (SUD: 17), since the will 
factors trivially in human life at this stage of existence or is even absent. As it stands, 
Kierkegaard's own phenomenological findings suggest that the self is disintegrated from the 
moment of its inception, even before the onset of reflection, and so does not originally choose it. 
Because of this tragic defect, which is not their fault, it is inappropriate for Kierkegaard to view 
these individuals with contempt and animosity in the way that he tends to as a Christian author. 
 
2.2  The Character of the Life of Immediacy 
 Anti-Climacus argues that human beings pass through three forms of despair on the way 
toward self-actualization, and that this process can be understood through dialectical thinking. In 
the first stage of life, we pass through the despair in ignorance, which unfolds smoothly and with 
                                                
135 I am in basic agreement with Rudd and his interpretation of despair in Either/Or. See Rudd, Kierkegaard and the 
Limits of the Ethical, p. 139. However, in writing on the ethical stage of life in Kierkegaard's work, Rudd restricts 
his analysis to the Judge's conception of despair, and does not analyze this concept as it occurs throughout his 
authorship. While there are strong similarities between the accounts of despair given by the Judge and Kierkegaard 
(and his pseudonyms) in the religious portion of authorship, there are also dissimilarities that will be pointed out. 
The individual who lives ethically conceives of his telos differently than the individual who lives religiously, and as 




little conflict within "the dimensions of temporality and secularity" (SUD: 51). In this stage, the 
individual exists in a primitive state of immersion in the world as a psyche-body unity, drawing 
no firm distinction between self and other.136 In his view, immediacy does not proceed in a 
dialectical manner, since the immediate individual has not yet realized his freedom as spirit by 
negating his natural position and coming to himself out of the thralldom of worldliness. Drowned 
in the "noise of secular life" and unreflectively caught up in associations with externalities, there 
is little movement or activity within the self with respect to its reflective, imaginative, and 
volitional capacities (SUD: 27). He is therefore ignorant of being a self in despair. Although he 
has cares and desires for earthly things, because he has no concern for himself as a spiritual 
being, Anti-Climacus refers to this mode of existence as “spiritlessness" (SUD: 45). He claims 
that this form of despair "is the most common in the world," and Christianity teaches that the 
pagans and "the natural man" are under its spell in indulging in a way of life rooted in the pursuit 
of enjoyment or worldly pleasures (SUD: 45).137  
 Because spiritless individuals do not possess a significant degree of self-consciousness, 
this is the least intensive form of despair. This might initially sound like an advantage, but it is 
not. In their ignorance, these individuals are further from being delivered from it than those 
whose despair has intensified to the point that that they recognize it as a problem that needs to be 
addressed (SUD: 44). The spiritless person is therefore likely to radiate happiness in the midst of 
everyday life, without ever suspecting that his healthy-minded enjoyment is a facade that 
conceals his underlying despair. In this section, I offer a profile of the life of immediacy by 
drawing on portrayals Kierkegaard provides in Either/Or and Sickness Unto Death, while 
explaining how the self in immediacy is disintegrated and imbalanced. I begin by describing the 
type of individual who possesses the least amount of reflection, before explaining how reflection 
and self-consciousness gradually emerges in individuals within immediacy through the 
                                                
136 See also section 1.4.1. 
137 Later on in Sickness, Anti-Climacus appears to contradict this by claiming that the despair of not willing to be 
oneself is the most common form of despair in the world (SUD: 57). These claims can be reconciled, however, upon 
noting that the despair of not willing to be oneself describes individuals who have become conscious of being in 
despair because they have lost some desired object or are facing some hardship. This is a despair that has surfaced to 
awareness and has made its presence felt in the world, unlike the despair of immediacy. Since Anti-Climacus 
contends that most individuals who are in despair do not know that they are, and would not admit to being so, this 
cannot be the most common form of despair among humanity in general. It would seem that, more plausibly, Anti-
Climacus is claiming that this is the most common form of despair among individuals who have become conscious 




development of spirit. This results in a "public" form of life based on uncritical adherence to the 
beliefs and practices of the community, which for Anti-Climacus, is an intensification of despair. 
 
2.2.1 Esthetic Immediacy: Don Giovanni 
 Through the pseudonyms A and Judge William in Either/Or, Kierkegaard delineates an 
"esthetic" way of life that closely resembles the life of immediacy described by Anti-Climacus. 
A’s papers portray two different kinds of esthetic figures: the immediate esthete, who lacks a 
significant degree of reflection, and the reflective esthete who does not, but who still has no real 
concern for himself as spirit. As other commentators have noted, these are two different phases 
that can be inscribed within the esthetic stage of life.138 As we will see in the next chapter on 
reflective despair, the reflective esthete tends to pursue contemplative pleasures obtained from 
observing novel or interesting situations, especially those that he has schemed in advance. A 
happens to be a reflective esthete who has outgrown the naivety of the immediate esthete. He has 
reached a point of intellectual development where he can observe the immediate esthete with 
fascination and marvel at his actions, but cannot participate in such thoughtless and impulsive 
behavior himself. A's ruminations on this figure are captured in the “The Immediate Erotic 
Stages,” where he rhapsodizes about the whimsical life of Don Giovanni as presented in 
Mozart’s classic opera of the same name. 
 A eulogizes Don Giovanni as a paragon of the life of immediacy, although as we will see, 
few if any human beings would fit this model exactly. He explains that Don Giovanni is a 
seducer busily seeking sexual gratification, without being concerned about social norms and 
practices or making others unhappy. In fact, he has little regard for anything but the conquest of 
hapless women, who are drawn in by his exuberant vitality. After gaining possession of a woman 
through his romantic wiles, he soon tires of the love-struck victim and leaves her in the lurch so 
that he can quickly move onto someone else to take advantage of. According to the list of his 
servant Leporello, who keeps close track of his exploits, his number of erotic conquests is 1,003 
and counting. Enchanted by life in its primitive form, Don Giovanni has no scruples about 
deceiving any of the women that attract him, and no concern for adhering to social norms and 
                                                
138 See for instance Taylor, Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, p. 128. This is also suggested in Dunning, 




practices. He only cares about enjoying himself, and will stop at nothing to obtain the pleasure he 
seeks.  
A explains that Don Giovanni seeks nothing else through his actions but the immediate 
satisfaction of desire, which arises in an unremitting cycle. Motivated by fits of erotic passion, he 
restlessly seeks to attain the women that are the primary objects of his desire. Once he gains 
satisfaction by consummating an affair, the woman is no longer capable of satisfying him, and he 
abandons her as if she were nothing so that he can take possession of someone new. Although he 
enjoys himself in this activity, he finds only momentary relief as the objects of his desire prove 
to be inadequate in satisfying him for any extended period. While he is not really aware of it, 
there is an emptiness that haunts Don Giovanni as he bustles about in the temporal. His life is 
driven by need and lack, and in the final moment, women are not able to make him feel whole. 
They only slip through his grasp once the seduction has been accomplished, which leaves him 
back at square one. In Gorgias, Socrates compares the minds of those with insatiable desire to 
leaky jars that they must constantly work to keep full, while those of the wise, who need little to 
be content, are like full jars that are of sound construction.139 Since Don Giovanni's seductions 
keep sensual pleasures pouring in, however, he has no interest in exercising the self-restraint 
needed for personal integrity of that kind.  
A claims that, despite first appearances, it is more proper to speak of the object of his 
desire not as this or that woman, or even women in general, but rather “the sensuous and this 
alone” (E/O I: 98). A describes the sensuous as an elemental power that is most adequately 
expressed through the rhythms of music, which is the reason that Don Giovanni so perfectly 
embodies it. In a manner reminiscent of Haufniensis' conception of time regarded independently 
of the eternal, he states that like music, the sensuous unfolds in a "succession of instants" (E/O I: 
56-57). He hesitates to call him a seducer because of this intimate entanglement with sensate 
existence, the glow of which he bathes in as a psyche-body unity.140 He writes: 
 
                                                
139 Plato, Gorgias, 493a-494b  
140 Levinas provides a rich phenomenological description of the sensuous with his notion of the "elemental," which 
he defines as a "non-possessable which envelops or contains" the human being, "without being able to be contained 
or enveloped" (Totality and Infinity, p. 131). This would include earth, sea, sky, light, and the like, or the elements 
that we are steeped in through sensibility, prior to representing them as objects for thought. He describes the 
elements that affect us as "qualities without support, without substance," and claims that we originally experience 




To be a seducer always takes a certain reflection and consciousness, and as soon as this is present, it can 
be appropriate to speak of craftiness and machinations and subtle wiles. Don Giovanni lacks this 
consciousness. Therefore, he does not seduce. He desires, and this desire acts seductively. To this extent 
he does seduce. He enjoys the satisfaction of desire; as soon as he has enjoyed it, he seeks a new object, 
and so it goes on indefinitely. Thus he does indeed deceive, but still not in such a way that he plans the 
deception in advance; it is the power of the sensuous itself that deceives the seduced… (E/O I: 99). 
 
Because he is "qualified psychically" but not yet spiritually, Don Giovanni has perceptions and 
desires, but is without the kind of thought or intentions that would be needed to be a seducer in 
the strict sense (E/O I: 62). His deceptions are carried out spontaneously and without any diligent 
strategizing or careful planning on his part. He acts blindly by inclination and impulse in 
accordance with "the energy of desire" present within the sensuous (E/O I: 100), and is, as A 
says, "a force of nature" about whom “one cannot learn except by listening to the noise of the 
waves” (E/O I: 92). In the way that A describes it, the relationship between desire and its object 
is like a game of hide-and-seek that goes on within the relation between psyche and body, which 
uses Don Giovanni as a vehicle of its play. In being rushed along by the current of temporality, 
he is a mere instrument of natural processes operating within him, which are a force of their own. 
While bustlingly active as a human being possessed by natural forces, as a self, Don Giovanni is 
a passive bystander to the desires, feelings, and passions that direct him and bring him to life in 
the world.141 With the spirit in him dreaming in an unreflective state of self-consciousness, he is, 
in a paradoxical way, selfish without being much of a self at all in Kierkegaard's sense. 
 In looking at Kierkegaard's authorship, a distinction can be made between the will, which 
is a characteristic of persons or spiritual beings (including God), and desire, which is an 
ingredient of the sensuous that is not necessarily possessed by spirit. It would be improper to 
speak of Don Giovanni as imposing his will on women, since as a radically "spiritless" 
individual, he has neither will nor reflection. In Frankfurt's terms, Don Giovanni is a wanton who 
is unable to separate himself from his first-order desires so that he can form second-order 
volitions concerning the desires he has, or the desires he wants to move him to act.142 Because of 
this, we cannot say of him that he wants to desire women, or that he might want to desire other 
things instead, or that he has considered being anything other than a seducer. Without reflection, 
                                                
141 I am borrowing the phrase "passive bystander" from Harry Frankfurt, who uses it to describe the wanton who is 
unconcerned about the first-order desires or attitudes he has. See The Importance of What We Care About, p. 54. 




he is not able to detach himself from the situation he is in to think about whether he should act in 
the ways he does, or even form intentions about how to act. Neither does he have any control 
over his desires as he oscillates between women within the ethereal medium of the sensuous. If, 
like Frankfurt, one believes that a person must be capable of having second-order volitions, then 
one must conclude that Don Giovanni is not a person. Since he is without reflection or will, and 
has no real agency, Anti-Climacus would claim that he is spirit in potentiality, but not in 
actuality. As such, his actions originate in natural necessity and not in freedom. He is therefore 
heteronomous to the impersonal forces of nature rooted in him as a psyche-body unity, and is a 
host to unconscious and anonymous life, which drives his actions automatically.  
Kierkegaard argues that human life begins in this state of immediacy. “Immediate feeling 
is certainly the first, is the vital force; in it is life, just as it is indeed said that from the heart flows 
life. But then this feeling must “be kept,” understood in the same way as when it is said, “Keep 
your heart, for from it flows life."" (UDVS: 71). Don Giovanni, however, has no way of 
"keeping" these feelings that spring up within him, since he is not able to attain any reflective 
distance from them through the infinite component in the self. This component, which Anti-
Climacus associates with the eternal and possibility, would allow him to think broadly about his 
given situation as a self that conceives of itself as persisting over time. It would also allow him to 
imagine different possibilities, and think about what would constitute his identity. In considering 
the kind of person he could be, or what he could do, he could endorse or reject the feelings and 
desires he has by employing his will. Normally individuals can do this, but Don Giovanni, has 
not yet reached a stage of spiritual development under which he can admit any of them as his 
own in this sense. In his Journals, Kierkegaard explicitly links desire and temporality, claiming, 
“desire is the temporal” and that “the temporal cannot hold out with the eternal” insofar as man 
fulfills his potential to become spirit (JP II: 2114). As it stands, Don Giovanni has not advanced 
to the point where he can impose his will on the spontaneity of nature through spiritual acts that 
would bridle, extinguish, or appropriate his desires. In acting on desire alone, he is mired in the 
temporal pole of the synthesis, and as a result, the eternal and temporal aspects of the self are 
drastically imbalanced.   
Without the continuity that the eternal provides in enabling reflection to apprehend and 
connect the infinite succession of temporal moments, Don Giovanni’s life consists of a series of 




about himself in relation to the world and no will, there is nothing to bind these episodes together 
in a way that would make them more than discrete episodes. He is therefore disintegrated as a 
self. A writes: 
 
Don Giovanni can become epic only by continually finishing and continually being able to begin all over 
again, for his life is the sum of repellerende moments that have no coherence, and his life as the moment 
is the sum of moments and as the sum of moments is the moment. Don Giovanni lies within this 
universality, in this hovering between being an individual and a force of nature… (E/O I: 96) 
 
Don Giovanni lives in the moment, but these moments are otherwise loose and disparate events. 
Without reflection to collect them, there is no experience of a continuing self that withstands 
temporal flux. While each of these moments might be said to possess a unity in consciousness 
insofar as he experiences them as a self, this unity quickly dissipates with nothing to account for 
it. It is true that there is a natural form of consistency in his life with respect to the cycle of desire 
and his recurrent seductions. Yet without a stable form of consciousness accompanied by 
recollection and anticipation, which would require reflective acts of the imagination, he does not 
gain insight into these repetitions, and so each affair is like the first for him. He is beyond 
himself in being cast outward toward a multiplicity of erotic affairs that have significance for 
him only in the moment they occur, and only for the pleasures they bring him. When considering 
him as an individual, A compares him to a “picture that is continually coming into view but does 
not attain form and consistency” (E/O 1: 92). There is a glimmer of selfhood trying to sprout 
through the shifting surface of the sensuous, but it cannot attain a definite shape, and fades into 
nothingness as quickly as it arises. He does have the potential to become a formed and unified 
self that is aware of having a history and future instead of a dissipated force of nature sunk in the 
immediate and momentary. But for the self to be set over nature in such a way that it could hold 
these different moments together in reflective consciousness and attain coherence over time, an 
awakening of the eternal element within him would have to occur.  
 
2.2.1.1 The Inauguration of Spirit Through Language and Reflection  
 A believes that in order for Don Giovanni to become conscious of himself as spirit and 
advance to a higher stage of human development, he would first need to become capable of 




judgments about it and speak about it. He makes the extravagant (and rather implausible) claim 
that Christianity made this possible in transfiguring humanity by introducing spirit into the 
world.143 In doing so, it both brought sensuality into the world and drove it out of the world by 
negating it (E/O I: 61). Elaborating on this idea in a manner that recalls Hegelian dialectics, he 
argues: 
 
 …it will become evident upon reflection that in the positing of something, the other that is excluded is 
indirectly posited. Since sensuality generally is that which is to be negated, it really comes to light, is 
really posited, first by the act that excludes it through a positing of the opposite positive… (E/O I: 61)  
 
The claim is that in order to have a definite conception of something, one must be able to 
conceive of what it is not. In conceiving of goodness, for instance, I also understand that it is not 
badness, and if I do not, then I do not have a genuine understanding of goodness. Similarly, once 
spirit emerges in the world and becomes known as something actual, it points to what it is not—
namely sensuality. For this reason, A claims, “Sensuality was first posited as a principle, as a 
power, as an independent system, by Christianity” (E/O I: 61). This is not to say that sensuality 
did not precede the emergence of spirit, but only that sensuality cannot be recognized as 
sensuality until spirit conceptualizes it through negating it. Before it did this, there was no 
conception for sensuality or any understanding of it, since there was no way for human beings to 
distinguish it from something essentially different from it.144 During this time, the sensuous was 
an all-pervasive element that totally encompassed human life, and so it could not "come to light" 
in consciousness, which objectifies it through reflective acts. With it being buried in the 
unconscious, human beings were in the dark about its presence. Consequently, this act of 
                                                
143 A admits that the claim that Christianity brought spirit into the world is brazen, and will fail to convince many. It 
would seem that the spiritual activity he describes would need to be a feature of any ethical community, including 
those that existed before Christianity. My interest is not in evaluating the plausibility of the claim, but rather to use it 
to illustrate the way in which a division within consciousness can be seen to arise through which the self opposes 
itself to the life of sensuality and the flesh. Even if it did not quite bring what he refers to as 'spirit' into the world, at 
the very least, Christianity played an important role in fostering an environment favorable to its development by 
making the opposition between the sensuous and non-sensuous aspects of existence more explicit.  
144 A's point is reminiscent of a parable given by David Foster Wallace during a commencement speech at Kenyon 
College in 2005. "There are these two young fish swimming along, and they happen to meet an older fish swimming 
the other way, who nods at them and says, “Morning, boys. How’s the water?” And the two young fish swim on for 
a bit, and then eventually one of them looks over at the other and goes, “What the hell is water?"" Wallace takes this 
to mean that the basic, obvious realities are often the most difficult to recognize or talk about. A suggests that this is 
because we are not able to attain the proper distance from them, given that they are right in front of us. To recognize 
these realities, we have to take up a standpoint outside of them to distinguish them from ourselves. This act of 




negation should not be understood as a logical movement in the way that Hegel understood it, 
but as an existential movement requiring force, much like the way an individual might oppose an 
adversary. Spirit negates the sensuous in the sense that its nature is to set itself in opposition to 
this positive reality in order to grasp its contents in consciousness.  
 One should note that according to A, spirit is not simply the capacity to negate a given 
existence or the psychical and bodily, since then it would be defined by the reality that it negates.  
Neither does spirit posit itself in existence in an act of double negation, negating itself as Hegel 
claims. He believes it too has a positive existence apart from the sensuous or anything external, 
and so is not reducible to it. Anti-Climacus also endorses this view when he defines spirit not as 
negativity, but as a "positive third" that synthesizes the eternal and temporal (SUD: 13). But 
because spirit is dormant in Don Giovanni while psyche and body are actively engaged with the 
world, his relation to his external and internal environment is primarily one of “harmony and 
consonance” rather than “contrast or exclusion” (E/O I: 62). One might object that, like a leaky 
jar, Don Giovanni's life lacks unity insofar as he cannot get lasting satisfaction from the objects 
of his desire, and has to repeat the seductions to sustain his enjoyment. Nevertheless, his 
psychical life is mostly integrated with the external world, since it continues to provide him with 
objects that satisfy his basic needs while contributing minimal resistance to his actions.145 Since 
spirit is not actualized, he also enjoys a lack of opposition between his intellect and his emotions 
or appetites, or between his lower-order desires and higher-order volitions, which have yet to 
emerge. While there is a rudimentary kind of unity and agreement between the self and its 
internal and external environment, which gives him great pleasure, this unity is momentary and 
at the animal level. Under Anti-Climacus' view, he is primarily disintegrated as a self because its 
                                                
145 Under the influence of Kierkegaard, Dąbrowski proposed a theory of personality development that has much in 
common with his. Dąbrowski describes the state of the personality in its earliest stage of development (such as that 
of Don Giovanni) as one of "primitive integration" (Positive Disintegration, pp. 1-3). In this stage, the individual 
acts under immediate instincts and impulses that are stimulated by things in his external environment, without 
suppressing them or sublimating them so that they conform to moral values. This yields unity and a lack of conflict 
within one's psychical life, but it also means that one is primarily an automaton pursuing basic biological ends. This 
primitive structure must be broken down in order for the person to operate at a higher level, where he would achieve 
autonomy and gain the ability to direct his life under principles he has chosen. Dąbrowski refers to this productive 
break down in the primitive structure of the psyche, which often causes episodes of anxiety and depression, as 
"positive disintegration" (Ibid., 14). As will become apparent, Kierkegaard would accept that such psychological 
disintegration, and the pain associated with it, is necessary for personal growth. However, he would likely reject the 
concept of primitive integration as Dąbrowski construes it in taking religion as his point of departure, rather than 
psychology and biology as Dąbrowski does. In Kierkegaard's view, those in the earliest stage of development are 
disintegrated as selves, since their lives consist of a series of passing moments that are not gathered into a higher 
unity by means of the eternal component within them. It should be noted that I am greatly indebted to Dąbrowski's 




eternal aspect has not emerged to lend continuity and stability to his life by setting him apart 
from temporal flux, and unifying the different moments of his life through the work of 
recollection and the imagination. As spirit in potentiality, he is dissipated in the sensuous, where 
he participates in a multiplicity of erotic affairs without collecting himself from out of it. Without 
spirit negating the sensuous and bringing unity and order to his life as a whole through the work 
of thought, he is without a stable sense of personal identity over time, and so is fragmented as a 
self.   
A explains how the spiritual activity of negation he describes is necessary for the use of 
language, and is implicit in our use of it. “In language," he says, "the sensuous as medium is 
reduced to a mere instrument and is continually negated” (E/O I: 67). In order for thoughts or 
ideas to be expressed or shared through language, the signifier of a word must become radically 
detached from what the word signifies and from its sense or meaning. For instance, the sound of 
the word ‘ball’, when uttered, differs sharply from the ball it refers to in reality, and also from 
the idea invoked in us by the word. The sound is also negligible for understanding the 
communication or discerning its meaning; any other sound would do, provided there is a mutual 
understanding among speakers who have the idea of a ball that it signifies a ball. This shows that 
with language, “that which is really supposed to be heard," or the ideas and meanings that the 
sounds convey, "is continually disengaging itself from the sensuous” (E/O I: 68). In order to 
understand what someone else is saying, for instance, one would never attend solely to the 
sounds made by the flapping of his tongue or his vocalizing; these purely sensuous elements are 
continually negated in order for the content of speech to become intelligible, and more than just 
sounds (E/O I: 67). The process of sensuous negation that can be seen to occur through language 
and the understanding corresponds to spirit’s negation of the sensuous, although these are not 
strictly identical processes, since language and the understanding do not comprise the entire 
functionality of spirit. Language therefore presupposes spiritual activity that, in a paradoxical 
way, synthesizes ideality and reality while excluding the sensuous aspect of the latter from its 
sphere of activity. Because it requires the appropriation of the sensuous for the purpose of 
speech, language is a medium of communication “absolutely qualified by spirit” (E/O I: 67).146 
                                                
146 That language exists and can be understood as meaningful provides strong evidence against the naturalist view 
that what is empirically given, or what we perceive through our senses, exhausts all of reality. As A says, "nature is 
mute" (E/O I: 68). If immediacy is all there is, we would never be able to articulate it through speech, or make sense 




Spirit therefore begins the process of breaking down the primitive type of integration that the 
human being enjoyed with impersonal nature in order to conceptualize reality, and work toward 
a higher unity centered upon the personal life of the individual. This is a paradoxical unity in 
which the sensuous and spirit are held together while remaining separate from each other.  
 Language and understanding can emerge only through the negation of immediacy, which 
as an activity of spirit, originally occurs through reflection. A states: “Reflection is implicit in 
language,” and that “Reflection is fatal to the immediate” (E/O I: 70). In reflection, we are able 
to transcend our immediate situation in the world through the infinite component in the self. In 
the first phase of reflection, we are able to discriminate between objects in our internal and 
external environment, and to differentiate ourselves from them. In the later phase, we are able to 
become an object to ourselves, and are capable of transforming ourselves and shaping our own 
identity through the will. Reflection enables us to step back from our given condition to think 
about the greater context of the world, and to come to knowledge about things both given and not 
immediately given in perception. We can therefore think about the past and future, about objects, 
people, and events not sensuously present, and about ourselves in relation to things that do not 
immediately present themselves as phenomena. In considering our lives as a whole from this 
position, we can then form higher-order attitudes and volitions in response. Such standing apart 
from (or even standing under) the world as selves opens up a dimension of ideality through 
which one can consider those things that do not exist in it as concrete entities, whether they be 
ideas, possibilities, logical forms, or the like. The understanding engendered through reflection 
thereby occasions a separation between self and world that allows the individual to draw a firm 
distinction between his own personal thoughts, memories, and imaginings on one hand and 
external objects or events on the other. It therefore establishes a duality in consciousness 
between one's inner life and external reality, or between subject and object. This is a distinction 
that Don Giovanni has yet to make in enjoying a primitive or non-dual form of consciousness.    
 Everyone using language must therefore be reflective to some extent, even if not all of 
them are fully self-conscious. The sensate man existing in the purest state of immediacy, such as 
Don Giovanni, would hear only formless vocalizing in the place of speech, and so would neither 
                                                                                                                                                       
the world. A provides striking phenomenological evidence that the empirically given is taken up and excluded by an 
opposing factor that uses it as an instrument for its own purposes, raising the human being up from its earthly 
condition toward the sphere of ideality and offering him a taste of transcendence. There is therefore always more to 
our experience than what we are sensibly affected by in virtue of our being a synthesis of ideality and reality, or the 




understand language nor be able to speak it. Since nearly all human beings use language or are in 
the process of acquiring it, it is rare that reflection does not penetrate immediacy and imbue the 
content of sensation with meaning and significance. In fact, Climacus contends that pure 
immediacy of the type enjoyed by Don Giovanni is an abstract concept that has no real existence, 
and so is never actually present in consciousness. He argues, “the immediate never is but is 
annulled when it is” (CUP: 112). The thought seems to be that the immediate can only be known 
to exist in being apprehended through reflection. Once reflection negates it to grasp it 
conceptually, however, immediacy is disrupted and brought to order in being differentiated into 
discrete objects. Hence, one can never know the reality of immediacy in its purest, pre-
conceptual form, prior to its being taken up and processed in consciousness; we only know it as 
it is determined through categories of thought or reflection, which spirit issues through its 
relation to the sphere of ideality.147 A describes the sensuous dimension of immediacy as "the 
most abstract idea conceivable" not because the sensuous itself has an ideal character, but 
because it is ineffable. This would seem to challenge spirit's ability to bring it to language or 
comprehend it at all (E/O I: 56). For instance, one cannot say the color red or a pleasurable 
sensation, but only perceive them. However, we can indeed speak intelligibly to one another 
about such perceptions or feelings since we have definite ideas that correspond to them. Spirit 
makes this possible by synthesizing ideality and the reality of the sensuous while holding them 
apart from one another as they succeed one another in time. It thereby renders the sensuous 
concrete by endowing it with form and structure, which assists in making it thinkable and 
articulable (E/O I: 55-56).  
In relation to spirit, A describes the sensuous as a principle or power that spirit excludes. 
This would suggest that the sensuous retains a kind of independence over and against spirit, and 
indeed, A believes this is the case. He claims that the sensuous enters into “alien territory” when 
spirit appropriates it for communicational purposes by way of excluding it (E/O I: 70). He also 
refers to language and the sensuous as two different kingdoms, paralleling the distinction 
between the eternal and the temporal that pervades Kierkegaard’s authorship. The kingdom of 
language is characterized by “collectedness of thought” and “laborious achievements of 
                                                
147 In his study of Kierkegaard's critique of German idealism, Kangas argues that Kierkegaard's work proposes a 
transcendent origin of existence that consciousness cannot assimilate or recover. He therefore rejects the idealist 





reflection”, while the kingdom of the sensuous is characterized by “the elemental voice of 
passion, the play of desires, the wild noise of intoxication” (E/O I: 90). Don Giovanni is, of 
course, an occupant of the latter kingdom, and by seducing without words, he has not yet made 
his way into the kingdom of language through the development of spirit. Without being able to 
negate his passions or achieve any reflective distance from them, he has no way of regulating his 
wild behaviors. 
The metaphysical dualism brought out in A's discussion is by no means anomalous with 
respect to Kierkegaard's authorship as a whole, including his self-authored works. Although 
Kierkegaard admonished his reader not to confuse him with the pseudonyms, the consistency 
between their views would suggest that one can be confident in attributing much of the view 
endorsed by A to him.148 By being absorbed in the sensuous (which Kierkegaard later conceives 
under the concept of the temporal), and without having actualized the spiritual, eternal 
component within him through language or reflection, Don Giovanni is captive to what 
Kierkegaard would later call an "alien power" that possesses him, and which moves him to act by 
acting seductively through him (EUD: 172).149 It seems that A has this power in mind when he 
calls the most abstract idea conceivable "sensuous genius," where genius denotes a daimonic 
energy that inspires his actions (E/O I: 56).150 This raises an important interpretive question: how 
is the sensuous alien to spirit if spirit constitutes the relation between psyche and body that the 
sensuous subsumes? It would seem inappropriate to conceive of psyche and body as alien to the 
                                                
148 Commentators sometimes ignore this admonition, and fail to give reasons why certain views of the 
pseudonymous authors should be attributed to Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard writes: "As is well known, my authorship 
has two parts: one pseudonymous and the other signed. The pseudonymous writers are poetized personalities, 
poetically maintained so that everything they say is in character with their poetized individualities; sometimes I have 
carefully explained in a signed preface my own interpretation of what the pseudonym said. Anyone with just a 
fragment of common sense will perceive that it would be ludicrously confusing to attribute to me everything the 
poetized characters say" (JP VI: 6786).  
149 Although temporality is foreign to spirit, Kierkegaard remains convinced that it ultimately derives its power from 
the eternal, and has no power of its own. Only through this borrowed power can the sensuous be “life, movement, 
continual unrest,” as A puts it (E/O I: 71). Max Scheler, another tripartite theorist of man, had conceived of the 
matter inversely. He argues that spirit is impotent, while the psychical and physical aspects of man are the source of 
his potency and vitality. Spirit therefore must work indirectly through the activity of these channels in order to 
sublimate the desires and actions of the human being. In this way, the primitive life of the human being can begin to 
work toward higher moral values. See The Human Place in the Cosmos, esp. p. 41. 
150 I have modified the Hong translation of the Danish Genialitet, which they translate as "elemental originality" 
instead of "genius." In a footnote to the translation, the Hongs claim this should not be translated as "genius," in the 
sense of an extraordinarily gifted individual (E/O I: 617). I agree that this is not the sense in which A uses it, but 
believe that the Hongs miss that "genius" can refer to a spiritual power attending to the individual. For A, this is 
certainly not a benevolent spirit or the conscience. It should be noted that A's notion of sensuous genius echoes the 
evil genius hypothesized by Descartes, who could lead him astray in his judgments by corrupting his senses. See 




self, since they are components of it. Hence, if the self can be said to be under an alien power, 
these cannot be the powers in question.  
In answer to this, one can recall from chapter one that for Kierkegaard, the temporal is a 
powerful reality independent of God and the self, which is destined for an eternal happiness apart 
from the temporal provided that it fulfills its telos, which is to become itself. The temporal is 
therefore alien to the self, even though a portion of it resides within the self in having infiltrated 
the relation between psyche and body. The temporal is a corrosive influence on this relation, but 
this does not mean that psyche and body are wretched or alien to the self by nature.151 Psyche 
and body should be closely guided by spirit to minimize the power the temporal has over it, but 
they are good insofar as they constitute living creatures, which are concrete individuals that God 
encompasses in existence in creating ex nihilo. In existing temporally, however, they remain 
beleaguered by their origin, which is from nothingness or non-being. In a cryptic excerpt from 
his Papiers, Kierkegaard alludes to "the nothing from which God creates, the nothing the devil 
chews on in vain."152 He seems to think that God originally creates living things from a source 
outside of Him, or from non-being, which as I explained in the previous chapter, in some sense 
is. But this source threatens to destroy or corrupt them in lingering with them throughout 
temporal flux.153 A appears to have a similar idea in mind when he suggests that destructive 
energies are a pervasive influence on Don Giovanni. He claims that Don Giovanni should be 
conceived not as an individual, but as “a force of nature, the demonic” (E/O I: 92). As an 
impersonal power or collection of powers that inflame the passions of individuals and urge them 
to perform wicked and thoughtless deeds in spite of themselves, the demonic "no more wearies 
of seducing or is through with seducing than the wind with blowing a gale, the sea with rocking, 
or a waterfall with plunging down from the heights" (E/O I: 92-93). Combining these views, it 
would seem that for Kierkegaard, the demonic is an unfortunate remnant of creation ex nihilo, 
                                                
151 Haufniensis recognizes that spirit is an ambiguous power in relation to psyche and body. It is "friendly" to them 
insofar as it holds them in relation, but it is "hostile" insofar as it disrupts their relation through acts of exclusion or 
negation (CA: 43-44). As a result, alienation might occur when the self feels estranged from its immediate desires or 
its body. Conversely, it might occur when one would like to lose oneself and one's inhibitions in the moment but 
cannot due to being overly self-conscious. The paradoxical nature of the self makes the human being prone to inner 
conflict and identity issues of various types, but strictly speaking, psyche and body are not alien to the self, because 
they are essential components of it. 
152 See Pap. III B 122:5 n.d., 1841-42. As quoted in the supplemental material to Either/Or: I, p. 547. 




and occurs when the temporal attempts to compromise God's good creation by parasitically 
clinging to entities in it, and drawing it toward an errant course. 
With this account of creation, Kierkegaard is not suggesting that the whole of nature is 
demonic in its separation from God. In fact, he praises nature on several occasions in his 
authorship.154 For instance, he writes: "With what infinite love nature or God in nature 
encompasses the great variety which has life and being!" (WOL: 252). Based on the writings of 
him and A, however, it would seem that due to its abyssal origin, nature harbors some amount of 
demonic energy that, if not harnessed by spirit, can possess a human being by means of the 
elemental power of the sensuous. This happens to be the case with Don Giovanni, who is a 
vehicle for sensuous energies like desire as a psyche-body unity. These can often be violent and 
unruly, but spirit can react by using the sensuous as its vehicle, prying the human being from the 
elemental nothingness that bore him and bringing him to his senses through language and 
reflection. If Don Giovanni were active as spirit, he would be able to appreciate order, structure, 
and regularity in existence, and would be able to get a hold of himself in it. The world as he 
perceives it would then be substantial for him. But as a passive vessel of natural forces, he is a 
slave to immediate instinct and impulse, without having any real understanding of his condition 
or control over it as a free agent.  
One should not assume that all immediate esthetes would live like Don Giovanni, not 
only because nearly everyone possesses some degree of reflection and linguistic ability, but also 
because they do not always find enjoyment in the same things. Yet some individuals might have 
many traits in common with him, even though it is unlikely that the world would meet their 
needs so effortlessly, and without resistance or conflict. Those who might be said to live in this 
mode would be similar in that they would pursue immediate pleasure for themselves to the 
exclusion of all else. At the crudest level, this could be from sex, entertainment, food, drugs, 
material goods, and so on. Those more socially inclined might constantly seek satisfaction from 
the attention and admiration of others, or through exercises of power. Since reflection would 
likely be minimal at this stage, the pleasure they get would be from the gratification of appetites, 
and they would rarely enjoy the more refined intellectual pleasures of things like art and study. It 
is worth noting that an immediate esthete could conceivably live to satisfy basic appetites while 
                                                
154 Kierkegaard's respect for nature and its organisms is especially evident in a collection of religious discourses 




possessing a significant degree of reflection about doing so. In this case, reflection would be 
used primarily for things like understanding and communication, or for discerning the 
appropriate means to the desired end, rather than for any kind of critical examination of the self 
or one's relationship with the world. The intellect would not be used for free thinking, but would 
be in service to the powers of the psyche, and so inclination and impulse would dictate most of 
the individual's actions.  
 
2.2.2 The Nascent Person: The "Public" Mode of Existence  
Anti-Climacus contends that the lifestyles of most human beings are properly categorized 
as immediate, despite their having "a little dash of reflection" to offset the sensuous aspect of 
their existence (SUD: 58). With the help of things like civilization, education, and culture, which 
are made possible by the spiritual achievements of thought and language, they have begun to 
subdue their unruly passions, heedless instincts, and the elemental forces of the natural world. 
Their higher capacities have brought a spiritual form of order and structure to their life in a 
manner that outruns any natural form of organization that organisms and inanimate things might 
have. They have also guided them in forming a regulated community to dwell in, where they 
attain some degree of stability and security. In achieving a degree of liberation from nature, they 
are also able to use their cognitive powers to understand things as being meaningful and rational, 
which Don Giovanni was unable to do. With self-consciousness having awakened to some 
extent, and in achieving some degree of unity as enduring selves, most people do not partake in 
sensual indulgence to the extent of someone like Don Giovanni. But Anti-Climacus believes that 
they are generally so wrapped up in selfishly pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain, and in 
maintaining an ultimately illusory sense of security within their milieu, that they do not advance 
far beyond his level of maturity.  
Following Schacht, I will call this way of life the "public" mode of existence.155 In the 
public mode, the human being is well adjusted to society and the traditional norms, values, and 
belief systems in place, while the primitive type of integration he had enjoyed with his natural 
                                                
155 Schacht, Hegel and After, p. 138. However, I do not agree with Schacht that the type of society Kierkegaard calls 
"the present age" in Two Ages can be categorized in this way. The present age, in Kierkegaard’s view, is best 
understood as a time in which individuals have become highly reflective and lethargic, and so are more likely to be 
spectators of life than passionate participants in it. While they are likely to have many of the characteristics 
associated with those in "public mode," they are also likely to have much in common with those in the reflective 




environment and immediate psychical life has started to break down through spiritual acts of 
negation. Once reflection is elicited through social conditioning, the individual no longer 
operates purely on the basis of natural impulse, inclination, or instinct. In order for the self to 
integrate itself with its psyche-body aspect and the surrounding world on a higher level, he must 
use reflection to cognize himself and the world. In the initial stage of his personal development, 
he is in no position to cultivate this capacity without the rearing of others, who he depends on for 
direction and support, and to teach him language and such. To reintegrate with the natural world 
and fit in with society as a reflective being, he looks to family, peers, race, state or the like to 
shape his identity, provide him with meaning and purpose, and determine how he should conduct 
himself. In this way, he can avoid living in pain, isolation, destitution, and confusion.  
This upbringing is a healthy part of growing up, but Anti-Climacus laments that those in 
the public mode tend to remain stuck in this provisional condition, and do not bother trying to 
deepen their understanding of who they are as individuals through self-reflection. Instead of 
building on this condition to become independent thinkers who are concerned about spiritual 
matters, they care more about retaining a sense of belonging to the collective, which they do by 
conforming to its attitudes, beliefs, and practices. They thereby fail to realize their full potential, 
and are in a state of immaturity as selves. Preoccupied with "temporal goals" like amassing 
money, progressing in a career, gaining power and status, and earning a good reputation, these 
individuals become pacified by the mundane routine of life in the community in integrating with 
it (SUD: 35). He states: 
 
Surrounded by hordes of men, absorbed in all sorts of secular matters, more and more shrewd about the 
ways of the world––such a person forgets himself, forgets his name divinely understood, does not dare to 
believe in himself, finds it too hazardous to be himself and far easier and safer to be like the others, to 
become a copy, a number, a mass man. (SUD: 33-34)   
 
Criticizing the lack of self-awareness and mediocre spirituality of individuals in the "public" 
mode, Anti-Climacus writes: "As a rule, men are conscious only momentarily, conscious in the 
midst of big decisions, but they do not take the daily everyday into account at all; they are spirits 
of sorts for an hour one day a week–which, of course, is a rather crude way to be spirit" (SUD: 




factors, rather than being the product of autonomous commitment. It is therefore liable to 
frequent change based on the fashions of the age or trends in their milieu.  
 Anti-Climacus believes that in avoiding taking up a critical perspective that would 
unsettle them by calling their way life or community too radically into question, most individuals 
lack a great deal of personal integrity and agency. In pursuit of contentment, they do not want to 
be anything other than what their circumstances and the direction of others have made them. 
They might step back from their concrete situation to evaluate it and make their own decisions 
about what to do as free beings on occasion, but to retain harmony with the natural world and 
society, they are primarily "immersed in triviality and silly aping" of the beliefs, attitudes, 
feelings, desires, and behaviors of other people (SUD: 101). Because their acts are so frequently 
motivated by comparisons to others and the pressures of conformity, in addition to natural drives 
and immediate feeling, it is likely that Anti-Climacus would consider those in the "public" mode 
to be more like wantons than persons in Frankfurt's sense. Because these individuals have 
characteristics in common with wantons and persons, while lacking a robust set of second-order 
volitions, their condition might best be described as nascent personhood. In the case of the 
nascent person, the finite component of the self outweighs the infinite component that is capable 
of exercising the will at a higher-order, and one's possibilities are greatly limited by what the 
crowd or one's immediate feelings dictate. By living this way, they achieve an intimate bond 
with their psyche-body aspect and the surrounding world, but Kierkegaard believes that to be 
torn from oneself in this way is to be "possessed" by the world, much like Don Giovanni was 
demonically possessed by the sensuous energies flowing through his veins (EUD: 165). Of 
course, spirit has tacitly begun to make its presence known among those taken in by this way of 
life through the emergence of language and reflection, and so they make some effort to keep the 
demonic at bay through second-order volitions. However, these individuals still do not have 
much reflection or will of their own, and so are principally moved by their strongest lower-order 
desires, even though they might sometimes resist them or call them into question. Therefore, 
however selfish or egotistical the individual living in the "public" mode might be said to be (and 
it is very likely that he will be selfish, even if it is not to the extent of someone like Don 
Giovanni), on Anti-Climacus' view, he is not much of a self at all. Alienated from themselves as 
autonomous agents, and complacent in the social roles they have assumed, they are for the most 




 Schacht correctly points out that Kierkegaard devotes little effort to working out an 
elaborate theory of the "public" mode of existence, "not because he considers the “public” mode 
to be of negligible significance, but rather because he finds the others both more interesting and 
worth taking more seriously as candidates for the most satisfactory form of human spiritual 
life.”156 Much can be inferred, however, from what he does say about those ignorant of being 
spirit. With their worldly cares, these individuals would still pursue pleasure and amusement 
above all else. However, since a community needs a stable set of norms, rules, and expectations 
to sustain itself and function properly, along with its inhabitants acting in agreement with them, 
this way of life would require a customary form of morality. This would likely include ethical or 
religious demands, such as obligations to family or society and obedience to its laws, or 
adherence to the religious tradition one was raised into. But without a strong sense of his 
freedom, he is unlikely to question or test the normative or political constraints put in place in 
society (which are not always fruitful or morally justifiable), whether they are explicit or 
implicit. He is therefore likely to be conservative in his worldview, although this might mean he 
advocates liberal values if he is brought up in a liberal community.157 Consequently, unlike an 
immediate esthete like Don Giovanni, the individual living in the public mode would not give his 
selfish inclinations and desires free rein as an instrument of natural forces. Instead, he would take 
some effort to constrain them for the sake of preserving the given social order, along with his 
reputation within it.  
 For those in the "public" mode, however, an ethical or religious practice is not an intense 
passion that they take to define them as individuals set apart from the mass. If it becomes an 
earnest commitment made in deepened inwardness, the individual would have transitioned from 
an esthetic way of life to an ethical or religious way of life. Even if the nascent person has goals 
or ideals about the kind of person he wants to be that are drawn from his culture, none of this 
                                                
156 Schacht, Hegel and After, p. 138. Kierkegaard alludes to this mode of life in his dissertation on irony, when he 
favorably discusses the distinction Hegel made between the ethical (Sittlichkeit) and morality (Moralität) (CI: 225-
237). There are complexities here, but the public mode I have described would best fit under the ethical in Hegel's 
thought, as opposed to that of morality, in which the individual has freed himself of all immediate bonds to the 
established order. With morality, the private life of conscience assumes primary significance. According to Hegel, 
morality is represented historically in the figure of Socrates, but this stage is surpassed on the way to achieving a 
higher unity with society in the form of ethics. After defending his dissertation, Kierkegaard had abandoned his 
Hegelian roots and placed morality on a much higher level than the ethical as Hegel conceives it. For Kierkegaard, 
Sittlichkeit becomes a prefiguration of morality. 
157 There is a worry that the attitudes and patterns of behavior of those in public mode could lead to fascism or 
totalitarianism, since these individuals are likely to submit to the will of authority figures without thinking or 




would invigorate the will or critical thought, and would likely even make him forget about his 
unique standing as an individual. Because the stages of life Kierkegaard lays out pertain to 
individuals in the robust sense, Kierkegaard might not characterize the "public" mode I have 
described as an esthetic, ethical, or religious way of life. Since individuals in the public mode 
dabble in these three spheres without passionately committing themselves to any of them, it is 
not a viable option for those who intend on living a good life in deepened inwardness as selves. 
But since there is some degree of spiritual development, Kierkegaard would not believe that this 
way of life is a lower grade of existence than that of the immediate esthetic.158 Additionally, 
because those in the public mode have a budding sense for the ethical or even intimations of 
conscience, Kierkegaard would recommend it over an esthetic way of life that disregards this.159 
In this respect, those in the “public” mode live more admirably than the immediate esthete, and 
have made real progress in personal development, despite their shortcomings.  
 Under the pseudonym of Judge William, Kierkegaard provides more evidence of an 
outlying "fourth mode" that succeeds the immediate esthetic but precedes the reflective esthetic 
stage in the development of selfhood. Although the ethical has begun to make its appearance in 
this stage of life, the Judge criticizes those in this mode for not taking the ethical seriously 
enough, and as a result, not realizing their nature as spirit. Even if they live in an ethically 
laudable way, they do not truly understand why they live ethically or resolve to live in an ethical 
way. He writes: 
 
…so many live out their lives in quiet lostness…they live, as it were, away from themselves and vanish 
like shadows. Their immortal souls are blown away, and they are not disquieted by the question of its 
immortality, because they are already disintegrated before they die. They do not live esthetically, but 
neither has the ethical become manifest to them in its wholeness. (E/O II: 168-169) 
 
                                                
158 Schacht disagrees with this assessment, claiming, “he considers those who never rise above this level to be the 
most pathetic representatives of mankind, compared with whom even an unscrupulous sensualist like Don Juan 
comes as a welcome relief.” See Hegel and After, p. 138. 
159 Kierkegaard regards conscience as a defining characteristic of individuality, and as the focal point of one's 
relationship with God. In the public mode, however, the individual mostly ignores the demands of his conscience. 
“Here in temporality the conscience already wants to make each one separately into the single individual… 
however…it all too easily happens that the voice of conscience becomes merely one voice among many others, and 
then the solitary voice of the conscience, as is usual with the solitary voice, is so easily outvoted—by the majority. 




As we will see in the next section and in chapter six, the Judge believes that these immature 
individuals have not yet become consciousness of their eternal nature, from which follows 
universally valid principles that assume the form of laws and precepts. Since this knowledge of 
themselves does not motivate their actions or decisions, he believes they cannot be said to be 
living ethically in the true sense. He argues that until they collect themselves out of their 
dissipation in immediacy or unreflective worldliness and realize that they are intended for the 
ethical way of life by nature, they are in despair.  
 
2.3 Unconscious Despair: Kierkegaard's Criticism of the Life of Immediacy 
 Although those in the "public" mode or in the immediate esthetic stage of existence do 
not believe they are in despair, Anti-Climacus claims that they are because, in their ignorance, 
they are "unaware of being defined as spirit" (SUD: 25). Like the Judge, he believes that learning 
the truth about one's eternal nature and exercising one's agency as a person of integrity is the 
ultimate goal in achieving spiritual health within this life. Following Socrates, he believes that 
relating oneself to the truth is "the highest good" for the human being. Consequently, by 
preferring to seek worldly or sensual goods instead of self-knowledge, one is unprepared to 
attain this highest good (SUD: 42). Supposing that he is even right about this, it would seem 
highly questionable that falling anywhere short of the highest good, whatever that happens to be, 
would mean one must be in despair. This is especially the case if this individual believes she is 
happy, and does not experience feelings of hopelessness or misery. It also seems puzzling that 
most people would not want to know themselves as spirit and be conscious of their freedom if it 
were indeed the highest good. Hence, if his view were that these individuals are in despair 
because they do not have the proper conception of themselves as agents or do not want to have 
this understanding, as Kosch argues, it would be a rather weak and unconvincing one.160  
 Fortunately, the Judge and Anti-Climacus provide additional reasons to think that the life 
of immediacy is despair that involve more than mere ignorance of being a self, or of failing to 
will in the way one should. In this section, I argue that, more fundamentally, the self in esthetic 
immediacy or the public mode despairs because it is disintegrated in its existence as a synthesis 
                                                
160 See Kosch, Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, p. 154. Kosch does explain that one's 
misconception of oneself results in a failure to achieve a stable synthesis in the self. She does not, however, base her 
analysis on the lack of integrity that selves have before despair is eliminated, or explain why this is such a dire 
predicament to be in. This structural problem caused by the will, I argue, is central to despair in Kierkegaard's 




of the eternal and temporal, infinite and finite, psyche and body, and possibility and necessity. In 
other words, the human being in this complex state is broken and his identity is compromised, 
even if he is not conscious of this or only has a rough idea of it. I explain that the disintegration 
of the self occurs due to its entanglement in the nothingness of temporality, which is a source of 
tension and anxiety. By being drawn away from his stronghold in the Eternal, and into sensuous 
pleasures or the life of the crowd as a psyche-body unity, the self is in disequilibrium due to an 
overemphasis on the temporal conditions of its existence. This imbalance prevents the self from 
realizing its spiritual freedom and independence from the world, and hence from knowing itself 
in relation to God. Without the harmony and balance that an intimate relationship with God 
yields, it lacks the deeper fulfillment and meaning that it longs for insofar as it is spirit, and has 
an aspect of the eternal and infinite within it. On this teleological account of the self, the self is 
truly itself and free of despair when it achieves integrity and wholeness through harmonizing its 
opposing constituents in the act of synthesis. In undertaking this effort by seeking fellowship 
with God, it evades the nothingness of a worldly existence, which threatens it with destruction or 
even perdition.161  
  
2.3.1 Despair as Existing Amid Nothingness 
 Those who read Sickness Unto Death without mining its depths will likely get the 
impression that Anti-Climacus is reticent to offer an explanation of why the life of immediacy is 
despair. Early in the text, he alludes to despair as a "gnawing secret" that besets every human 
being (SUD: 27). Elaborating on this idea, he writes:  
 
...anyone who really knows mankind might say that there is not one single living human being who does 
not despair a little, who does not secretly harbor an unrest, an inner strife, a disharmony, an anxiety about 
                                                
161 Taylor also argues that in Kierkegaard's view, the self is in despair due to its failure to achieve its telos, which is 
to attain self-integration by unifying the different components of the self (Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship, 
p. 10). Taylor suggests that in the esthetic stage of life, this state of disequilibrium is caused by the absence of a 
decision that would bring stability to the self (Ibid., p. 128). This lack of stability is a problem because so long as 
one remains in this stage, one remains, in some sense, a child (Ibid., p. 75). I do not disagree with Taylor that 
Kierkegaard argues this, but I explain why Kierkegaard believes this lack of stability is a major problem for the 
person living in the esthetic or public modes, and hence why there is a need for religious or ethical decision to 
correct this. As Kosch notes, Taylor understands the relation between the different stages of life largely in 
developmental-psychological terms, such that deficiencies in one stage only become apparent at a higher, more 
advanced stage (Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, p. 150 footnote). But it is not clear why 
living like a child must mean that one is in despair, or why such a grave expression is suitable in describing anyone 
who has fallen short of spiritual maturity. My analysis in this section will be done with the intention of getting clear 




an unknown something or a something he does not even dare to try to know, an anxiety about some 
possibility in existence or an anxiety about himself, so that, just as the physician speaks of going around 
with an illness in the body, he walks around with a sickness, carries around a sickness of the spirit that 
signals its presence at rare intervals in and through an anxiety he cannot explain. (SUD: 22) 
  
In this secretive passage, he associates despair with "anxiety," and an "inner strife" or 
"disharmony" lurking in the heart of each and every human being, even among those who appear 
to be the happiest. "Even that which, humanly speaking, is utterly beautiful and lovable—a 
womanly youthfulness that is perfect peace and harmony and joy—is nevertheless despair" 
(SUD: 25). Hinting as to why even someone with this quality must be said to be in despair, he 
writes: "Despite its illusory security and tranquility, all immediacy is anxiety and thus, quite 
consistently, is most anxious about nothing" (SUD: 25). The immediate esthete might seem 
content in having most of his desires satisfied, just as the individual who has settled into the life 
of his community might. These individuals are also likely to find adequate meaning and purpose 
in their lives, which satisfies them as reflective beings. Anti-Climacus, however, believes that the 
serenity they enjoy within the world is shallow and precarious. There is an indeterminate danger 
lurking beneath the veneer of harmony and bliss that they are dimly aware of, but are unable to 
identify as they can other things, and at a deeper level, this "nothing" is a nebulous presence that 
menaces them in their existing. In other words, the anxiety that affects those living in immediacy 
is not aimed at any determinate thing in existence, but is a generalized anxiety that arises simply 
from becoming conscious in immediacy.162 The true nature of immediacy is, as Climacus states, 
indeterminateness, although determinate objects become manifest to the human being under 
reflection (PF: 167). As the original source of anxiety, immediacy is not a definite thing in the 
way that particular objects or entities in the empirical world are, but is rather the medium 
through which they become present as phenomena in consciousness. Haufniensis states, "the 
most correct expression for immediacy is that which Hegel uses about pure being: it is nothing" 
                                                
162 Heidegger makes essentially the same point in his fundamental ontology when he distinguishes between fear, 
which is directed toward a definite item within the world, and anxiety, which is not. "That in the face of which one 
is anxious is completely indefinite...Nothing which is at ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within the world functions 
as that in the face of which anxiety is anxious" (Being and Time, p. 230). Heidegger concludes from this that "the 
world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety" (Ibid., 181). Hence, the world as he interprets it 
phenomenologically is not a definite thing, but rather the horizon under which things (beings) are disclosed. Much 
like Kierkegaard, then, he understands the world in terms of nothingness. Repudiating the dualism that Kierkegaard 
invokes in his ontology, he rejects the existence of an eternal being, or God, that is infinitely qualitatively distinct 




(CA: 37).163 Anxiety about nothingness therefore characterizes the despair of those in 
immediacy, although it is typically suppressed or rendered unconscious through occupation with 
the finite affairs of worldly life, where definite beings are the focus of attention.  
 Anti-Climacus offers little further explanation of what it means to be anxious about 
nothing, or why this nothingness provokes anxiety, but Kierkegaard sheds light on this topic 
elsewhere in his corpus. We have seen that in his religious discourses, Kierkegaard contends that 
the world and everything within it is built upon nothingness in having been created by God ex 
nihilo, and that non-being nevertheless is in some weak sense in its association with 
possibility.164 Determinate beings, which exist temporally but not eternally, come into being 
from an indeterminate field of possibility and pass away according to God's will. Consequently, 
they are insubstantial and transitory in nature, but they exist in actuality so long as God 
maintains them in existence. However, they are nothing apart from their relation to God, who is 
in the fullest sense. Since anything that exists temporally is self-contradictory and perishable as a 
union of being and non-being, any human being wrapped up in temporal conditions has strayed 
from his divine origin. As a result, he is menaced by non-being and the prospect of death.165 
According to Anti-Climacus and Haunfiensis, this palpable presence of nothingness that 
pervades immediacy generates anxiety, or even despair. The Christian who has learned of his 
eternal nature while being situated in the temporal gains constancy, and in doing so, hopes to be 
saved from the void by holding fast to the Eternal in existence. Because he is a synthesis, 
                                                
163 Hegel intends to begin his dialectic of mediation with immediate existence in an effort to free his thought of 
presuppositions. By this logic, being and nothing are in fact the same. "This pure being is after all a pure abstraction, 
and therefore absolutely negative; regarded immediately it is nothing" (Hegel's Logic, p. 127). As quoted in the 
Hong footnotes to The Concept of Anxiety, p. 234. Climacus, however, criticizes idea that philosophy could begin 
without presuppositions. "How does the system begin with the immediate, that is, does it begin with it immediately? 
The answer to this must certainly be an unconditional no ... The beginning of the system that begins with the 
immediate is then itself achieved through reflection... a logical system must not boast of an absolute beginning, 
because such a beginning is ... a pure chimera" (CUP: 111-112). Hence, immediate existence is already presupposed 
in any philosophical reflection, which begins by annulling it through an intellectual act of apprehension through 
which objects are discerned, rather than directly coinciding with it. He thereby rejects the idealist notion that 
existence originates in an act of thought that posits it, or that thinking and being are identical. Although immediate 
existence as reflected in human consciousness is nothing, Kierkegaard rejects that this designator of emptiness and 
abstraction applies to eternal being, which is concrete and full. In affirming that existence is characterized by 
irreconcilable duality, Kierkegaard departs from Hegel in assuming that being and non-being are absolutely distinct.  
164 See section 1.3.2. 
165 Following St. Paul's lamentation in Romans 8:19-23, Kierkegaard argues that human beings are not the only 
living things to sorrow due to their temporal plight. "Yet the lily and the bird do have sorrow also, just as all nature 
has sorrow. Does not all creation groan under the perishability under whose dominion it was placed against its will? 
It is all under the dominion of perishability! ... perishability, that is the groan—because to be under the dominion of 
perishability is to be what a groan signifies: confinement, restraint, imprisonment; and the content of the groan is: 




however, he must wait in temporality in patience, as he can only be removed from it and attain 
immortality after death.  
 A similar but secular account of creation can be found in A's essay on Don Giovanni, who 
expressed the life of immediacy in its purest form in his total immersion in the sensuous. In a 
passage depicting the origin of Don Giovanni, he writes: 
 
Don Giovanni's life is...the full force of the sensuous, which is born in anxiety; and Don Giovanni himself 
is this anxiety, but this anxiety is precisely the demonic zest for life. After Mozart has had Don Giovanni 
come into existence this way, his life now develops for us in the dancing strains of the violin, in which he 
lightly, fleetingly speeds on over the abyss. When one throws a pebble in such a way that it skims the 
surface of the water, it can for a time skip over the water in light hops, but it sinks down to the bottom as 
soon as it stops skipping; in the same way he dances over the abyss, jubilating during his brief span. (E/O I: 
129-130) 
 
According to A, the anxiety that animates the life of Don Giovanni stems from his originating 
from the nothingness of possibility. Anxious about slipping back into the abyssal depths from 
which he came, he possesses an exuberant energy that keeps him busily flitting between affairs 
with different women. However, these joyous events transpiring within the sensuous are 
ephemeral, quickly fading into nothing just as they emerge from nothing. Don Giovanni's life 
unfolds in a similar way as he hurtles toward inevitable doom, lusting after women without ever 
gaining a real sense of himself over temporal duration. Interestingly, A does not describe this 
nothingness that generates anxiety as empty like Kierkegaard does elsewhere, but as misty and 
dense.166 He compares this fullness to what one might view in nature when seeing the horizon 
"dark and clouded; too heavy to support itself, it rests upon the earth and hides everything in its 
obscure night; a few hollow sounds are heard, not yet in motion but like a deep mumbling to 
itself" (E/O I: 129). Then, A envisions this formless, featureless landscape roused and lit up by a 
flash from the distant heavens, which signals the arrival of Don Giovanni. As this flash, which is 
"born in anxiety," gains momentum in its perpetual reoccurrence, one has "a presentiment of a 
                                                
166 A's notion of an elemental fullness that precedes the event of creation recalls Haufniensis' claim that the Eternal is 
full, while retaining none of its positive connotations. Their disagreement is a consequence of their competing 
worldviews. As an esthete, A has a vastly different conception of the Eternal than does Haufniensis, who occupies a 
Christian standpoint. For A, the "womb" of creation, or the "eternal mother of everything," is a monstrous "vortex" 
that blindly creates just as it destroys (E/O I: 168). The indifference, caprice, and violence of A's eternal is a far cry 




great fire" that represents the eruption of passion in his life (E/O I: 129). For A, then, it would 
seem that the immediate consciousness of human beings, and the passions that drive their 
actions, emerge from this elemental nothingness in the same foreboding manner, and this 
produces anxiety. One can flee from this demonic origin or render it unconscious through lively 
activity directed toward determinate beings in existence, but for the esthete A, salvation is out of 
the question; in the end, one must return to one's place of origin. It is this primal form of anxiety 
experienced within the sensuous that Anti-Climacus seems to associate with despair in the 
individual living in immediacy with only a small degree of reflection.  
 In the passage invoked at the beginning of this section, Anti-Climacus describes this 
anxiety that haunts the individual as being "about some possibility in existence" or "about 
himself" in his existence, and not simply an anxiety about being in the world as such (SUD: 22). 
It might seem that with this statement, he backpedals on the claim that anxiety is about nothing 
and has no determinate object, but there is a way to resolve this problem. In coming into being 
from nothing through temporality, the self is not yet what it is essentially, and as a result, it does 
not yet have an eternal existence. In its infinitude, it hovers in the sphere of possibility as spirit in 
potentiality, but possibilities are not a thing until they are actualized in existence. Insofar as the 
self exists as a synthesis of possibility and necessity, it is in a sense nothing, even though it is 
destined for an eternal existence in reality. Anti-Climacus indicates this when he states that 
"reflection is never so much itself as when it is––nothing" (SUD: 25-26). In the act of reflection, 
the infinite component of the self disrupts the individual dwelling in his natural condition by 
negating it, and this also produces anxiety. One might, however, evade this anxiety about one's 
infinitude by occupying oneself with social affairs in the public mode or sensual pleasures. In 
clinging to finite things for support, the individual conceals his anxiety from himself by keeping 
his knowledge of himself to a bare minimum. On the other hand, insofar as the self consists of 
necessity and exists concretely, it is "a very definite something" (SUD: 36). The self therefore 
has reality in thinking and willing as a human being, but since it is in the process of becoming 
itself in temporality, one cannot say that it is realized in the fullest sense. The person ought to 
strive for this by wanting to realize its essential possibilities in heightened self-reflection. As 




between God and the world, or being and nothingness, and this induces, at a level that is likely 
unconscious, anxiety and despair.167  
 To get a better sense of what Anti-Climacus might mean by suggesting that anxiety 
pertains to possibilities and to oneself, one can consult the work of Haufniensis, who deals with 
the concept of anxiety while investigating the conditions under which the misuse of the will (or 
sin) occurs. While agreeing with A and Anti-Climacus that immediacy "begets anxiety" and that 
this anxiety is about "nothing," Haufniensis expands on this idea by relating anxiety to the 
freedom and imagination the human being possesses as spirit (CA: 41). To make these 
connections explicit, Haufniensis invokes the myth of the fall from Genesis, in which God 
prohibited the first man, Adam, from eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil.168 
Describing the immediacy enjoyed by Adam before his first sin, he writes: "Dreamily the spirit 
projects its own actuality, but this actuality is nothing" (CA: 41). In other words, as a spiritual 
being constituted by infinitude, one is capable of detaching from one's natural condition to 
imagine innumerable possibilities on the horizon, including possible ways one might be or 
possible actions one might take. Because these are only possibilities that emerge through 
reflective acts of negation, they have not yet become concrete or actual, although some of them 
might in the future. The indeterminacy of possibility produces anxiety in the human being by 
unsettling his determinate existence and imbuing it with uncertainty. Haufniensis explains that 
the imagination, in its projecting, can conjure up all sorts of dreadful possibilities that threaten to 
become actualized, and this is a key contributor of anxiety (CA: 156). 
 The nothingness of possibility bears not only on what will become of us, but also on 
human freedom. In his freedom, the human being can choose to act on some of the manifold 
possibilities projected through the imagination, including those he knows he ought not to act on. 
In a dialectical fashion, Haufniensis argues that Adam does not learn of his freedom until he 
receives the prohibition from God, who introduces an obstacle for freedom by announcing its 
potential misuse. The prohibition awakens "freedom's possibility" in Adam, which is "the 
                                                
167 Descartes articulates a similar position in explaining how he is susceptible to errors in judgment as an imperfect 
being. "I realize that I am, as it were, something intermediate between God and nothingness, or between supreme 
being and non-being: my nature is such that in so far as I was created by the supreme being, there is nothing in me to 
enable me to go wrong or lead me astray; but in so far as I participate in nothingness or non-being, that is, in so far 
as I am not myself the supreme being and am lacking in countless respects, it is no wonder that I make mistakes" 
(Meditations, p. 38). Descartes, however, does not conceive of nothingness in terms of impermanence in the way 
that Kierkegaard does throughout his authorship.  




anxious possibility of being able" (CA: 44). The possibility of using one's freedom to do 
something forbidden, or in the case of Adam, sinful, thereby becomes a live option that spirit 
imagines. Even if it does not choose to act on this forbidden possibility, the mere idea of it 
provokes anxiety. When the possibility appears in consciousness, one reacts emotionally to it, 
even though one remains innocent. Freedom of choice therefore makes one anxious just as the 
imagination does, and the anxiety that attends choice (especially of the forbidden) provides 
compelling evidence of our freedom as individuals. Haufniensis does not associate the anxiety of 
freedom and possibility with despair, but Anti-Climacus appears to be willing to make this move 
in his account of despair.169  
 In his endorsement of an ethical way of life, Judge William also suggests that the life of 
immediacy is despair due to its entanglement in nothingness. He emphasizes that this creates 
instability in the human being, which as an ethicist, he finds particularly objectionable. Since 
instability creates uncertainty and disorder, it is not unrelated to anxiety, but Judge William does 
not treat anxiety at great length. Instead, he focuses on despair in those who are ignorant of being 
selves. He claims that regardless of whether the person who lives in immediacy know it, in his 
reliance on temporal conditions, his life is despair "due to its having been built upon that which 
can both be and not be" (E/O II: 225). On the other hand, in its avowal of the eternal in the 
human being, the ethical life-view avoids despair by separating itself from the temporal and 
building itself upon that which "to be" essentially belongs" (E/O II: 225). The individual living in 
esthetic immediacy or the public mode is engrossed in the fleeting affairs of worldly life, but in 
contrast to the eternal, which essentially is, that which exists temporally is embroiled in a fusion 
of being and non-being.170 The human being thereby lives among things that can either be or not 
be, and that are constantly transitioning between these states. For instance, a person's health 
might fail him, material conditions constantly change, relationships end, wealth can be won or 
                                                
169 Haufniensis argues that Adam's first sin was freely chosen in a state of anxiety, but he does not believe that the 
state of anxiety is sin. On his view, Adam would have remained in anxiety under the prohibition even if he had 
remained innocent as a consequence of being created from nothing. He thereby treats anxiety as an immediate 
precursor of sin, or as a presupposition of it. Now, according to Anti-Climacus, despair results from the misuse of 
the will, and identifies this with sin (SUD: 77). If we attribute this view to Haufniensis, one could say that on his 
account, Adam was originally anxious, but was not in despair until he violated the prohibition and sinned. However, 
it would seem that on Anti-Climacus' account, which identifies anxiety with despair, Adam must have been in 
despair even before violating the prohibition. If we attribute Haufniensis' view on the origin of creation to Anti-
Climacus, this would contradict the latter's claim that the individual in despair is bringing it upon himself, since 
Adam had not misused his will yet. This would provide additional evidence that despair is not the fault of the 
individual as he claims, but is his original state.  




lost, and pleasures come and go. In short, it is in the nature of everything finite to come into 
being and pass away, and when an individual defines himself by transitory concerns, which alone 
have meaning for him, he too exists in this volatile state under the pall of non-being. The Judge 
puts this by saying, "it is always despair to have one's life in something whose nature is that it 
can pass away," and the esthete does just this by forming attachments to contingent things like 
money, material goods, reputation, status, or in the case of Don Giovanni, women (E/O II: 236). 
In desiring things that are not secure from the vicissitudes of life, and that he might eventually 
lose, he is in despair, even if he otherwise believes he is happy.171 Because the individual living 
esthetically has an aspect of the eternal within him but paradoxically invests himself in transient 
conditions that determine his identity, the Judge says of the esthete that his "whole being 
contradicts itself" (E/O II: 162). This contradiction generates spiritual tensions that are associated 
with despair, as the self, in the act of synthesis, strives for a stable and continuous existence 
amidst the instability of life in the world.  
 In a certain sense, then, the Judge thinks that the individual living esthetically exists in 
defiance of the principle of contradiction, which is the Aristotelian dictum that it is impossible 
for the same thing to be and not be at the same time.172 This is a principle that Hegel rejected in 
order to get his dialectic of mediation started, but the Judge does not follow him in making this 
move.173 He upholds it as a logical principle of thought, agreeing with Aristotle that it is 
impossible to think of the same thing as both existing and not existing at the same time. 
However, since the spheres of thought and existence (or what I have earlier referred to as ideality 
and reality) are distinct, he does not believe it is applicable to what exists beyond the scope of 
human thought or experience (E/O II: 170).  Insofar as a human being is immersed in the fleeting 
conditions of the temporal, in which everything is a muddled compound of being and non-being, 
                                                
171 In her analysis of despair in Either/Or, Kosch argues that for the Judge, despair in the esthetic stage is the result 
of a misunderstanding of the nature of one's agency, and not a result of desiring transient goods that might not 
always be attainable (Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, p. 143). For the Judge, it certainly 
is the case that those who desire only transient goods have failed to understand their nature as spirit, and are poor 
moral agents. Kosch, however, overlooks the fact that the Judge clearly offers this as a reason for the esthete's 
despair, and so misses an important dimension of despair in his thought. On my reading of the Judge's criticism, 
those who desire only transient goods are disintegrated as selves in failing to consolidate their lives through the 
eternal component within the self. It follows from this that they misunderstand the nature of their agency, but this is 
not the primary reason why they are in despair; they are in despair because they are broken human beings who have 
succumbed to vanity and triviality in their pursuit for worldly things, without having sought the highest good in 
existence through the realization of selfhood under God. 
172 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV Chapter 3 (1005b24–30) 




his position is unsustainable, and so he is not. Insofar as he is spirit and consists of necessity, 
however, he is, and so ought to seek eternal existence from within his temporal situation. In the 
Judge's view, the eternal cannot be found in the precarious reality outside of him, since 
everything in it is constantly changing. If it is to be anywhere, it must be within him, and indeed, 
the Judge believes that one can discover it there. Therefore, in order to extricate himself from 
this unsustainable contradiction that he exists in and come to be in truth, the individual must free 
himself from the clutches of the temporal by willing to be himself "in his eternal validity" (E/O 
II: 214). As we will see in chapter four, the Judge believes that one can only do this by becoming 
aware of oneself as spirit, and then deciding to take up the ethical way of life in earnest. In 
defining oneself under ethical principles, which give one's life ultimate purpose and value, one 
eliminates despair by integrating the contradictory aspects of oneself under the direction of the 
eternal within.  
 Before we move on from this preliminary discussion of the ethical stage of life, the Judge 
makes other another claim about despair in the esthetic stage of life that helps in interpreting his 
criticism. The Judge claims that the central feature of the esthetic way of life is the pursuit of 
enjoyment, but this poses difficulties when taken as a life-view (E/O II: 179). He writes, “the 
person who says that he wants to enjoy life always posits a condition that either lies outside the 
individual or is within the individual in such a way that it is not there by virtue of the individual 
himself” (E/O II: 180). In disagreement with Anti-Climacus, who thinks a relationship with an 
external power (or God) is necessary for defeating despair, the Judge goes on to add, "every life-
view that has a condition outside itself is despair" (E/O II: 235).174 On the Judge's view, the 
esthete lacks composure in his attachment to external conditions, and so is not collected as a self. 
By allowing his happiness to depend on things that he does not control, he must focus his efforts 
                                                
174 Kosch explains that there is some disagreement about the reason why the Judge believes that those whose 
enjoyment depends on external conditions (or internal conditions not under their control) are in despair (Freedom 
and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, pp. 142-145). Lübcke, for instance, has taken his claim to be that 
in order to avoid despair, we must be sure that our central aim in life will be fulfilled ("An Analytical Interpretation 
of Kierkegaard as Moral Philosopher," p. 97). Because we cannot be sure we will consistently be met with success 
in pursuing things like health, reputation, or wealth, the claim goes, our happiness cannot be guaranteed, and so we 
are invariably in despair over the prospect of failure. This interpretation would make some sense of the idea that one 
could appear happy and still be in despair, since the possibility of loss or failure might beleaguer one unconsciously. 
But if this were the Judge's basic argument, it would be unconvincing, since there is little reason to think that we 
cannot be happy with our present-day affairs while knowing perfectly well that what makes us happy now might not 
do so in the future, or that we might lose whatever has ensured our happiness. Assuming we even are pained by the 
realization that there will come a time in which our aim will not be met, we could mentally prepare ourselves to take 
up a new goal rather than succumb to despair. For these reasons, I agree with Kosch that one should look for an 




outward toward the multifarious circumstances in the world in order to maintain it, rather than 
ever finding it within. Due to the oppositions and fluctuations he will encounter in this approach, 
as the objects of desire threaten to flee from his grasp, the Judge describes him as "restless" and 
unstable (E/O II: 87). In seeking a life-view unaffected by despair according to the Judge's 
criteria, one obvious place to look would be for one that is not based on enjoyment of something 
transient and outside of one's control. It must also be one in which the individual takes 
satisfaction in a lasting condition that lies within him in such a way that it is within his control as 
a self. The Judge believes that the ethical life-view he endorses meets these criteria by allowing 
for the cultivation of the eternal in the human being under moral ideals. Living ethically 
engenders an awareness of universally human values and principles that are entailed by one's 
eternal nature, and fosters the will insofar as one wills to act in accordance with them. By 
integrating the eternal and temporal aspects of the self, it offers a solution to despair for the one 
willing to adopt it. 
 As we will see, the remedies to despair that Judge William and Anti-Climacus offer differ 
in important ways, since one suggests a religious way of life through Christian faith, while the 
other suggests a way of life focused on ethical duties and obligations towards humanity. Both 
emphasize self-knowledge and the exertion of the will on the journey toward self-actualization, 
but their disagreement results from having different conceptions of what the eternal is, how it 
relates to the human being, and what it requires of us. With his predilection for the eternal aspect 
of the human being, however, Anti-Climacus would likely accept most of the Judge's criticism of 
the life of immediacy. From the Christian standpoint, Kierkegaard criticizes the "pagan" or 
"natural man" who is caught up in his natural spontaneity in a way that resonates with their 
criticisms (WOL: 40). Like the individual in esthetic immediacy or the public mode, the pagan, 
he writes: 
 
...wants to belong to temporality on the most wretched conditions; he does not want to escape it. He clings 
tightly to being nothing, more and more tightly, because in a worldly way, and futilely, he tries to become 
something…See, that king whom the gods punished suffered the dreadful punishment that every time he 
was hungry luscious fruits appeared, but when he reached for them they vanished; the despairing lowly 
one, the pagan, suffers even more agonizingly in self-contradiction…It is not the fruits that withdraw 





Ignorant of being a self, the pagan is "trapped in everydayness and habit" in concerning himself 
with the transitory affairs of the world, and selfishly seeking eminence within it (EUD: 347). 
Kierkegaard explains that a way to escape this predicament would be to make an ethical or 
religious resolution, as resolution "joins a person with the eternal, brings the eternal into time for 
him, jars him out of the drowsiness of uniformity, breaks the spell of habit" (EUD: 347). Without 
any steadfast commitment to break the spell of the temporal, which those in ignorance are under 
while gripped by the daimonic energy of the sensuous, the pagan "becomes alienated from the 
eternal and the original" in himself, and is at risk of perishing in triviality (EUD: 347).175 
Although the pagan might think his life is rooted in something secure and stable in his care for 
earthly wealth and abundance, Kierkegaard believes that he has no lasting foothold in existence. 
In his hankering after what is perishable, the pagan has lost sight of what, in its divine 
immutability, is truly secure and stable––the Eternal. “The greatest distance," Kierkegaard 
writes, "is the distance from God’s grace to God’s wrath, from the Christian to the pagan, from 
being blessedly saved in grace to “eternal perdition away from the face of God,” from seeing 
God to seeing from the abyss that one has lost God” (CD: 69). In choosing the lesser goods of 
the world over the supreme and abiding goodness of God, the pagan has lost his spiritual 
integrity and is in danger of being abandoned forever by God. For Kierkegaard, this is the source 
of his despair.  
 
2.3.2 Despair as the Disintegration of Selfhood 
 Recall that Anti-Climacus associates the despair of those living in immediacy with 
anxiety, or with an "inner strife" and "disharmony" that usually is concealed from awareness 
through preoccupation with earthly or social matters (SUD: 22). In the last section, it was 
suggested that this discord is a result of the tension of being situated in the nothingness of the 
temporal as an individual destined for an immutable existence free of all strife and disharmony. 
Don Giovanni, for instance, "lives for the moment" by delighting in transitory affairs with no 
regard for his past or future, but this is a fragmented way of living; the different moments of his 
life are discrete episodes that have no real coherence or unifying link in his consciousness. Since 
                                                
175 Although paganism is traditionally thought to be a religious way of life, Kierkegaard seems to think that it is 
more properly understood as a form of estheticism rather than a form of religion. One might plausibly argue, 
however, that for Kierkegaard, paganism is a lower religious stage that would precede the ethical stage and the 
higher religious stage, which is strictly monotheistic. This would challenge the commonly held notion that there is a 




the human being is a synthesis of the temporal and eternal, any way of living that exaggerates the 
temporal constituent of the human being is intrinsically unstable and out of keeping with one's 
nature as spirit, as Kierkegaard points out: 
 
We speak, to be sure, of a lust for life based on despair, which simply because it does not have the next day 
lives, as it is said, totally in the today. But this is an illusion, because one cannot exactly live that way in the 
today, least of all totally. A human being has the eternal within him, and therefore he cannot totally be in 
the purely momentary. (CUD: 77) 
 
Kierkegaard believes that the eternal component in the self demands unity and coherence 
throughout the whole duration of one's life, and not in just a moment or in parts of it. Since the 
life of the unreflective or minimally reflective individual degenerates into a formless multiplicity 
by him being absorbed in worldly affairs and phenomena, he lacks integrity and balance as a self. 
He lives in an "episodic and momentary" manner, without resolving to use its imagination to 
bind these moments or episodes together so that they form a unified whole (WOL: 178). In order 
for the self to keep itself intact and collected during its passage through temporality, a passionate 
mode of self-reflection is needed. The crystallization of selfhood cannot be achieved, however, 
so long as one is mostly unaware of being a self that has continuity due to having an aspect of the 
eternal within it. With his lack of inwardness, the individual living in the immediate esthetic or 
public modes has, as he puts it, "lost the eternal" and drifted away from himself (WOL: 178). But 
because the eternal is an ineradicable aspect of the human being, to lose the eternal in this sense 
is not strictly to lose it, but rather "to be lost" in illusion and untruth (CUD: 137). The Judge 
elaborates on this when he suggests that the lives and identities of such individuals are a riddle 
that they cannot explain to themselves. The life of the individual in immediacy "disintegrates" 
insofar as he cannot rise above its particular moments to understand it synoptically over time as 
the Judge can from an ethical point of view (E/O II: 179). Without the eternal to assist him in 
integrating the manifold aspects of his life as a human being in the temporal, his life can be 
characterized as one of despair.  
 Anti-Climacus believes that most people are not self-conscious enough to achieve the 
degree of integrity needed for a genuinely spiritual existence, but that this is nevertheless the 
"task" for all human beings due to their eternal endowment (SUD: 35). He claims that an 




something higher, at least in an idea" that would serve as an ultimate good to aim to realize in 
existence, and to shape one's life in accordance with (SUD: 107). This unifying principle or 
criterion would comprehend the multifarious aspects of an individual's temporal existence, and 
would orient him in a complex world by providing him with meaning, direction, and a goal to 
strive for in passionate concentration. By committing to it freely and granting it authority over 
him, he would achieve a stable sense of identity in his concrete existence, and bring order and 
regularity to his life as a whole. Anti-Climacus believes that the idea of God should serve as this 
criterion for any individual (SUD: 79), although it is generally the case that people select lesser 
criteria to view themselves under, such as family, the state, the workplace, or the community.176 
By doing this, one goes on living immersed in the world's multiplicity, alienated from the eternal 
element in oneself.  
 Anti-Climacus explains that individuals who earnestly maintain this inner consistency are 
anxious about losing it. They worry this would happen if they fail to comply with the demands of 
the criterion under which they have imagined and built their life in the temporal: 
 
In that very moment, the spell is perhaps broken, the mysterious power that bound all his capacities in 
harmony is diminished, the coiled spring is slackened; everything perhaps becomes a chaos in which the 
capacities in mutiny battle one another and plunge the self into suffering, a chaos in which there is no 
agreement within itself, no momentum, no impetus. The enormous machine that in consistency was so 
tractable in its steely strength, so supple in all its power, is out of order; and the better, the more imposing 
the machine was, the more dreadful the tangled confusion. (SUD: 107) 
 
In this passage, Anti-Climacus suggests that when one cultivates inwardness through a resolution 
to live under a higher good or ideal, one casts one's own spell under the auspices of the eternal, 
and this counteracts the luring spell of worldliness in the temporal. The self-reflective individual 
who does this constantly recollects his mission and renews this resolution to avoid being 
sidetracked by the pull of the temporal, coiling himself in inwardness to gain stability and 
cohesion. Anti-Climacus believes, however, that most people exist without much inwardness in 
                                                
176 Neither Anti-Climacus nor Kierkegaard rule out that individuals might live spiritually with an idea of "the good" 
that does not involve the acceptance of any form of religion. In Two Ages, for instance, Kierkegaard praises those 
revolutionaries who centered their lives upon an idea during times of political turmoil, and so these individuals 
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believes that any way of life outside of Christianity is despair. They are therefore inadequate forms of spirituality. 




being ignorant of being selves. In changing their general attitudes, beliefs, and practices based on 
their immediate feelings, or on what the crowd is doing, "they never experience putting 
everything together on one thing" (SUD: 107), and this threatens to lead to volatility in one's 
behavior and character.  
 It would seem that by assimilating to conditions in their external environment, which is 
formed and regulated through the basic spiritual achievements of culture and society, most 
people are able to maintain unity and order in their lives as reflective beings, despite the myriad 
occasions in which they might find themselves. Anti-Climacus, however, believes this primitive 
form of integration between the self and the world does not give the self the integrity it needs in 
containing the eternal within it, and that despite appearances to the contrary, sociocultural 
institutions are not ultimately stable due to their being stationed in the temporal. Those who are 
primarily shaped by their milieu or possessed by sensual desires are characterized by conflicting 
or contradictory desires, beliefs, and attitudes that crop up at different times and on different 
occasions, depending on the situation, which means they are fundamentally disintegrated as 
selves. Without relying on the eternal to ground one's existence and hold one's life together, one 
is dissipated in the chaos of the temporal, even if this chaos has been quelled for the time being 
through the implements of society. This latent threat is a source of both anxiety and despair, even 
if one remains unconscious of it.  
 One might object that having a stable personal identity and discerning continuity in one's 
life over time is the rule rather than the exception, even for those who live in esthetic immediacy 
or in the public mode. The character or temperament of most people does not seem to shift 
drastically over the course of their lives, especially once they have reached a state of relative 
maturity as adults. One's interests, hobbies, or core beliefs might change on occasion, but often 
these are fairly consistent. Surely it is common to maintain lasting relationships with family, 
friends, and the community, or to have a steady career or occupation through which one 
understands oneself in existence. We also tend to have secular goals or projects that help define 
us and provide us with a lasting sense of meaning and purpose, whether it is becoming wealthy 
or successful at the workplace, or raising a family, starting a business or organization, or the like. 
Hence, ordinary people can organize the multiplicity and complexity in their lives without 
succumbing to the chaos Anti-Climacus describes, and most human beings are not nearly as 




 Nevertheless, in advocating the religious way of life, Anti-Climacus, rejects anything 
short of the Eternal as an adequate criterion under which to view one's life. This higher calling is 
lost if one's identity is completely wrapped up in impermanent conditions that are destined for an 
impending oblivion, even if one might retain a degree of consistency through them for the time 
being. These individuals might be said to subscribe to an ideal derived from their culture, but 
Kierkegaard concludes that an "ideal attainable in this world" is "no ideal," since these consign 
the individual to finitude rather than facilitating a deep appreciation of the infinite within him (JP 
I: 852). In his view, the infinite component of the self will outlast anything the world has to 
offer, and so suggests a hereafter. The individual should acknowledge and prepare himself for 
this in his daily life in the world by fixing on the proper sorts of ideals from within his earthly 
situation, rather than remaining ignorant of it or evading it by anchoring himself in fleeting 
conditions in the world. The apparent substantiality of the world only deceives the individual 
who believes it offers safe haven and is not essentially groundless.  
 Since individuals in the immediate esthetic or public modes are mostly "spiritless," they 
will generally exist in harmony with their immediate psychical life, their natural environment, 
and society without becoming deeply aware of themselves as different from these conditions. 
Their relatively smooth passage through temporality certainly provides them with a sense of 
security and enjoyment while it lasts. However, since the imagination subtly projects possibilities 
of hardship, misfortune, and destruction that threaten to become actualized at any moment, the 
secret of this way of life is nevertheless anxiety and despair, which is not mitigated through faith 
in God. These possibilities quickly become glaring as earthly conditions deteriorate and the 
chaos lurking beneath it all begins to manifest. Anti-Climacus writes, "When the enchantment of 
illusion is over, when existence begins to totter, then despair, too, immediately appears as that 
which lay underneath" (SUD: 44). He believes that when the tumult of temporality is eventually 
experienced and ruination looms heavily upon the individual, only the eternal can offer him 
genuine support and consolation, provided he has faith. While an individual like Don Giovanni 
feels "at home" in the natural world in soaking up the pleasures of seduction, the unity that he 
has with it is, upon closer examination, shallow and precarious; at any moment, he might 
succumb to the nothingness that bore him, and which induces the anxiety that fuels his actions. 
 Anti-Climacus explains that the disintegration of selfhood that occurs in despair can also 




those of infinitude, finitude, possibility and necessity (SUD: 29). In his account of despair as it 
relates to these constituents of the self as a synthesis, the self that despairs due to a lack of 
infinitude and possibility seems to most closely resemble the despair of ignorance. On his view, 
a self that lacks infinitude would be constricted by its finitude, and would not have freed itself 
from worldly ties so as to think and choose for itself, and become its own person. In letting 
others determine how it defines itself, it would fail to use its imagination to recognize its unique 
possibilities of being. With a narrow, secular approach to his existence, and patterning his beliefs 
and behaviors around the throng of others, this person risks “becoming a number instead of a 
self, just one more man, just one more repetition of this everlasting Einerlei [one and the same]” 
(SUD: 33). Because finitude greatly outweighs infinitude in these individuals, these constituents 
of the self are not integrated properly, and this imbalance is a source of despair.   
 Additionally, a self that lacks possibility would despair because principles of necessity 
govern its entire life, without it being willing to admit the miraculous in existence. Anti-
Climacus says that those with a "philistine-bourgeois mentality" have succumbed to this mode of 
despair (SUD: 41). He describes those with this mentality as being practical individuals who, 
with their inordinate degree of common sense, have established their lives on the basis of 
probabilities and calculations that they have gathered from empirical evidence. In doing so, they 
do not allow room for possibilities in existence that exceed what can be accommodated within 
the narrow constraints they have imposed on their imagination. For Anti-Climacus, an example 
of this type of person would be the determinist or fatalist who does not believe in a supreme 
being for whom anything is possible. When he is in a situation in which his ruination appears 
inevitable, he is unable to pray to an omnipotent God who, in His concern for them, might step in 
to assist him with his difficulty (SUD: 40). To many, it might seem spectacular to suppose there 
exists a supreme being who might shatter the bonds of necessity and defy the expectations of 
human understanding at will. But if we are not able to believe in the power of prayer or the 
possibility of salvation, then we have nowhere to turn for help when, humanly speaking, a 
situation is unsalvageable. Since devastation and tragedy is bound to arise for all human beings, 
such as in the case of loss, sickness, or death, Anti-Climacus believes that to not believe in God 






2.3.3 Despair as a Faint Presence in The Life of Immediacy 
 Anti-Climacus recognizes that many persons who are mostly unconscious of being a self 
in despair might have a “dim idea” of its presence in their lives, whether it is through an 
underlying anxiety or a sense that something is amiss (SUD: 48). The typical response is to 
suppress or ignore this vague understanding, rather than earnestly confront their despair to 
discern its nature and significance. One way to do this would be to attribute one's underlying 
malaise to the impact of external factors, such as poor economic or political conditions, a 
dysfunctional family or social life, or the inability to satisfy an earthly desire. Once these 
conditions or obstacles are removed, the individual would believe that despair would no longer 
burden them, and they could go on living without disquietude. Another way would be to busily 
distract oneself from one's hidden sorrows by burying oneself in worldliness, and pursuing a 
bevy of engagements, projects, and relationships. Often those who establish this system of self-
deception are not even aware they are doing so, but some might have an idea that they are 
indulging in a form of escapism by retreating from the intensification of self-consciousness.  
 Pascal arrived at a similar conclusion about the human condition in his Pensées. He 
writes, “The only good thing for men therefore is to be diverted from thinking of what they are, 
either by some occupation which takes their mind off it, or by some novel and agreeable passion 
which keeps them busy, like gambling, hunting, some absorbing show.”177 For Anti-Climacus 
and Pascal, the diversions employed in everyday life maintain an illusion of security, and by 
making people complacent in their ignorance, are able to prevent despair from protruding too 
heavily into the course of daily life and advancing to an intensified stage. Although this makes us 
comfortable for the time being, for these Christian thinkers, it has the negative effect of keeping 
us from acknowledging the truth about our miserable condition, as well as the offer of 
redemption through Christ.  
  Many of those who are ignorant of being selves are so unintentionally, but there are those 
who vaguely recognize the presence of despair in their life but want to remain ignorant about it. 
In reflecting on their lives, they have some idea of their freedom and infinitude as individuals, 
but they evade an earnest admittance of it by distracting themselves with worldly affairs. Content 
with their circumstances, they do not want to deal with the separation anxiety that comes with 
maintaining oneself apart from the group, and finding oneself alone in existence, with nothing to 
                                                




fall back on. They realize that mental unrest ensues from calling the system of beliefs and 
practices they have inherited too heavily into question, and know it is much easier to fall in line 
with what others are doing, even if there are lingering doubts that it is the right thing to do. They 
are also afraid of taking responsibility for their own decisions and reconsidering, in light of the 
possibilities opened up before them, whether their values and priorities are the right ones to hold, 
knowing that guilt and internal conflict will likely follow. Since they want to remain ignorant of 
being selves to avoid dealing with the anxiety and despair that comes with self-knowledge, they 
would need to have some understanding of the self they take measures to remain ignorant of, but 
this would not be enough to translate into a spiritual awakening. This person might believe he is 
happy in choosing to forget about his "naked abstract self" (SUD: 55), but "despair is right there 
behind him," waiting to crop up at the moment in which self-consciousness is aroused from its 
earthly slumber (SUD: 52). 
 
2.4 Criticisms of Kierkegaard's View of the Life of Immediacy 
 In treating the human condition as despair, Kierkegaard offers a profound 
phenomenological analysis of the everyday lives of most human beings, which uncovers many of 
the deepest insecurities and conflicts that we face. Yet many of his assumptions are problematic. 
In this section, I argue that one should be skeptical of the idea that the life of immediacy he 
describes is despair, since individuals in this stage of existence are likely to have no knowledge 
of this, and to disagree with the claim that they are. I also argue that Kierkegaard has no reason 
to think that "spiritless" individuals are bringing despair upon themselves, since they lack a 
significant degree of self-reflection and will to begin with. If we are disintegrated individuals as 
he claims, then this is a tragedy inflicted on us by God, or whatever created us. Lastly, I take 
issue with Kierkegaard's misanthropy, which he betrays by ridiculing the way of life of most 
people. If Christianity requires that one have compassion for one's suffering neighbor, and to 
love them as one loves oneself, then Kierkegaard and his Christian pseudonym are very poor 
Christians.  
 
2.4.1 Against the View that Those Who Believe They are Happy are in Despair 
 Those who accept the customary view of despair rather than the technical view given by 




Kierkegaard's works is in fact despair. These individuals, in their "ignorance" of spiritual 
matters, do not appear to be in despair, nor do they believe themselves to be. Without the misery 
that accompanies what we ordinarily understand as despair, there is no prima facie reason to 
suppose they are, or that they would want to escape their condition to defeat it. Evidence based 
on testimony or experience might seem to better indicate the presence of despair than the 
tortuous speculations of Anti-Climacus, at any rate. Yet he remains convinced that only someone 
with a superficial understanding of the issue could think that these appearances coincide with the 
reality of things, which only a person with a deeper knowledge about himself can discover. 
Recall that on his view, "that which, humanly speaking, is utterly beautiful and lovable—a 
womanly youthfulness that is perfect peace and harmony and joy—is nevertheless despair" 
(SUD: 25). This remark demonstrates how far from the customary understanding of despair Anti-
Climacus takes us by appropriating the concept for his own purposes, and how much confusion 
this can invite. On his view, the most cheerful and hopeful person alive would still be in despair 
so long as they lack the spiritual awareness he describes. In saying something so outlandish, 
some might claim that he no longer appears to be speaking of despair in any meaningful sense, 
and that he is simply abusing the language. Even if there are problems under the surface that one 
is ignorant of, so long as these do not make their presence felt in everyday life, it would seem 
that one would remain free of despair, so long as we understand despair in the usual sense.  
Interestingly, the view that it would be wrong to say that the life of immediacy is one of 
anxiety and despair is supported by one of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms. A claims that although he 
is anxious, “Don Giovanni’s life is not despair” (E/O I: 129). He does not elaborate on this claim, 
but there appear to be a couple different reasons for this. First, life goes very smoothly for Don 
Giovanni. He has little trouble satisfying his desires or achieving his aims, and so he does not 
have to deal with major opposition, adversity, or crises. Although a single woman provides him 
with no lasting satisfaction, going through 1,003 of them unimpeded keeps him content, even if it 
only distracts him from the anxiety that broods beneath the ebullient surface of his life. 
Secondly, and perhaps because of his ease of living, Don Giovanni does not reflect on his 
existence or his actions, whether it is about trivial matters pertaining to his natural condition, or 
more serious questions regarding his life’s significance, his mortality, or his greater purpose 
beyond exploiting women. The pleasures he obtains through his immersion in the sensuous 




examination of his way of life, or even being concerned about finding meaning. While no human 
being could live exactly like this, it is plausible that some people enjoy a life relatively 
unburdened by obstacles, difficulties, or excessive reflection that would drastically disrupt their 
natural spontaneity and bring them to a heightened form of self-awareness. Perhaps it is 
inaccurate to claim that such individuals––like the lovable, youthful women––are in despair, 
even if an underlying anxiety or a repressed suffering besets them. 
 Anti-Climacus evidently thinks he is justified in regarding such a condition as despair 
because he supposes that despair more in line with our customary understanding is concealed 
beneath the veneer of the life of immediacy, only needing the right circumstances to emerge in 
awareness. Rejecting this view, Theunissen argues, “there is no unconscious despair. We can 
have an inadequate idea of despair; however, we cannot be in despair without somehow knowing 
it.”178 Yet Freud and his followers have made a strong case for accepting that various emotions, 
beliefs, desires, and so on can lurk within the psyche while being suppressed from conscious 
awareness. It is plausible, for instance, to think that someone might harbor a secret happiness 
about the misfortune of others, or a prejudice against a select group of people, even though they 
believe they do not. One can also see that on Anti-Climacus' account, despair in ignorance does 
not have to remain entirely hidden from conscious life: it gains expression through the bustling 
activity that keeps many people distracted from bigger problems that would consume them if 
they stopped to consider them closely. The claim that despair cannot be unconscious does not 
pose an insurmountable objection to his account, as Theunissen believes. 
 While one might despair unconsciously, it seems questionable for Anti-Climacus to make 
the sweeping assumption that every person who happily lives an immediate way of life must be 
in despair at an unconscious level, which he does make (SUD: 22). As I argued in the previous 
section, Anti-Climacus and the Judge believe this based on their presuppositions about the nature 
of the self as a synthesis of eternity and temporality, finitude and infinitude, and possibility and 
necessity.179 The key idea is that a human being is disintegrated or imbalanced as a self so long 
as he privileges the temporal aspect of his being without appreciating its eternal aspect, and that 
this is a source of both anxiety and despair. On the teleological account of selfhood they provide, 
whoever does not integrate these components effectively by taking up the ways of life they 
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endorse cannot hope to eliminate it. Their view of despair and their proposed solutions to it are 
therefore inseparable from their understanding of the self; if you reject their assumptions about 
the constitution of the self as a synthesis of contradictory components that exists in relation to the 
Eternal, or are not convinced that achieving integrity and balance with respect to these 
components is the self's telos (or that it even has a telos), then there is little reason to prefer their 
view of despair to the customary view that most individuals are not in despair.  
 This limitation might seem to be a weakness of their account of despair, but my aim 
throughout this work is to show that Kierkegaard provides a convincing phenomenological 
account of the self that would suggest that the self is constituted in a paradoxical manner, and 
that this position has considerable merit. Because of its constitution, the self has difficulty 
harmonizing contradictory aspects of itself. However, given that individuals in ignorance can go 
on happily despite such internal discord, as in the case of the youthful woman who exhibits few 
signs of unconscious turmoil, I argue that it does not necessarily follow from this that they are in 
despair, unless we understand despair in the technical sense given by Anti-Climacus. But if we 
do that, the argument becomes question-begging, and the meaning of the term comes radically 
apart from its meaning in common usage.  
 I also believe the paradoxical conception of the human being offered in Kierkegaard's 
work succeeds in posing a major challenge to naturalistic or monistic accounts of humankind, 
which lose sight of the individual in their effort to comprehend the universe as a whole, often in 
a scientific manner.180 These accounts attempt to explain the nature or telos of the individual by 
appealing to her place within the universe as a totality or system, but this is problematic, given 
the freedom the self has through its infinite component. As a synthesis of paradoxical 
components, the individual has difficulty fitting into a natural or logical system, and does not 
entirely coincide with such systems. The teleological claim that Anti-Climacus and the Judge 
take to follow from their conception of the human being is more suspect, however, even if the 
developmental model that Kierkegaard provides by appealing to the different "stages of life" 
lends credence to it. There has been much disagreement among philosophers about what the self 
essentially is, or whether it even has an essence, with no consensus in sight. Supposing we rule 
out naturalistic or monistic accounts of the human being and look toward those views that are 
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dualistic, we are still left with competing alternatives on this issue. Kantians, for instance, argue 
that humans are essentially rational beings who are normatively governed by universal laws and 
principles that we give to ourselves a priori in the act of thinking. Traditional theists, who are 
often quick to draw a firm distinction between soul (or spirit) and body, oppose this view in their 
belief that we are essentially God's creatures to whom directives are given by divine fiat. 
Existentialists like Sartre reject that the human being has a determinate essence like other things 
in the natural world, and think it is up to us to decide who we are and how we ought to live 
through our conscious ability to transcend our given situation.181 This is also an issue within 
Kierkegaard's own authorship, when he would have us decide between esthetic, ethical, or 
religious ways of living. Although he intends to show that there are conflicts intrinsic to the 
esthetic and ethical modes that should push us into religion, the multiple possibilities we have at 
our disposal seem to undermine the notion that the self has a definite telos or essence that we can 
accurately discern at all. In the final moment of his thought, one is supposed to believe that one 
is a self before God with the task of attaining eternal salvation on the basis of faith and not 
knowledge. This stance would appeal to those willing to accept Christianity as a remedy for the 
problems of human existence where others have failed, but it also leaves room for skepticism or 
doubt about what it means to be a human being. 
 Someone who endorses a paradoxical conception of the self nevertheless has good reason 
to think that one can be "disintegrated" or "dissipated" in ignorance in the way that the different 
authors describe without this being despair. This would be the case in figures like Don Giovanni 
or the youthful woman, who are not acutely self-conscious or reflective, but for whom joy arises 
spontaneously and effortlessly. Perhaps this state of naivety is in fact the best position to be in 
for anyone who can maintain it, even if it means that does not have much of a perspective on 
one's life as a unified whole, or that one has no greater purpose than enjoying life and its beauty. 
Perhaps the inner consistency and stability that comes with an earnest commitment to endow 
one's life with an ethical or religious character, which occurs in the more intense stages of 
despair, is exactly what should be avoided in order to ward off the misery typically associated 
with despair.  
 
 
                                                





2.4.2 Against the View that Despair In Ignorance Happens By Choice 
 In explaining what it means to despair in ignorance as a "spiritless" individual, Anti-
Climacus points to a close relationship between spirit and the intellect.182 These individuals do 
not care about knowing the truth about themselves or becoming self-conscious in the deeper 
sense because "the sensate in them usually far outweighs their intellectuality" (SUD: 43). In the 
last chapter, I explained that reflective, imaginative, and volitional capacities are essential to 
selfhood, and that these capacities correspond with the infinite component of the self. These 
capacities would certainly seem to include the intellect. But this leads to the question of whether 
every individual has intellectual capacities strong enough to allow them to understand the truth 
about themselves as spirit, and so to be en route to defeating despair. It is quite obvious that 
some people are naturally endowed with stronger intellectual abilities than others, and that this is 
one of the many limitations that we have as human beings living in circumstances beyond our 
control. It would seem those individuals with a greater intellectual capacity would, in general, 
tend to be more reflective, and hence more likely to appreciate deeper insights about their nature 
as selves. Those who are less reflective would have more difficulty in thinking critically and 
generally about their given situation, and so would have more difficulty separating themselves 
from their original immediacy so as to become intensely self-conscious as spirit. Yet Anti-
Climacus and Kierkegaard give no reason to think that we choose the strength of our intellectual 
capacities, in the same way that we did not originally choose to have an intellect. Presumably, 
those who have a weaker intellect would want to have a stronger one if it was possible, but 
unfortunately it is not. It seems, then, that those who are less intellectually gifted might be unable 
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to know themselves as spirit or will to be that through no real fault of their own. In this case, it 
would be wrong to accuse them of bringing despair upon themselves and to hold them 
responsible for their spiritless ignorance, assuming they are in despair as Anti-Climacus claims 
(SUD: 17). 
 In addition to dispositional factors, there are environmental factors that might inhibit 
someone from achieving the degree of self-reflection necessary for being aware of oneself as 
spirit and defeating despair. Many are forced into oppressive conditions, or lack access to quality 
education, or must attend to pressing issues of material sustenance that would seem to impede 
the kind of rigorous self-examination or intellectual growth needed to "be spirit" in Anti-
Climacus' sense. For example, a manual laborer struggling to obtain the basic necessities for 
survival for himself or his family probably does not have the leisure to ponder deeper questions 
concerning who he is and whether he is living a good life. Perhaps his options are extremely 
limited given his onerous circumstances, unless he decides it would be better to carelessly leave 
everything behind. In Anti-Climacus’ view, only those who are in a fortunate enough position to 
arrive at deeper knowledge of spiritual matters can ever hope to overcome despair, but this 
would seem to require idle time or opportunities for religious and philosophical contemplation 
that many people simply do not have. One might argue that it is not difficult to become a 
Christian or learn of its message in Western society, but for Anti-Climacus, this is a mistake. If 
an individual has not diligently thought through the terms of Christianity and her life in relation 
to it because she has become Christian through inheritance, she is better described as a pagan in 
Christendom than a genuine Christian (SUD: 45). A significant portion of the population 
therefore would seem to be at a disadvantage in coming to self-awareness from the very 
beginning, without this being their choice. Perhaps if they were differently situated, they would 
want to reach the lofty spiritual peaks suggested by Anti-Climacus by awakening spiritually from 
the life of immediacy. 
 Kierkegaard, of course, would not accept either of these excuses for spiritlessness. He 
claims, "spirit must not be considered identical with talent and genius, by no means, but identical 
with resolution in passion. A simple person can feel the need for the decisively religious” (TA: 
22). He therefore holds that the self-knowledge he insists on is not difficult to come by, and that 
even meager intellectual abilities or earthly conditions would suffice to elevate a person to the 




would likely be many who are "spiritless" not because they are unable to become spirit or know 
themselves as that for the foregoing reasons, but because they do not want to be. However, this 
does not appear to be the demographic Anti-Climacus has in mind when describing despair in 
ignorance. Those persons would be those who despair because they do not want to be who they 
are, which, as we will see in the next chapter, is a different category of despair. In contrast, many 
of those who are spiritless would seem to be in the curious position of being unable to will as 
selves due to a lack of reflection. Anti-Climacus writes: 
 
Generally speaking, consciousness––that is, self-consciousness––is decisive with regard to the self. The 
more consciousness, the more self; the more consciousness, the more will; the more will, the more self. A 
person who has no will at all is not a self; but the more will he has, the more self-consciousness he has also. 
(SUD: 29) 
 
Given that spirit is the self, the individual who is spiritless lacks self-awareness and will. He is 
mostly stuck in the pre-reflective consciousness of immediacy, with just a "dash of reflection" to 
take him out of it (SUD: 58). "Immediacy actually has no self," as Anti-Climacus writes, because 
"it does not know itself" (SUD: 53). But without being adequately conscious of himself, the 
individual living in immediacy can have no real will of his own. Most of his actions are 
motivated by desires issuing from his natural spontaneity and not from his higher-order volitions, 
which would require deliberate reflection on himself and his natural condition (SUD: 52). Of 
course, he might entertain light thoughts of being a self or about making his own choices, but 
because he is not deeply conscious of being spirit by having separated himself from his 
immediate condition, freedom has yet to awaken, and he is not in a position to will as a self. He 
is, as Frankfurt would put it, a wanton rather than a person.  
 Anti-Climacus does well to conceive of this form of despair as ignorance rather than a 
genuine misuse of the will for this reason. But so long as they do not will as a self, they cannot 
be bringing their despair upon themselves as he claims must happen in all cases of despair. If 
they are in despair, it must be occurring through the unfolding of their natural spontaneity, rather 
than through their own spiritual acts. We have seen that Anti-Climacus associates anxiety with 
despair. Because the human being is naturally anxious in virtue of existing amid the nothingness 
of immediacy, and is also anxious about the freedom and infinitude that he possesses as a self, it 




should also not be held responsible for being in despair as he claims (SUD: 16). To be 
responsible for a given state of affairs, you would have to be involved in willing such a state into 
existence. But these individuals would not be intending to be spiritless or ignorant; they just 
happen to be that way by nature. Therefore, they should not be held responsible for it.  
 In an effort to explain how spiritless individuals can be held responsible for being in 
despair, Davenport argues that they must have made a primordial choice to be this way. He 
states, "the aesthete has a hand in his wantonness because his innermost self or volitional identity 
consists in the third-order will not to have second-order volitions" with respect to the first-order 
desires that move him to act.183 This cannot be right prima facie, because it would seem to 
require a degree of reflection that the individual living in immediacy is incapable of at this stage 
in his development. For instance, it would be inappropriate to accuse the young child of choosing 
not to control himself or direct his life, when the child lacks the self-awareness necessary for 
this. Davenport avoids this worry by claiming that this third-order act of will is not undertaken in 
reflective consciousness, but he does not explain how this is possible. He cites Kant's Religion 
Within the Bounds of Bare Reason in his essay, and so perhaps has Kant in mind in framing his 
view. In this work, Kant attempts to explain how it is possible that we hold people responsible 
for their behavior and judge that they are capable of making choices about how they will act, 
when we do not do this for other animals. He concludes that for this to occur, our moral character 
as human beings must have been determined by a primordial choice that we made freely outside 
of time.184 He does not believe that God originally established this character, or that it is imposed 
upon us by conditions in the natural world, since then the kind of person we are and the choices 
we make would be the consequence of necessity and not freedom. It would then be unfair to 
attribute moral responsibility to us, in the same way that it is inappropriate to do so with other 
animals, which act in accordance with casual principles in the natural world rather than in 
freedom. On Kant's view, an individual like Don Giovanni would have initially chosen an 
immoral lifestyle, rather than being born into it by fate. Far from being without a will, he would 
have had a will all along, and so we can hold him responsible for his bad behavior. Since the 
self's freedom originates in the eternal component within it, one might conceive of the "third-
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order act" that Davenport describes as a timeless choice in the Kantian sense, however 
inscrutable such a deed might be. 
 I believe that for it to make sense to understand despair as the responsibility of the 
"spiritless" individual, or to conceive of him as bringing it upon himself in the way Davenport 
does, modifications would need to be made to Kierkegaard's account so that the will plays a 
more prominent role in human life in its earliest stages. This account would likely resemble the 
one Kant offers. While it is needed to make his view consistent, I can find little textual evidence 
to support the claim that Anti-Climacus (or Kierkegaard) held a view of this sort. Kant's account 
prefigures the idealist thesis that the self originally posits itself in its existence, and so it is 
unlikely that Anti-Climacus would endorse a position like it. As a theist, he believes the self is 
established in its existence by a supremely great power, and the Kantian view simply grants the 
self too much power over its original condition to be compatible with his view. Moreover, Anti-
Climacus claims that the self is established in existence as a synthesis of the eternal and 
temporal, rather than originating in a timeless state in which it establishes the character it will 
assume in time. On the other hand, there are those who despair unconsciously who will to be 
ignorant of being selves, and in this case, it would be reasonable to hold them responsible for 
being spiritless. But it is not reasonable to hold them responsible for bringing upon themselves 
the state of immediacy that automatically elicits their despair in the first place. It is this incipient 
condition that the individual who wills to be ignorant intends to remain in, fearing a worsening 
of his condition if he breaks from the life of immediacy, whether it is esthetic immediacy or the 
public mode.  
 If despair is generally not a state that spiritless persons will into being, and they are 
nonetheless all in despair, then it would seem that their despair must be affected by either an 
external motivation or by whatever established them as a self. Anti-Climacus undermines his 
own position and corroborates the idea that despair can be affected by arguing that an ignorant 
individual might become conscious of being in despair due to some earthly misfortune that 
strikes or “impinges” upon him (SUD: 51). The type of despair that might occur in immediacy, 
he explains, "is only a suffering, a succumbing to the pressure of external factors; in no way does 
it come from within as an act” (SUD: 51). An example of this form of despair suggested by Anti-
Climacus is a case of a young girl who despairs over the loss of her beloved, whom her 




girl has little reflection or self-consciousness to speak of, Anti-Climacus suggests that she would 
not be bringing despair upon herself through her own act in response to the loss, but that her 
despair would be foisted upon her by forces beyond her control. As Anti-Climacus explains, 
since her despair resulted from external conditions or by fate, she would quickly recover if these 
conditions changed and her beloved returned to her (SUD: 52). If she despaired over herself 
through her own act, then external conditions would not be the reason for her despair, and an 
improvement in them would be no guarantee that her despair would resolve.  
 Anti-Climacus appears to recognize that this possibility of affected despair would result 
in a blatant reversal of his original position, and introduces confusion to mitigate the 
inconsistency in his account. He maintains that it is really “an innocent abuse of language” to 
call this despair, since despair in the strict sense occurs through the self's own activity (SUD: 
51). On his view, in order for a person to truly know what it means to despair, he must 
understand that he is really in despair because he has lost or alienated himself from the eternal 
through his preoccupation with temporal matters. The individual in ignorance of being a self, 
however, has no awareness of this loss, or knowledge that it was his own doing, and so he claims 
this state is "not despair in the strict sense" (SUD: 13). However, he then goes on to say that the 
individual with affected despair “stands and points to what he calls despair," but this "is not 
despair, and in the meantime, sure enough, despair is right there behind him without his realizing 
it" (SUD: 52). One should not pardon Anti-Climacus for his equivocation on this issue, however, 
since in passages like this, he obviously intends to suggest that those whose despair is trigged by 
an earthly suffering or a life of immediacy are, at the basic level, in despair in the strict sense. 
After all, these modes of existence are most common. If those in the immediate stage of life are 
not actually in despair, then it is not universal to the human condition, and the central thesis that 
made his work so intriguing to begin with collapses.185 
                                                
185 Beabout claims that Anti-Climacus does not believe that all of us have to deal with despair, but only those who 
have misused their freedom. For example, the young child who has not yet made free choices would be an example 
of someone not in despair. He argues that Anti-Climacus "cannot claim that all human beings are in despair and that 
despair is essential to being human, or else despair would not be the fault of the individual” (Freedom and its 
Misuses, p. 101). However, Anti-Climacus goes so far as to claim "no human being ever lived and no one lives 
outside of Christendom who has not despaired," demonstrating how radical his view actually is (SUD: 22). Beabout 
defends his interpretation by arguing that Anti-Climacus uses overstatement for rhetorical effect, but this cannot be 
right, since his radical position is a logical consequence of his view that any human being who is ignorant of being a 





 But how could they be in despair, if despair were not already affected in them by 
something beyond their control? With little to no will of one's own, it does not seem possible to 
will to despair in the strict sense, or to lose the eternal through one's own choosing. Even if 
despair spontaneously arose through the self's own activity, occurring behind its back, as it were, 
it would have to be something happening to the self, since it is not under the self’s volitional 
control. As a result, either we should say that these individuals are not actually in despair, or that 
they are, but are affected by it. Although Anti-Climacus admits both of these states as 
possibilities to help lend credibility to his account, he obfuscates the issue by insisting they are 
always, at bottom, in despair in the strict sense, and at fault for it. Nevertheless, he cannot 
successfully resolve the inconsistency plaguing it without flatly accepting one of these two 
options, along with its undesirable consequences. 
 In holding individuals responsible for their despair, Anti-Climacus rejects the notion that 
despair can be affected by what originally established the self in its existence as a synthesis of 
the eternal and temporal, which he takes to be the God of monotheism. He argues that despair, as 
a misrelation in the self, could not exist if the self in its original state was not "in the proper 
relationship," for then "despair would be something that lies in human nature as such" (SUD: 15-
16). The thought seems to be that despair is to be understood dialectically by consideration of 
those dispositions that are not despair, and that if it belonged to everyone essentially, then it 
could not be said to belong to anyone. Since we would have no state of mind to contrast it with, 
we would not be able to conceive of it at all. God must therefore have created the self as a 
perfectly integrated and balanced synthesis of contradictory components before these 
components become misrelated through its own free choice. The emergence of despair is thereby 
contingent on an awareness of an unimpaired state of being. I have done my best to reconstruct 
Anti-Climacus' argument, but if this is indeed his argument, it is a bad one. Certainly there are 
many things that would seem to lie in human nature as such, such as consciousness or 
embodiment, but their pervasiveness does not keep us from understanding them or distinguishing 
them from other things. If Anti-Climacus is correct in claiming that despair is universal to the 
human condition, despair might be an essential part of our nature in the same sort of manner. 
 More importantly, the assertion that the self does not begin its existence in despair is 
incompatible with the account of human development given by Anti-Climacus and supported in 




begins in a state of immediacy, without possessing a significant degree of self-consciousness or 
freedom. In its immersion in sensuousness or in worldly affairs, it does not originally know of its 
eternal nature, or that it has a higher destiny as spirit. It can only discover this through reflection, 
which the immediate esthete or the individual living in the "public" mode lacks a significant 
degree of. Moved to act by his natural spontaneity, and passive to the unfolding of immediate 
desire, this individual has no real will of his own, and is what Anti-Climacus describes as 
"spiritless." Since spirit emerges in existence on his account, it is not that the individual begins 
his life reflectively conscious of himself as spirit or volitionally active, and then degenerates into 
spiritlessness, losing or ignoring his capacities as a self or his relationship with God through his 
own bad decisions. If that were his view, it would look much like the Kantian idea of a "timeless 
deed" that the self performs in establishing its character, which I argued he would not accept. It 
is rather that one begins one's life as spiritless, and gradually becomes conscious of oneself as 
spirit and capable of making one's own decisions through actualizing one's potential as a self. It 
therefore seems that the self is a misrelation in its original state of ignorance after all, since it is 
engrossed in the temporal aspect of its existence, which includes finitude and necessity.  
 Additionally, if the components of the self were in a proper relationship when God 
"releases it from his hand" at the moment of its creation, then its eternal and temporal aspects 
would be properly aligned, and it would not begin its existence as disintegrated (SUD: 16). We 
have seen, however, that for both A and Anti-Climacus human life begins in immediacy, and that 
to live in immediacy is to be disintegrated as a self due to existing amid nothingness. Therefore, 
the eternal and temporal aspects of the self cannot be in the proper relationship at the moment of 
its creation as Anti-Climacus claims. As I discussed in the first section, the figure of Don 
Giovanni appears to represent the most primitive form of selfhood conceivable, and so would 
seem to be the perfect example of a self immediately released from God's hand. If Anti-Climacus 
is right, then the components of his self should be well-integrated in relation to God, but one can 
recognize that his life has disintegrated from the very beginning. He is not uncorrupted, but 
demonic. Without the eternal to stabilize and ground his existence, Don Giovanni's life consists 
of a series of disparate moments in temporality that lack coherence or continuity. Unable to 
appreciate his life as a whole from a unified perspective, his actions are motivated by anxiety and 
blind desire rather than by real conscious intent or an understanding of his predicament. But in 




have done to contribute to his disintegration as a self, or the misrelation of the eternal and 
temporal in him. Lacking in wholeness from the very beginning, he is innocent of any abuse of 
freedom that would have caused this. This argument would largely extend to immediate esthetes 
and those in the public mode, since they share many of the same characteristics as Don Giovanni, 
despite being more self-conscious and possessing a will to some minimal extent.  
 Of course, Anti-Climacus would not accept the notion of affected despair. He writes, “No 
one is born devoid of spirit, and no matter how many go to their death with this spiritlessness as 
the one and only outcome of their lives, it is not the fault of life” (SUD: 102). I have shown that 
this view has insurmountable difficulties on his own phenomenological account of human 
development, and that spiritless ignorance would seem to be the fate of many without their 
choosing it. Allowing for despair to be affected by an external condition would resolve the 
inconsistencies in his account, but it would also disturbingly point to God as its ultimate origin. 
In his view, God is the omnipotent ruler of the natural world and everything in it, which He 
creates out of nothing. For Anti-Climacus, this nothingness threatens the human being in its 
existence from the very beginning, and produces both anxiety and despair, even if one remains 
ignorant of it. If that is the case, God must have allotted us these precarious earthly conditions 
that elicit despair in the first place.  
 To make matters worse, in the next chapter, I argue that on this account, it would seem 
that God admitted a fault into our spiritual nature irrespective of what natural conditions hold, or 
more precisely, that the self was established as a misrelation to begin with in being paradoxically 
constituted. Most Christians would have little trouble admitting either of these possibilities under 
the Augustinian notion of hereditary sin. They could explain our despair by appealing to the 
perversion of our nature, which Scripture declares to have resulted when the first man and 
woman disobeyed God’s orders by eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Anti-
Climacus rejects this, evidently not wanting to undermine the idea of a just God or to mitigate 
the responsibility of individuals for their own condition. By his own lights, however, it would 
appear inescapable to conclude that the form of despair which embroils us in the first part of life 
is a suffering brought upon us out of necessity by God, without this being our fault. Befallen by 
distressing circumstances we do not control but must work through to the best of our ability, and 
disintegrated as selves, his phenomenological investigation ends up suggesting that the human 





  Anti-Climacus believes that most people are ignorant of being spirit, and have a lifestyle 
that can be categorized as immediate. He does not just describe the lives of these fellow human 
beings as spiritually inadequate or empty, but deems them downright contemptible. He calls 
those lives that are not properly spiritual “wasted” (SUD: 26). From a superior and more spiritual 
vantage point, he declares that he could “weep an eternity over the existence of such 
wretchedness” (SUD: 27). Such remarks are ubiquitous in Kierkegaard's authorship, and not only 
in the pseudonymous writings. They expose an undercurrent of elitism and resentment pervading 
much of his discourse on human existence, and arguably a hatred of humanity. Kierkegaard was 
well aware of his hostile attitude toward the great majority of human beings, who in his view, are 
nowhere near fulfilling their potential as spirit:  
 
To contend with people––well, yes, this appeals to me in a certain sense. By nature I am so polemical that I 
really feel in my element only when surrounded by human mediocrity and scurviness. But on one 
condition: that I be permitted silently to disdain, to satisfy the passion that is in my soul, disdain––for 
which my life as an author has richly provided an occasion. (MLW: 92) 
 
On Kierkegaard's view, even those individuals who achieve greatness in secular enterprises do so 
in vain if they do not know themselves deeply as spirit, and hence do not view themselves in 
strict opposition to everyone and everything around them. Many of those "spiritless" individuals 
who earn his disdain are decent, hard-working people with a love for family and friends, and a 
concern for the welfare of society. Perhaps they are not incredibly passionate, but they are 
nevertheless happy with their lives and generally intend to do no harm. But as Anti-Climacus 
states, in this life, "happiness is not a qualification of spirit" due to our underlying despair (SUD: 
25). This statement betrays the inhuman consequences of "being spirit" as he construes it. 
Apparently, you are not living spiritually unless you hold petty grievances against people like the 
lovable, youthful woman, work ceaselessly to undermine your own happiness through excessive 
self-reflection, and are disgusted by any happiness or contentment that others might find. While 
human behavior does often leave us with much to be indignant about, whether it is our 
propensity to selfishness, greed, aggression, or our susceptibility to adopt a narrow group-
mentality without much questioning, to refuse to admit the good that ordinary people can do for 




cause for despair. Such a spiteful attitude toward otherwise blameless manners of existing seems 
unbecoming for a person who "rests transparently" in faith (SUD: 14). 
  Furthermore, while it is a none too surprising fact that many of us take our mind off 
negative emotions by staying busy with other things, it would be unfair to reduce the majority of 
human life to diversionary tactics that we use (whether consciously or not) to distract ourselves 
from learning the terrible truth about our condition. Human beings are active by nature, and this 
activity manifests in many forms, whether it is in our struggle for survival, the work we do, our 
capacity for creativity and imagination, socializing, or our need for entertainment. Some of this 
activity might indeed ward off negative thoughts or feelings, but not all of it can be considered as 
forms of self-deception. These are just things that we need to do so as long as we want to 
continue to survive and be human beings, and not risk halting all practical activity by retreating 
into an otherworldly life of idle solitude (or if we are talented enough, a prolific authorship). It is 
unclear what it would even mean for an individual to spend all of his days "undistracted," 
thinking incessantly about who he is or what God demands of him, or the fundamental truths of 
existence. Certainly we all have material needs that must be met to live, and social needs that 
must be met to keep us from going insane, and this would naturally require participation in what 
for Kierkegaard and Pascal is wretched worldliness. To understand human life in such terms as 
they do bespeaks profound moral illness, and a lack of sympathy for human beings who are 
persevering in an existence they did not ask for, and under conditions that they do not control. If 
most are indeed vulnerable to self-deception in ignoring painful truths, perhaps some amount of 
self-deception is desirable, and we would do well to learn from them. If so, we should not be 
anxiously on guard against it, or ridiculing people who fall short of our own proud standard of 
authenticity. 
 Kierkegaard also seems to seriously underestimate the amount of self-awareness and will 
people generally have. As I argued earlier in this chapter, it is unlikely that he would agree with 
Frankfurt in calling those in the "public" mode full-fledged persons.186 Taylor notes, with some 
perplexity, that for Anti-Climacus, it seems the well-known bourgeoisie citizen is not self-
conscious in any important sense.187 "In Christendom," Anti-Climacus writes, the average person 
is "also a Christian, goes to church every Sunday, listens to and understands the pastor...he dies, 
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the pastor ushers him into eternity for ten rix-dollars––but a self he was not, and a self he did not 
become" (SUD: 52). Now, the average human being believes they are conscious of being a self 
that is capable of making its own decisions and thinking about its own life, however much they 
might be influenced by the direction of others. Unless we are skeptics about other minds, we 
should take them at their word for that. The degree or intensity of self-consciousness and 
willpower, however, is more difficult to measure, although admittedly, it might be possible to 
make educated guesses from another's expressions, attitudes, or behaviors like Kierkegaard does. 
This difficulty poses a problem not only for Kierkegaard's theorizing, but my own objection. Yet 
if Kierkegaard were able to engage with people in a less critical and more empathetic way, 
perhaps he would recognize that they generally have more self-knowledge than he gives them 
credit for, and that they have a vivid inner life of their own as selves. With some humility, he 
might even realize that they suffer through the hardships of human existence too, rather than 
coasting through life like animals in immediacy. 
 Kierkegaard's wry observations of human life indicate that he was unable to encounter 
other people face-to-face in reality and actually listen to what they had to say. His perception of 
them was skewed by his formidable imagination, which sized them up from afar while bringing 
all of his prejudices and animosity to bear on them. To his credit, Kierkegaard seems to have 
recognized this theoretical approach toward other human beings was one of his shortcomings. He 
writes, "even if I may have a psychologist's eye––I nevertheless see people in such universality 
that I truly can be said to see no one."188 This is an unfortunate (and potentially dangerous) 
consequence of spiritual acts of negation, which Kierkegaard wielded with rare intensity with his 
extraordinary intelligence and his repulsion for all things worldly. His refusal to temper the 
negativity of detached reflection is out of keeping with the value he placed on positive, concrete 
living. It signifies not only an imbalance as a self in the direction of infinitude, but also a pitfall 
of his thought.189 While his psychological insights into human nature are more often than not 
ingenious, in some cases, he presents a caricature of how people actually live, and displays a 
callous inability to relate to the plight of other people. Those readers who intend to apply his 
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189 Kierkegaard was well aware of this fault in his character. Anti-Climacus writes of the despair of a "poet-
existence" verging on the religious, which he describes as "the sin of poetizing instead of being, of relating to the 
good and the true through the imagination instead of being that––that is, existentially striving to be that" (SUD: 78). 
In his Journals, Kierkegaard confirms that this part of the book is about him (JP VI: 6437). In this section, I question 




thought to their lives in the world, and who take love for one's neighbor seriously, should be 
wary of accepting all of his conclusions, so long as they aim to maintain "purity of heart" and to 
regard others humanely. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 Anti-Climacus’ claim that those who live without a great deal of self-reflection are in 
despair should remain unconvincing. One can be perfectly happy as an immediate esthete 
seeking basic forms of enjoyment, or as a social conformist in the public mode, even if there are 
conflicts occurring at an unconscious level due to the paradoxical nature of the self. If we accept 
that the self is disintegrated in its absorption in the life of the world, which it did not in the first 
instance choose, then we should admit that this condition must be affected by whatever 
established the self in existence. Tragically, it cannot be a state that one is responsible for 
bringing on oneself. It might seem that this position leads to fatalism, but it does not. In the 
following chapters, I endorse Kierkegaard's suggestion that the human being is capable of 
attaining freedom of thought and will upon emerging from his natural immediacy in a heightened 
state of reflection. Since many of those who live mostly within immediacy with minimal 
reflection consider themselves happy, however, I reject the suggestion that despair is universal to 
the human condition, though it is likely more common than traditionally believed. Although 
many might despair unconsciously, it would only directly impact a segment of the population for 
whom self-consciousness has intensified, or in other words, for whom individual freedom has 
come to be at stake. Anti-Climacus classifies these more obvious manifestations of despair as 
weakness and defiance, which I will refer to as being a self in flight or recoil from existence, and 













The Self in Recoil 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 We have seen that, for Anti-Climacus, the form of despair that occurs in most people 
consists in a state of disintegration in which the eternal and temporal aspects of the self are out of 
kilter due to an overemphasis on its temporal aspect. In being ignorant of being a self, the 
individual is absorbed in a multiplicity of finite affairs in the world, without adequately realizing 
his capacity for transcendence as a spiritual being endowed with the infinite. The self in this 
stage is mostly dormant. Defining himself by external conditions that he is passively caught up 
in, such as worldly affairs or material possessions, the individual has not reflected upon himself 
enough to appreciate the unique possibilities of existence available to him, or to will any of these 
into being through his own acts of self-determination. He also lacks consciousness of the eternal 
within him, which would pry him from his immersion in the nothingness of the sensuous and 
provide him with stability and consistency against the interminable flux of temporality. Without 
the eternal as one's stronghold in existence, one is adrift in a momentary existence that has no 
greater unity or coherence, and to be dissipated in this dreamlike state is to be in despair. 
 Anti-Climacus believes that despair becomes progressively more intense the more that 
one has reflected upon oneself as an individual. While most people do not advance far beyond 
the immediate form of self-consciousness that human beings originally possess, he acknowledges 
that there are many individuals who become more self-conscious, and hence more spiritual, by 
gaining an awareness of the eternal within them, including infinitude and possibility as 
components of their being. When the self begins to reflect more deeply on its existence, it 
detaches itself from its situation in the world, and questions or raises doubts about the existing 
state of affairs. When this transition from ignorance occurs, despair assumes an intensified form 
and become what he calls despair in weakness, or despair "in the strict sense" (SUD: 13). On his 
account, when an individual despairs in weakness, he does not want to be himself because of 
some problem that arises for him in the temporal, which might include an earthly loss, trauma, 
suffering, or hardship. The problem he experiences in temporality elicits heightened reflection on 
himself and his difficulties, and so engenders knowledge of the eternal in the self by awakening 




oneself and one's unique possibilities, in addition to the more deliberate form of decision-making 
that might accompany this. It can be classified as a form of weakness because the self is not 
strong enough to accept its sufferings and admit them as part of itself.  
 In support of my claim that despair in Kierkegaard's works is best understood as a state of 
disintegration in the self, I argue that despair in weakness occurs due to the loss of integration 
between the self and the surrounding world, or between the self and itself as a finite human 
being. This painful separation, which originally occurs in the esthetic stage of life, produces a 
state of consciousness that can be described as a form of alienation. While the individual in 
ignorance is alienated from the eternal and infinite within him without knowing it, in weakness, a 
reversal occurs in which the self, in fleeing from its beleaguered finite self as an infinite self, 
becomes alienated from the world, from others, from society, and from itself as a result of 
heightened reflection upon them. I argue that an earthly loss or hardship motivates a spiritual 
form of vitality that conflicts with the naturalistic form that predominates in the earlier, more 
immediate stages of human life. The inverted vitality of spirit produces an incurvature within 
consciousness, wherein the self surges up from its existence in the natural world to turn in upon 
itself in thought. I argue that this incurvature within consciousness, and the awakening of 
spirituality that produces it, is the distinctive feature of despair in the strict sense. In liberating 
itself from its worldly existence as spirit, it enters into confrontation with it, rather than being 
naively immersed in it.  
 In section 3.2, I explain that the transition to weakness initially arises through a loss of 
integration with the world, which Anti-Climacus describes as "despair over the earthly or over 
something earthly" (SUD: 50). By despairing over a particular earthly thing, Anti-Climacus 
believes that one necessarily despairs over oneself in one's finitude. In approaching despair from 
a highly theoretical perspective, he does little to explain what any of this would mean in practice. 
To do this, in the remaining sections, I argue that certain figures illustrated in Either/Or serve as 
vivid examples of individuals who despair in weakness, and that they demonstrate an inverted 
form of vitality centered upon the spiritual life of the person, rather than the naturalistic form 
vitality rooted in the sensuous or elemental forces of nature. In the next chapter, I explain that 
despair in weakness intensifies when it becomes despair over the "earthly in toto," or over the 
world as a whole (SUD: 60). I claim that this second phase of weakness is also portrayed in 




described in such similar ways in these pseudonymous works, it will be shown that a generally 
consistent account of it emerges in Kierkegaard's work, although there is some disagreement 
between the authors that will be addressed. 
 
3.2  Despair Over Something in the World and Over Oneself: The First Phase of Weakness 
 On Anti-Climacus’ view, despair in weakness begins with a suffering that disrupts the 
blithe worldview of the immediate esthetic or public mode of living. In heightened self-
reflection, the self does not want to be itself in its finitude or concretion due to some temporal 
difficulty it comes up against, and that it must deal with in some way. In this state of "crisis," the 
everyday routine the individual has become accustomed to breaks down (SUD: 25). The system 
of diversions and distractions that renders despair unconscious in the smooth functioning of 
everyday life has, in some sense, failed, and it becomes a noticeable problem in one's personal 
life. In the last chapter, it was explained how a self in ignorance might become conscious of 
being in despair as a result of external factors impinging upon it by a "stroke of fate," such as a 
trauma or misfortune (SUD: 51). The example Anti-Climacus uses to illustrate this form of 
despair is the loss of some beloved person or object through which the self felt intimately 
connected with the surrounding world, or as he exaggeratingly puts it, through the loss of what 
"to the man of immediacy is his whole life" (SUD: 51). Because the self in ignorance is mostly 
passive to its immediate desires, and is driven to act by them, he does not describe despair in 
ignorance as involving acts of reflection or the will. Although the ignorant individual thinks 
about himself and states of affairs in the world insofar as he uses language and has become 
educated within his community, reflection is primarily in service to immediate impulses, 
feelings, drives and desires, many of which are patterned on the behaviors of others. These are 
primarily directed toward earthly matters, rather than more spiritual concerns about one's life. As 
a result, he remains well adapted to his psychical life, his embodiment in the natural world, and 
his milieu, even while temporarily grieving under some earthly burden that causes feelings of 
separation or loss.  
 We saw that language, education, and socialization spurred reflection in individuals, but 
that in most people, this only involves a minimal degree of self-consciousness. Anti-Climacus 
argues that this state of ignorance is despair, but he explains that the more serious cases of 




not merely a suffering, a succumbing to the external circumstance, but is to a certain degree self-
activity, an act" (SUD: 54). A significant increase in self-awareness, in his view, is motivated by 
earthly suffering in certain individuals who are unable to readily recover from it, whether it is 
through some loss, illness, or adversity. When despair becomes the self's own act through some 
difficulty that it cannot get over and insists on clinging to through continued reflection, the self 
despairs in weakness by not wanting to be itself. Since this form of despair is a product of 
reflection, the suffering the individual experiences redoubles. She suffers from despairing over 
something earthly, but she also suffers from being a self that is conscious of being in despair. For 
instance, someone who despairs over the death of her beloved would suffer under this loss, but 
she would also suffer from being a self who has to live without her beloved. Despair over 
something earthly is therefore, at the same time, despair over oneself, and for Anti-Climacus, the 
latter is the basis of all despair (SUD: 19). Despair is indeed brought to awareness by earthly 
hardship or crisis that one has latched onto, but in all its variations, it is essentially a sickness of 
self-consciousness. It can be classified as a form of weakness when the self is not strong enough 
to accept its sufferings and admit them as part of itself.  
 The character traits of those who despair in weakness are suited to the customary view of 
despair, which is usually not the case for those who despair in ignorance. These individuals are 
likely to show signs of depression, to grieve over their circumstances, or to announce they are in 
despair to others. He claims that the intensified forms of despair generally occur in people with 
deeper natures, or in those who have become more spiritual as a result of having endured “bitter 
experiences and dreadful decisions” in life (SUD: 26). In his view, many people never reach this 
stage of self-development because they remain enchanted by the sensuous element of their 
existence, including the objects, people, or things that present themselves by means of it (SUD: 
43). When a painful crisis emerges that jolts them out of their complacency, however, despair 
becomes palpable as a sickness of the self.  
 Despair in weakness should not be understood as arising simply from having one's aims 
thwarted, or from one's desires not being satisfied. Someone might suffer because he was 
rejected for the position he wanted, or because a close friend betrayed him, but this does not 
necessarily mean that he does not want to be himself. While such external conflicts are likely to 
cause pain, grief, or frustration, the individual does not truly despair in weakness unless internal 




from the finite condition it had previously settled into to engage in sustained reflection on itself 
and the difficulty that has befallen it. In his separation from immediacy, he finds himself at odds 
with something in existence as a thinking being, and not merely in a disagreeable emotional 
state. Rather than simply bemoaning a loss or difficulty, he might persist in asking himself why 
things had to happen as they did, whether he did something wrong, and what he should do with 
himself. He might also be anxious, doubting that good things are in store for the future, and not 
trusting that things will go well for him or those he cares about. If reflection becomes too 
advanced, he might have problems discerning meaning and purpose in life. He might begin to 
question why he bothers going on, or what the point of it all is. Such reflective distancing 
unsettles him in his concrete existence, and opens up a realm of possibilities that had been 
obscured when he was content with his worldly situation. He is therefore likely to think critically 
about his previous life, his values and ideals, his role in society, the world at large, the future, 
and what these all mean for him. Certainly he had questioned external conditions in his earlier 
life and sought reasons to explain his circumstances, but only at this point of earthly hardship 
does his own existence get put into question. When this occurs, the inner life begins to awaken, 
and his being truly becomes an issue for him.190  
 Anti-Climacus does not explain why an earthly suffering is necessary to increase the 
degree of self-awareness and reflection in an individual to the point that despair becomes a 
noticeable or even chronic problem. It would seem that this could happen simply through being 
well educated, imaginative, or intelligent, or that one might begin to raise worries and have 
misgivings about states of affairs in the world and oneself in it just by learning of terrible events 
that occur, without personally experiencing a major suffering or loss.191 It could be that the kind 
of detachment that he has in mind with his notion of despair in weakness requires a great deal of 
pain to trigger it, which one is unlikely to experience absent a significant crisis. One way that 
human beings respond to pain is by dissociating themselves from their feelings so that they are 
not fully absorbed by them. By recoiling from his pain, the individual alleviates it to some 
extent, however minimal. In reflecting on his painful condition, he also would be able to consider 
how best to handle his situation. In these ways, heightened reflection functions as a defense 
                                                
190 I am borrowing this phrase from Heidegger, who uses it to describe the mode of being of the human being (or 
more precisely, Dasein). See Being and Time, p. 32. Heidegger does not reserve the term for those who are facing 
adversity, however.  
191 In the next chapter, I show that A in Either/Or is arguably one such individual who seems to have become acutely 




mechanism when life becomes burdensome. In support of this idea, one might recognize that we 
are most likely to be keenly self-conscious when we are ill with the flu or the like. In an 
incapacitated state of detachment, we are torn away from our everyday projects and concerns, 
and forced to confront ourselves. Without experiencing much suffering, it is unlikely that we will 
disengage from our habits and activities in ordinary life and stop to consider our lives closely for 
an extended period, even if we are otherwise reflective. In a state of relative contentment or 
enjoyment, we would be less likely to come to any greater knowledge of ourselves.  
 Although this mode of self-reflection obviously has its drawbacks, he believes that it has 
the positive effect of allowing the individual to obtain a more accurate conception of his identity 
as a person.192 He claims that the self in ignorance, in its outward-directed enjoyment, 
mistakenly identifies itself solely with "externalities," such as the things it desires, the people it 
cares about, or its place in society (SUD: 53). But when the self in weakness turns inward to 
reflect on itself and the earthly suffering it experiences, it consciously sustains itself in this 
reflection, rather than forgetting itself in worldly occupations and engagements. As the self gains 
hold of itself from the flux of the temporal by recollecting its issues, and repeatedly calling them 
to mind, it begins to understand, however vaguely, that there is something unchangeable within 
it, and that it is "essentially different from the environment and external events and from their 
influence upon it" (SUD: 54). While the self in ignorance might be described as an externalist 
about personal identity in understanding itself relative to finite conditions or events in the world, 
the self in weakness might be called an internalist about its identity in beginning to become 
conscious of itself as absolutely distinct from anything external, finite, or worldly. It thereby 
gains a kind of freedom and independence that it did not have in the state of ignorance, and so 
comes closer to realizing the eternal within it. 
 Because this is only the initial phase in the transition from ignorance, the self who 
despairs in weakness over a particular earthly loss or hardship will only obtain a limited amount 
of self-knowledge. Although he would gain continuity in his consciousness of himself by 
maintaining himself in his self-relational activity over an extended period of time, and by 
collecting himself from his immersion in the temporal, this would not be enough for a spiritual 
breakthrough of the type desired by Anti-Climacus. The self that despairs in weakness, he writes: 
                                                
192 With his theory of positive disintegration, Dąbrowski also conceived of painful existential crises to generally 





...has no consciousness of a self that is won by infinite abstraction from every externality, this naked 
abstract self, which, compared with immediacy's fully dressed self, is the first form of the infinite self and 
the advancing impetus in the whole process by which a self infinitely becomes responsible for its actual self 
with all its difficulties and advantages. (SUD: 55).  
 
It is difficult to make sense of this passage, since Anti-Climacus seems to refer to four different 
types of self that the individual possesses as a result of being disintegrated.193 But the difficulty 
eases when one realizes that Anti-Climacus is referring to a single "actual self" that, as a 
synthesis of infinite and finite components that are sundered, can be described in multiple ways 
depending on which component is under consideration. Absorbed in its concrete situation in the 
world, and dependent on it for his establishing its identity, the "fully dressed self" of immediacy 
does not know of its infinitude, even though it has it. When problems are confronted at the level 
of the finite and the self despairs, the self begins to reflect on itself and its concrete situation as a 
"naked abstract self," which it does by detaching itself from this situation and conceiving of 
itself, events, or possibilities in an abstract way. Not feeling "at home" in the world due to 
something it suffers under in it, it flees its painful condition by retreating into the imaginative 
realm of infinitude and possibility. No longer seeing itself as embedded entirely within its earthly 
existence, it gets a sense of itself as being outside of it in thought.  
 It is important to note that, for Anti-Climacus, the "naked abstract self" is only the "first 
form" of the "infinite self," rather than the final form that the self is responsible for realizing in 
existence in becoming eternal. Kierkegaard suggests elsewhere that this term denotes the self in 
essence but not in existence.194 As we will see in Chapters 5 and 6, rather than lingering outside 
of existence in infinitude and abstraction, in its mature state, the self draws toward itself in its 
concretion, much like the self had done in its original state of immediacy. The difference is that 
the ethical or religious individual, who has achieved the spiritual breakthrough described above, 
                                                
193 Kierkegaard is not the only philosopher who often spoke of the self in different senses. Kant, for instance, 
distinguishes between a phenomenal self, which is constrained by spatiotemporal conditions, and a noumenal self, 
which is not. The phenomenal self, he claims, "can be determined by his reason, as a cause, to actions in the sensible 
world,” while the noumenal self is “the same man though in terms of his personality” (The Metaphysics of Morals, 
6:418). The phenomenal self for Kant would roughly correspond to the "finite self" of Anti-Climacus, while the 
noumenal self would correspond to the "infinite self." The decision to split the self in two in this way might seem 
puzzling, but it can be explained if one assumes that the self is disintegrated in its existence, and so can be regarded 
in different ways.  





wills to reconcile the conflict between the infinite and finite aspects of his nature by living out 
his thought within existence in deepened inwardness. In doing this, he achieves integrity, unlike 
the individual who is ignorant of being a self. 
 
3.3 Despair over Something Earthly in A's Analysis of Tragedy  
 Under the pseudonym of A, in Either/Or, Kierkegaard lays out the essential features of 
despair in weakness and the state of consciousness that it consists in by appealing to characters 
culled from art, music, and literature. In the first of his morbid speeches delivered before a secret 
society known as "The Fellowship of Buried Lives," A examines the ways in which modern 
tragedy has departed from ancient tragedy by edging toward despair.195  He first considers how 
the character of human life has changed since the Greek period. The essential difference between 
human beings in the ancient and modern period, he believes, lies in the fact that the ancients, in 
enjoying a life of immediacy, were not adequately self-reflective, and so did not conceive of 
themselves as free agents whose lives were of their own making.196 "Even if the individual 
moved freely," A writes, "he nevertheless rested in substantial determinants, in the state, the 
family, in fate" (E/O I: 143). Even though he acts by making choices, the hero's tragic downfall 
is primarily a suffering under natural or supernatural powers that dictate the course of his life in 
consequence of being bound by necessity and finitude. Imperiled in temporal existence, he sees 
himself engulfed by a totality of forces that have no regard for him as an individual. Although 
these immense and inscrutable powers provoke fear and anxiety, in part by making individuals 
realize they are basically powerless spectators of a hostile world, the tragic is not an occasion for 
despair for A like it would be for Anti-Climacus; as an esthete, he believes the ensuing 
destruction of human life contains a soothing and alluring beauty that has healing potential for 
those able to find solace in it (E/O I: 145). For these individuals, reverence for the tragic 
                                                
195 'The Fellowship of Buried Lives' is a translation of 'Symparanekromenoi,' which as Hannay explains, is a Greek 
expression coined by Kierkegaard (Either/Or, p. 616). The Hong's translate this as "The Fellowship of the Dead," 
but this is less pregnant with meaning, and does not convey that those within this association are nevertheless still 
alive.  
196 Elsewhere in Either/Or, A claims that the ancient Greeks were "qualified psychically" but not yet spiritually, 
meaning that they were yet to attain reflective self-conscious  (E/O I: 62). He therefore conceives of them much like 
children, which as Williams notes, is a view shared by classical scholars as eminent as Nietzsche (Shame and 
Necessity, pp. 9-10). Williams, however, challenges the idea that the consciousness of the Greeks was substantially 
different from our own. He argues that they had similar notions of moral agency, responsibility, obligation and the 




reconciles them with existence, without needing any ethical or religious curative measure as the 
Judge and Anti-Climacus claim.197  
 In the modern age, however, individuals have become more reflective and liberal than 
those in the past due to the influence of Christianity on Western culture. By turning their 
attention inward toward themselves, they have gained an autonomy and independence from 
natural conditions that the pagans of the ancient period lacked. Therefore, in modern tragedy, 
"the hero's downfall is not really suffering but is a deed," or his own wrongful act that he is to be 
held responsible for (E/O I: 143). Although the modern tragic hero suffers under some earthly 
difficulty like the ancient one, this is not a suffering that contemporary audiences deem him 
totally helpless against. They believe the individual brought it upon himself, in the same way that 
Anti-Climacus believes that one brings despair upon oneself. Because they have lost sympathy 
for the hero, and believe he is guilty or somehow at fault for his predicament, A laments that the 
modern age risks losing a sense of the tragic entirely, even though it proclaims an essential truth 
about existence in its fatalistic depiction of human suffering and defeat (E/O I: 149). 
A claims that, unlike the ancient tragic hero, who is integrated with circumstances in the 
natural world and tightly constrained by familial, political, and religious bonds, or what might be 
called "the social substance," the modern tragic hero has become dissociated from these 
nurturing and placating elements.198 He is, as A puts it, "subjectively reflected in himself, and 
this reflection has not only reflected him out of every immediate relation to state, kindred, and 
fate but often has even reflected him out of his own past life" (E/O I: 143). Hence, the modern 
individual begins to break from the established order that he was reared in by relating himself to 
himself in the way that Anti-Climacus describes, gaining a sense of his freedom as a "naked 
abstract self." As A explains, spirit achieves this feat by negating the sensuous, including the 
psychical and bodily elements that constitute the self in the sphere of temporality, while 
                                                
197 In his commentary on Aristotle's account of the tragic, Kierkegaard claims that the conflicts experienced by the 
tragic hero arouse fear and sympathy in viewers, and that through these emotions, they become involved in the 
hero's plight. In this way, tragedy tears individuals out of their narrow outlook and makes them witness a greater 
truth about human existence. Kierkegaard believes the kind of reconciliation with existence that tragedy fosters is 
inadequate, however, since it brings about a loss of self in contemplation of the esthetic, rather than helping the 
spectator discover meaning in his or her existence as a self. See Malantschuck, Kierkegaard's Thought, p. 45. 
198 I am borrowing this term from Schacht, who uses it in interpreting Hegel's conception of alienation. See 
Alienation, p. 37. This term risks being a misnomer, since Kierkegaard believes that in the final moment, nothing 
situated within the temporal is enduring or substantial. One might, however consider society and its institutions as 
substantial for a temporary period, and as providing support, order, and structure for human beings during the 




nevertheless retaining a loosened relation to it. Through the awakening of his own activity of 
self-reflection, he understands himself in opposition to the worldly context that he had formerly 
been bound up with, when he was mostly passive as a "fully dressed self" in immediacy. A 
suggests that this opposition might become so drastic that he even finds himself alienated from 
the individual he previously took himself to be, or unable to identify himself with who he was in 
the past. He believes that with the uprooting from the social substance and the earthly that 
reflection has engendered in modern times, the individual, in his isolation, "becomes his own 
creator," and with this autonomy, assumes responsibility for the total character of his life in a 
way that was unthinkable for the ancient Greeks (E/O I: 149). As an esthete partial to the tragic 
and the totalizing, deterministic system it assumes, A believes that this conception of a radically 
independent self stripped of its finite characteristics rests on an illusion, and that nature and 
society alone form and constitute the individual. Nevertheless, it is a pervasive illusion that has 
come to define the present age with the assistance of Christianity and its otherworldly 
understanding of the human being. 
 A believes that when the individual's downfall is thought to happen chiefly through his 
own free acts instead of through the external conditions that had formerly supported him in his 
existence, the tragic is lost, and "when the age loses the tragic, it gains despair" (E/O I: 145). He 
therefore associates the self-sufficient mindset of the present age, in which the human being 
becomes radically guilty for his flaws or mistakes, with despair instead of tragedy. In our age of 
despair, he claims, the doubt and critical thought engendered by excessive reflection has 
undermined the political and religious bonds that held the state together "invisibly and 
spiritually," along with the meaning they bestowed. Meanwhile, the disintegration of society has 
led to a state of confusion and disorder that has made people more self-reflective in turn (E/O I: 
149). Caught in this vicious circle, the isolated individual is left to pick up the pieces of the 
broken social substance on his own, using his imagination to find his own path and meaning 
amidst the chaos. A, however, believes that to construct a worldview on one's own account in this 
way is to despair.  
 In order to illustrate how the basic theme of ancient tragedy might be expressed in 
modern tragedy, which departs from it in attesting to despair, A recasts the Greek heroine 
Antigone into a modern figure tormented by self-reflection. While in the ancient Greek play, it is 




the modern Antigone he envisions is the only person that knows of this tragedy. Unwilling to 
tarnish her father's legacy by revealing this terrible fact to anyone else, it remains a painful secret 
that she holds within her and resolves to protect with all her might. The hereditary guilt and 
sorrow that characterizes ancient tragedy is preserved in the modern retelling, since A's Antigone 
inherits these sentiments as a result of her father's mistake. Suffering privately under this familial 
burden, she remains embedded within the social substance and the earthly like the Greek 
Antigone. On the other hand, she has loosened herself from it as an individual through sustained 
and solitary reflection on the family secret. Although A does not explicitly state that she is in 
despair, by taking her father's guilt upon herself and suffering under the weight of her thoughts 
about him, which she repeatedly calls to mind of her own will, one can see that she has the 
characteristics of despair that he describes. Because her sorrow is caused in part by her own acts 
of reflection on a state of affairs that she will not forget about or get over, and in part by 
something earthly that burdens her, she also qualifies for despair in weakness as described by 
Anti-Climacus.  
 Concealing the knowledge of her father's error within her heart, and vowing to remain 
silent about it, A explains that the modern Antigone's life "does not unfold like the Greek 
Antigone's; it is turned inward, not outward. The stage is inside, not outside; it is a spiritual 
stage" (E/O I: 157). While the Greek Antigone lacked this interiority, and had no essential 
secrets that threatened to be disclosed to others, the modern Antigone, in her solitude, holds back 
her knowledge from the world, and is duplicitous in her dealings with it. By all appearances, she 
is enthusiastic and joyful when the Greek nation commemorates her father as king, but hidden 
within her is sorrow and guilt over her knowledge and his fate that nobody else is aware of. 
Unlike the Greek Antigone, the feelings of her inner life do not coincide with those expressed in 
her outward life, or as Anti-Climacus might put it, her "infinite self" does not align with her 
"finite self." There are two different principles of activity running concurrently within her that 
are not in essential agreement. Her spiritual activity is invisible and unexpressed to others, while 
she continues to act normally in the world. Those in the Greek period were interested in the 
visible expressions of the tragic hero, but in the modern period, the invisible activity of her 






3.3.1 "Inverted Vitality" as a Designation of Despair 
 By transforming Antigone into a "buried life" that a disintegrated age like our own can 
admire, A intimates a paradoxical and dualistic philosophy that might be called 'inverted 
vitalism.'199 Traditionally, vitalists have challenged mechanistic accounts of living things by 
claiming that life originates in an immaterial force that animates material bodies.200 In Bergson, 
this is conceived as a creative impetus common to all living things, which he calls élan vital.201 
Vitalism is a monistic theory insofar as it intends to explain the extraordinary complexity and 
diversity of life, including the individuation of organisms and the advent of persons, by tracing it 
to this common source that is essentially impersonal in its basic operations.202 In A's thought, the 
human being might be said to instantiate this universal vital impetus as a synthesis of psyche and 
body, which are activated by the elemental powers of nature and the sensuous.203 This is most 
perfectly exemplified by Don Giovanni, who as a "force of nature," is moved to act by lower-
order drives and desires without experiencing conscious opposition to them, and without 
                                                
199 I am indebted to my friend Zach Williams for this turn of phrase. He suggested it to me after being inspired by a 
poem from Emily Dickinson. "A Death blow is a Life blow to Some / Who till they died, did not alive become - / 
Who had they lived - had died but when / They died, Vitality begun -" (Dickinson 966, p. 407). This is a theme that 
carries on throughout Kierkegaard's authorship, where the individual who lives spiritually lives as one "dead to the 
world."  
200 See Bechtel & Richardson, "Vitalism" in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
201 See Bergson, Creative Evolution, esp. pp. 87-97.  
202 In explaining how vitalists would understand the life of a human being, Bergson writes, "in nature, there is 
neither purely internal finality nor absolutely distinct individuality. The organized elements composing the 
individual have themselves a certain individuality, and each will claim to have its own vital principle if the 
individual pretends to have his own . . . the individual is not sufficiently independent, not sufficiently cut off from 
other things, for us to allow it a "vital principle" of its own . . . In this sense each individual may be said to remain 
united with the totality of living beings by invisible bonds. So it is of no use to try to restrict finality to the 
individuality of the living being. If there is finality in the world of life, it includes the whole of life in a single 
indivisible embrace" (Creative Evolution, pp. 42-43). Kierkegaard would likely argue that this theory, which takes 
as its point of departure the multiplicity of elements constituting the life of organisms, fails to account for the basic 
and persistent unity in the consciousness of the person conducting the biological investigations, or what Kant calls 
the transcendental unity of apperception. Similarly, it does not explain how the individual can retain the sense of his 
own identity over the vast number of biological changes that occur in time. On the other hand, A would likely agree 
with Bergson's claim, since he believes individuality is a product of natural forces and social influences. Yet I claim 
that it is just this theory that A calls into question by proposing that one might live while being dead to the world, 
much like the modern Antigone. Inverted vitalism is a position that is reconceived in a more promising light, but not 
essentially altered in the ethical and religious stages of life. 
203 Elsewhere, Kierkegaard calls "immediate feeling" the" vital force" that generates life, and explains that this 
feeling must be kept to steer it on the proper course (UDVS: 71). I argue that because the human being is spirit, what 
"keeps" or watches over this vital force to set it on the right path cannot originate in immediacy, since then spirit 
would be naturalized as a temporal phenomenon, and so commensurable with other living things. To maintain the 
transcendence of spirit and do justice to its eternal aspect, there must be an essential difference between the lives of 
natural entities and human beings. Natural beings are driven solely by this vital force, whereas the human being is 
driven in part by this vital force through the psyche-body relation, and in part by the spiritual activity of the 




thinking about them or choosing which to make his will. Because the human being is spirit, 
however, the character of his life is susceptible to an inversion in which the natural processes of 
life in their primitive immediacy are disrupted by the individual's self-relational activity. I 
believe that in Kierkegaard's writings, reflection, imagination, and willing consist of a higher-
order form of vital activity originating in the self rather than in nature or the external world. This 
internal principle of activity that God allots to the individual should not be disparaged as dead 
intellectualizing, but is vital in the sense that it is driven by a non-naturalistic form of desire, 
which I have referred to as will. Hardship, suffering, or loss can thereby stimulate an 
individualized élan that thwarts one's natural spontaneity, as the self spontaneously relates itself 
to itself in existence. It does this in thinking about itself, in striving to attain the ends it aims at, 
and in choosing which of its lower-order desires it wants to be its will. In setting long-term goals 
for itself and shaping itself as it chooses, it would think and will with a concern for the future, 
rather than narrowly focusing on its present or immediate existence.  
 Inverted vitalism is demonstrated in the life of the modern Antigone. While the life of the 
Greek Antigone does not end until Creon puts her to death for violating his decree by burying 
her brother, the life of the modern Antigone "is essentially at an end" once she learns of her 
father's mistake and begins a process of intense self-reflection in securing his secret (E/O I: 156). 
Although she continues to live in the world among others, and appears normal and even happy in 
everyday life, this role she takes on is a facade that she does not truly identify with. As A puts it, 
in her separation from the world and humankind, "her real life is nevertheless hidden" beneath 
externals that she is dead to, but to be disintegrated or torn from one's finitude in this way is to 
despair (E/O I: 157). In the terms of Anti-Climacus, in weakness, she flees from the concrete self 
that she does not want to be. 
 One should not confuse the despair inherent to inverted vitalism with lifelessness or 
stagnancy, however. As A explains, inwardly the modern Antigone is richly alive in mulling over 
her thoughts and holding onto the memory of her father. He states that this energetic "turning 
back into oneself" that her self-reflection occasions "gives her a preternatural bearing. She is 
proud of her grief, she is jealous of it, for her grief is her love. But yet her grief is not a dead, 
static possession; it is continually in motion; it gives birth to pain and is born in pain" (E/O I: 
158). This active state of inhibition is a reversal of the condition of Don Giovanni, whose activity 




her. A explains that she feels proud and ennobled in sustaining her conscious opposition to the 
surrounding world, and in being selected "in a singular way" to preserve the legacy of her father 
through her secrecy (E/O I: 157). There is, then, "a great animating idea" that drives the solitary 
existence of the modern Antigone and gives her purpose, as she continues to reflect on her 
father's fate, her love for him, and her guilt in knowing of his mistake (E/O I: 158). One can see 
that fervent idealizing motivates the life of the inverted vitalist, while sensual desires, appetites, 
and the pressures of social conformity motivate the life of immediacy. Inverted vitalism is 
therefore a dualistic position that sets the human being in strict conflict with the greater forces of 
nature or the social world, whereas vitalism traditionally posits a global harmony between them, 
despite allowing for conflicts and tensions within this greater unity.  
 Elaborating on his "inverted vitalism," A writes of the alienation that the modern 
Antigone experiences in her separation from the totality of the world and humankind. In the 
Greek version of the tragedy, when Antigone learns that she will be buried alive in the tombs for 
disobeying Creon's orders, she cries: "alive to the place of corpses, an alien still / never at home 
with the living nor with the dead."204 Although she meant this quite literally, A explains that the 
modern Antigone can say this of herself figuratively for the rest of her life after she learns of her 
father's fate (E/O I: 159). These remarks express the uncanny predicament of the modern 
Antigone. In limbo, she is not dead, but neither is she alive in the sense that those in their 
original immediacy might be said to be.205 Withdrawn from the everydayness that characterizes 
the lives of most people in the world, her life plays out away from the world and not in it.206 In 
her restless, detached reflections, and with a love that "draws her out of herself into her father's 
guilt," the modern Antigone "feels alien to humankind" (E/O I: 161). Refusing to be drawn back 
                                                
204 See footnotes on p. 630 in Either/Or I (Hong translation) 
205 It is questionable whether A conceives of the majority of people that the modern Antigone dwells among as alive 
in a deeper sense, although they would certainly fit the biological definition of it. In a figurative sense, the inverted 
vitalist is "alive to the place of corpses" in everyday life within the world, or what we might call the public mode. 
Perhaps he sees the average person as not unlike the walking dead in his automaton-like conformity to his 
surroundings, although this is admittedly a harsh and, as I have argued earlier, unfair assessment.  
206 A's notion of a "buried life" as depicted by the modern Antigone would seem to challenge Heidegger's conception 
of the human being as 'being-in-the-world' (Being and Time, section 12), and support Scheler's view that the human 
being occupies a position outside of the world in virtue of his reflective capacities. Scheler writes, "at exactly the 
same moment when this "human being" placed himself outside nature to make it an object to be dominated and an 
object of novel principles of arts and signs––at exactly the same moment he had to anchor his very own center of 
being somehow outside and away from the cosmos. He could not anymore conceive himself simply as a "part" or as 
a simple "member" in the world after having placed himself so bravely above it" (The Human Place in the Cosmos, 
p. 64). For Anti-Climacus, the human being can be said to be in the world insofar as psyche and body also constitute 




into the self that she is as a human being situated in the world, she does not want to be herself in 
her concretion, but this failure of identification results in a state of alienation indicative of 
despair.  
 A discusses the fatal consequences that would ensue if the modern Antigone's secret were 
disclosed by generating a tragic collision in his version of the story (E/O I: 162-164). He 
proposes that she falls in love with another man whom she feels obligated to be open with, while 
also bearing a love for her father that demands the secret be withheld. The man suspects that she 
is keeping something from him, and tries to wrest the secret from her. She must therefore decide 
whether to maintain her fidelity to her father and lose her beloved, or to confide her father's error 
and her guilt to him. But as A explains, in surrendering the secret that it was her mission to 
defend, the inverted life of Antigone is in peril: "our Antigone carries her secret in her heart like 
an arrow that life has continually plunged deeper and deeper, without depriving her of her life, 
for as long as it is in her heart she can live, but the instant it is taken out, she must die" (E/O I: 
164). Once she reveals her inner self to her lover by admitting her terrible knowledge and her 
sorrow, the suggestion is, the life that she had been withholding and concealing would evaporate 
into exteriority, and Antigone would lose the self she had been cultivating as an internalist about 
her identity.  
 One might argue that this situation seems more pathological than tragic, and that she 
ought to release her secret to her beloved in order to rid herself of her despair, along with her 
pitiful self-obsession. Perhaps this return to ordinary worldly life through personal disclosure 
would strengthen her as an individual and reconcile her with her finite self so that she could 
overcome the weakness of not wanting to be herself that Anti-Climacus describes. In a similar 
vein, Dupré argues that Kierkegaard's continued interest in excessively reflective subjects of this 
sort evinces an immature personality on his part, or a narcissistic self-centeredness.207 Like Sagi, 
however, I do not believe that the emphasis Kierkegaard puts on these issues, whether it is in the 
pseudonyms or his self-authored works, is simply a result of his personality quirks or the mental 
pathology of an uncompromising individualist.208 As a master psychologist, his descriptions of 
alienation and despair stem from profound insight into the human condition that might apply to 
anyone sincerely grappling with his or her existence in the face of suffering. It is likely that those 
                                                
207 Dupré, Kierkegaard As Theologian: The Dialectic of Christian Existence, p. 18.  




who have closely examined their life in response to an earthly hardship or suffering will relate to 
the plight of the modern Antigone in some way or another, whether it is her secret pride, her 
hidden sorrow, her isolation, or her inhibitions. The characteristics of the intensification of self-
consciousness that he provides in this pseudonymous work are therefore not simply accidental 
features of one person's existence, but will apply to anyone who arrives at greater knowledge of 
who she is. 
 It is also not obvious that the despair of the modern Antigone would resolve if she 
released the secret that had been animating her inner life and stirring feelings of guilt and sorrow, 
and that this would allow her to recover the type of integration with the world and herself that 
she had enjoyed before carrying her burden. Neither is it clear that an individual roused to self-
reflection through profound suffering could return to his previous life of immediacy unchanged 
as a person, and without having lurking doubts about existence or harboring a certain mistrust of 
it. Anti-Climacus, for instance, believes that despair over something earthly of the kind 
experienced by the modern Antigone would awaken a deeper consciousness of oneself that one 
might try to ignore or forget through diversionary tactics, but that one would not be entirely 
successful in this. This individual might thereby seek relief from despair by throwing himself 
into worldly life and externalities, "but always with the consciousness of the self he does not 
want to be" (SUD: 66). The infinite aspect of the self that had surfaced in despair in weakness 
might recede into the background of his existence, but it would not vanish from awareness 
entirely, and his inner restlessness would manifest itself in worldly ventures and bustling activity 
instead of personal reflection (SUD: 56). This, however, is still despair, even if this despair has 
been effectively rendered unconscious.  
 Anti-Climacus would also disagree with A's claim that the modern Antigone would "die" 
if her secret is wrested from her. In his view, sustained reflection on her guilt and her grief 
fosters the self, but it does not create the self or keep it alive as A seems to suggest. Because the 
self has something eternal in it, it cannot die. It therefore remains continually present throughout 
the duration of one's existence, whether one becomes conscious of this or not. Like A, however, 
he believes that self-reflection allows for getting a hold of oneself apart from the world, which 
the self is originally under the sway of. But A thinks that ultimately, it is ridiculous for an 
individual to consider himself as "the absolute in all this, his relativity," and to believe that he 




his fate (E/O I: 145). As we will see in the following chapters, Kierkegaard believes that 
sustained self-reflection under the auspices of the eternal is a presupposition of human freedom. 
It allows for self-shaping and self-transformation that would not happen if nature simply ran its 
course temporally without the guidance and input of the individual. Hence, although it is possible 
for one who despairs in weakness like the modern Antigone to give this up and preoccupy 
himself with worldly endeavors instead, this is not to lose oneself as A thinks, but "to be lost" 
and away from oneself as an infinite being (CUD: 135). In relapsed individuals adrift in 
everydayness, despair would still lie underneath as an unresolved problem that they flee from.  
  
3.4 Despair as it Manifests in Reflective Sorrow  
 In "Shadowgraphs," the second of his speeches dealing with the aesthetics of despair, A 
expands upon his inverted vitalism by delineating the contrast between exteriority and interiority 
in self-reflective individuals. This fundamental distinction, he claims, becomes evident upon 
considering the differences between immediate and reflective sorrow in those affected by 
misfortune or the loss of something earthly. Although it is felt interiorly, immediate sorrow 
expresses itself sensuously in mourning or the like, and so has a corresponding exteriority. 
Although there is great external conflict in the human being who sorrows in his immediacy, there 
is little internal conflict, since the interior and exterior aspects of the human being remain in 
basic agreement. Just as in the case of the tragic, the sufferer would rest in natural conditions or 
in the social substance in his suffering, and so would not qualify as being in despair in A's sense. 
Reflective sorrow, however, "is not at one with itself" in this respect, and so would qualify as 
despair (E/O I: 170). As he describes it, reflective sorrow "wishes to conceal itself" interiorly, 
and so remain hidden beneath an incongruent exterior (E/O I: 169). As Anti-Climacus might put 
it, in refusing disclosure, the "infinite" or "abstract" self of the individual who sorrows 
reflectively is not in accord with her "finite" or "concrete" self. Because one cannot perceive 
reflective sorrow in the appearance of the human being, it is not fit for artistic portrayal, unlike 
immediate sorrow.  
 While recognizing the difficulty of the task, A intends to illustrate reflective sorrow 
artistically through what he calls 'shadowgraphs'. A shadowgraph, he explains, is an image that is 
not visible until the material that contains it is held up to the light, whereupon it appears as a 




'spiritual stage' that he described the modern Antigone's life as playing out on, he attempts to 
capture "an interior picture that is too delicate to be externally perceptible, since it is woven from 
the soul's faintest moods" (E/O I: 173). Catching hints of this shadowy form of sorrow in certain 
literary figures, he draws on subtle cues from their visible life to imagine what they are 
experiencing internally in response to the loss of their beloved.  
 One of the figures that he uses to illustrate a "buried life" of reflective sorrow is Marie 
Beaumarchais from Goethe's Clavigo. After she becomes engaged to Clavigo, who means the 
world to her, he decides to leave her, inflicting great suffering upon her by "perfidiously severing 
the connection" that she had with him (E/O I: 180). Too weak to bear her grief on her own, she 
must depend on the support of those around her, who recognize that the broken engagement 
signals "the death of her" (E/O I: 181). To console her, they try to convince her that he was a 
loathsome person and a deceiver that she should forget about. But along with her sorrow, which 
she keeps hidden beneath a quiet and calm demeanor as she goes about her everyday business in 
the world, Marie has incessant doubts about whether or not he truly cared for her as he appeared 
to, which others have no inkling of. Although she is dead to the everyday concerns of ordinary 
people, inwardly, she has been has brought to life through his departure.209 Explaining how she 
cannot reach finality in the process of reflecting on whether his love for her was real or an 
illusion, A writes: 
 
...her sorrow is characterized by the restlessness that prevents her from finding the object of her sorrow. 
Her pain cannot find quiet; she lacks the peace that is necessary for any life if it is to be able to assimilate 
its nourishment and be refreshed by it; no illusion overshadows her with its quiet coolness as she absorbs 
                                                
209 One might note the analogy between the relationship of Marie and Clavigo and the God-relationship in 
Kierkegaard's thought. This link is suggested in a couple places. A writes of what is on Marie's mind as she imagines 
her reconciliation with Clavigo: "He returns; he does not look down; he looks at me half reproachfully and says: O 
you of little faith, and this little phrase is poised like an olive leaf on his lips––he is there" (E/O I: 185). This 
references a statement made by Christ in response to the disbelief of his disciples (Matthew 8:26). It also references 
the olive leaf the dove gave to Moses after the great flood, signaling that he could return from his ark to the dry land 
of the earth (Genesis 8:11). Clavigo's departure is thereby compared to Christ's departure and promised return. 
Similarly, Climacus compares God to a seducer who surreptitiously guides the human being to self-actualization in 
withdrawing from him. “No anonymous author can more slyly hide himself, and no maieutic can more carefully 
recede from a direct relation than God can. He is in the creation, everywhere in the creation, but he is not there 
directly, and only when the single individual turns inward into himself (consequently only in the inwardness of self-
activity) does he become aware and capable of seeing God" (CUP: 243-244). This analogy that Kierkegaard runs 





the pain. She lost childhood's illusion when she acquired that of erotic love; she lost erotic love's illusion 
when Clavigo deceived her. (E/O I: 189) 
 
Unable to settle on any definite conclusion about what Clavigo's intentions were with the 
relationship, and whether or not she was used, the object of Marie Beaumarchais's sorrow is 
indeterminate, although this mystery fuels her continual inquiry. Without a definite object to 
sorrow over, she might be said to sorrow over nothing. In despair, she circles around in thought, 
imagining the possible scenarios that might have occasioned the breakup without knowing what 
actually did.  
 It should be noted that the indeterminacy of the object of reflective sorrow that A 
describes resembles the indeterminacy of the object of anxiety that both Haufniensis and Anti-
Climacus describe. The restlessness of sorrow and anxiety would also seem to suggest a close 
relationship between them. For all these thinkers, anxiety precedes reflective sorrow as an 
ineluctable feature of human life in its immediacy. As we saw in the last chapter, anxiety is 
present in pre-reflective individuals like Don Giovanni who are in strict pursuit of sensual 
enjoyment, and in more reflective individuals living in 'the public mode' who worry about future 
possibilities in existence. While these two feelings are not identical, it would not be unreasonable 
to conclude that for A and Haufniensis, reflective sorrow emerges in anxiety and is inflected with 
it, just as despair is. For Anti-Climacus, on the other hand, despair is not a consequence of the 
progression of anxiety, but anxiety is despair from its inception, since it is the immediate product 
of a disintegrated self. In his view, reflective sorrow would simply be one of its later, more 
advanced manifestations.  
 In the passage above, we saw A alluding to the illusions and deceitfulness of affairs in the 
temporal, which unless uncovered, have a pacifying and alluring effect on those drawn into 
everyday life in the world. These effects are remarkably similar to the effects he attributed to the 
tragic for those are able to come to terms with it. As I have pointed out, even though the 
temporal is an ineliminable aspect of the self by way of the psyche-body relation in the human 
being, Kierkegaard has suspicions about it, and conceives of it as a danger in associating it with 
nothingness or non-being. His anxieties crop up in comments made by A, who seems to conceive 
of the deceiver Clavigo as Marie's guide through temporality. Remarking on Marie's doubts and 





She has lost the happy trust with which she would have accompanied him dauntlessly into the abyss, and 
she has acquired instead a hundred misgivings....At the time Clavigo left her, a future lay before her, a 
future so beautiful, so enchanting, that it almost confused her thoughts; it obscurely exerted its power over 
her. Her metamorphosis had already begun; then the process was interrupted, her transformation stopped. 
She had had intimations of a new life, had sensed its powers stir within her; then it was broken off and she 
was repulsed... (E/O I: 189).  
 
Here A describes Marie in the earlier, more passive phase of her life, when she was captivated by 
her life in the world. In her erotic attachment to Clavigo, she could maintain a healthy confidence 
in the world, and rely on the satisfaction brought by his love. Blithely carried along by earthly 
affairs that she immediately identified with, and rooted firmly in the present moment, she had no 
deeper understanding of her situation, and no real concern about future misfortune. As A 
explains, "that which was to come smiled upon her very generously and mirrored itself in the 
illusion of her erotic love, and yet everything was so natural and direct" (E/O I: 189). The natural 
processes associated with traditional vitalism therefore steered her physical and psychological 
development, rather than her doing this of her own will. The negativity generated by the 
traumatic loss of Clavigo, however, disrupted the inner stillness she enjoyed in her original 
harmony with the temporal, and made her recoil from her concrete existence. The doubts and 
sorrow that set in with her separation from him made her gain a heightened consciousness of 
herself through her own reflective activity, and left her trying to make sense of things in the 
aftermath of her loss. 
 In her restless doubting and questioning, which have disrupted the natural process 
smoothly unfolding in her original immediacy, Marie has begun a personal process of spiritual 
development that I have described as inverted vitalism. Carefree and untroubled during her 
engagement with Clavigo, Marie might be described as "living without why" in her natural 
spontaneity as spirit in potentiality. 210 But in becoming spirit in actuality after Clavigo breaks 
the engagement, Marie lives with a why in questioning and demanding an explanation of her 
predicament. Although one's natural development leads one to the stage in which spiritual 
                                                
210 I am borrowing this phrase from Meister Eckhart, who suggests that "living without why" is the highest form of 
spiritual practice, rather than the initial stage of spiritual development. For Eckhart, however, "living without a why" 
means doing God's will by surrendering one's will and forgoing earthly attachments. For a discussion of Eckhart's 




development is possible, this latter, more "angular" phase of the self's development cannot be 
carried out in its original immediacy, since there the self does not relate itself to itself through its 
own acts of reflection or volition. As Anti-Climacus puts it, spiritual growth does not come 
naturally like "teeth, a beard, etc." or "as a matter of course over the years; this concept is 
precisely the uttermost opposite of spirit" (SUD: 58-59). While the acquisition of language, 
education, and socialization facilitate the initial development of spirit, and motivate the self's 
initial activity that transcends psychical or physical processes, the self can only be spurred to 
higher stages of development through the kind of disintegration that occurs following an earthly 
suffering or loss. Because detachment from the world and earthly desire is needed to rouse the 
self's own activity to a degree under which it can substantially transform itself in its existence, he 
states, "the self must be broken in order to become itself" (SUD: 65). It therefore must awaken to 
despair to know itself and become what it is, which will likely entail episodes of depression, 
psychological turmoil, or anxiety of the kind experienced by Marie and the modern Antigone.  
 
3.4.1 Despair as Self-enclosure  
 A state of brokenness is precisely the position that Marie Beaumarchais finds herself in 
after her broken engagement to Clavigo, as the infinite and finite aspects of the self are no longer 
aligned with one another. Detached from her concrete existence, and consumed by thoughts 
about whether he led her astray, she is, as A puts it, "inclosingly reserved, silent, solitary," 
despite appearing to others to be her normal self (E/O I: 169). 'Indesluttet,' which I will follow 
the Hongs in translating as 'inclosing reserve,' designates an intensified form of self-
consciousness associated with self-relational activity, and is, as we will see, the central concept 
in Kierkegaard's account of despair. The self that is inclosingly reserved does not expand to greet 
the world in its overwhelming givenness like it did in its earlier immediacy, but rather contracts 
or shrinks from it. A describes it as an "innermost retreat" where the self dwells in restless 
abstraction, endlessly seeking the object of its sorrow. "Like the pendulum in a clock," reflective 
sorrow "swings back and forth" between different possibilities, passing the time in its hideaway 
without being able to settle upon any definite item in existence to sorrow over (E/O I: 170). In its 
uncertainty, it "continually begins from the beginning and deliberates anew, interrogates the 
witnesses, checks and examines the various statements, something it has already done hundreds 




Marie desires resolution to her painful reflections by finding a finite expression that would put 
her thought to rest, but insofar as she cannot attain this end, she remains isolated from the 
temporal realm (E/O I: 180). Grieving in inclosing reserve, she "is never really present" in the 
world among others, "but is continually in the process of becoming" (E/O I: 172).  
 The spiritual awakening of the human being that happens in despair in weakness involves 
a personal process of becoming that overlies a natural process of becoming, the latter of which 
would include changes occurring within the psyche-body relation. Climacus refers to these 
distinct levels of process in his discussion of the coming into existence of the historical, which 
for him, pertains only to persons in the medium of temporality. Because they have an eternal 
component in them, they are able to conceive of themselves as being the same person over time, 
and to understand the duration of their life as forming a unified whole, unlike other animals. He 
claims, "coming into existence can contain within itself a redoubling, that is, a possibility of a 
coming into existence within its own coming into existence. Here, in the stricter sense, is the 
historical" (PF: 76). The historical is "dialectical with respect to time" as a result of emerging 
from the dynamic interaction between the eternal and temporal in the human being, and thereby 
involves both persistence and change (PF: 76).  
 A describes the self-relational activity that the individual engages in when coming into 
being as a self in the natural world as circular, and as constantly in motion. "Like a squirrel in its 
cage," he writes, reflective sorrow "turns around in itself" in recollection, rather than forgetting 
itself and its issues, or losing itself by focusing on finite affairs outside of its concern (E/O I: 
170). In constantly returning to herself in her reflections, the individual with an intensified self-
consciousness is not fully present to herself in her finite situation. Detached from it as an infinite 
self, she fails to completely coincide with herself at any single moment in the realm of the 
temporal. Because the human being in inclosing reserve is not at one with itself in its procession 
through temporality, self-reflection is rather more like an advancing, spiraling motion rather than 
a circular one where the self would end its reflections directly at the point where it began them; 
although the subject matter of these thoughts tends to repeat itself incessantly, she ends up at a 
new position in her thinking as time goes on, moving forward in her thinking despite the lack of 
any resolution to it. Through this enduring pattern of self-relational activity, she establishes a 




 A claims that there are only two ways to stop this endless cycle of reflective sorrow and 
restore unity in the self, or what Anti-Climacus would call the infinite and finite aspects of the 
self. The first way to break her inclosure would be to find an external expression for one's 
sorrow. Marie Beaumarchais, for instance, would have to obtain definitive evidence that Clavigo 
had or had not deceived her. A believes that in this case, the sorrow would not necessarily cease, 
but it would become an immediate sorrow that discloses itself externally by resting in substantial 
determinants (E/O I: 178). In this way, relief would arrive as her emotions would no longer be 
bottled up, and the different aspects of the self would be in basic agreement with one another. 
The second way would be to resolve to terminate this reflection through an act of will. Marie, 
however, is still motivated by earthly concerns rather than spiritual ones, and so "this cannot 
happen, for the will is continually in the service of reflection, which energizes the momentary 
passion" (E/O I: 188). Although her spirituality is budding insofar as she engages in acts of self-
reflection, she has not yet reached the point where she has control over her will as a self. Because 
her will conforms to her strongest first-order desires, she is, as Frankfurt would put it, more like 
a wanton than a person with second-order volitions that determine what she will or will not 
desire. Earthly passion dictates her actions and the content of all of her thinking, while thought 
inflames the transient desires that force her to aim toward a conclusion to her inquiry.211  
 A suggests that in order for her to terminate her sorrowful reflection and direct her 
thinking to other matters, a higher-order act of freedom is needed. By imposing her will as an 
infinite self, she would be able to subdue the earthly passions that her reflections are entangled 
in, and thereby liberate her thought from their rule. Marie, however, has yet to gain a grip on her 
thinking so that she could resolve to quit thinking about whether she was deceived. She has come 
to herself in suffering under something earthly, but has yet to begin to live as a self-possessed 
individual. As we will see, the Judge believes that when one has detached oneself from external 
conditions to the extent that one can gain hold of oneself and begin to will of one's own accord, 
one has moved beyond the esthetic stage of life and into the ethical stage. This latter stage does 
                                                
211 Frankfurt initially claims that the wanton could be capable of reasoning or deliberating on what he intends to do, 
but that in doing so, it wouldn't matter to him what desires form his will (The Importance of What We Care About, p. 
17). He rejects this in a later essay, claiming "reasoning involves making decisions concerning what to think, which 
appear no less incompatible with thoroughgoing wantonness than deciding what one wants to do” (Ibid., p. 176). A 
suggests that Marie is reasoning about her situation without making decisions about what to think, and so sides with 
Frankfurt's original claim. It is first-order desires that determine what is on Marie's mind, while reason assists in 
guiding her to the conclusion she passionately searches for. She has not yet stepped in to intervene by deciding what 




not appeal to A, as he believes ethical duties and obligations are an obstacle to enjoyment, which 
is the only thing worth living for.  
 One might think that Marie would feel proud and exceptional in distancing herself from 
the surrounding world and others, much like the modern Antigone. But A remarks on how 
insignificant Marie feels in her spiritual abandonment, stating: "Her sorrow always remains a 
tiny wailing infant, a fatherless and motherless child" (E/O I: 189). As he describes it, her self-
enclosure does not seem to be motivated by pride or a feeling of her own importance with 
respect to others, but rather by uncertainty and doubt about the beloved whose cruel deception 
left her existing like a foundling. As a Christian, Anti-Climacus would not agree with this 
assessment. Following Augustine and Luther, who conceived of sin through the metaphor of man 
being curved in on himself in his selfish rejection of God, he claims that pride is "the secret" of 
inclosing reserve (SUD: 65).212 Yet Anti-Climacus does not offer a reason to think that inclosing 
reserve has to be held out of stubborn pride or reprehensible self-love, even if it is in some cases. 
The fact that it originates in an earthly loss or hardship due to circumstances beyond one's 
control counts against this conclusion, and instead suggests that the secret of inclosing reserve is 
unwanted suffering. It is therefore quite natural to sympathize with someone like Marie, who 
strikes us not as conceited or sinful, or even as selfish, but as a frail individual who suffers 
tragically through no real fault of her own. One can imagine that many of those who despair after 
the loss of a loved one, or in suffering from a serious illness or the like, are in a situation similar 
to hers. It would seem strange to conceive of their heightened self-reflection and disquietude as 
sin or pride as Anti-Climacus does, unless one has no trouble accepting it is sinful to not easily 
come to terms with an affliction brought on in one way or another by the will of God. Far from 
being wicked, their perplexity and sorrow is quite understandable.  
 
 
                                                
212 In The Gravity of Sin, Jensen explains that homo incurvatus in se is a metaphor that has roots in Christian 
anthropology. This term was first put forward by St. Augustine and later rehabilitated by Luther to illustrate how the 
human being, in sin, selfishly turns away from God and others. St. Augustine claims, "Yet man did not fall away to 
the extent of losing all being; but when he had turned towards himself, his being was less real than when he adhered 
to him who exists in a supreme degree. And so, to abandon God and to exist in oneself, that is to please oneself, is 
not immediately to lose all being; but it is to come nearer to nothingness" (City of God, Bettenson translation, Book 
XIV, Section XIII, pp. 572-573). Indesluttet would seem to be a descendent of this term, although Kierkegaard does 






 On Anti-Climacus' view, one first becomes conscious of being in despair when one 
despairs over a particular suffering or difficulty that arises in one's earthly existence. Because 
reflection is a part of the self's nature, in despairing over something earthly, one ultimately 
despairs over oneself as the subject of suffering. Hence, at this stage of personal development, 
friction arises not only between the self and the world, but also between the self and itself with 
respect to its abstract and concrete aspects. Since this difficulty pertains to a particular earthly 
thing, the individual will likely be fairly integrated with the surrounding world and his 
immediate psychical life, although his connection to them will be loosened or compromised as a 
result of intense reflection on his life. He might continue enjoying many of the same things, and 
his desires, attitudes, and lifestyle might not change a great deal. He might also depend on family 
and the community for support during this time, and still find meaning and value in what he once 
did. On the other hand, the suffering he experiences leaves him detached, and raises doubts about 
many of these things that formerly gave him a sense of belonging in the world and society. Self-
reflection disrupts the unity and harmony that he felt between himself and the world when life 
was going smoothly for him, and when he did not need to pause to consider his life too closely. 
This conflict within the self is characteristic of despair, and attests to a lack of integration 
between its eternal and temporal components. Anti-Climacus refuses to conceive of this 
dysfunction as tragedy as an esthete like A would, but believes that it is the individual's own 
fault. In the next chapter, I argue that despair in weakness could not be the fault of the individual 
on his own account, much like despair in ignorance could not be. A therefore has good reason to 
view human existence as tragedy, although one should fault him for not taking human freedom 
seriously enough.  
 Through figures like the modern Antigone and Marie Beaumarchais, we have seen that 
suffering under something earthly rouses the vitality of spirit by bringing the individual to self-
reflection and invigorating her imagination and will. Before she experienced this suffering, her 
reflective and volitional activity was mostly in service to earthly desires, appetites, and passions 
generated from her natural spontaneity, which proceeds from the lower nature in the human 
being. Of course, being a member of society contributes to reflection and requires regulation of 
these selfish desires and drives, which complicates the life of the human being. Yet much of our 




and socially approvable manner. When the individual's own spontaneous activity increases as a 
result of becoming conscious of being in despair, however, backflow occurs, and her attention 
begins to turn inward toward herself and thoughts about her life. This is liable to isolate her and 
leave her in a painful state of self-enclosure, where many of her thoughts and feelings remain 
bottled up and undisclosed to others. Although it has obvious drawbacks, this added 
complication benefits her insofar as it enriches her inner life, and liberates her from her naive 
immersion in worldly flux. Human suffering can therefore foster a personal process through 
which one gains possession of oneself and realizes one's higher nature as spirit. In the next 
chapter, I explain that this process gains momentum when the individual despairs over the world 


























The Self in Flight 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 In the last chapter, I explained that Anti-Climacus characterizes despair as a form of 
weakness when the self does not want to be itself because of earthly hardship, loss, or suffering. 
This form of despair has two phases. In the first phase, the individual despairs over a particular 
earthly thing, while in the second phase, she despairs over the "earthly in toto," or the world in 
totality (SUD: 60). When despair intensifies upon entering this second phase, the individual 
becomes more self-consciousness in knowing herself as absolutely separate from the world and 
society, and not merely as opposed to particular things that she despairs over. Although the 
individual who despairs over something earthly starts to gain an appreciation of herself as a 
"naked abstract self" in her emerging reserve, in other ways, she is still supported by things or 
people in the world that she closely relates to, such as friends, family, occupations, projects, or 
the like. In this way, she slowly transitions from the public mode to a new way of viewing the 
world and her place in it. In the case of despair over the earthly in toto, however, these 
"externalities" that had previously anchored her in existence and held her interest as a "finite 
self" no longer do, and in a state of detachment, she sees herself as an individual in conflict with 
the whole world as an "infinite self." She does not only despair over the state of the world, but in 
being self-reflective, she also despairs over herself in her painful confrontation with the world. 
 In this phase of despair, there might indeed be external conflicts involving friends, 
family, occupations, and so on, but this is not the primary reason for her despair. Her despair 
originates in self-consciousness, and is caused by internal conflict that arises between the 
psyche-body relation, which the world has possession of, and the higher capacities of the 
intellect or will. With earthly suffering having brought her to heightened self-reflection, she has 
either lost many of the desires she once had in her natural spontaneity, or no longer identifies 
with them like she once did. Nevertheless, she continues to go on with life in the world torn in 
this way, without getting much satisfaction from life. Because of her suffering, and perhaps the 
suffering she observes in others around her, the world in general has started to lose its luster and 
meaning for her. In a state of crisis, things do not make sense or align with her expectations like 




state of affairs, she will likely spend time fantasizing about a better order of things, or thinking 
about the way things ought to be rather than the way they are. With the loss of pleasure and 
meaning in her life, the rift between herself and her finite condition has widened, and the 
harmony that she had previously enjoyed with it has been lost.   
 In explaining how this variant of despair arises, Anti-Climacus states: "When the self in 
imagination despairs with infinite passion over something of this world, its infinite passion 
changes this particular thing, this something, into the world in toto" (SUD: 60). Inflamed by 
passion, the imagination "infinitely magnifies" the loss or difficulty through the tendency it has 
to make hasty generalizations (SUD: 60). This might, for instance occur in someone who has lost 
a beloved. In losing this particular person, she might soon imagine herself to have lost the whole 
world. For Anti-Climacus, this individual discovers a genuine aspect of herself in learning of her 
infinitude, but her partiality toward it is a mistake made by a self in flight from the world. He 
states that in truth, "the loss or deprivation of every earthly thing is actually impossible, for the 
category of totality is a thought category" (SUD: 60). Following Aristotle, he suggests that 
concrete individuals are what truly exist, as opposed to general ideas like that of totality, which 
are abstractions generated by the imagination.213 The idea seems to be that despite her 
difficulties, she still exists in the world as an individual in relation to other individuals, and must 
come to grips with this aspect of herself in order retain balance with her finite aspect. The 
complication is that the suffering caused by her particular earthy loss has sent her imagination 
spiraling into such abstractions in the sphere of ideality, and so has exaggerated the infinite 
aspect of her self at the expense of the finite.  
 Anti-Climacus does not treat despair over the earthly in toto at length, but in section 4.2, I 
argue that the pseudonyms in Either/Or provide a rich account of it by delineating what might be 
described as the reflective esthetic mode of existence. This way of life was intimated in the 
figures of the modern Antigone and Marie Beaumarchais, who had moved on from the 
immediate esthetic and public modes in the event of an earthly suffering. It is epitomized, 
however, by A, an ironist and romanticist who suffers not through anything in particular 
impinging upon him in the way that Anti-Climacus describes, but by being an intelligent person 
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that cannot be conceived under the category of individuality, although individuals embody this force of nature that 
subsumes them to varying degrees. As spirit, the individual recognizes the presence of the sensuous within him and 




who has gained a clearer sense of the world as a whole after much experience in life.214 These 
figures all exemplify the inverted vitality of spirit, and show how it produces a desolate state of 
self-enclosure by disrupting the primitive type of integration one had with the world in one's 
original immediacy. In section 4.3, I explore the methods that A uses to cope with this state, 
which is characteristic of despair.  
 There is a question, however, of what kind of spiritual activity Anti-Climacus believes 
gets roused in despair in weakness, given that the self has both reflective and volitional 
capacities that are interlinked, but not identical. Some scholars have suggested that despair in 
weakness, and the esthetic way of life in general, is due to an absence of decision or a failure of 
agency. While this might be Kierkegaard's intent, in section 4.4, I argue that based on the 
phenomenological evidence he presents throughout his works, this form of despair stems from a 
complication ensuing from the use of the intellect, rather than from a misuse of the will.215 It is 
therefore principally a problem of increased knowledge of oneself and existence, or the shedding 
of ignorance that results from increased self-reflection. It is true that Anti-Climacus describes 
this as a state of not willing to be oneself, but I claim that by the estimate of him and the Judge, 
the will is a subsidiary factor in this form of despair. Like despair in ignorance, then, it seems to 
be a condition that people originally find themselves in, rather than one that they bring upon 
themselves as he claims. It would be more justifiable to conceive of the division and conflict 
occurring between the paradoxical aspects of the self as tragedy, rather than as sin or 
wrongdoing. 
 
4.2 Despair over the Earthly in toto in Either/Or 
 Through his nihilistic but incisive ruminations on the human condition and existence in 
general, A offers a multifaceted approach to the problem of despair by describing the many ways 
in which it can manifest in the more reflective stages of human life. This involves a pervasive 
                                                
214 A does not seem to arrive at this condition through the loss of a particular thing that he has magnified into the 
world in total, unless one counts the loss of joy as an occasion to rail against all existence (which I discuss in the 
next section). Or at least if he has, it is not mentioned in his writings. But he would seem to qualify for this condition 
insofar as he does not despair over anything in particular, but rather in the face of all existence.  
215 Kosch, for instance, agrees with Taylor that "the most fundamental characteristic of the aesthetic stage of 
existence is the absence of decision" (Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, footnote on p. 
150). I agree that this is an important characteristic of the esthetic stage of life, but I reject the notion that despair 
should be understood as rooted in it, despite Anti-Climacus' protests to the contrary. It is simply inconsistent with 




sense of meaninglessness, anxiety, anhedonia, boredom, alienation, isolation, and absurdity. 
Although these facets of despair might seem only loosely related, I argue that under Anti-
Climacus' view, they are intrinsically linked through their common origin, which is in the state of 
disintegration the self undergoes through heightened reflection on itself and existence. As we 
will see in the next section, A tries to overcome despair through the free play of his imagination 
and by converting his life into art, but he falls well short of success in doing so. This leaves him 
open to criticism by the Judge, who suggests that he take up the ethical mode of existence to 
restore his connection with the world, and unify the infinite and finite aspects of himself. The 
Judge believes he can only do this by properly orienting himself toward the highest good––that 
is, the Eternal––through an effort of the will, which he has yet to exercise adequately.   
 
4.2.1   The Loss of Joy and the Escalation of Boredom in the Reflective Aesthete 
Interestingly enough, A rarely mentions despair explicitly in his collection of writings, 
and seems reluctant to characterize his condition as that. With the exception of his effusive essay 
on Don Giovanni, however, it forms the undercurrent of all of them.216 Reading his papers, one 
gets the impression of a shrewd man who has foundered under his comprehensive outlook on the 
world, and by extension, his knowledge of himself as a member of it. As was the case in figures 
like Marie Beaumarchais and the modern Antigone, reflection has taken him out of his narrow 
immersion in the present moment and opened up the sphere of ideality. Unfortunately, this 
increase in activity as a self has placed him into inclosing reserve, where he heaps scorn on all of 
existence based on the grander vision he has arrived at through his repeated observations. As the 
Judge explains, A’s thought about his situation and the human condition has made him “a 
stranger and an alien in the world” (E/O II: 83). His alienation from the world figures most 
prominently in “Diapsamalta,” which contains a series of aphorisms on human existence that he 
fittingly addresses “to himself” (E/O I: 17). There he writes, 
 
I am alone, as I have always been—forsaken not by men, that would not pain me, but by the happy jinn of 
joy, who trooped around me in great numbers, who met acquaintances everywhere, showed me an 
opportunity everywhere. (E/O I: 41) 
  
                                                
216 Under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard confirms that this was his intention in writing about 




Ironically, he believes that his loneliness does not stem from his isolation from other people, but 
from the joy that had embraced him in his original immediacy abandoning him and making him 
fend for himself. This pleasurable feeling was not one that he chose, but it instead came upon 
him naturally in his proximity with the sensuous, when he felt in agreement with affairs in the 
surrounding world. A suggests that this withdrawal of joy causes him to feel alienated from the 
world in toto, but for Anti-Climacus this is a mistake: it is actually our own activity of self-
reflection that disrupts the enjoyment that the sensuous presents us with in our finitude by 
bringing us to an awareness of our separation from it as an "infinite self." Since this type of 
happiness "is not a qualification of spirit," the self cannot restore the enjoyment that has been 
lost of its own accord (SUD: 25).  
 Although contemplative enjoyment is possible at this stage due to the continued influx of 
the sensuous, this comes rather infrequently, and overall is not as pleasing as being immersed in 
joy. Of course, the cultivation of one's intellectual capacities is productive in many ways, but it 
can carry with it detrimental effects. Had A not begun to think abstractly about his life in the 
world to the extent that he has, he would never have lost this primordial joy of living that a 
sensualist like Don Giovanni experienced in going through 1,003 women without getting sick of 
it. But since reflection is an essential activity of the self that is catalyzed not only by suffering, 
but also by the acquisition of language, education, and social conditioning, a heightening of this 
activity inevitably arises in any normal human being. Few, however, will realize this capacity to 
the degree that A has. It is therefore less likely that most people will experience the continual 
absence of joy that he feels. 
Because the human being is spirit, the natural vitality and passive enjoyment of someone 
like Don Giovanni cannot generally be sustained over the course of an entire lifetime. For those 
who have gained a great deal of experience in life and have given much thought to it, desire 
gradually wanes, and what once provided satisfaction eventually becomes stale. In the case of A, 
life has lost the enchantment that it once had for him, and has become a mundane routine. Exiled 
from the sensuous as spirit, he complains that he no longer has the same enthusiasm for things as 
he once did: 
   
My soul is dull and slack; in vain do I jab the spur of desire into its side; it is exhausted, it can no longer 
raise itself up in its royal jump. I have lost all my illusions. In vain do I seek to abandon myself in joy’s 




mounted, light, hearty, and cheerful. When I rode slowly through the forest, it seemed as if I were flying. 
Now, when the horse is covered with lather and is almost ready to drop, it seems to me that I do not move 
from the spot… (E/O I: 41) 
 
A can recall a point in his life when everything was new and wonderful, and he felt exuberant as 
desire irresistibly grabbed him and propelled him on the journey through temporality. In this 
stage of natural spontaneity, the sensuous had captivated his interest with its lush and vibrant 
activity, without demanding much from him in return. To the extent that reflection accompanied 
this process, it was used uncritically to help him find the means to satisfying his natural desires 
and appetites, or to conduct himself in a way that would meet social demands and expectations. 
By establishing an abbreviated degree of separation between himself and the surrounding world, 
it was able to lift him above the moment just enough for him to get a wider perspective on it, but 
he could just as quickly enter back into the swing of things at the next moment. 
 Unfortunately the time of youthful vigor has long since passed, and it now takes strained 
effort on his part to do anything. A writes that even trivial everyday activities have become 
burdensome, and no longer come naturally to him: 
 
I don’t feel like riding—the motion is too powerful; I don’t feel like walking—it is too tiring; I don’t feel 
like lying down, for either I would have to stay down, and I don’t feel like doing that, or I would have to 
get up again, and I don’t feel like doing that, either. Summa Summarum: I don’t feel like doing anything. 
(E/O I: 20) 
 
In a state of listlessness, he appears to conclude that action in the external world is futile, even 
though he is highly active in the internal realm of abstraction. His vitality is therefore inverted. 
As he ponders his situation as a disengaged spectator of the universe, he does not see the point of 
doing anything. Yet he somehow manages to go on without really wanting to.  
No longer attracted by life in the world, A is left alone without a compelling reason to act, 
and life has become boring for him. The world does not stimulate his senses in the way that it 
used to, although his lack of interest in its affairs does stimulate thought and speculation, and 
made him more self-conscious as a result. In the esthetic essay “Rotation of Crops,” he argues 
that boredom is a fundamental principle of existence (E/O I: 290-291). This basic fact of 




disclose itself to disillusioned reflection that has turned in upon itself. Boredom, he explains, 
motivates action in existence by means of repulsion, as people desire to rid themselves of its 
influence by losing themselves in worldly engagements, whether they are conscious of this or 
not. He even speculates that boredom must have been the impetus of motion in the act of 
creation. “The gods were bored,” he writes, “therefore they created human beings. Adam was 
bored because he was alone; therefore Eve was created. Since that moment, boredom entered the 
world and grew in quantity in exact proportion to the growth of population” (E/O I: 286).  
Although daily tasks, relationships with others, projects, busywork and the like offer 
relief from boredom for most people, A has become disengaged from all these affairs through 
increased reflection on himself and existence. As a result, the boredom lurking beneath it all 
appears to him in all its might. No longer able to experience joy, which would relieve him of his 
boredom and bring him into concrete engagement with the world, he is no longer moved to act in 
it, and no longer strongly identifies with what he once did. As external action declines, his 
internal activity of reflection is spiraling, leading to a renewed vitality that I have described in 
the third chapter as inverted vitalism. But as we have seen through Anti-Climacus' writings and 
the A's essays, this loss of harmony between the infinite and finite aspects of the self is despair, 
and must be surmounted to arrive at spiritual health.  
 
4.2.2 Fatalism and Existential Paralysis 
A does not believe he did anything to prompt joy’s departure, and thinks that there is 
nothing he can do of his own powers to bring it back. He feels himself to be without a say in his 
crippling loneliness and abstraction—a hapless victim of fate. He declares, “So I am not the one 
who is the lord of my life; I am one of the threads to be spun into the calico of life! Well, then, 
even though I cannot spin, I can still cut the thread” (E/O I: 31). In this aphorism, A suggests that 
at an earlier point of his life, when he was in the midst of things, he had the impression of having 
control over his life and power over his own destiny when he acted. This is a freedom he 
strongly desires as a human being. As he begins to stop and reflect on the series of events 
unfolding around him, whether it is due to the loss of joy or some earthly crisis that befell him as 
Anti-Climacus suggests, he begins to think this sense of freedom was an illusion. From his 
alienated standpoint, everything about his existence, including his own desires, seems to be the 




the cause of anything. In his theorizing, he finds himself a passive bystander in a situation not of 
his own making, but rather one in which he is "spun" or thrown into. This is, of course, a far cry 
from Kierkegaard's religious conception of being as gift.  
Feeling impotent, he is convinced that the cosmos generates life out of an indifferent and 
impersonal necessity, with no regard for him as an individual. “I am predestined,” he writes, 
“fate laughs at me when it suddenly shows me how everything I do to resist becomes a factor in 
such an existence” (E/O I: 36). Believing that he is ultimately unable to rejuvenate himself 
through an effort of the will, he claims to have only one real liberating power: the stoical 
capacity to detach himself from his natural condition, including his feelings, emotions, and other 
people, so that they have only a minimal effect on him. He can only “cut the thread” from life 
and refuse identifying with these things by being perched in contemplation of his natural 
condition, rather than being an earnest participant attached to certain projects, relationships, or 
outcomes that might occur. A is indeed an esthete without religious commitments, but this is 
nevertheless a spiritual movement intended to redeem from his entanglement in the temporal. 
Yet in implementing this desperate strategy to save himself through his acts of reflection, he 
severs his connection to his finite self, which is irretrievably in the world and bound up with the 
processes of life.217 In putting too much stock into his infinitude, he does not want to be himself 
in his finitude. As a result, his alienation from the finite only worsens, and inclosing reserve 
reaches a fever pitch.  
By his own estimate, this liberating measure is not nearly as effective as he would like in 
bringing him the serenity he desires. Despite his mystical contemplation, he still admits to having 
to endure a life filled with suffering: 
 
“I seem destined to have to suffer through all possible moods, to be required to have experiences of all 
kinds. At every moment I lie out in the middle of the ocean like a child who is supposed to learn to swim. 
I scream (this I have learned from the Greeks, from whom one can learn the purely human). Admittedly, I 
                                                
217 Summarizing Luther's assessment of man's fallen condition, Shestov makes a point that befits A's fatalistic 
perspective: "the fallen man cannot do anything for his own salvation, his choice is no longer free, everything that 
he undertakes brings him closer to death, and the more he "does" the weaker he becomes and the deeper his fall" 
(Athens and Jerusalem, p. 221). Anti-Climacus claims that the human being is free to make the resolution of faith, 
but that God has to act upon us to save us, and to establish the conditions under which the choice to become a 
Christian can be made. We cannot do it of our own powers, but must have faith that help will come from the outside. 
One might take offense at the idea that God incarnated himself as a human being for our salvation, but as he 
explains: “Faith is a choice, certainly not direct reception—and the recipient is the one who is disclosed, whether he 




have a swimming belt around my waist, but I do not see the support that is supposed to hold me up. It is 
an appalling way to gain experience.” (E/O I: 31-32) 
 
Broadening his thinking to matters concerning the totality of existence, A has no an adequate 
explanation for his predicament. Without a belief in God, or any firm understanding about the 
ultimate nature of reality, he finds himself surrounded by mystery. Feeling as helpless as a child 
as he floats atop an ocean of uncertainty, he concludes that some power must be sustaining him 
in his existence, but he is not sure what it is. He anxiously struggles to make out the best way to 
navigate the waters it has cast him out on, but never feels confident about his ability to do so. 
Neither does he know where they will ultimately lead him. Pascal had expressed a similar worry 
in his Pensées, writing, “The eternal silence of these infinite spaces fills me with dread.”218 
Perhaps A screams to fill these spaces and draw the attention or pity of the powers that 
overwhelm him, but in their indifference, they refuse to give any reply. As his existential 
reflections advance and lead him into the infinitude of the imagination, Anti-Climacus would 
claim that A neglects the finite aspect of the self, which creates an imbalance within it. In lacking 
an appreciation for the concrete context of his existence in his excessive abstraction, he is in a 
disoriented condition that Anti-Climacus calls infinitude's despair (SUD: 30-33). 
In this state of flight, where all relations to the finite are severed, A discovers the terrible 
ambiguity of his fate, imagining the many possibilities that might be realized in existence. He 
explains that this repulses him, and causes him profound anxiety: 
 
What is going to happen? What will the future bring? I do not know, I have no presentiment. When a 
spider flings itself from a fixed point down into its consequences, it continually sees before it an empty 
space in which it can find no foothold, however much it stretches. So it is with me; before me is 
continually an empty space, and I am propelled by a consequence that lies behind me. This life is turned 
around and dreadful, not to be endured. (E/O I: 24) 
 
Although he exists in a state of detachment, he still feels himself reaching out toward something 
solid and secure to hold onto, some end or goal that will guarantee him final rest and safety, but 
such stability eludes him. The future gives him no assurance that he will ever find it, and proffers 
only a multitude of vapid experiences instead. He gets the sense that whatever force propels him 
                                                




onward through temporality has long since determined what it will do with him, and although he 
would like to change his trajectory, he can do nothing to frustrate the necessity of its procession.  
 Remarking on the distinct mood that his fatalism produces in him, he writes, “I feel as a 
chessman must feel when the opponent says of it: That piece cannot be moved” (E/O I: 22). He 
longs for freedom, which for Anti-Climacus, is an essential characteristic of the self, but the loss 
of freedom he assumes rules out any capacity for choice that would make an honest difference in 
existence. This puts a severe limitation on what remains possible for him. He once saw a world 
of possibility at his fingertips, but it has since been brought to ruins. He laments: 
 
“My soul has lost possibility. If I were to wish for something, I would wish not for wealth or power but 
for the passion of possibility, for the eye, eternally young, eternally ardent, that sees possibility 
everywhere. Pleasure disappoints, possibility does not. And what wine is so sparkling, so fragrant, so 
intoxicating!” (E/O I: 41) 
 
Recall that Anti-Climacus holds that necessity and possibility are two components of the self that 
are brought into relation. In viewing his entire life under the category of necessity and ceding the 
notion of possibility, Anti-Climacus would claim that A has disregarded an essential component 
of who he is. He has thereby succumbed to necessity's despair, which is to lack possibility (SUD: 
37-42). Anti-Climacus believes that when there is an overweight of one or more of these 
components, as in the case of A, the self is in despair as a result of losing its integrity or balance. 
A's position is especially unstable in that he might also be described as having succumbed to 
possibility's despair by lacking necessity. Steeped in the infinite through his overactive 
imagination, he is anxious about what might happen in the future, and shipwrecked on 
speculations about the nature and origin of his existence. With existence appearing chaotic to 
him, everything has come to seem possible for him, while nothing seems possible at the same 
time. Vacillating between these two variants of despair, he occupies a self-contradictory position 
rife with tension and incoherence, and this only worsens his despair.  
 The lack of possibility and freedom leaves A in a wretched state of paralysis. As the 
Judge puts it, for a reflective aesthete like A who has thought through his existential condition in 
such a thoroughgoing manner, “life comes to a halt” (E/O II: 171). In contrast, the vital activity 
of immediate esthetes like Don Giovanni or those in the public mode rarely comes to a halt, for 




intensified in a way that would disrupt the flow of the sensuous by calling anything too radically 
into question. Doing what comes naturally to them, whether it be conforming to social norms or 
following their strongest desires where they lead, these individuals do not pause to step back 
from their situation to evaluate it to any significant degree, and lack an enduring identity as 
selves. As a reflective esthete who has transitioned from these stages of life, A writes, “Time 
passes, life is a stream, etc., so people say. That is not what I find: time stands still, and so do I. 
All the plans I project fly straight back at me; when I want to spit, I spit in my own face.” (E/O I: 
26) While those in the earlier stages of life are immersed in temporality through their 
entanglement with the sensuous, and are basically "going with the flow" of it all, A observes 
himself standing at a point outside of it in inclosing reserve, ruminating upon existence while 
alienated from the world. However, he is nevertheless situated in it as a human being constituted 
by psyche and body, and so is alienated from himself.  
Reflection has enabled A to apprehend existence and come to a greater understanding of 
it, but it leaves him at such a remove from the present moment that the fluid character of 
temporality loses its emphasis. In an evocative description of this state, Thompson writes that A 
feels as if "the continuity of his life has been ruptured on either side of the present moment. He 
looks back to a past which is no longer, and forward to a future which is not yet. Removed from 
both, he occupies a moment which is, as it were, wrenched out of time. This moment—isolated, 
discontinuous, lonely—is the moment of the “dreadful still life”" which lies at the heart of A's 
existence."219 For this reason, A asserts, “It is not merely in isolated moments that I, as Spinoza 
says, view everything aeterno modo, but I am continually aeterno modo” (E/O I: 39). As we saw 
in chapter one, pantheists and objective thinkers also enter this "timeless" state of universality in 
their impartial speculations, disregarding their existence as individuals in their search for an 
eternally valid explanation of things.220 Their situation is therefore similar to that of A.221 While 
                                                
219 Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, p. 43. 
220 See section 1.2. 
221 The Judge criticizes those philosophers who conceive of their lives altogether speculatively, without valuing their 
individuality. Because they believe all of their actions are necessitated by past events, they do not take themselves to 
be freely choosing their actions with an eye toward an indeterminate future. Consequently, "life comes to a halt" for 
them (E/O II: 171). In his view, they too are in despair in their reflections, and are alienated from themselves much 
like A is, even if they do not realize it. Describing their condition, he writes: "Their minds are at ease; objective, 
logical thinking has been brought to rest in its corresponding objectivity, and yet, even though they divert 
themselves by objective thinking, they are in despair, for a person can divert himself in many ways, and there is 
scarcely any means as dulling and deadening as abstract thinking, for it is a matter of conducting oneself as 




these thinkers remain in it only during intense periods of study or contemplation, A purports to 
remain in it constantly, with a sense of his individuality intact.  
This moment is a painful position to be in, but it has great import for the development of 
selfhood. It indicates that the eternal and eminently spiritual aspect of his self has come to the 
fore and begun to eclipse the temporal aspect that had kept him enslaved to sensual desire, his 
natural condition, and his social milieu. While this helps bring the self to maturity, in other 
respects, A displays a remarkable immaturity as a self. For Anti-Climacus, A despairs of the 
earthly in toto by hovering in the infinitude of abstract thought, without admitting the 
significance of his existence as an individual, which is concrete and real. Consequently, he has 
become a fantastic spectator of existence rather than an active participant in it. In turning too 
closely to the eternal aspect of the self and neglecting the temporal aspect, he continues to be 
disintegrated as a self. The Christian would also criticize him for his lack of faith. In failing to 
orient himself to the past or future in such a way that he could conceive of his life as a unified 
whole, he does not repent of his misdeeds, nor does he expect salvation in a life to come. For 
Haufniensis, the dreadful moment A describes is transfigured under the terms Christianity 
introduces, and becomes the Instant.222 Rather than regarding it as unbearable, the person of faith 
interprets it as a sign that salvation is imminent. He do not remain hung up sub specie 
aeternitatis like A, but reconciles himself with his concrete existence as an individual by living in 
the world as Christ taught, or in other words, doing God's will in existence.  
While A has gained an intimation of himself as spirit and as a synthesis of the eternal and 
temporal, infinitude and finitude, and possibility and necessity through the deepening of 
reflection, in Kierkegaard’s view, he remains at an early stage on the path toward realizing his 
spiritual nature. As Kierkegaard explains in Two Ages, this recognition of one's infinitude and of 
possibility is a precondition for a higher and more liberating mode of existence, but is in no way 
sufficient for it (TA: 96). A's estheticism would need to be surmounted in order for him to enter 
the ethical or religious stages and properly realize his freedom. As we will see, in these stages, he 
could embrace both the eternal and temporal aspects of himself, and help bring them into 
alignment as a way of overcoming despair, along with his debilitating tragic sense of life. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
observation, and do not see themselves as active participants in life as human beings (E/O II: 172). 





4.2.3 The Loss of Meaning, and the Attempt to Rediscover Joy  
 Because of his increasing detachment from the world and from other people, which had 
previously endowed his life with ample meaning without him having to search for it or give it 
meaning through his own efforts, A must grapple with a looming sense that existence is 
meaningless. Sometimes, he seeks for a greater meaning that might be eluding him, asking, 
“What, if anything, is the meaning of this life?” (E/O I: 31). At other times, however, he comes 
to the nihilistic conclusion that the search is futile, and that there is no meaning to be found in the 
tedious march of necessity, which generates the same outcome for all finite beings in the end: 
 
How empty and meaningless life is…we find consolation in the thought that we have a long life ahead of 
us. But how long is seven times ten years? Why not settle it all at once, why not stay out there and go 
along down into the grave and draw lots to see to whom will befall the misfortune of being the last of the 
living who throws the last three spadefuls of earth on the last of the dead? (E/O I: 29) 
 
To A, who discerns the nothingness of temporality, nothing seems to last, and the inevitability of 
death renders everything we do pointless and insignificant in the long run. Moments of joy flee 
from our grasp just as soon as they arrive, and everything held dear to us will be utterly forgotten 
at the end of this short life. By bringing the totality of existence under scrutiny, including an 
uncertain future, his thoughts have emptied any meaning that his present circumstances might 
offer without replacing it with anything. With possibility being lost for him, any attempt to 
recover a possible meaning must, in the final moment, be a hopeless enterprise. 
 The Judge corroborates the conclusion that this state is despair in his treatment of the 
esthetic life-view of A. Given that despair is mentioned infrequently in A's writings, one cannot 
assume he would necessarily agree with this assessment, despite the mounting evidence for it. 
The Judge says that he might prefer to call his a life-view of sorrow, which for him, can still be 
of esthetic interest, or he might not admit to having a life-view at all (E/O II: 232-239). 
Nevertheless, the Judge calls despair "the final esthetic life-view" because the individual taking it 
up has come to recognize the meaninglessness and futility of a life centered upon the enjoyment 
of transient pleasures (E/O II: 194). In his letter to A, the Judge writes,   
 
You still have in your power all the elements for an esthetic life-view. You have financial means, 




because a young girl would not love you. And yet you are in despair. It is not a despair involving 
something actual but a despair in thought. Your thought has rushed ahead; you have seen through the 
vanity of everything, but you have not gone further. Occasionally you dive into it, and when for a single 
moment you abandon yourself to enjoyment, you are also aware that it is vanity. Thus you are continually 
beyond yourself—that is, in despair. (E/O II: 194) 
 
As the Judge explains, it cannot be the actual circumstances of his life that have made A 
unhappy, since these are quite good, but rather how he has come to understand or interpret these 
circumstances. He therefore seems to disagree with Anti-Climacus' claim that earthly hardship or 
suffering is needed to jolt the individual into an intensified state of self-consciousness. Perhaps 
in intelligent or sensitive individuals like A, learning or rumination would suffice. He initially 
retreated into ideality to escape the burden of reality, which he judges to be vain and empty, but 
his knowledge ends up burdening him more than reality ever did. The Judge notes that on a few 
occasions, A's wandering reflections subside enough for him to enjoy himself by getting caught 
up in the moment, much like the immediate esthete. Yet even when this happens, there is still a 
sense in which A is outside of the moment in thought, and for the Judge, this can only mean he is 
in despair. Not only is this despair of the earthly in toto, but more importantly, it is also despair 
over himself as a thinking being who must confront the world in all its tedium and triviality.  
 By living in the concealment of inclosing reserve, A occupies the standpoint of irony. 
Kierkegaard explains that a feature of all forms of irony, whether it is rhetorical, literary, or 
existential, is that "the phenomenon is not the essence but the opposite of the essence" (CI: 247). 
One can note how the inner life of A fails to coincide with his outer character. He appears to 
others as a healthy, stable bourgeoisie citizen, but on the inside, he broods over how wretched 
everything is, without anyone else having a clue. Kierkegaard generally treats of irony as a state 
of consciousness in which the subject sees himself "as negatively free" from all earthly bonds 
and attachments, or what I have referred to as the social substance (CI: 247). This negative 
freedom is a consequence of spiritual acts of negation, which generate reflection upon one's 
natural condition by bringing the self back to itself in a repelling movement away from it.223 This 
spiritual power liberates the individual from the surrounding world and puts them into a position 
to comprehend it, but it can be taken to extremes if he does not temper it with existential 
commitment to the finite. In its extreme form, represented by A, irony undermines everything 
                                                




that supports the individual in existence, including its sense and meaning. From this standpoint, 
the social substance has lost its substance, and shown itself to be illusory. Kierkegaard writes: 
 
Irony sensu eminentiori is not aimed at one part of existence or another, but is aimed at the entire actuality 
of a given time and under given circumstances. It has, therefore, an apriority in itself; it does not achieve its 
totalizing view by successively destroying one part of actuality after the next, but it is by virtue of its 
totalizing view that it destroys individual parts. It is not one phenomenon or another which is observed sub 
specie ironiae, but it is the totality of existence. As far as this goes, one sees the correctness of Hegel's 
designation of irony as infinite absolute negativity. (CI: 254) 
 
Kierkegaard explains that the ironic consciousness consists of an irreducible and self-sufficient 
unity in relation to the world and its multiplicity. One does not arrive at this unity by judging 
particular things or events to be insignificant or illegitimate, since then irony would be dependent 
on the parts of reality that it negates. In this case, the ironist would not be able to adopt a 
universalized standpoint independent of the world's multiplicity, and so would never be able to 
achieve an overarching view in which he recognize the finite particulars as being parts of a 
greater whole. In its infinitude, irony understands itself as absolutely distinct from anything 
external or finite, which for it, is a mere passing show bearing no essential truth. To the extent 
that the ironist allows himself an identity rather than nullifying it like he does with everything 
else, he would be an internalist about his identity, but it is unlikely he will allow this. In refusing 
to let anything remain unharmed under his destructive gaze, A does not employ his freedom as 
spirit in a positive, concrete way by bringing himself into engagement with the world, others, or 
God.  
 The pall of meaninglessness A discovers in existence makes the achievement of a 
concrete unity with it exceedingly difficult. Adrift in a world that he has difficulty relating to, he 
finds himself set with no real purpose or task, or even a real opportunity for pleasure; as a result, 
he feels that he has no good reason to act. The Judge charges A with being indifferent toward the 
consequences of his actions, saying, “You turn toward the future, for action is essentially future 
tense; you say: I can do either this or do that, but whichever I do is equally absurd—ergo, I do 
nothing at all” (E/O II: 170). Lacking any sense of direction that would guide him toward a 




living by anchoring him to his concrete existence.224 In a groundless state of flight from it all, he 
is unable to act with any enthusiasm or conviction. What happens to him also does not matter to 
him. He maintains, “If I were offered all the glories of the world or all the torments of the world, 
one would move me no more than the other; I would not turn over to the other side either to 
attain or to avoid (E/O I: 37). His existential paralysis has not only made the quality of his 
experience burdensome and boring, but has led him to the point that he has no motivation to do 
anything. Without a will of his own, he has resigned to being passive to the greater forces in the 
world that have swept him up and determined his circumstances. Now, however, he is an ironic 
spectator of them, as opposed to Don Giovanni, who was absorbed in them in his enthusiastic 
participation in existence. 
 While A has developed spiritually by having surmounted his natural immediacy through 
his own activity of reflection, Anti-Climacus would claim that his idleness and apathy toward his 
life show that he still has a long way to go before he realizes his full potential as a self. A has no 
robust will of his own, and as he explains, the less will one has, the less of a self one is; without a 
will, one is not a self at all (SUD: 29). The Judge claims that there is one sense in which A does 
have a will. He says to him, “What you want to be is—fate” (E/O II: 15). This suggests that A 
has forgone the exercise of his freedom in an attempt to reconcile himself with the natural 
processes that unfold by necessity, which in his view requires an embrace of the tragic. Perhaps 
he believes that by successfully leaping into the sensuous, he would become present to himself 
again in his finitude, and would recover his long-lost joy of living. He would, at the same 
moment, have quelled his acute self-consciousness, which he longs to be free from. As 
Heidegger explains in his own thought, this quietistic movement would seem to require a weak 
application of the will at the outset, or a will to not will, so that the self can give up its resistance 
and let in sensuous energies without influencing them through its higher-order acts.225 But 
                                                
224 In an effort to determine what makes human beings want to continue to go on living at all, Williams puts forward 
the idea of "ground projects" that people take on. These provide a human being with "the motive force which 
propels him into the future, and gives him a reason for living." See "Persons, character and morality," p. 13. 
225 Following the tradition of German mysticism beginning with Meister Eckhart, Heidegger conceives of the goal of 
this act as releasement [Gelassenheit]. See Discourse on Thinking, especially pp. 59-61. Thompson argues that it is 
impossible to overcome self-consciousness by not willing, since willing is essential to self-consciousness (The 
Lonely Labyrinth, p. 97). Although I am sympathetic to the view that this strategy is self-defeating, Heidegger 
plausibly argues that there is nothing contradictory about this movement as Thompson suggests. One would will to 
surrender one's will in submission to the series of events presently unfolding, or as Heidegger might put it, the 




weaning himself from willing by surrendering to fate is not how he should use his will if he 
intends to maintain his integrity as a self and retain the possibility of defeating despair. Recall 
that, for Anti-Climacus, the self is a synthesis of freedom and necessity. By aligning himself with 
necessity and denying his freedom as an individual, A neglects a crucial facet of selfhood, and so 
does not want to be himself. If it were possible to succeed in carrying out this movement, he 
would still be disintegrated as a self.  
 Don Giovanni was similarly without a will in his sensual intoxication. Disintegrated as a 
self in a pre-reflective mode of self-consciousness, he was in thrall to the temporal, without the 
ability to even know this. By resigning himself to fate, A seems to want to regress to a unitive 
state much like that of Don Giovanni in an effort to recapture the splendor of immediacy, and 
recover his natural spontaneity. This strategy, however, is incoherent. In despair over himself 
and his separation from the earthly in toto, A might try to throw himself into sensual living in 
order to rid himself of self-consciousness and rekindle the enjoyment of previous times. But as 
spirit, this infantile way of life is exactly what he had originally flown from in becoming more 
self-conscious. Even if he were to succeed in returning to an illusory state of security and 
comfort by assimilating back into the public mode, he would not be happy in it for very long. He 
would soon remove himself from it again through ironic reflection, where he would turn back in 
upon himself. He is therefore in dire straits in despairing over himself and over the earthly, and 
must figure out a different way to combat his despair than inclining too heavily toward one pole 
rather than the other. Additionally, short of a lobotomy or mental disease, the knowledge of 
existence he has obtained in his infinitude cannot be forgotten. It would also seem difficult, if not 
impossible, to turn off reflection at will. Rather than move backward in a nostalgic groping for 
an idyllic past, he must push forward in his pursuit of unity by willing to be himself. This 
outlook toward the future would put him into the ethical or religious stage, where he would gain 
a deepened appreciation of his agency and responsibility as an individual in possession of 
himself. As we will see in the next chapter, an affirmation of his individuality will first take him 
further into despair, which is something that the hedonist A does not want to risk. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
annihilation of the will would come upon the individual as a gift from beyond, rather than as his own doing. At this 




4.2.4 Absurdity and The Persistence of Desire in the Reflective Esthete 
 Although A condemns all of existence, and is listless when it comes to engaging in 
worldly activities or seeking earthly satisfactions, as an inverted vitalist, desire does not entirely 
go away for him. He admits, “my eyes are surfeited and bored with everything, and yet I hunger” 
(E/O I: 25). He feels that something essential is absent in his life, but he cannot discern what it is 
that he needs to complete him. This is not a desire for any object that the world or society can 
offer him, since his desires for finite goods are either satisfied or easily satisfied. It seems, then, 
that it could not have originated within the psyche-body unity, or the lower nature of the human 
being, at all. It is rather a non-naturalistic desire stemming from the individualized élan that was 
evoked in the face of earthly difficulty, when the infinite component of the self began to drive a 
wedge between himself and the surrounding world. As an inverted vitalist, he has what C.S. 
Lewis would describe as an "inconsolable longing" for something transcendent and ineffable, 
which corresponds with the eternal aspect of his being.226 The Germans refer to this feeling as 
Sehnsucht, but I will refer to it as spiritual longing. Those who are ignorant of being selves are 
likely unaware of this infinite longing in their cravings for sex, money, success, material things, 
acclaim, and so on, but it emerges in those whose higher, spiritual nature has awakened.  
 One might attempt to address spiritual longing by throwing oneself into sensuality, with 
nostalgic yearnings for an earlier, happier period of life, but as we have seen, this would be a 
mistake. This desire cannot be fulfilled by any finite good in the temporal, and so must be 
directed toward an infinite good. In Repetition, Kierkegaard treats spiritual longing in the 
reflective esthete in great detail under the pseudonym of Constantin Constantius. Constantius 
tells a story of a young man who falls deeply in love with a woman, but whose love only lasts for 
a few days before his feelings for her dissipate. While he is initially overcome by the glory of the 
beloved, who captures his imagination and fills him with awe, his bliss cannot be sustained for 
long. Once it passes, he feels empty, and even annoyed by the woman. He can only begin to 
approach this feeling again by recollecting the love he had for her, but merely imagining it pales 
in comparison to the real thing, and so ends up making him generally unhappy. In the wake of 
this loss, the young man experiences “a melancholy longing in which he not so much drew near 
to the beloved as withdrew from her" (REP: 137). He flees into the sphere of ideality to reflect 
on his former love for her, while confusedly trying to maintain the relationship in everyday life 
                                                




despite the fallout from the feelings that are now lost. As Constantius explains, in truth, it was 
never the woman he loved: "she was merely the visible form, while his thoughts, his soul, sought 
something else that he attributed to her" (REP: 141). Constantius refers to this "something else" 
that transfigured the woman as "the idea" which his love had set in motion in him (REP: 140). 
His point seems to be that the woman had momentarily embodied the idea of infinite love or 
goodness, and that this brief experience of its realization had brought out the romantic in him. He 
longs for the return of the wholeness and unity he felt in that moment (what Constantius calls a 
repetition), when the reality of the woman and the idea of love in its infinitude coincided. Now, 
however, he is divided against himself. He perceives the woman and all of reality as imperfect, 
while chasing the perfection of the idea through his poetic imagination, as it beckons to him from 
on high.227  
 Both the young man and A are reflective esthetes, but A's case would seem to be different 
in some ways, since he does not cite a failed love affair as the reason for his misery. Perhaps he 
thinks he is close to attaining this highest good that the young man longs for when beauty dawns 
on him in its profundity, whether it is through the observance of art or an encounter with the 
sublime in a natural setting. This might offer him a taste of heaven for the moment, but his 
persistent malaise would seem to suggest that it does not provide the lasting fulfillment and 
harmony he seeks.228 As we will see in the following chapters, individuals at a higher stage of 
personal development aim to address spiritual longing by pursuing the ethical or religious way of 
life. For Anti-Climacus (and also for Lewis), only Christianity offers a convincing response to 
the essential needs of the human spirit by promising to unite the individual with God, and by this 
means, to eternally heal the division between the infinite and finite components in the self. 
                                                
227 Continuing a theme that lurks throughout Kierkegaard's works, Constantius considers the notion that God is a 
seducer. As he understands it, God used the girl to stimulate the young man's spirituality and evoke in him an idea of 
infinite goodness. "From a religious point of view, one could say it is as if God used this girl to capture him, and yet 
the girl herself is not an actuality but is like the laced-wing fly with which a hook is baited" (REP: 185). In a 
religious sense, the young girl is a "ladder rung by which he had climbed" on his inward journey toward God (REP: 
138).  
228 A rhapsodic expression from his Journals provides evidence that Kierkegaard might have experienced what it is 
like to have this longing fulfilled for a brief period of time, or at least to the limited extent that earthly life permits of 
this. “There is an indescribable joy that glows all through us just as inexplicably as the apostle’s exclamation breaks 
forth for no apparent reason: “Rejoice, and again I say, Rejoice.”—Not a joy over this or that, but the soul’s full 
outcry “with tongue and mouth and from the bottom of the heart”: “I rejoice with my joy, by, in, with, about, over, 
for, and with my joy”—a heavenly refrain which, as it were, suddenly interrupts our other singing, a joy which cools 
and refreshes like a breath of air, a breeze from the trade winds which blow across the plains of Mamre to the 




 A's despair can be seen to stem from the incompatibility between some of his basic needs 
as a human being with a spiritual aspect, and the barren conditions of existence, which can fulfill 
hardly any of them.229 He yearns for freedom and enriched possibility, but can only believe in 
fate. He desperately seeks understanding, meaning, and purpose, but things have come to seem 
meaninglessness. He wants to experience joy, but pleasures now feel dull to him, and he cannot 
help but be bored by everything. He desires security and certainty, but senses danger and 
volatility in existence. These are all indications that he is alienated from the world, and by 
extension, himself as a finite being related to others in it. Reflecting on the experience of these 
effects of alienation, as he does in "Diapsalmata," only exacerbates his problems, creating a 
devastating feedback loop of despair. The state of alienation that reflection has sent him spiraling 
into implies that he is disintegrated and imbalanced as a self. In his spiritual longing, he cannot 
attain harmony with an imperfect world he is forced to reside in, and which does not align with 
his lofty ideals. 
 This conflict at work in A's life reveals something absurd or even paradoxical about his 
situation. Camus explores this absurdity in great depth in his writings on the human condition. 
Interpreting Camus' thought, Sagi explains: 
  
On the surface, the absurd resembles alienation, but this is not so. The experience of alienation focuses on 
the process of detachment and separation. By contrast, the experience of the absurd assumes that unity and 
alienation coexist, and the sole legitimate meaning of unity is the constant yearning for it.230  
 
Anti-Climacus could explain the absurd through his view on the paradoxical nature of the self, or 
spirit, which demands both separation and union in its existence. We have seen that A's life is 
marked by the widening gap between the infinite and finite aspects of himself, as spirit liberates 
thought, imagination, and the will from the confinement of the earthly through its reflective acts 
of negation. Yet his life consists in a unity insofar as spirit consists of the relation between the 
infinite and finite. Unfortunately, this relation is not the untroubled unity that he desires, since 
existence refuses to accommodate him by satisfying his longings as a self that has something 
                                                
229 Throughout his works, Kierkegaard suggests that this incongruence between the individual and the world is 
despair, but Camus refers to it as the absurd. Camus defines it as "that divorce between the mind that desires and the 
world that disappoints, my nostalgia for unity, this fragmented universe and the contradiction that binds them 
together" (The Myth of Sisyphus, p. 49).  




infinite and eternal within it. Try as he might, he cannot hope to acclimate to existence by 
ridding himself of his finite aspect, as was clear in the failures of stoical detachment to resolve 
the alienation he experiences. Despite being able to view his life and existence from a 
universalized perspective, his embodiment and psychical life as a particular individual are 
conditions that he finds himself ineluctably attached to. He therefore realizes that he must 
overcome the alienation wrought by spirit not by indulging the negativity of contemplation, but 
by using his freedom in a positive way in taking an active and participative role in existence. In 
the next section, I explore the methods that A uses to forge this connection with existence in 
practice. 
  
4.3 Coping with Despair: The Decadent Life-view of the Reflective Aesthete 
 I have argued that for Anti-Climacus, the meditations in "Diapsalmata" reveal a man in 
despair, but this is not to suggest that A wallows in despair without taking measures to mitigate it 
or even overcome it. As an esthete, A seeks redemption from his misery not in ethical or 
religious action, but by taking up the life of the mind in pursuit of great art. A does not just 
indulge in art as a hobby, as he does throughout his collection of essays, but more importantly, 
he attempts to conceive of his life as art to glorify it and make it interesting again. His approach 
bears much in common with that of the Romantics, who tended to treat all of reality poetically.231 
Through ironic detachment, he turns his life into poetry by engaging in flights of imagination 
that take him out of the real world and into an ideal world of his own devising. He explains: 
 
My sorrow is my baronial castle, which lies like an eagle’s nest high up on the mountain peak among the 
clouds. No one can take it by storm. From it I swoop down into actuality and snatch my prey, but I do not 
stay down there. I bring my booty home, and this booty is a picture I weave into the tapestries at my castle. 
Then I live as one already dead. Everything I have experienced I immerse in a baptism of oblivion unto an 
eternity of recollection. Everything temporal and fortuitous is forgotten and blotted out. (E/O I: 42) 
                                                
231 A's poetic reconstruction of reality draws heavily from the thought of Schlegel, a leading figure in the Romantic 
movement and a proponent of irony. Kierkegaard treats this topic in The Concept of Irony. In analyzing Schlegel's 
Lucinde within the context of that work, Soderquist explains that Schlegel "uses the term “irony” to describe the 
consciousness of an individual who has discovered the spiritual key to personal integration. That is, he suggests that 
a consciousness of “irony” brings about a kind of synthesis between irreconcilable opposites: the ironist lives in the 
finite world, where no finite human purpose seems ultimately fulfilling, while at the same time keeping alive an 
awareness of the infinite, a sphere that promises wholeness if one can access it via a sort of mystical union. Irony 
accompanies the “religious” consciousness that has “seen the inner light,” to so speak. Schlegel seems to imply that 
this divine inner light assures the individual that his purposes and goals are valuable in and of themselves” (The 





Trapped in a "buried life" of reflection, A chooses to inhabit a lonely realm of fantasy rather than 
to stay grounded in the world and suffer the mundane. The latter is what he would have to do in 
living in accord with the norms and practices of society and its institutions, or the strictures of 
morality in the public mode. In suspending considerations of these external sources of order and 
meaning for the sake of pleasure and beauty, he interprets the world entirely from his subjective 
vantage point and invents his own meaning, without caring about whether he sees things as they 
in fact are.232 To facilitate the creative process, he has abandoned objective standards of truth, 
including the notion that there is a reality independent of him that he should appreciate without 
distorting things through his own preferences and biases.  
 In defense of worldly engagement, the Judge criticizes this way of life. He tells A:   
  
You continually hover above yourself, but the higher atmosphere, the more refined sublimate, into which 
you are vaporized, is the nothing of despair, and you see down below you a multiplicity of subjects, 
insights, studies, and observations that nevertheless have no reality for you but which you very whimsically 
utilize and combine to decorate as tastefully as you can the sumptuous intellectual palace in which you 
occasionally reside. (E/O II: 198) 
 
A understands himself in an altogether abstract way, which allows him to render reality all the 
more ideally to himself through his imaginative constructions. The Judge, however, believes that 
this conception rests on a fundamental misunderstanding, and that the self so considered is a 
mirage. Rather than seeing himself correctly as bound to civilization and its institutions, A sees 
himself as a spectator torn apart from them. This sends him soaring beyond the social substance 
and into an intellectual space that can best be described as one of nothingness. As a result of the 
freedom he has achieved through ironic negation, his life is without substance, and he perceives 
the world as chaotic and broken. The Judge accuses A of being "youthfully intoxicated" in the 
"infinity that is your element" by privileging the boundless possibilities of idealizing over the 
settled conditions of his actual existence, especially as this concerns practical matters such as his 
relationships with other people (E/O II: 83). A has therefore alienated himself from the world, 
and also from himself as a human being situated in it, by converting it to theater based on his 
                                                
232 The Judge puts this by telling A, “You scorn everything that is established by divine or human laws, and in order 




desires. Reality has value for him only insofar as it supplies him with the material content, or as 
he puts it, the "occasion" for the free play of his imagination (E/O I: 233). After touching down 
in the broken world of finitude to acquire fragments for his stage production, he flees to the 
rarified atmosphere of the infinite, where he can impose whatever meaning and significance he 
wishes upon them, like some sort of god, before repeating the process. According to the Judge, in 
being "finished with the world" and everything finite in this way, he has brought himself to 
despair with his lopsided oscillating (E/O II: 202). Anti-Climacus, of course, has a very similar 
view. In despairing over the earthly in toto, he can also be said to be in infinitude's despair due to 
overemphasizing the infinite component of his self, although he remains in dialogue with the 
finite, which is positively transfigured under his poetic reconstruction. 
 This strategy of relieving despair does not cohere with other aspects of A's life-view. He 
believes that the course of his life is necessitated and that freedom is illusory, but at the same 
time, he lingers in possibility, choosing how to imaginatively construct the world around him. As 
a fatalist convinced of his impotence, he lacks possibility, but as an orchestrator of his existence, 
he has it in excess. His prodigious imagination has effectively liberated him from the constraints 
of his finite existence, and so has made him a consummate freethinker. This tension in his views 
points to instability within the self, which Anti-Climacus would take as a sure sign of despair. 
 We have seen that A finds it difficult to act in the external world, but as an inverted 
vitalist, there is lively reflective activity occurring through his imagination. Therefore, he acts, 
but this action is confined to his internal environment, and does not bear external results. This 
lifestyle would seem to require autonomy and a measure of will, but Anti-Climacus would not 
agree that A is strong-willed, or that he has actualized himself to any significant extent. In his 
view, that would require steadfast existential commitment to things that an ironist like A, in his 
destructive idealizing, would refuse to accept as binding or authoritative. Instead, A intends to 
ceaselessly reinvent himself in an arbitrary way. For instance, he cautions against friendship or 
marriage, for then an individual "has lost his freedom and cannot order his riding boots when he 
wishes, cannot knock about according to whim" (E/O I: 297). As Rudd points out, while A has 
begun to realize his freedom by detaching himself from all ideals, principles, and states of 
affairs, he does not utilize this capacity to shape himself through the will much at all. "He is 




definite)."233 Rudd explains that one might object that he commits to the principle of non-
commitment, or that his ground project is to have no ground project, but this is self-
contradictory, and so leads him further out of balance.234 This volatile state of indeterminacy and 
insubstantiality is further evidence that A has succumbed to the nothingness of despair.  
 By taking up this project, Kierkegaard argues that an ironist like A desires “the subjective 
freedom which at every moment has in its power the possibility of a beginning," and which is 
"not inconvenienced by previous relationships. There is something seductive about beginnings, 
because the subject is again free, and it is this pleasure the ironist longs for. In such moments, 
actuality loses its validity for him; he is free, above it" (CI: 253). It is not an ending or future 
goal that A seeks in his spiritual longing, or even real and lasting meaning, but a glorious 
beginning, before he was encumbered by the belief structures, values, and practices that society 
has put in place. It is therefore a desire to be free of his finite self. In this primordial moment, he 
would not even be saddled with an identity, which had been shaped under their influence. He 
thinks that if he could recollect this infinite beginning in a state of freedom, he would be at the 
helm of a world that was all his to capitalize on. This state of freedom would be much like the 
one Don Giovanni experienced, but in the opposite direction, since Don Giovanni was free of 
being an infinite self. As Soderquist puts it in his reading of Schlegel, "this spiritual longing for 
the infinite sparks artistic creativity: as the ironist cultivates and expresses a mystical union with 
the infinite, finitude itself appears to be transformed. And by virtue of this divine creative light 
which changes the individual and his world, the individual “self” emerges as a whole."235  
 For Anti-Climacus, who posits an infinite qualitative distinction between God and the 
human being, this purported "mystical union" with the God within is nothing more than the 
zenith of self-absorption. Rather than becoming divine, the self has become little more than a 
mirage. On this point, Kierkegaard states "as actuality has lost its validity for the ironic subject, 
he himself has to a certain degree become unactual” (CI: 259). The Judge and Anti-Climacus 
believe that until the self becomes concrete and actual by humbling itself under its limitations in 
the finite, it is in despair. From the Christian standpoint, however, Anti-Climacus does not think 
that the Judge's ethical commitment or A's esthetic toying with life suffice in coping with the 
difficulty of integrating the opposing constituents of the self, or bringing it to its fullest 
                                                
233 Rudd, Self, Value, & Narrative, p. 71.  
234 Ibid., p. 74.  




realization. He believes that if an individual wants any hope of defeating despair, he must expect 
that his spiritual longing will be fulfilled in the future rather than in the immediate present, from 
which he is irremediably cut off in reflection. 
 By living from the constructions of his imagination in an ironic pose, A intends to fuse 
(or confuse) reality and ideality, the finite and the infinite, and freedom and necessity, in an 
attempt to restore joy and meaning in his life through his own powers. The problem is that this 
attempt at an esthetic reconciliation with existence is a groundless project that is not guided by 
any firm principles or commitments, other than the pursuit of beautiful or interesting subjects for 
observation. Because perceiving or imagining things that have these qualities depends largely on 
passing moods or contingent circumstances, Anti-Climacus would claim this is too fickle and 
unreliable of a criterion to arrange one's life by. It cannot give him the stability and consistency 
he ultimately needs as a self with something eternal in it, and so would not yield lasting harmony 
in his life. 
 
4.3.1 Techniques For Producing Pleasure and Reducing Suffering 
A's retreat into ideality provides him with ample opportunities for amusement, but it 
makes him almost totally inaccessible to others. In inclosing reserve, he can no longer enjoy real 
and lasting relationships with other people in the present, including friendships and romances.236 
Like the young man in Repetition, he would rather recollect such relationships than face them in 
reality: 
 
For me nothing is more dangerous than to recollect. As soon as I have recollected a life relationship, that 
relationship has ceased to exist. It is said that absence makes the heart grow fonder. That is very true, but it 
becomes fonder in a purely poetic way. To live in recollection is the most perfect life imaginable; 
recollection is more richly satisfying than all actuality, and it has a security that no actuality possesses. A 
recollected life relationship has already passed into eternity and has no temporal interest anymore. (E/O I: 
32) 
 
A usually gets more pleasure from his imaginative excursions than he does from interactions with 
other people, since he is able to view them in an idealized way. A recollected love affair, for 
instance, can conjure up a rich assortment of moods and emotions in a person, depending on how 
                                                





he remembers it. Of course, he is also given considerable leeway to recall the relationship as he 
sees fit, perhaps by neglecting its imperfections and augmenting its desirable or poetic aspects. In 
shaping and refashioning material through the imagination, the recollecting individual wields a 
great deal of creative control over his experience. He has room to consider countless 
possibilities, and is able to exercise a freedom in the sphere of thought that is nearly total. The 
freedom and creative control that A desires is otherwise harder to come by with respect to the 
limits imposed by one's finite condition. While the power of the imagination is a great good for 
human beings, the Judge and Anti-Climacus believe that it is misused when dissociated too much 
from actual life on such a regular basis, as it is in the case of A.  
 In addition, A values recollection because of the security it provides him. Because 
recollection only depends on reality as the occasion for its activity, it is less impacted by 
temporal uncertainty, which A has become acutely aware of. It can also protect against loss or 
misfortune, which he recognizes are uncomfortably close at hand for every human being. For 
example, a lover to whom he has grown deeply attached might leave or betray him. To avoid 
future misery, he can abandon such a relationship early and recollect it, fantasizing about what 
was and could have been. Recollection is also a capacity that he has under his own power. 
Because it is an activity internal to him, only in extreme circumstances could it be taken away 
from him, and it could not be taken away like an earthly good. Thus, recollection empowers him, 
and makes him independent of conditions in the surrounding world. Through acts of recollection 
and the imagination, A can conceive of his life as a work of art without having to feel pinned 
down by responsibilities toward others. Relationships constrain and disappoint, but in his view, 
recollection is a reliable and liberating companion on life's journey. 
 Although A is able to spend much of his life in imagination and recollection, he must also 
manage life in the world to the best of his advantage. To do this, he implements additional 
creative strategies to attenuate the boredom that factors in his despair so that he can regain 
pleasure in the mundane. In “Rotation of Crops,” he recommends a method for defeating the 
monotony of everyday affairs and adding some variety to life. This method, he writes, “does not 
consist in changing the soil but, like proper crop rotation, consists in changing the method of 
cultivation and the kinds of crops” (E/O I: 292). As a fatalist who understands himself to have 
caught sight of existence as a whole, A believes that human beings do not have much of an 




which they approach the multiplicity of existing things, or “crops.” To make life feel new again, 
he suggests constantly changing one's attitudes and behaviors, along with the particular situations 
or things one takes an interest in. As he puts it, “The eye with which one sees actuality must be 
changed continually” (E/O I: 300).  
 A believes that there are a few tricks to carrying out this method successfully. First, one 
has to master the art of forgetting and recollecting in order to “cultivate” the field of existence 
effectively (E/O I: 292-295). While people typically want to forget only painful or unpleasant 
things, in his view, we should become skilled in forgetting even pleasurable and meaningful 
things, as these tend to quickly lose their luster the more a person gets used to them. For 
example, a song one likes might start to wear thin after the tenth listen, or a job one originally 
enjoys might get old after a couple of years. For this reason, pleasures should be limited ahead of 
time so that similar pleasures can be enjoyed at a later date. They can always be recollected, or 
experienced anew after being forgotten about. Recollection and forgetting should therefore be 
used in a way that keeps life as fresh and exciting as possible in order for boredom––and 
consequently despair––to be avoided.  
 Second, one must also be able to “continually vary oneself” by being in control of one’s 
moods (E/O I: 298). He concedes that moods cannot be controlled in the sense that they can be 
called up on command, but the individual can be sensitive to how they are operating within him, 
and be able to predict what moods to expect in the future based on past and present 
circumstances. He should not remain with a single object or task for very long, but make changes 
to what he is doing based on the moods that arise. For example, if he finds a project or 
relationship he is involved with getting dull, or if he thinks for any moment that he has 
maximized the pleasure he could get from it, then this would be a reason to pursue something 
else. He might also use his skill of forgetting to come back to it later with a rejuvenated mindset. 
In this way, one can live artistically by orchestrating one's experience through the succession of 
moods.  
 Because moods are highly variable, the individual who surrenders to their progression in 
this way will be capricious and unprincipled, and thereby will be more likely to have a fondness 
for the random in existence. A explains:  
 




middle of a play; one reads the third section of a book…One enjoys something totally accidental; one 
considers the whole of existence from this standpoint; one lets its reality run aground on this. (E/O I: 299) 
 
A use this method as a way of integrating his freedom with the imposition of reality, just as he 
tries to establish this harmony by wanting to be fate. Existence appears to him as a chaotic and 
contingent phenomenon that is constantly in flux and without reason, and so he follows suit by 
allowing himself to be changed continuously through mood, along with changing the attitude 
through which he approaches things in existence. In acclimating to his concrete existence while 
preserving his poetic license, he ventures the paradoxical feat of mastering life without being 
master at all. He states, “The accidental outside a person corresponds to the arbitrariness within 
him. Therefore he always ought to have his eyes open for the accidental, always ought to be 
expeditus [ready] if something should come up” (E/O I: 300). In seeking enjoyment in trivialities 
and nonsense, A rejects any notion of an enduring self that retains a coherent set of beliefs, 
attitudes, behaviors, and values over the course of time. In his view, if he were to have a stable 
character, it would be the most boring, predictable thing imaginable, and certainly something to 
despair over. He therefore creates excitement in his life by playing at being different selves 
depending on the situation, and allowing his identity to shift over time.  
 Constantius alludes to a state similar to this in describing the formation of identity as it 
occurs in young people. He explains that initially, the youth is not conscious of having a 
determinate identity. In the process of discovering himself, he looks to external conditions like 
family and the community to assist him in establishing one, while also drawing on the power of 
his imagination for the task. Constantius uses the theater as a metaphor in explaining how the 
youth might go about this in ordinary life upon observing the conduct of others. At the theater, 
he might take pleasure in imagining himself in the many different roles that the characters on 
stage play:  
 
In such a self-vision of the imagination, the individual is not an actual shape but a shadow, or, more 
correctly, the actual shape is invisibly present and therefore is not satisfied to cast one shadow, but the 
individual has a variety of shadows, all of which resemble him and which momentarily have equal status as 
being himself. As yet the personality is not discerned, and its energy is betokened only in the passion of 






In this passage, Constantius rejects the anti-essentialism of later existentialists like Sartre, who 
claim that the self has no profound identity.237 With the individual having an "actual shape" that 
persists invisibly over the duration of his experience, Constantius suggests that the self has an 
essence as a "naked abstract self." In the first chapter, I explained that Kierkegaard believes this 
essence is analogous to the base line of a drawing that fundamentally shapes it without being 
visibly present in it.238 At this early stage of development, however, the youth does not know 
who he essentially is as a person. He does not understand what the "base line" of personality 
requires of him, and so does not know how to realize this essence in existence. To determine this, 
he must experiment with different identities or characters in order to find the one that best suits 
him through trial and error. The child might do this when he is at play, or when he models 
himself on others and follows what they do. Constantius explains that figuring out who one is by 
experimenting with different "shadows" is a healthy part of growing up and coming to know 
oneself in truth, but "it is tragic or comic if the individual makes the mistake of living out his life 
in it" (REP: 155). In his ironic posturing, A makes precisely this move, negating any sense of 
having a stable identity so that he can experience the pleasure of starting fresh at any moment. 
His arbitrary toying with his identity sows discord between the infinite and finite aspects of the 
self by exaggerating its infinite aspect, and so contributes to inner restlessness. His failure to 
settle upon a determinate identity and employ it consistently in existence is therefore a sign of 
despair and a lack of maturity as a self.  
 It might be asked whether all reflective esthetes will necessarily use all of the 
aforementioned techniques in order to combat despair, or whether one must have the same 
qualities as A does to live under this category. There is no reason to think that this is the case. A 
and the young man of Repetition each portray one way in which the reflective esthete might live, 
just as Don Giovanni comically portrayed one way in which the immediate esthete might live. As 
Eremita explains, a single, coherent view of the esthetic way of life cannot be presented (E/O I: 
13). It is difficult to account for all of the factors that constitute both forms of this lifestyle, 
although I have attempted to delineate their general features. One might recognize many of these 
same qualities in oneself, or even in the modern age at large, as society has become transformed 
through digital technology and its capacity to render reality in an idealized way. The essential 
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feature of the reflective aesthete is his attempt to retain interest in life and make it agreeable to 
him again despite being plagued with dismal thoughts about its nature. To do this, it is 
conceivable that he might turn to alcohol or drugs to subdue his reflection instead of something 
like recollection, or he might lose himself in busy work, hobbies, electronic devices, or projects 
that bear little relation to art, without thereby succumbing to the crowd mentality. Kierkegaard is 
not interested in these unexceptional cases, since they concern individuals who do little to 
explore their spirituality to any great depth. Of course, Kierkegaard contends that even the most 
profound esthetic lifestyle would do poorly in fulfilling one's spiritual longing, since it fails to 
address the eternal component in the human being effectively. 
 
4.3.2 A Portrait of Spiritual Longing in The Reflective Esthete  
 A’s papers conclude with “The Seducer’s Diary,” a darkly humorous and perverse work 
that depicts a reflective esthete who masterfully uses these techniques for procuring pleasure. 
The diary chronicles the seduction of an innocent and unsuspecting young girl by a shadowy 
figure named Johannes. In the preface to the diary, A purports to be only its editor, while 
claiming that Johannes is the author.239 On the surface, Johannes appears to others as a human 
being like the rest, but few have any idea of his duplicity. As a voyager of ideas and a poet of his 
own existence, he is, as A puts it, “infinite reflectedness into himself” (E/O I: 307). In a passage 
that returns to the dualist theme permeating Kierkegaard’s thought, A writes: 
 
Behind the world in which we live, far in the background, lies another world, and the two have about the 
same relation to each other as do the stage proper and the stage one sometimes sees behind it in the 
theater. Through a hanging of fine gauze, one sees, as it were, a world of gauze, lighter, more ethereal, 
with a quality different from that of the actual world. Many people who appear physically in the actual 
world are not at home in it but are at home in that other world. (E/O I: 306)  
 
Although the actual world provides Johannes with finite content, whether it is a young girl, a 
public event, or the like, he uses this as merely an occasion for his idealizing. To use an 
expression from "Rotation of Crops," out of the abundance of his imagination, he is able to 
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“fertilize actuality” in order to enhance its original presentation and perceive it in a way that suits 
his interest at any given moment (E/O I: 305). In weaving his tapestry from these fragments of 
life, Johannes imposes the forms and meanings on things that he desires, but this capricious 
playing with possibility robs the world of the form and meaning it already has, and so deprives it 
of its solidity and substance. Finite conditions, as ordinary people in the public mode understand 
them and relate to them, no longer have significance for him. This tactic adds excitement to 
existence by endowing it with lightness and mystique, and by allowing him artistic control over 
it. As a result of this, however, he is increasingly unable to distinguish between reality and 
ideality, or fact and fiction. He can no longer perceive things as they actually are, but rather how 
he has artistically envisioned them to be. The world has become his canvas that he can embellish 
as he wishes, and life little else but a dream. 
 Johannes epitomizes the reflective aesthete in his pursuit of pleasure, just as Don 
Giovanni epitomized the immediate aesthete. While Don Giovanni desired all women by 
impulse, Johannes, in his deliberations, carefully discriminates between them, and is only 
interested in seducing one at a time. Eremita explains that, unlike Don Giovanni, the reflective 
seducer is less gratified by the satisfaction of sensual desire than he is by the process of 
seduction. Using his imagination to scheme the seduction and create a character for himself 
relieves him of the boredom of everyday life, and provides the real enjoyment of the affair.240 
Rather than stay with the woman once he has completed the seduction, he quickly abandons her 
and pursues someone new, in keeping with the rotation method discussed by A. Don Giovanni 
and Johannes are therefore stuck in the same habit of manipulating more and more women to 
satisfy their desires, without finding lasting rest or fulfillment.  
 The victim in the diary is a seventeen-year-old girl named Cordelia. Johannes first 
catches a glimpse of her on a stroll through Copenhagen, where he spends his days surveying 
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young women in action as he lurks in the distance. He does not first speak of her as an embodied 
human being, but as an image that captivates him as it passes through his mind. After a dramatic 
period of recollecting the sighting, he eventually finds out who she is, and ingratiates himself 
into her life by keeping company with her aunt, who cares for her. While he desires her 
erotically, the consummation of the relationship pales in comparison to the thrill he gets from 
plotting the seduction and observing her conduct from afar, and so he postpones the tryst for as 
long as possible. In an effort to conceal his intentions, he pretends to hardly notice her in the 
early stages of his visitations with her aunt, and even tries to set her up with a diffident young 
man who has fallen in love with her. This might seem risky, but he does it only to draw her 
closer to himself, which occurs through her being repelled by the young man. Johannes claims to 
“revel in possibility” as the relationship unfolds (E/O: 331). He delights in witnessing how each 
scenario he has thoughtfully arranged plays out, and also in ruminating on how best to achieve 
the desired outcomes in the future. One gets the impression that he prefers to recollect the affair 
and his schemes through the entries in his diary than to experience it in reality.  
 Johannes claims that his main goal is to slowly bring her to maturity by elevating her into 
a state of freedom (E/O I: 360). At the time of their meeting, Cordelia is still too naive to be 
properly reflective. As a young, innocent girl that seems to occupy what I have referred to as the 
public mode, she has little feeling for the erotic, and is not esthetically preoccupied with 
existence in the way Johannes is. By educating her about these matters, however, Johannes aims 
to develop her so that she will be liberated from the actual world and carried upward into the 
infinite realm of her imagination. He writes: 
 
What she must learn is to make all the motions of infinity, to swing herself, to rock herself in moods, to 
confuse poetry and actuality, truth and fiction, to frolic in infinity. Then when she is familiar with this 
tumult, I shall add the erotic; then she will be what I want and desire. (E/O I: 392) 
 
The ultimate pleasure of the relationship, Johannes claims, will be when she gives herself up to 
him freely in erotic passion. But for her to do this, she has to first approach his level of reflection 
through an inner transformation that he will assist her in making. As a maieutic figure, Johannes 
initiates this development by getting her to imitate his thoughts and actions. He convinces her 
that marital engagements are boring, for instance, and pulls back from the relationship so that she 




experience her freedom, he sets her up to make the fall into the erotic. After he has accomplished 
his task, he leaves her, for she ceases to be interesting to him. He can then devote his intellectual 
energies to a new young girl in order to stave off boredom and imbue his life with esthetic 
significance.  
Johannes does not describe his life as one of sorrow or despair, which might lead one to 
question whether a reflective aesthete could avoid despair entirely and find enjoyment in this sort 
of lifestyle. Under the views of Anti-Climacus and the Judge, however, a profound despair 
dwells within him, which he covers over with his esthetic ventures. In living out of the 
possibilities of his imagination, he has effectively severed himself from relations to the actual 
world and other people, and is more like a specter than a human being of flesh and blood. 
Genuine communication with others has become exceedingly difficult, since he is so inwardly 
focused on his relation to himself. We saw that inclosing reserve is a state of consciousness that 
begins to emerge in individuals in despair over something earthly, but for individuals like 
Johannes who have lost the earthly in toto, it is at risk of intensifying to become what 
Haufniensis calls “the demonic" (CA: 123). This is not the sensuous demonic that is capable of 
possessing the finite pole of the self, but rather the spiritual demonic, which endangers the self 
when it leans too heavily toward its infinite pole. He writes: “The demonic…wants to close itself 
off. This, however, is and remains an impossibility. It always retains a relation, and even when 
this has apparently disappeared altogether, it is nevertheless there” (CA: 123). As Haufniensis 
describes it, the demonic individual, in his isolation, shuns contact and communication with 
others, along with any help that they might provide. Yet for Anti-Climacus, Johannes' effort to 
become completely self-sufficient in inclosing reserve must inevitably fail, since in being 
constituted as a synthesis of the eternal and temporal, infinite and finite, and possibility and 
necessity, he exists essentially in relation to God, the world, and other human beings. He cannot 
isolate one relational aspect of the self––the self-relation––and remove the other aspects, for then 
he would cease to be a human being.241 Because living out of the imagination demands a 
                                                
241 Given that the self is essentially relational for Anti-Climacus, there is a danger in misinterpreting his discussion 
of an “infinite” and “abstract” self. He is not suggesting that an authentic spiritual existence requires that an 
individual turn away from others and retreat entirely into himself in some sort of mystical probing for the divine 
within the self. Only the devil (or perhaps a demonic figure like Johannes) could be said to inhabit this lonely 
sphere, for “the devil is sheer spirit and hence unqualified consciousness and transparency” (SUD: 42). While the 
self can conceive of itself ideally as a “naked abstract self,” it must achieve its concretion and become actual 




lopsided emphasis on his relation to himself and his infinitude, with an intensified self-
consciousness, he is in despair.  
 Although he still gets pleasure while being closed up within himself in esthetic reflection, 
his relationship with Cordelia suggests that deep down, he yearns for interaction with other 
persons, and does not want to be alone. His desires for both closure and openness with others are 
a further sign of his internal conflict. He does not desire Cordelia physically so much as he 
desires to develop her inwardly as a person. As he puts it, “she should not fall like a heavy body 
but as mind should gravitate toward mind” (E/O I: 360). In his hopelessly reflective state, the 
erotic is sublimated in such a way that it becomes a desire for non-physical communion with 
another person. In foregrounding the relationship between the individual and God throughout his 
work, and with his penchant for the poetic "idea" that inspires a romantic like the young man, 
Kierkegaard rarely considers the otherness of other human beings. I claim, however, that this 
desire for genuine contact with another person evinces the spiritual longing of Johannes, which 
he does not quite know how to address properly. This is not a naturalistic desire for finite goods 
of the flesh, or even for pleasure of the usual sort, but is a desire for something that cannot be 
given phenomenally in the world of experience. Only the reflective individual, in transcending 
the world and his concretion as a human being through his infinitude, can have this spiritual 
longing for contact with other people who are selves like him. Transcendence gradually builds 
within him as he becomes more self-conscious (particularly in the event of loss or affliction), and 
the basic desires and appetites of his natural spontaneity decline. With the pain and despair of 
spiritual transcendence comes a desire to transcend himself in the fullest sense, so that he could 
break free from inclosing reserve once and for all. While he achieves partial transcendence 
through his flights into the imaginary, this is not the complete transcendence that he longs for, 
and which I claim he unconsciously pursues through his maieutic relationship with Cordelia.  
 Because Johannes encounters Cordelia on esthetic terms rather than ethical or religious 
terms, the relationship just leaves him more enclosed and self-absorbed. He cannot get through to 
her on a personal level like he wants to, since in his artistic ploy, he refuses to disclose to her 
who he really is through his outward features and expressions. As an ironist, his communication 
with her does not reveal his true thoughts or feelings, but continually conceals them. Harries is 
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right to point out that for the demonic Johannes, “dialogue inevitably degenerates into a 
monologue.”242 The faithless Johannes is ultimately forced to concede the unreality of Cordelia 
in a discussion of woman as “being-for-other” near the end of the diary, undoubtedly inspired by 
Hegel and his speculative attempt to reduce the other to the same (E/O I: 430). “She does not 
subsist out of herself,” he writes, but only in relation to man (E/O I: 431). In the final moment, 
he considers not just Cordelia, but all of nature to exist solely for him and his own esthetic 
enjoyment. In his effort to transcend the world and himself as a human being in it, he has ended 
up in total isolation within the confines of inclosing reserve, and has become completely 
detached from reality. 
 It is little wonder that A approaches the diary with great anxiety. As a reflective aesthete 
himself, he recognizes that this way of life culminates in the cold detachment of a figure like 
Johannes, which distresses him greatly. Johannes uses esthetic techniques for blunting the 
despair that his reflection has engendered, including a love of the accidental, the pursuit of the 
interesting, recollection, and the transference of life into art. Yet as the gloomy aphorisms in 
“Diapsalmata” show, these are only palliative measures. The deeper problem comes readily to 
light in the ghostly Johannes, who in a state of disintegration, is alienated from himself and the 
earthly in toto. The reflective aesthete has undergone a separation from his concrete existence as 
a human being, and as a result, his internal and external aspects are radically out of joint. Eremita 
says of A that “His exterior has been a complete contradiction of his interior,” and Johannes only 
brings this contradiction to its breaking point (E/O I: 4). This contradiction is a source of great 
conflict in the life of the individual, and indicates a rift in the self. As we will see in the next 
chapter, the Judge recognizes it as the problem plaguing A, and argues that one can heal it 
through an ethical reconciliation with one’s concrete existence. He believes that ethical 
commitment will allow the self to come out of its concealment in inclosing reserve, and disclose 
itself in worldly life through its obligations toward God, the world and others. In this way, the 





                                                




4.4 On The Origin and Nature of Despair in Weakness  
 Anti-Climacus believes that despair in weakness stems from not wanting to be oneself 
due to some suffering, hardship, or loss in one's concrete existence that one recoils from. These 
would constitute the makings of despair, but if people like A, Johannes the Seducer, Marie 
Beaumarchais, and the modern Antigone were to will properly by wanting to be themselves 
before God, trusting that He will make things right in the end, they would not be in despair. This 
position, which foregrounds the will in the formation of despair, is in tension with his claim that 
despair in weakness is characterized by a break from immediacy, which is the state of being 
thoughtlessly absorbed in worldly affairs without knowing oneself. The problem is that as he 
describes it, reflection establishes this separation from the world and one's finite self, and so 
would seem to be the source of this form of despair rather than the will (SUD: 54). Anti-
Climacus does little to explain the role that the will plays when the self separates itself from 
external conditions to turn in upon itself in thought, but we can follow his logic to see what view 
he would be committed to. The self could not choose to begin reflection, since as we have seen, 
it is incapable of choice before reflection occurs. The "spiritless" individual submerged in life in 
the world is blindly driven by immediate desires and bound up with external things, and so has 
no will of his own. In order to choose at all, he must be able to take a detached perspective on 
himself and his environment so that he can come to a general understanding of them, and thereby 
deliberate on alternative possibilities for action as a human being in the world. Therefore, the 
will presupposes reflection, and some external factor must elicit the self's activities in the first 
place, rather than the individual himself. This would suggest that despair in weakness is 
inevitable so long as reflection emerges in the life of the individual, regardless of whether he 
wills it.  
 This conclusion aligns with other important phenomenological findings suggested by 
Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms. I have shown that the "little dash of reflection" and volition 
that characterizes the inner lives of those in esthetic immediacy and the public mode is triggered 
by social factors like education, the transmission of language, and culture. For Anti-Climacus, 
however, this is not enough to arouse self-consciousness to the degree needed to become oneself 
in truth. To explain how this jolting of consciousness is possible, he appeals to despair over the 
earthly rather than assert that the individual becomes more self-reflective by bootstrapping off 




freely chosen, but is affected by an external factor. Consequently, despair in weakness does not 
seem to originate from the self not wanting to be itself as he claims, but from reflection, as the 
individual gains greater knowledge of himself and his defective existential condition upon 
experiencing an earthly suffering. With the source of his painful separation from his concrete 
situation being a reflective state of detachment, the will is a subsidiary factor. I have explained 
that heightened reflection on oneself and existence expresses the inverted vitality of the person, 
and that this inward turn into abstraction alienates the individual from his earthly circumstances. 
This internal conflict that ensues in inclosing reserve is indeed likely to quickly galvanize the 
will and lead the individual to not want to be himself in despair, or it might lead him to want to 
be himself in faith or defiance, which as we will see in the next chapter, is a different form of 
despair. But under Anti-Climacus' criteria, it seems impossible that the will of the individual 
could be the original cause of this internal conflict through which despair becomes a noticeable 
problem for him. Those willing to accept what is consistent in his account should therefore reject 
the view that he is originally responsible for bringing despair upon himself.  
 If Anti-Climacus does not offer good enough reasons to think that the self causes itself to 
despair by misusing its will, then one might think that the Judge might have the resources 
available to salvage this view. Kosch, for instance, argues, "despair, for the Judge, is the 
conscious or unconscious assumption of a passive or fatalistic attitude towards one’s existence, 
motivated by a misconstrual of the nature of one’s agency".243 While Kosch is correct that the 
Judge believes the kind of despair experienced by A has these features, she ignores that his 
failure to appreciate himself as an agent, his fatalism, and his inability to act stem from him 
being alienated from his concrete existence. The despair of the reflective esthete would therefore 
seem to be engendered foremost by his intellectual capacity for detachment rather than by him 
wanting to be alienated in this manner. Kosch disagrees on this point, claiming that for the 
Judge, despair can only occur because one's misconception of oneself as an agent "is always in 
some sense voluntary" and that despair "is in the first instance an act, not a psychological 
state".244 In her view, the state of radical detachment which characterizes A's despair is a 
voluntary one, and so the result of a real choice on his part. 
 Any interpretation of the Judge's thought that would understand despair in the esthetic 
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way of life to be the result of a choice conflicts with his puzzling assertion that the individual 
living esthetically is incapable of real choice. He writes to A:  
 
The esthetic choice is either altogether immediate, and thus no choice, or it loses itself in a great 
multiplicity. For example, when a young girl follows her heart’s choice, this choice, however beautiful it is 
otherwise, is no choice in the stricter sense, because it is altogether immediate. If a man esthetically 
ponders a host of life tasks, then he, as is the case with you in the preceding portion, does not readily have 
one Either/Or but a great multiplicity, because the self-determining aspect of the choice has not been 
ethically stressed and because, if one does not choose absolutely, one chooses only for the moment and for 
that reason can choose something else the next moment… (E/O II: 167) 
 
This formulation of the problem would appear to be paradoxical, inasmuch as those living 
esthetically could, even on the Judge's criterion, be said to be making choices. The Judge seems 
to resolve this when he claims that the individual who lives aesthetically "develops with 
necessity, not in freedom" (E/O II: 225). In other words, the choices he makes are determined by 
natural events that unfold spontaneously and by necessity, rather than by his own free acts. 
Because they are not self-determined, but are dictated by external influences such as vital 
processes of nature or other people, they cannot be considered choices in the strict sense. For this 
reason, the Judge claims that the development of the esthete "is a development just like that of a 
plant, and although the individual becomes, he becomes that which he immediately is" (E/O II: 
225). Therefore, under his view, the kind of despair experienced by the individual living 
esthetically cannot have been freely chosen. There is a certain sense, then, in which A is correct 
when he says that all of his life has been fated, since in living esthetically, he has not made 
choices in earnest as a self-determining being. As the Judge writes, "no metamorphosis takes 
place in him, no infinite internal movement by which he comes to the point from which he 
becomes the person he becomes” (E/O II: 225). As we will see in the next chapter, he believes 
this inward transformation requires that the individual come to know himself apart from the 
multitude of transient conditions in which he naturally has his life. Upon gaining this awareness, 
he would become an internalist about his identity (if he was not already) by defining himself 
against external phenomenon, and would be in a position to choose himself in his essential 
freedom. Until A galvanizes his will through this pivotal choice, which would be informed by the 




despair, even if he does not know it.  
 The upshot of this is that, based on the phenomenological evidence Kierkegaard provides 
in the pseudonyms, despair in weakness does not begin through some poor decision that the 
individual has made, or with some wrongdoing. It begins through an increase in one's knowledge 
of oneself that is not willed, but rather elicited by external causes impinging on the individual. It 
is true that he most likely does not want to be himself in response to the encumbrances he 
experiences. He might choose to aggravate his despair by fleeing further upward into the intellect 
like A does and becoming more self-reflective, or he might choose to alleviate it by evading this 
reflection, and throwing himself into worldly affairs and pursuits. He might also do what Anti-
Climacus believes he ought to do, and will to be himself before God in faith. One might be 
justified in holding him responsible for these actions, but since despair in weakness begins 
through reflection, one would not be justified in holding him responsible for being in despair in 
the first place, just as it would be unfair to do so in the case of the individual ignorant of being a 
self. 
 
4.5   An Assessment and Conclusion 
 I have argued that in his self-authored works and those of his pseudonyms, Kierkegaard 
suggests that in all forms of despair, the problem is that the self is disintegrated and imbalanced 
as a paradoxical synthesis of the eternal and temporal, infinite and finite, and possibility and 
necessity. In despair in ignorance, this is because the individual is entangled in the temporal 
element of existence. This would seem to be a defect in creation more generally, which ends up 
compromising the self in its existence. Drawn into worldly pursuits, uncritical social conformity, 
or sensuality, and living for the moment, he lacks awareness of the chaos and anxiety that 
underlies life in the world, or the nothingness that imperils him in existence, however quietly. In 
despair in weakness, however, the self is imbalanced in the opposite direction in inclosing 
reserve, in part because it has a premonition of the terrible possibilities that threaten to be 
realized. It recoils from its finite or temporal condition in the world in reflecting upon both its 
earthly suffering and itself in its consciousness of this suffering. In not wanting to be itself in the 
event of it, it becomes increasingly aware of there being an aspect of infinitude and the eternal 
within it by which it knows itself to be stuck in this miserable condition, although this awareness 




temporal component, but contradicts it. In the process of negating it through acts of reflection, 
which conceptualize the world and bring its contents to comprehension, the self experiences 
opposition between itself and the world, and also between itself and itself as a human being that 
suffers in it as a psyche-body unity. When this activity intensifies, a reversal occurs in which the 
self inclines toward the eternal and infinite pole of its existence. Consequently, in both forms of 
despair, the eternal and temporal components of the self are out of kilter, which causes it to 
despair. 
 Anti-Climacus suggests that there is originally a lack of such opposition in the self, 
claiming that the eternal and temporal components of the self are well-integrated at the moment 
of its creation, when God "releases it from his hand" (SUD: 16). I have argued that this view is 
untenable on his own theory, since in its initial stage, the self is mired in the temporal pole of its 
existence while neglecting the eternal pole.245 I claim that in truth, this opposition bespeaks of a 
rift within the self that had existed well before it despaired over something earthly, but which 
had been concealed from awareness due to its absorption in the immediacy of worldly life, which 
pacifies it. This rift in the self prevents its eternal and temporal aspects from coinciding or 
aligning properly, and consequently, there is disharmony in it by its very nature.246 The conflict 
within the individual is initially smoothed over through the shallow harmony he enjoys in its 
original immediacy, but he has the potential to learn of this deeper disharmony when it worsens 
after he falls upon hard times. The friction between the eternal and temporal components of the 
self is unconscious at first, but is, as it were, just waiting for the right opportunity to intensify 
and become discernable in reflection. But here we see that in becoming conscious of being in 
despair, one gains knowledge of this divisive structure that was already in place.  
 Furthermore, it would seem that this structure is essential to the normal functioning of the 
self. It is necessary for reflective self-consciousness, which separates the knower from the object 
known in the act of apprehending it. It is also necessary for the will, which requires that one be 
able to detach oneself from one's first-order desires and attitudes so that one can objectify them, 
and decide which to endorse and which to reject. Since immediacy always consists of some 
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existence as a system of reason, for Anti-Climacus, the phenomenology of human life indicates that the self does not 
entirely coincide with itself. This is because it is paradoxically constituted in bearing the psyche-body relation, 
which is a muddled compound of being and non-being. The existing individual despairs unconsciously in being 
embroiled in the nothingness of the world, which is an "alien power" that corrupts this relation by leading the self 




degree of reflection, and hence some degree of knowledge of oneself, this separation between 
self and world and the self and itself always exists in human life, although it is not obtrusive so 
long as one is ignorant of being a self. Yet it is prominent enough to start us trembling in anxiety 
from the moment of our inception, and make us prone to feelings of alienation and despair. To 
absolve God of the charge that he made us unstable and beleaguered in this way, which would 
risk casting into doubt his goodness, Anti-Climacus wants to blame the individual for it. This 
move, however, has no justification in the context of his phenomenology. 
  If the ways of life described under despair in weakness do in fact point to a problem in 
the self, I argue this is a tragic defect in one's spiritual nature that concerns one's intellectual or 
reflective capacity, and cannot be the result of the individual misusing his will as Anti-Climacus 
claims. This tragic defect in one's spiritual nature is evident in both forms of despair, but only 
becomes burdensome when self-consciousness intensifies, and one does not want to be oneself. 
The human being is therefore doubly defective in being created in the natural world out of 
nothing, and in being able to become aware of himself as imperiled and suffering in his earthly 
existence. When he becomes disenchanted with the world in despairing over something earthly 
or over the earthly in toto, he experiences a loss of meaning and enjoyment in life, and likely has 
trouble following social conventions that he once took for granted. As we have seen with 
someone like A, he also confronts difficult truths about existence that most people ignore. In 
seeking eternal rest from the noise and confusion of earthly life, Kierkegaard describes the whole 
wide world as a "prison" that traps the individual, and certainly it can seem this way for the 
individual who despairs over the earthly in toto (EUD: 350). He tries to escape it to the best of 
his ability through reflection, but his imaginative flight from the world leaves him isolated in 
inclosing reserve. In being turned in on oneself in reflection, one soon realizes that reflection, 
too, is "a snare in which one is trapped," and one's confinement in the world gives way to a 
narrower self-confinement, which intensifies the pangs of despair (TA: 89). Hovering in ideality, 
the individual clearly recognizes that he despairs not merely over the earthly, but more 
essentially, over himself as spirit. He might be able to make gains in escaping from the world by 
retreating into ideality, but he cannot escape from himself.  
 Of course, spiritual development also has its advantages in the form of liberation and 
enlightenment. Most tend to avoid the process of self-discovery because it is painful and deeply 




has the courage to go through with it cultivates his capacity to think for himself and make his 
own choices. The independent exercise of his spiritual capacities frees him from the bonds of the 
natural world and society, and signifies that a trap is in the process of being broken. Kierkegaard 
suggests that external powers arising from these temporal spheres are often not innocuous, but 
operate out of coercion in aiming to control one's beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors, and 
assigning one specific roles to fill. In stealing power from us so that we work in their favor and 
conduct ourselves accordingly, they also function to keep us in the dark about ourselves and 
sedate us with respect to our level of self-awareness. In an edifying discourse, he claims that the 
individual who is ignorant of being a self is "a slave in the service of the world" (EUD: 347). The 
individual who does not want to be himself in despair, however, is likely to resist being ruled by 
sensuous urges and those in positions of power, and to struggle for personal autonomy: 
 
...if he nevertheless is unwilling to be like an instrument of war in the service of inexplicable drives, indeed, 
in the service of the world, because the world itself, the object of his craving, stimulates the drives; if he 
nevertheless does not want to be like a stringed instrument in the hands of inexplicable moods or, rather, in 
the hands of the world, because the movement of his soul [psyche] is in accord with the way the world 
plucks its strings...if he himself, even before the eye aims at something to make a conquest, wants to 
capture the eye so that it may belong to him and not he to the eye...well, then everything is changed; the 
power is taken away from him, and the glory. He struggles not with the world but with himself. (EUD: 308) 
 
The greatest battle the individual who despairs can face takes place within himself, as he is a 
synthesis of contradictory elements. In his finitude, he is moved to act by vital forces that stir his 
cravings for things like sex, wealth, worldly influence and superiority as a psyche-body unity, 
and that keep him under the spell of moods and habit. In being brought up within a community 
and emulating its practices, other people direct him and shape many of his basic attitudes and 
desires, before he can decide whether they are ones that should be affirmed or rejected. He might 
believe he is free while being bound to immediacy in ignorance of being a self, but this is little 
more than an illusion. He must learn to control these inclinations and impulses that nature and 
society provoke if he wants to gain possession of himself and earn his freedom from earthly 
subjection. This can only happen by critically reflecting on his broader situation in his infinitude, 
and coming to understand the different possibilities available to him within the context of it. The 




A, who is satisfied with a liberation of the intellect. However, a deeper understanding of oneself 
and the world in general, which he has attained through his detached standpoint, is indispensable 
to the task of willing as a self and shaping oneself in accordance with ideals one has chosen. 
Many are unlikely to arrive at this understanding and appreciate the inverted vitality of spirit, but 
when the threatening aspect of existence rears its head in the event of an earthly suffering or loss, 
it might become inevitable.  
 Since becoming spiritual leads to a form of liberation and enlightenment, it is 
questionable whether the human being's capacity for reflection is a defect at all. As I explained in 
chapter two, by negating the sensuous, reflection conceptualizes the natural world, and brings it 
to order and comprehension. In leading us out of a savage state of nature, it makes language, 
communication, and consequently civilization possible. Without using thought and the 
imagination to construct our dwellings and institutions, produce art and tools, and make the 
world a hospitable place, there would be no culture. Human beings would be no different from 
the beasts, which roam blindly in the sense that they are unable to reflect on what they are doing 
as they are doing it. The state of affairs in the world is not one that we in the first instance 
choose, but rather one that we find ourselves in the midst of as human beings. The kind of 
detachment that reflection requires can indeed cause distress and alienate us from conditions in 
the natural world, and also from ourselves in the case of self-reflection. When this intensifies to 
the point of despair, it can leave us feeling homeless and adrift, as A clearly demonstrates. Yet 
this separation can also serve us by bringing us into relation with a higher sphere of ideality and 
value, and ennobling us not only in our confrontation with nature and the elements, but also with 
the base nature in ourselves. 
 As a Christian who believes that being spirit puts the human being into correspondence 
with God, whom he regards as the highest good in existence, Anti-Climacus encourages the 
awakening of spirituality, and believes it is necessary for faith. He thinks that in spiritless 
ignorance, most people do not go far enough in cultivating their spiritual capacities in an effort to 
avoid despair, whether they do so consciously or unconsciously. Social affairs, earthly pleasures, 
and developments in the realm of culture and technology tend to occupy us so long as we are in 
the public mode, but this is only a preliminary phase on the journey of the individual toward 





"The possibility of this sickness is man's superiority over the animal, and this superiority distinguishes him 
in quite another way than does his erect walk, for it indicates infinite erectness or sublimity, that he is 
spirit...Consequently, to be able to despair is an infinite advantage, and yet to be in despair is not only the 
worst misfortune and misery––no, it is ruination." (SUD: 15)  
 
Anti-Climacus believes that the human being is fraught with ambiguity in his paradoxical 
condition. As spirit, he has kinship with the divine and can soar in the sphere of ideality, with 
seemingly unlimited potential in comparison to other animals. However, his intellectual and 
imaginative capacities are both a blessing and a curse, as states like anxiety and despair illustrate. 
 One might look to human achievements as they appear in the external world as evidence 
of the sublimity of our nature or our "blessedness," but Kierkegaard only takes an interest in 
internal expressions of this as it emerges in esthetic, ethical, or religious ways of life. The 
reflective esthetes observe their own form of spirituality, whether wittingly or not, though they 
do not associate it with religion or the Christian God. For instance, when the young man of 
Repetition falls in love with the girl, he receives an intimation of something infinitely higher than 
anything earthly, which inspires romantic fervor in him. This blissful feeling comes upon him as 
a blessing for a brief period, but upon its departure, he feels cursed. He despairs upon 
recognizing the painful reality of things: the girl is not perfect like he had imagined, and the 
transcendent region he caught glimpse of is off limits for mortals like him. While the young man 
persists in seeking the glory of the infinite as a poet, Johannes the Seducer and A do so as 
ironists. One might be successful in this approach on occasion, like the Seducer was in his 
conquest of Cordelia, but it has many negative consequences. In ironic detachment, these 
individuals have emptied the ordinary world of meaning and substance and supplanted it with 
their own fantasies, and have become trapped in inclosing reserve. A's meditations reveal the 
unhappiness, boredom, and loneliness of this frivolous way of life, and its inability to fulfill his 
longing for unity and harmony in existence for any extended period.  
 The reflective esthete has secured negative freedom, or freedom from earthly constraints, 
but he struggles to employ this freedom in a positive way by taking an active role in his concrete 
existence.247 The intellectual strategies he has devised to defeat boredom and make life 
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interesting again do not suffice for the reconciliation he seeks. The Judge believes that A can 
break his enclosure and overcome despair if he wills it, but to do this, he must make an earnest 
commitment to live ethically. In assuming moral duties and taking full responsibility for himself 
and his actions, he would be able to open himself to the world and other people. In the Judge's 
view, the dreadful state of detachment A finds himself in precipitates the moment in which an 
ethical resolution can be made, as it makes a genuine exercise of freedom possible. Hence, the 
loss of integration that A experiences is painful, but invaluable in coming to know himself in 
truth. The Judge explains that this period of transformation can be difficult for many. He writes 
to A:  
 
You are like a woman in labor, and yet you are continually holding off the moment and continually remain 
in pain. If a woman in her distress were to have the idea that she would give birth to a monstrosity or were 
to ponder just what would be born to her, she would have a certain similarity to you. Her attempt to halt the 
process of nature would be futile, but your attempt is certainly possible, for in a spiritual sense that by 
which a person gives birth is the nisus formativus [formative striving] of the will, and that is within a 
person’s own power. What are you afraid of, then? After all, you are not supposed to give birth to another 
human being; you are supposed to give birth only to yourself. (E/O II: 205-206) 
 
Many of us have a fear of knowing ourselves and becoming who we truly are because we are 
uncertain about what lies in store for us once we do. For his part, A has the presentiment of an 
inner transformation, but he resists it out of fear of what his life would become if it were carried 
through. On the other hand, he occupies a precarious position in his alienated state. The Judge 
writes to him, "you cannot stay on that apex, for it is true that your thought has taken everything 
away from you, but it has provided you with nothing in its place" (E/O II: 203). He therefore 
gives A two options: either he can inhibit his spiritual growth by remaining in a fatalistic mindset 
that sees nothing but vanity and meaninglessness in life, or he can carry through his despair by 
willing to be his true self, which is ethical in nature. The Judge argues that the latter choice is the 
only one capable of satisfying his spiritual longing, and restoring meaning and purpose to his 
life. 
 In fairness to A, perhaps his despair is not as debilitating one might think. It is 
questionable whether he would feel the need to make the transition into the ethical way of life 





In addition to my other numerous acquaintances, I have one more intimate confidant—my melancholy. In 
the midst of my joy, in the midst of my work, he beckons to me, calls me aside, even though physically I 
remain on the spot. My melancholy is the most faithful mistress I have known—no wonder, then, that I 
return the love. (E/O I: 20, trans. modified)248 
 
In the final moment, A might not intend to overcome despair. His desolation is the single 
assurance that he has in life, the “knowledge of the truth” that he believes he has likely come to 
through his meticulous reflections (E/O I: 35). In a strange way, he ends up finding a certain 
degree of solace in his suffering, and might even take a masochistic pleasure in his love for the 
melancholic. This would be difficult for anyone in the thick of major depression or mental 
illness, which is likely to attend despair in its more advanced stages. A kind of serenity, however, 
might be possible upon having abstracted oneself from one's condition enough to closely reflect 
on it and come to a deeper understanding of it. Yet at the same time, this final movement in the 
esthetic phase would not be enough to overcome despair or defeat feelings of depression entirely, 
since the individual still remains encumbered by the world in his concretion, and is not wholly 
outside of it.249 While the gnostic forms of spirituality hold that knowledge of the truth leads to 
salvation, A vehemently denies that he has attained salvation with his dismal knowledge, and 
admits to having little else to expect from life (E/O I: 35). For this reason, the Judge advises him 
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The Self Under Obligation 
 
5.1 Introduction   
 In the last chapter, I argued that for Anti-Climacus, a reflective esthete like A does not 
want to be himself in despairing over being in the world. Delighting in ironic detachment and 
imaginative play, A flees from the part of himself that suffers through an earthly existence that 
has come to seem mundane to him. Frolicking in the infinite and possibility, his romantic 
stratagems transfigure the arid landscape of existence by endowing it with lightness and 
mystique, but they also alienate him from the world and himself insofar as he is situated in it as a 
human being among others. Without a good reason to participate earnestly in social events, and 
with little interest in popular culture, he surveys human life from a distance in the sphere of 
ideality, and has isolated himself from others in inclosing reserve. On reflection, existence only 
has esthetic significance for him, and is considered inscrutable and meaningless apart from its 
value as spectacle.  
 In his criticism of the esthetic way of life, Judge William would agree with Anti-
Climacus that A is in despair. The Judge proposes a way out of personal disintegration in 
articulating an ethical way of life. In his letters to A, he attempts to persuade him that the 
spiritual development of the individual culminates in ethical action, and that A has good reason 
to approach life ethically if he intends to defeat despair.250 The Judge argues that the human 
being fundamentally aims at stability and coherence in his life as a result of his freedom, 
although he might ignore or forget this basic need by losing himself in sensual pleasures, esthetic 
diversions, or unreflectively following the actions of others. Until he realizes this essential goal 
or telos by knowing himself and wanting to be himself in truth, however, he would not attain 
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individuals fare any better at combatting the miseries of life. The reasons he gives are therefore context-independent. 
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discussion between A and the Judge "has no conclusion" (E/O I: 13). It might even be the case that the Judge 
eventually abandons his position and comes to believe there are better reasons to live esthetically, which would 




genuine and lasting fulfillment in his life, and so is in despair. For the Judge, ethical action 
provides fulfillment by endowing human existence with meaning and purpose, bringing 
enjoyment through the fulfillment of duties, and expressing human freedom in the natural world 
and society. The ethical life-view thereby empowers the individual so that he does not succumb 
to the impotence felt by A in his despair. Although the individual who lives esthetically will 
acquire a budding awareness of himself and his freedom as he becomes more reflective, the 
Judge contends that his conception of himself will be inadequate so long as he does not know 
himself as a responsible agent or want to be one. On his view, the individual can only become 
competent in this role through earnest reflection on ethical concerns, and by diligently adhering 
to ethical norms. 
 In proposing the ethical way of life as a solution to despair, the Judge elaborates on the 
general attitude and character of the person who has properly oriented himself to the world as a 
synthesis of the eternal and temporal. Given that the self has abstract and concrete aspects, he 
explains how to shape oneself into such a person, and the responsibilities such a life entails, by 
elaborating on these aspects of the commitment to live ethically. In section 5.2, I explore his 
claim that the ethical way of life necessarily follows from wanting to be oneself in earnest, which 
is a choice that those who live esthetically have yet to truly make. He believes that this resolution 
to change one's basic disposition, which might be described as a conversion of the heart, can 
only occur upon recognizing that this disposition is despair, and that one fulfills one's spiritual 
longing to become eternal through this conversion.251 In section 5.3, I explain why the Judge 
thinks that ethical commitment is necessary for achieving personal integrity and becoming 
oneself. He believes that by approaching life ethically, the individual can express his freedom in 
everyday life by fulfilling his obligations to himself, his family, society, and God. In section 5.4, 
I claim that for Kierkegaard, resolute self-assertion through the ethical project inevitably fails to 
bring the individual into harmony with the world as a free agent. While the Judge attempts to 
take his salvation into his own hands by perfecting himself ethically, his attempt to eliminate 
despair will not succeed of his own efforts. For this division within the self to heal, Kierkegaard 
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believes an awakening of the religious is needed, and an admittance of the need for God's grace 
to carry out what we cannot. 
 
5.2 The Abstract Dimension of The Ethical Decision: Willing to be Oneself  
 In the second chapter, I explained that the Judge believes the immediate esthete is in 
despair due to seeking transient pleasures from external goods. Because this individual fails to 
live in accord with the eternal within him, his happiness does not last. In the fourth chapter, I 
explained that he believes the reflective esthete is in despair as a result of alienating himself from 
the world, from others, and from himself in inclosing reserve. However, this does not mean that 
those who live esthetically will become conscious of being in despair, much less know that these 
are the reasons for it. For instance, A never explicitly states he is in despair, even though an 
undercurrent of despair pervades his reflections on the aimlessness of existence. The Judge holds 
that in order for a quietest like A to truly admit to himself that he is in despair, it does not suffice 
to acknowledge it passively by observing his condition and noting the presence of despair, or by 
contemplating how meaningless or horrible things are. Rather than maintaining a detached point 
of view toward his life and seeing despair as something outside of him, he must re-engage with 
his life in a concrete sense by wanting to be in despair. The Judge believes that the individual 
will break out of his self-enclosure and bring unity to his life only when he chooses to despair 
passionately, with "all the power and earnestness and concentration of the soul" (E/O II: 208). As 
the Judge describes it, the choice of despair would lead the individual to learn the truth about 
himself, which he cannot do so long as he remains caught up in diversions and worldly pleasures 
in the esthetic or public mode. While these individuals are in despair, since it has not surfaced to 
conscious awareness, they cannot be said to be in despair "in truth."252 He writes, "in order truly 
to despair, a person must truly will it; but when he truly wills it, he is truly beyond despair" (E/O 
II: 213). Since no one really wants to remain in despair, choosing to deal with it directly by 
                                                
252 Adopting a different strategy than Anti-Climacus, the Judge argues for the existence of unconscious despair in 
individuals living esthetically by appealing to cases of those who despair because they either have lost the object of 
their enjoyment, or cannot obtain whatever transitory thing their happiness has depended on (E/O II: 192). His point 
seems to be that they would already have been dimly aware that this dependence makes them vulnerable to hardship 
or despair, and so they must already have been in despair before having the more profound realization that they are 
in the event of a crisis or loss. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to reject the Judge's argument that such an event 
could not fundamentally change the mentality of the person. Recognizing that one might despair in the future does 
not mean that one is currently in despair, in the same way that the possibility of an event occurring does not entail 
that it is actually occurring. If one rejects this argument like one should, one might prefer Anti-Climacus' reasons for 




bringing it to heightened awareness would prompt the individual to take action to defeat it, which 
the Judge believes will naturally lead him to the ethical way of life. Hence, this state of 
conscious despair is only temporary; once the choice to despair has been made, one would 
already have gained relief by identifying the problem and initiating the process necessary to 
overcome it. For this reason, the Judge admonishes A to give up idle contemplation of esthetic 
matters and change his basic attitude toward life by resolving to live ethically. 
 The Judge believes that by choosing to despair, one would come to know the truth about 
oneself for the first time, and that this is a spiritual act that would transform the character and 
disposition of the person. "When a person has truly chosen despair, he has truly chosen what 
despair chooses: himself in his eternal validity" (E/O II: 213). He claims that this knowledge is 
the ultimate aim of human development, since it indicates the full realization of our capacities. 
Borrowing from the virtue ethics of Aristotle, he thereby endorses a teleological conception of 
the human being. "The individual has his teleology within himself, has inner teleology, is himself 
his teleology; his self is then the goal toward which he strives" (E/O II: 274). He understands his 
view on this point to be in accord with the highest ancient wisdom:  
 
The person who lives ethically has seen himself, knows himself...The phrase γνῶθι σεαυτόν [know 
yourself] is a stock phrase, and in it has been perceived the goal of all a person’s striving. And this is 
entirely proper, but yet it is just as certain that it cannot be the goal if it is not also the beginning. The 
ethical individual knows himself, but this knowing is not simply contemplation...It is a collecting of 
oneself, which itself is an action, and this is why I have with aforethought used the expression “to choose 
oneself” instead of “to know oneself.” (E/O II: 258) 
 
With his avowal of the eternal in the human being, there are some resemblances between the 
Judge's view and the Greek view that such knowledge pertained to the immortality of the soul. 
However, the Judge offers an original interpretation of the aphorism at Delphi by claiming that 
one truly knows oneself when one knows oneself to be in despair. On his view, the individual 
becomes aware of this either in realizing how terribly isolated he has become in reflecting on the 
nullity of worldly life, or upon having lost something transient that he had invested his life in, 
and that he had depended on for enjoyment. For Anti-Climacus, similarly, this is a result of 
suffering under a particular earthly difficulty or from feeling encumbered by the world in 




after a period of dissipation in temporal conditions, he believes this knowledge demands the 
exertion of the will as opposed to merely thinking about oneself, which A is already versed in by 
indulging in abstractions. To know oneself in the strict sense, one must want to retain a 
heightened form of self-awareness while confronting suffering and despair as a human being in 
the world, and not let oneself be drawn into an assortment of worldly engagements that would 
take one's mind off it. Throughout his works, Kierkegaard claims that this passionate 
concentration on oneself would involve things like critical self-examination, and reshaping one's 
life on the basis of ideals, principles, and commitments that are maintained over time. Such 
single-mindedness would involve recollecting these commitments and renewing one's resolution 
to maintain them, and also planning for the future. The individual living esthetically, however, is 
capricious, and has not yet made the choice to be an enduring self that engages in vigilant self-
reflection while intending to get at the root of the problem of despair. On the Judge's view, the 
individual ought to make this choice to bring unity to his life and actualize his spiritual nature, 
rather than drift through it without making anything definite of himself. 
 The Judge therefore agrees with Anti-Climacus' claim that despair in the strict sense is a 
choice, and that one never truly despairs out of necessity (E/O II: 213). For both figures, it is a 
state that one is responsible for being in, although as I explained in chapter two, it is difficult to 
see how those individuals who lack a significant degree of volition or reflection could be held 
responsible for it. He disagrees with Anti-Climacus, however, in contending that the choice to 
despair entails extensive self-knowledge and heralds the ethical way of life, although Anti-
Climacus believes one is more likely to live ethically as one becomes more reflective in response 
to earthly suffering (SUD: 55).253 Since the Judge believes the will is essential to being a self, he 
also rejects the view that the higher form of self-knowledge is disinterested, and consists only in 
someone learning certain facts about himself and being able to report on them.254 The self that 
knows itself is not only an intellectual being capable of thinking about its condition objectively, 
                                                
253 In Anti-Climacus' view, the ethical way of life that the Judge describes would be an active form of defiance, 
since the individual living ethically wants to be self-sufficient without admitting his dependence on God. See 
Chapter 6.   
254 In recent times, Moran has argued against this view, which he calls the Spectatorial model of self-knowledge 
(Authority and Estrangement, pp. 149-150). For Moran, self-knowledge involves an ethical dimension, in which the 
self takes a stance on its condition. In defense of this, he states that in ordinary life, we expect a person "to speak for 
his feelings and convictions, and not simply offer his best opinion about them" (Ibid., p. 91). He illustrates this point 
with a dialogue that none of us are likely to experience: "Do you intend to pay the money back?" "As far as I can 




but is also an agent passionately concerned about its existence as an individual, with the ability 
to form intentions and take responsibility for itself. It depends on knowledge to guide it so that it 
can make informed decisions within the greater context of the world, along with using its 
imagination to consider different possible actions it might take, but following through on these 
decisions is an act of will. Since the person must overcome despair of his own will, which many 
underuse in being unreflectively moved by sensual desires, immediate inclinations, and the 
dictates of others, the Judge stresses that knowing oneself means being an agent who has taken 
an interest in oneself. But on his view, one can only resolve to be oneself and bring unity to one's 
life if one first chooses to despair. 
 
5.2.1 Freedom as an Answer to Spiritual Longing 
 In the Judge's view, as spirit, the individual has an inner drive to fulfill his telos over the 
course of his development by knowing and choosing himself as a free being. He refers to this 
drive for self-determination, which is categorically distinct from natural drives or impulses that 
determine actions of living things in time, as "the passion of freedom" (E/O II: 216). Until he 
attains the freedom that he ultimately longs for as a spiritual being, he is in despair, even if he 
does not know it. By choosing himself apart from any external influences that would motivate 
him to do so by necessity, which a highly reflective individual like A is in a position to do, he 
would learn that the self "is freedom" (E/O II: 214). Hence, in desiring freedom, one desires to 
possess oneself as a responsible agent that knows that it exists independently of temporal 
conditions affecting it as a psyche-body unity. The self that understands this recognizes that 
natural or social factors do not necessarily determine its actions or choices, although they are the 
predominant influence until he understands this. Consequently, self-knowledge is knowledge of 
oneself as free, while the individual gains this knowledge after reflection alienates him from the 
world and himself as a psyche-body unity. This state of alienation, which characterizes despair in 
its more advanced stages, is necessary to choose oneself in truth, since it means that the human 
being is set apart from the world that originally possesses him. In this state, he can reflect more 
thoroughly on his lower nature, which is under the yoke of external powers that move him to act 
in the esthetic stage. By becoming weaned from the world and its influence as a self, whose 
powers of reflection and volition have gradually developed to the point that he can stand on his 




In gaining maturity as a self after a period of social upbringing in the natural world, he attains the 
true conception of himself as a free being. 
 According to the Judge, when the individual attains freedom by learning he is in despair, 
he would at the same moment have discovered himself as 'the absolute'. This is a term that he 
uses to describe the dignified character of freedom, which recalls the "naked abstract self" 
described by Anti-Climacus in his discussion of the infinite aspect of the self. He explains: 
 
I choose absolutely precisely by having chosen not to choose this or that. I choose the absolute, and what is 
the absolute? It is myself in my eternal validity. Something other than myself I can never choose as the 
absolute, for if I choose something else, I choose it as something finite and consequently do not choose 
absolutely. (E/O II: 214) 
 
The absolute is not an external object or condition, which exists among the "boundless 
multiplicity" that the self relates itself to in its engagement with the world (E/O II: 216). Because 
these things are constantly transitioning between being and non-being, they do not exist 
absolutely, but only relative to time, and so their actions are determined by principles of 
necessity in relation to other things in time. If one chooses the absolute, what is chosen must be 
changeless, unconditional, and exist at all times, and the Judge believes that the self meets this 
criterion in contrast to any external condition. Hence, in choosing himself absolutely in despair, 
the Judge believes that the individual accepts himself as existing independently of anything 
external or relative, or indeed, anything finite whatsoever. He can certainly relate himself to 
natural objects, people, situations, and events in time, but these relations do not essentially 
constitute him insofar as he chooses himself absolutely.  
 With these remarks, the Judge suggests that one has a reason to choose oneself absolutely 
if one wants to become autonomous, even though he does not use this Kantian term himself.255 
For Kant, the will of rational beings is autonomous in that it legislates itself through its own 
principles. Similarly, for the Judge, the individual living ethically is autonomous in that he wills 
to unconditionally commit himself to what is essentially his own. On his view, autonomy is not 
                                                
255 I agree with Kosch that the Judge offers an ethics of autonomy, in which the will of the agent is the source of 
morally binding norms (Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, p. 155). Since the self is given to 
itself, however, the view that it gives itself the normative principles that it adheres to is complicated by an empirical 
factor. For the Judge, moral knowledge is not a priori as it is for Kant, and the self does not legislate itself by a 




ready-made, and does not come naturally or immediately to us. Instead, it is a possibility for the 
individual that can become actualized only later in his development, once he achieves a personal 
breakthrough through a conversion to the ethical. Autonomy is not simply one possibility among 
many that may or may not be actualized, but is distinctive in that it is the ultimate aim and thrust 
of the temporal development of the self. It is in the process of becoming actualized as the 
individual progresses through the esthetic stage, although many remain ignorant of their freedom 
as selves, and never fully actualize it. Of course, an individual living esthetically can make 
choices and engage in reflection, but insofar as he does not know himself as free, or chosen to 
will as the individual who resolves to live ethically has, he is not truly free (E/O II: 169). In 
pursuit of things like pleasure, money, social approval, and influence over others, the choices of 
the individual living esthetically are dictated by conditions outside of him. The norms and values 
that govern his actions are also acquired from his culture or other people. In these respects, his 
will is heteronomous, even though he is in on the path to autonomy.256 If the individual living 
esthetically can be said to have chosen himself by wanting to be himself in his basic enjoyment 
of life, it is only relatively.  
 Since the self is freedom, autonomy must originate in a free act, even though it is brought 
to the point where it can perform this act with the assistance of nature and society. These external 
powers are products of necessity that contribute to the growth and development of the self and its 
capacities, but its acts of reflection and volition are its own, and so are not products of necessity. 
However, they are originally bound by natural processes and social influences, and so are not 
free in the strict sense. For instance, the individual living esthetically is moved by inclination, or 
thinks, acts, and chooses as others do, or if he is more reflective, he might break with established 
norms or pursue pleasure and interesting subjects beyond the limits of what is socially 
appropriate. But once the individual becomes highly reflective and has firmly separated himself 
from anything external, he needs to become autonomous to bring unity to his life as a whole, and 
thereby defeat despair of its own free will. Because he is free, he can no longer depend on nature, 
                                                
256 The Judge argues that the will is not active in the individual in the esthetic stage of life, and so all of his choices 
are made out of necessity and not freely (E/O II: 166-167 & 225). However, I do not believe that this is an accurate 
description of the phenomenology of agency for individuals who have become reflective. External conditions are 
certainly powerful influences over the individual in the esthetic stage, and he might rightly be said to be in service to 
them. But insofar as he has attained a reflective form of self-consciousness, he ultimately consents to this, and 
makes choices that are in accord with them. It might be accurate to describe his will as heteronomous, but this is 
nevertheless a choice that he freely makes. He is no passive bystander to his actions, and has some say in what he 




family, or society to maintain harmony with the world, which they fostered as long as the 
individual drifted through life with minimal reflection in the immediate esthetic or "public" 
modes of existence. The Judge claims that when the individual who has reached an advanced 
stage of reflection chooses to liberate himself from the multitude of external conditions that 
reflection and the will are originally in service to, "the personality declares itself in its inner 
infinity and in turn the personality is thereby consolidated" (E/O II: 167). Consequently, when 
the self chooses to realize its potential for autonomy as the absolute, it brings itself into clear 
focus for the first time. In gaining its composure, it refuses to remain absorbed in worldly life 
without much say in the matter. No longer tossed about amid the noise and confusion of the 
temporal, or being a passive bystander to earthly passions that move it without them being under 
its control, through its hard-won knowledge, it discovers its essential freedom, which it longs for 
as spirit.  
 Some might, of course, object that they long to know themselves in this wholly spiritual 
sense, and to take control of their life with such earnestness. An ordinary person might be 
satisfied with his identity as a member of society and the natural world, knowing himself as a 
white heterosexual American who occupies the role of a father, a teacher, or the like. He might 
have no need to call any of these beliefs into doubt, or to question whether the choices he makes 
are truly his own or only the result of social conditioning, or psychological or biological factors, 
so long as he feels free. For him, the only freedom worth caring about might consist in being able 
to pursue happiness in accordance with the laws of his country, and in not being imprisoned or 
oppressed by a tyrannical government, a difficult line of employment, or perhaps an overbearing 
family. The Judge, however, pities these lost souls in the esthetic mode who do not consider their 
lives at greater depth, and who have no inkling of their immortality or dignity as spiritual beings 
(E/O II: 169). Since he believes the telos of human life is spiritual freedom, it would seem that he 
must hold that these individuals long for such freedom while adrift in the temporal, though they 
remain ignorant of this in being preoccupied with external affairs. This longing for autonomy 
would all too often be quieted amid the hubbub of everyday life, or suppressed as the individual 
aims to satisfy his desires for worldly things or amusements. In his view, because the individual 
carries the eternal within him, which endows his life with an essential unity that counteracts the 
multiplicity of the world, the variety of temporal goals that one naturally aims at is unsuitable for 




therefore experience internal conflict in wanting to be free of the external conditions that 
determine their identity and shape their beliefs, attitudes and behaviors, while also wanting them 
to continue to have dominion over them because of the pleasure, security, or contentment they 
bring.  
 While the Judge's criticism of ordinary people can sound snobbish, it is indeed plausible 
that many human beings experience internal conflict as a result of both wanting and not wanting 
to be free from certain social and naturalistic influences or constraints. For instance, many people 
would probably agree that they want to be their own person and be in control of their lives, while 
all too often they let other people determine what they want, how they act and what they believe 
out of a need to belong to a group. They might think they are making their own choices as they 
conform to what the group has assigned to them, but without critically reflecting on what they 
are doing and considering whether they should endorse its ideas or practices, it is quite clear that 
these choices are not truly their own.257 Some of these individuals might also have little self-
control when it comes to curbing their earthly passions and appetites, and gain pleasure or avoid 
discomfort by letting them go unchecked. These things can become obvious problems, such as in 
the case of the unwilling addict, or the person who incurs a guilty conscience in going along with 
the group. When this happens, the desire for personal freedom might become pronounced. For 
Anti-Climacus, too, such dynamics are evidence of the interplay between freedom and necessity 
that occurs within all human beings, who paradoxically exist as a synthesis of both components. 
 The Judge believes that there are individuals who become conscious of this kind of 
spiritual conflict, although many will never reach a point in their personal development where 
autonomy becomes a major concern. Describing the state of highly reflective individuals like A 
who are on the brink of a spiritual transformation, and who long for the spiritual freedom that is 
their telos, he writes: "As immediate spirit, a person is bound up with all the earthly life, and now 
spirit wants to gather itself together out of this dispersion, so to speak, and to transfigure itself in 
itself...If this does not happen, if the movement is halted, if it is repressed, then depression sets 
in" (E/O II: 189).258 A person might want to avoid knowledge of her freedom or the wide range 
                                                
257 Fromm treats this phenomenon in greater depth in his psychoanalytic study of human freedom. See his discussion 
of "automaton conformity" in Escape from Freedom, pp. 183-204. 
258 Kosch argues against the view that on the Judge's view, despair occurs as a result of dissatisfaction from one's 
intrinsic ethical telos not being fulfilled (Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard, p. 146). 
However, she contradicts what the Judge directly states, and ignores that he claims to be offering a teleological 




of choices available to her out of a natural fear of finding herself alone with her thoughts, with 
the weight of existence bearing down on her. The anxiety that results from becoming 
independent and standing on one's own apart from the crowd can be painful, and this is one of 
the reasons why the Judge thinks the choice to be one's true self happens in despair. But as Kant 
puts it while urging individuals to become enlightened by thinking for themselves, the danger of 
walking without assistance from others and without being controlled by natural inclinations "is 
not in fact so great, for by a few falls they would eventually learn to walk."259 The Judge believes 
that if this process of self-realization is thwarted or inhibited by an individual on the brink of 
self-discovery, then psychological disturbance will likely ensue, since at a deeper level, the 
individual does want to be free. A is an example of an individual who resists becoming conscious 
of his freedom, while being exceedingly close to gaining this awareness. In the Judge's view, his 
malaise and overall sense of dissatisfaction will continue until this internal conflict is resolved, 
and such pains are to be expected in the process of growth for spiritual beings that paradoxically 
exist in the natural world. 
 In the last chapter, I explained that the individual becomes aware of spiritual longing as 
he becomes more self-conscious, and his search for deeper meaning in existence intensifies. As 
reflection increases, and the individual becomes more susceptible to suffering under earthly 
burdens, the temporal loses the tight grip it formerly had on him, and transient goods no longer 
draw his attention or satisfy him like they used to. As spirit, he desires something that the world 
cannot offer him, even if he does not have a clear idea of what this higher good is. The reflective 
esthete attempts to satisfy spiritual longing through art and idle contemplation, and while this 
yielded brief moments of immense joy, he still felt his life was lacking something important. The 
Judge believes that such individuals are in despair because they have not found the lasting 
spiritual fulfillment they ultimately seek amid the transitory conditions of earthly life.260 The 
                                                
259 See Kant, "An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?" in Practical Philosophy, 8:36. 
260 Kosch argues against the view that despair can be understood as the result of the inability of esthetic criteria to 
provide genuine and lasting fulfillment (p. 146). First, she argues that if this were the Judge's view, "he should be 
unwilling to say of those immediate individuals for whom nothing had gone awry that ‘these people were indeed 
happy’—yet this is precisely what he does say...Those individuals who do succeed according to aesthetic criteria are 
happy, enjoy themselves, etc.—and they are in despair." Not only does she overlook the Judge's claim that these 
individuals cannot truly be happy so long as their happiness depends on external goods (E/O II: 252), but she also 




Judge refers to spiritual longing when he writes, “nothing that is finite, not even the whole world, 
can satisfy the soul of a person who feels the need of the eternal” (E/O II: 203). While he would 
certainly concede that the individual living esthetically experiences momentary pleasures, he 
does not believe this is the enduring type of satisfaction that the individual who has chosen 
himself ethically will derive from actualizing his freedom and becoming eternal. To distinguish 
this form of satisfaction from the momentary pleasures of the sensual life, I will refer to it as 
happiness. Like Aristotle, the Judge suggests that by nature, human beings ultimately aim for 
happiness, and that happiness is self-sufficient unlike pleasure, which depends on external 
conditions for its production.261 He claims, "it is indeed a superstition to think that something 
that lies outside a person is what can make him happy" (E/O II: 252), which would suggest that 
happiness can only arise from the activity of freedom occurring within a person. He believes that 
in choosing himself ethically, the individual will satisfy his spiritual longing. 
 The Judge describes this pivotal moment of conversion in a passage reminiscent of Kant's 
declaration of wonder at the starry heavens above and the moral law within: 
 
When around one everything has become silent, solemn as a clear, starlight night, when the soul comes to 
be alone in the whole world, then before one there appears, not an extraordinary human being, but the 
eternal power itself, then the heavens seem to open, and the I chooses itself or, more correctly, receives 
itself. Then the soul has seen the highest, which no mortal eye can see and which can never be forgotten; 
then the personality receives the accolade of knighthood that ennobles it for an eternity. He does not 
become someone other than he was before, but he becomes himself. The consciousness integrates, and he is 
himself. (E/O II: 177) 
 
When the individual, upon having isolated himself from the rest of the world, chooses himself 
earnestly in despair "with all the inwardness of his personality," the Judge claims that "his inner 
                                                                                                                                                       
individuals for whom everything continues to go well, and who get whatever they want in life, the Judge suggests 
that such individuals do not really exist. He therefore assumes "the opposite movement" and supposes none of this 
happens—that is, they despair (E/O II: 191-192). Additionally, she argues that if this were his view, "his claim 
should be that the lower pleasures of the aesthetic life are replaced in the forefront of the ethical individual’s life by 
the higher satisfactions of the exercise of virtue. Instead we find him arguing at length that what he himself labels 
‘aesthetic’ satisfactions are consistent with and preserved in the life of duty (for instance, in his ‘aesthetic defense of 
marriage’)" (p. 147). Yet it is consistent for the Judge to hold that esthetic satisfaction is an important part of the 
ethical life while maintaining that this type of satisfaction alone cannot provide the lasting fulfillment that the 
individual seeks.  
261 See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book X, Chapter 7. Despite their similarities, their views are also distinct. 
Aristotle argues that the highest good is happiness and not freedom, while the Judge argues that the highest good is 




being is purified and he himself is brought into an immediate relationship with the eternal power 
that omnipresently pervades all existence" (E/O II: 167). He goes on to state that this means the 
self chooses itself "absolutely from the hand of the eternal God" (E/O II: 217). The individual 
thereby achieves a transfiguration in consciousness by which he understands himself in light of 
the divine as an immortal being, rather than as a being that only exists in relation to finite or 
"impure" things in the external world. Unlike the esthetic individual who is ignorant of his 
spiritual nature while unreflectively absorbed in temporal conditions, "the ethical individual is 
transparent to himself" in living under God (E/O II: 258). While A had described the eternal 
power at work in existence as a destructive vortex, the Judge believes that in personally 
discovering himself as the absolute, this power––or as he calls it, God––must be benevolent, and 
favor the development and integrity of persons.262 If it were a merely natural power, it could only 
create natural entities, and there would be no way he could have reached the sublime moment of 
the absolute choice. The Judge believes that can one align with the divine power in the purest 
sense and gain complete clarity about one's nature only by choosing oneself as a person, and that 
union with God is what one longs for as spirit. Unlike Anti-Climacus, who believes that God is 
"infinitely qualitatively distinct" from the human being in His sheer transcendence, the Judge 
believes that God is present in human consciousness. For the Judge, God does not dwell in utter 
mystery, far beyond the reach of human beings, but can become known to us when we choose 
ourselves absolutely in despair. If God were a transcendent authority who issued directives from 
outside of the self, then the individual that chooses to relate to Him would be heteronomous, and 
so would not be essentially free.    
 As the Judge describes it, the choice of oneself as the absolute is a moment of 
extraordinary spiritual significance, and a milestone en route to overcoming despair. In the way 
that the Judge frames it, it may seem like an attempt at self-deification, or at least an endeavor to 
be superhuman, but the Judge is certainly not suggesting that the individual created himself and 
the universe from scratch in the manner of a supremely powerful deity. The Judge emphasizes 
that in choosing himself absolutely, the individual receives himself from God, from whom he 
and the universe originated. However, once they achieve union in consciousness through the 
                                                
262 In a morbid speech delivered to a secret society known as Symparanekromenoi [The Fellowship of the Dead], A 
exclaims, "would that the vortex, which is the world's core principle....erupt with deep-seated resentment and shake 
off the mountains and the nations and the cultural works and man's clever inventions...I toast you, silent night, the 




absolute choice, the distinction between them dissolves. On this point, the Judge coopts the 
German idealist thesis that the self posits itself in its existence, while rejecting Anti-Climacus' 
view that it was established by a power greater than itself. He writes:  
 
I posit the absolute, and I myself am the absolute. But in other words with exactly the same meaning I may 
say: I choose the absolute that chooses me; I posit the absolute that posits me—for if I do not keep in mind 
that this second expression is just as absolute, then my category of choosing is untrue, because it is 
precisely the identity of both. (E/O II: 213) 
 
In order for the individual to choose himself as the absolute, the absolute, or God, must have, at 
the very same moment, chosen him in the creative act. The Judge does not posit an unbridgeable 
gap between the human being and God as Anti-Climacus does, but thinks that the individual can 
fully participate in the creative life of God from within his concrete situation in the world. He is 
able to do this by shaping himself ethically, rather than straying from God by letting his beliefs, 
desires, and actions be determined by external causes in the esthetic mode. In harnessing the 
powers of the divine through his essential freedom, the individual is brought into the most 
intimate union with God as a spiritual being, creating himself while he is being created. There 
are certainly echoes of mysticism in the Judge's account, but the Judge insists that he is not a 
mystic in the traditional sense, since he does not think one should renounce the world and its 
pleasures to unite with God (E/O II: 247). Instead, one ought to integrate with the world through 
the ethical commitment for the sake of spiritual fulfillment. 
 As we will see in section two, where I elaborate on the connection between the eternal 
and the ethical as a way of life, the individual exercises autonomy in accordance with universally 
valid ethical principles rather than selfish desires or inclinations. For the Judge, the universal is 
divine, and so relating to God as a particular human being in time means that one's beliefs, 
motives, and actions correspond with a timeless ethical principle that governs human action. This 
protects it from the vacillations of the temporal, where feelings, attitude, and fashions are always 
changing, and lends stability, endurance, and coherence to the self. But rather than advocating 
for ascetic withdrawal or indulgence in metaphysical abstractions, he promotes an ethical brand 
of mysticism in which the individual forms attachments to people and things in the world to unite 





5.2.2 The Rebirth of the Human Being as Eternal 
 In the Judge's view, this moment of self-discovery establishes an entirely new beginning 
in one's life. In choosing himself under God in despair, the person is transformed in such a way 
that he can be said to come into being for the first time, even though in a lesser form he had 
preceded the choice as a product of nature and society. The Judge draws an analogy between this 
event and procreation, stating that by choosing to be himself, the individual "gives birth to 
himself" (E/O II: 258). Of this birth of a new human being, in which the eternal emerges through 
a choice made in time, he writes:263 
 
The choice here makes two dialectical movements simultaneously—that which is chosen does not exist and 
comes into existence through the choice—and that which is chosen exists; otherwise it was not a choice. In 
other words, if what I chose did not exist but came into existence absolutely through the choice, then I did 
not choose—then I created. But I do not create myself—I choose myself. (E/O II: 215) 
 
This account is cryptic and alarmingly paradoxical, but the complication it describes recalls Anti-
Climacus' notion that the self exists as a paradoxical synthesis of freedom and necessity.264 As 
Rudd explains, in this passage, the Judge attempts "to understand the tension between sense that 
we are responsible for shaping or authoring our own lives, and the sense that there is something 
distinct and definite about ourselves that has to be accepted as simply given."265 In response to 
this dichotomy, some philosophers argue that the human being does not have a fixed nature and 
is free to constitute itself as it likes, while others argue that it comes into existence with a fixed 
character that it is unable to effectively change, however hard it tries. 266 The Judge, however, 
seeks to find some middle ground between these two positions, and to negotiate the tension 
between freedom and necessity in the self throughout his account of the ethical. His point is that, 
                                                
263 The Judge does not reference St. Paul in his discussion of a second birth, but there is certainly a Pauline influence 
in his account. According to St. Paul, Christ tells us "to put off your old self, which belongs to your former manner 
of life and is corrupt through deceitful desires, and to be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and to put on the new 
self, created after the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness." See Ephesians 4:22-24 (ESV). 
264 In this passage, the Judge addresses what Korsgaard calls "the paradox of self-constitution" (Self-Constitution, p. 
35). The problem is that self-creation seems impossible, since the self would not be able to create itself unless it 
already exists, while if it exists, it would have no need to create itself. The Judge tries to navigate this difficulty by 
arguing that the self chooses or shapes itself from raw materials of life that are given to it, rather than creating itself. 
On this view, human freedom is not a pure activity of self-constitution, but has both active and passive dimensions.  
265 Rudd, Self, Value & Narrative, p. 3 
266 Rudd cites Sartre as a proponent of the view that the self does not have a fixed nature, and Schopenhauer as a 
proponent of the view that the self has a nature, which is a determinate brute fact that it must ultimately accept, 




in the first period of human life, in which the individual lives esthetically, he exists with a 
specific set of characteristics, desires, and abilities that are there without him having chosen 
them. As a creature of natural necessity, he exists in relation to people, places and things in this 
world, and aims for things like survival, pleasure, and the like. These conditions determine his 
nature and identity, without him having decided on any of this for himself. As the Judge puts it, 
"his self consists of this multiplicity, and he has no self that is higher than this" (E/O II: 225).  
 The Judge insists that the human being does not create himself, and suggests that it is 
God who creates the natural world and human beings ex nihilo by actualizing possibilities in the 
temporal. He states, "whereas nature is created from nothing, whereas I myself as immediate 
personality am created from nothing, I as free spirit am born out of the principle of contradiction 
or am born through my choosing myself" (E/O II: 215-216). Although the individual exists in the 
esthetic stage of development as a psyche-body unity that is capable of some degree of 
reflection, he does not exist absolutely in his eternal form. In existing within the temporal, which 
Kierkegaard describes as a kind of nothingness that produces anxiety, he is embroiled in 
contradiction as a muddled compound of being and non-being, and is originally without a proper 
understanding of God.267 He therefore exists in a volatile condition in the natural world as a 
mortal being, but he does not have to remain in it; as spirit, the individual "according to his 
possibility is eternal and becomes conscious of this in time; this is the contradiction within 
immanence" (CUP: 578-579). While Hegel had rejected the principle of contradiction in 
proposing an identity between being and non-being, and so would not see this contradiction as a 
problem, the Judge refuses to follow him in veering into speculative thought.268 Freely affirming 
his existence as spirit in time, he chooses to be in the fullest sense, and thereby become eternal 
and autonomous. To actualize the possibility of being eternal and resolve the contradiction that 
compromises his existence, he wills to be himself apart from the multiplicity from which he had 
originated in time. The self that emerges as eternal is "absolutely different from his former self" 
that existed in the esthetic mode (E/O II: 215), and yet it is still he himself, since he still exists 
                                                
267 See sections 1.3.2 and 2.3. 
268 In the notes to their translation of Either/Or II, the Hongs cite multiple passages from Hegel that indicate he 
rejects this the Aristotelian principle that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same 
respect (pp. 482-483). For instance, Hegel writes, "Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world: and it is 
ridiculous to say that contradiction is unthinkable. The only thing correct in that statement is that contradiction is not 
the end of the matter, but cancels itself...The proximate result of opposition (when realized as contradiction) is the 
Ground, which contains identity as well as difference superseded and deposited to elements in the completer 




concretely as a human being in the world. While he does not deny his mortality as a human being 
upon resolving to be himself, he does think that his life in time is transfigured under God when 
he chooses himself absolutely, and that this gives him profound responsibilities. In the next 
section, I explain how the temporal, which is originally outside of the self, is "taken up" or 
absorbed by the eternal when one wills to live ethically, as opposed to the individual remaining 
absorbed in worldly pursuits.    
 The Judge therefore believes it is a mistake to conceive of the self as eternal, or as 
timeless, before it chooses itself, as philosophers and religious thinkers have been accustomed to 
do.269 On these theories, which understand the eternal altogether abstractly, the self merely 
contemplates its eternal nature, which exists as fixed without him having chosen this. The Judge, 
however, offers an existentialist conception of the human being that foregrounds freedom rather 
than necessity, and draws a firm distinction between existence and essence. On his view, the 
eternal aspect of the self does not always exist, but must come into existence through a concrete 
process of construction that occurs in time. The eternal is initially a possibility for the individual, 
who becomes eternal in time by willing to actualize it, and this bears strict ethical requirements 
that will bind him to people, events, and things in the world. Because the eternal is part of our 
telos as beings who have a drive for freedom, the possibility of becoming eternal is not just one 
possibility among others that may or may not become actualized; it is essential to us in that we 
are in the process of actualizing it as our reflective and volitional capacities develop in existence. 
Becoming eternal certainly involves recollection and rational thinking, but one does not recollect 
that one is necessarily eternal as Plato held. Hence, although the self is essentially eternal, it does 
not exist as eternal until it chooses to become so at a moment in time. When this happens, a 
personal breakthrough is achieved, and the individual becomes autonomous.  
 It should be noted that in affirming that the self exists concretely in time while choosing 
to become eternal at a certain point in its life, the Judge rejects the notion that the self is an 
eternal substance that is self-identical, and which bears properties that change over time. The 
person has the wrong idea about who he is, the Judge claims, if he believes that "he could be 
changed continually and yet remain the same, as if his innermost being were an algebraic symbol 
that could signify anything whatever it is assumed to be" (E/O II: 215). This would entail that the 
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self always was eternal, and not that it has the possibility of becoming eternal, which it might not 
choose to actualize. He therefore conceives of spiritual freedom as a changeless activity that 
emerges in time rather than as a substance.  
 One might object that because the self is essentially eternal, and aims to become this 
throughout the course of its development, it cannot be free. It would seem that its destiny is 
determined for it in advance, without it being able to choose it. The Judge, however, has a 
response to this worry. While all human beings are essentially eternal, and carry this spiritual 
potential within them, they are free to choose whether they will actualize it (E/O II: 205-206). 
However, the Judge believes that the individual will remain in despair if he refuses to actualize 
it, because in longing for freedom from the temporal as spirit, he inevitably wants an eternal 
form of existence, and he will not ultimately be fulfilled until this is attained. For instance, he 
might choose to remain in the esthetic stage of life, experimenting with different roles, 
occupations, or identities in an arbitrary fashion as he exploits the various possibilities for self-
creation available to him. But as we saw with the reflective esthete, while this unconstrained 
venture of the imagination might sound like freedom, it remains geared towards pleasure and 
amusement in the temporal, and will not provide him with lasting spiritual fulfillment. It also 
alienates him from the world and from himself as a human being in it, leaving him isolated in 
existence. The Judge believes that once the individual becomes self-enclosed through the 
development of reflection, he must become autonomous to will to open himself to everyday life 
in the world, but he is not required to make the choice to convert to the ethical. But on the 
Judge's view, if he does not work to establish a harmonious relationship with the world through 
the modest constraints of the ethical way of life, he is imprisoned within himself, and not truly 
free.    
 The Judge recognizes that on his view, radical measures need to be taken on the path 
toward self-realization, and that this would include acquiring a startling new conception of one's 
nature as the absolute. He explains that he is "fully aware that there is an earnestness about this 
that shakes the entire soul; to become conscious in one’s eternal validity is a moment that is 
more significant than everything else in the world" (E/O II: 206). Despite the difficulties and 
anxieties that attend this process, the Judge believes that as persons, it is in our nature to seek 
spiritual fulfillment as our telos. Our spiritual longing for freedom can indeed be quieted or 




observation as in the esthetic way of life, or through worldly activities that allow us to keep our 
attention occupied on things other than ourselves. Yet the Judge believes the desire for union 
with God persists alongside these diversions, and we are in despair until it is achieved. In his 
view, this will not happen until we turn inward and come to terms with our despair, which lurks 
within us so long as we invest our life in external conditions that are never really under our 
control. But in order for despair to be defeated and not simply gawked at, he believes one's 
freedom must be directed towards a concrete task that would galvanize his will while reconciling 
him with himself, society, and the world. He contends that the ethical way of life is perfectly 
suited to ground the self’s freedom through its demand for action chosen out of a sense of 
responsibility toward oneself, humanity, and ultimately God. It therefore brings the eternal and 
temporal aspects of the human being into agreement with one another.  
 
5.3 The Concrete Dimension of the Ethical Decision: Reconciliation in the Ethical Mode 
 For the Judge, knowing oneself is necessary for transforming one's moral character and 
re-orienting oneself in existence, but it is not sufficient for spiritual health. If an individual were 
to stall in abstractions at this point, without wanting to use his freedom to engage with people 
and affairs in the world, then he would remain beyond himself in despair like the reflective 
esthete, and would be horribly alienated from himself and from life in the world. In this section, I 
examine the Judge's contention that once one has chosen oneself absolutely, ethical action is 
needed to properly establish oneself in existence in one's essential freedom. Once the ethical is 
implemented in daily life, it is supposed to eliminate all the trappings of despair and enable 
spiritual fulfillment by providing the individual with (a) an eternal aim or purpose, (b) an internal 
condition for his happiness that lies within his power, (c) a way of reconciling himself with life 
in the world, and (d) a project that vivifies his will and anchors him in his concrete existence. 
This attitude adjustment that occurs after living esthetically requires that the individual use his 
freedom responsibly by assuming a lifestyle motivated by duty, which would give him the 
satisfaction of realizing the universally human as a particular individual. By coming to appreciate 
the humanity in every person, and focusing on our similarities rather than personal or cultural 
differences, he connects with the human race. After explaining how the individual is to change 
his basic disposition so that it is no longer despair, in the final part of this section, I go into some 




performance of duty gives him a reason to live, and would include things like marriage, work, 
and friendship.   
 
5.3.1 Re-entering The World When Choosing Oneself 
 Because choosing oneself absolutely in despair means choosing oneself apart from any 
finite or temporal condition whatsoever, it is, in the first moment, a choice to experience oneself 
as alienated from the world, and by extension, from oneself as an embodied human being within 
it. The Judge plainly suggests this when he states, “For the person in despair...it is no rhetorical 
expression but is the only adequate one when he sees on the one side the whole world and on the 
other side himself, his soul. In the moment of despair, the separation is evident" (E/O II: 221). In 
willing despair, the individual recognizes that he has become free from external conditions that 
would define him, but that he lacks integrity in existing both eternally and temporally. He is 
therefore divided against himself, occupying an ambiguous position that is both terrible and 
sublime. According to the Judge, he does not despair over the eternal aspect of his existence, 
since this divine attribute of his nature is precisely what "fills him with an indescribable bliss and 
gives him an absolute security" as the object of his spiritual longing (E/O II: 231). What he 
despairs over is being submerged in the temporal, which draws him away from the fullness, 
permanence, and changelessness of the eternal. The Judge indicates this by stating, "when I 
despair, I despair over myself just as over everything else. But the self over which I despair is 
something finite like everything else finite, whereas the self I choose is the absolute self" (E/O II: 
218-219). Hence, in the first moment of the more profound kind of self-knowledge, the 
individual faces a world that has come to seem completely foreign to him, and devoid of 
meaning or value. As an occupant of it, he has become a stranger to himself. The experience of 
this terror impels the individual to complete the transition into the ethical stage, where he can 
work toward perfecting himself in everyday living in a world that will gradually come to seem 
familiar and meaningful again. As Kant puts it: "Only the descent into the hell of self-cognition 
can pave the way to godliness."270  
 Like Anti-Climacus, the Judge does not seem to be suggesting that two different selves 
constitute a single individual, but rather that the individual consists of two conflicting aspects 
that need to be unified in order for despair to be resolved. One can refer to these different aspects 
                                                




by speaking of a "finite self" and an infinite or "absolute self," but really there is only one self 
that does not fully coincide with itself in oscillating between its eternal and temporal components 
during its passage through time. In the esthetic stage of life, in which the individual is 
heteronomous, his "finite self" is overemphasized, as he is drawn toward relative ends in the 
world. After serious reflection on himself and existence, the individual becomes capable of 
choosing himself as absolute over and against this multiplicity of external conditions that had 
determined his character and way of life as a "finite self". Upon collecting himself through the 
absolute choice, he discovers an internal condition to center his life on as an "infinite self", and 
things outside of him no longer possess him or define him. His identity will not be foisted upon 
him, but will be of his own making, and so he will be able to determine the definite 
characteristics that he has as a "finite self". But in gaining the freedom he had longed for as 
spirit, he despairs over his entanglement in a world that now seems alien to him, and in affairs 
that he has come to see as fleeting and empty.  
 Although the temporal is the ultimate contributor to despair, the Judge does not think one 
should divest oneself of it or fail to perceive significance or value in the world, since the eternal 
becomes actualized in one's existence as a human being. As a psyche-body composite that exists 
in relation to people and things in the world, the temporal is in fact an essential part of the human 
being, and he needs to care about his concrete situation to achieve wholeness and unity in his 
life. A Stoic might object to this approach as a way of attaining virtue, and advise us to regard 
the world with indifference. On this view, external objects and affairs are distractions or 
temptations whose influence one should aim to be rid of, so long as one wants to be self-
sufficient and in control of oneself as a rational being. Those who retain attachments to external 
objects are prone to emotional instability and suffering in being affected by things that are 
beyond their control, and so they will not be able to achieve lasting happiness in life. However, 
as Furtak notes in his Kierkegaardian criticism of Stoic thought:  
 
...the achieved calm of the sage who can drift through any situation without the risk of being moved is 
attained at a price: to be free from the burden of perceiving significance in life is to be closed off to the 
experience of value. Complete independence from contingent events can be preserved only by a person 




able to find meaning in the world. Stoic morality is consistent with, and may even entail, an existential 
despair...271 
 
The Judge agrees with the Stoic that one should seek wholeness within oneself, but since the self 
is ineluctably associated with objects and events in the world as a concrete being, this cannot 
involve a renunciation of it. If an individual were to refuse to care about things in the world, and 
intended to become emotionally detached from states of affairs in it, he would be divided as a 
self, and would remain self-enclosed. Even if the Stoic succeeds in achieving a tranquil state of 
apathy through this strategy, by not opening his heart to people, objects, or conditions outside of 
him, he would be unable to achieve the happiness that arises from attaining harmony in one's 
existence.   
 In embracing his life as a whole with his new understanding of himself, the individual 
who has chosen himself ethically affirms the goodness of everyday life in the world. However, 
he initially has the problem of integrating the eternal and temporal components of his nature. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how this union between essentially dissimilar things could be 
accomplished. When the self is considered absolutely, apart from any definite concrete entity or 
external determination, it would seem to exist as a pure abstraction barred from contact with 
anything in the world. If an individual were to remain suspended in this state, without any 
intention to engage with the world or the finite aspect of himself, radical isolation would be 
insurmountable, along with the most aggravated kind of despair. To defuse this worry, the Judge 
clarifies that the self that is chosen absolutely in despair has both abstract and concrete 
dimensions: "But what is this self of mine? If I were to speak of a first moment, a first expression 
for it, then my answer is this: It is the most abstract of all, and yet in itself it is also the most 
concrete of all—it is freedom" (E/O II: 214). The Judge explains that the self so chosen would 
only seem to be an abstraction initially, and that in order for an individual to understand himself 
properly, he must also see himself in his given concretion: 
 
...at the first moment of choice the personality seemingly emerges as naked as the infant from the mother's 
womb; at the next moment it is concrete in itself, and a person can remain at this point only through an 
arbitrary abstraction. He remains himself, exactly the same that he was before, down to the most 
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insignificant feature, and yet he becomes another, for the choice penetrates everything and changes it. Thus 
his finite personality is now made infinite in the choice, in which he infinitely chooses himself. (E/O II: 
213) 
  
On his account, the self does not remain timelessly hovering above the world in choosing itself 
out of it, for then the individual would be something like a pure spirit dissociated completely 
from its embodied condition. Obviously one's freedom is not empty so long as one perceives 
oneself to be a human being in the world, with ties to one's embodiment and the surrounding 
world. Consequently, the self does not refuse to involve itself with the surrounding world upon 
making the absolute choice, but rather wills to give concrete content to freedom by wanting to be 
itself. It therefore affirms that it wants to be "this specific individual with these capacities, these 
inclinations, these drives, these passions, influenced by this specific social milieu, as this specific 
product of a specific environment (E/O II: 251), or what Anti-Climacus would call its "finite 
self." This choice is not determined by causal processes unfolding by necessity within the 
external world, but occurs through an original act of self-determination that can only be realized 
once the person has found himself, bare and naked, at a point outside of the world.272 The Judge 
summarizes the act of appropriation through which freedom "clothes" itself in its concretion by 
stating: "The true concrete choice is the one by which I choose myself back into the world the 
very same moment I choose myself out of the world" (E/O II: 249). The individual thereby takes 
the first step in resolving the painful separation that occurred through the absolute choice by 
identifying with his embodied condition as a free agent. Someone who conceives of himself in a 
purely spiritual way has the freedom to choose not to make this identification, but if he does not, 
he will remain disintegrated as a self. 
 While the individual longs for freedom, in despair, he recognizes that this cannot be won 
in a vacuum. According to the Judge, the freedom that he seeks cannot be a purely negative 
freedom that characterizes an ironist like A, who has made himself light and airy by withdrawing 
into his imagination. In the same way, it cannot be attained in a Stoical fashion, or through the 
speculative thought of the philosophers, which is "calm and free" in its disinterested 
contemplation of the universe.273 Instead, freedom must be realized positively through ethical 
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action that has real consequences, and the resolution to live ethically gives his existence 
substance and weight. Consequently, in longing for freedom, one longs for unity between the 
eternal and temporal components in oneself, and not for the eternal alone. In forging this unity by 
wanting to be itself in its concretion, the self intends to overcome alienation and restore a sense 
of belonging in the world, while still retaining its autonomy. The Judge believes that if the 
individual succeeds in establishing this union, he will attain happiness, since his longing for 
freedom would be fully satisfied. Hence, in choosing himself absolutely in time, the possibility 
of being eternal becomes actualized in a concrete sense, and he achieves integrity as a self. By 
cultivating this union between the temporal and eternal aspects of oneself through the ethical 
way of life, the Judge believes that despair can be defeated. 
 
5.3.2 The Transfiguration of the Self in Freedom  
 The Judge nevertheless has something peculiar in mind when he states that the self 
becomes itself by choosing itself back into the world after choosing itself out of it. In order for 
freedom to emerge in truth, the self, in a state of detachment from the world, must assimilate the 
world and its concretion into itself as spirit. By doing so, the self takes up an anthropocentric 
relation to the world, revolving around itself rather than external objects.274 It cannot retain 
possession of itself in freedom by being assimilated into the world in unreflective pursuit of 
external objects, since then it would be in the clutches of the temporal and the externally 
determined sequence of events that happen out of necessity. Supposing that it were even possible 
to become immersed in life in the world after one has become so detached from it through 
heightened reflection, this would be a regress to the unreflective immediacy of the esthetic mode, 
and "to damage one's soul" by forfeiting one's eternal aspect (E/O II: 220). The Judge describes 
the process of reconciliation between self and world that occurs through the absolute choice by 
stating: 
 
In the moment of choice, he is in complete isolation, for he withdraws from his social milieu, and yet at the 
same moment he is in absolute continuity, for he chooses himself as a product. And this choice is 
freedom’s choice in such a way that in choosing himself as product he can just as well be said to produce 
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himself…As product he is squeezed into the forms of actuality; in the choice he makes himself elastic, 
transforms everything exterior into interiority. He has his place in the world; in freedom he himself chooses 
his place—that is, he chooses this place. (E/O II: 251) 
 
The self is originally a product of nature as God's creation, but once it has separated itself from 
nature and society by becoming absolute, it must appropriate its concrete existence by bringing 
its worldly life into accord with its spiritual life. The Judge explains that this act of self-
constitution is "a movement from himself through the world to himself," indicating that he 
moves himself to embrace life in the world out of his longing for unity and wholeness, rather 
than anything else in the world motivating him to do it (E/O II: 274). He claims that in doing 
this, all of his history becomes "my personal deed in such a way that even that which has 
happened to me is transformed and transferred from necessity to freedom" (E/O II: 250). This 
does not mean that he morally approves of everything he did or of what happened to him in the 
past, but rather that he accepts it all as his own, however unpleasant some of it is. In establishing 
continuity with his embodied condition and his external environment by taking it all up in 
freedom, he becomes his own maker, and although he exists eternally, he acquires a personal 
history in time. In acquiring a personal history through this passionate involvement with 
existence, his life no longer consists of a series of loosely connected events that do not amount to 
anything more than fragments in his memory, or as a mere period of world history. In firmly 
identifying with the person he was in the past as eternal, he conceives of the many episodes of 
his life as being bound together in such a way that they compose a unified whole. In bringing 
synchronic and diachronic unity to his life through the assertion of will, he intends to resolve the 
internal conflict that is characteristic of despair. 
 The Judge's account of self-constitution is strange, but there is a rationale behind it. In 
choosing himself in a concrete sense, the individual no longer considers his human condition as 
foreign or alien to him, or as the product of external causes, or even as his fate. He does not want 
to admit that he exists as a human being without him willing it, since then he would no longer 
understand himself as being in possession of his life. To prove to himself that he is free, and 
avoid feeling powerless and passive to greater forces outside of him as A does, he chooses to 
make his concrete condition an essential part of himself. In becoming active as a free agent, he 
wills to take responsibility not only for everything that he does, and for everything that he did in 




to the absolute choice, they had occurred naturally without him truly willing them, but upon 
recollecting them, he assumes responsibility for them. This action demonstrates the extreme 
measures the Judge will take to elude the fear of viewing his entire life as the outcome of 
circumstances beyond his control. This is an anxiety that is liable to send him into despair. 
 While it is part of his strategy for defeating despair, it seems that the Judge is only 
deceiving himself in believing that what he had no choice in is really something he freely chose. 
In admitting that his specific background as a human being is originally a product of necessity, 
the Judge recognizes that things he does not control determine a huge portion of his life, and so it 
would seem that he could only pretend to be his own maker.275 The Judge might respond to this 
worry by acknowledging that God created these conditions ex nihilo, but since he attains unity 
with God in choosing himself absolutely, he can come to deem them his own product. However, 
one does not need to endorse the theism of Anti-Climacus to cast doubt on this self-positing 
thesis.276 Fortunately, his account does not hinge on the radical notion that he is responsible for 
his entire constitution as a human being, and for everything that has ever happened to him, 
whether it is a case of bad luck or merely being born. One can therefore reject this effort to 
harmonize the self with the natural world while still finding merit in the Judge's position. His 
view is consistent with a weaker conception of freedom, where the autonomous person holds 
himself responsible for some things in his life but not others, and does not admit complete 
control over every aspect of it. For example, he might take responsibility for his actions and 
character as a human being, but not for his place of birth, how he was raised, or for the fact that 
he is a human being and not another animal. Some things can remain accidental. In section 2.5, I 
explain that repentance, love, and work can also serve as binding powers in the ethical mode 
where a heroic effort of the will of the kind he describes might fail.   
  Because the self is absolute in its freedom, the Judge does not believe that it has an 
essence in the way that other things in time do. For example, it is in the essence of a table to 
serve a certain function––namely, to support physical objects––and it is not free to do otherwise. 
However, when he has become free by choosing himself absolutely, it is up to the person to 
determine his essence by deciding what to make of himself as a moral agent. The individual 
living esthetically is not able to genuinely decide on this, since he lacks knowledge of himself 
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and his freedom. Of course, since he is a human organism, he is a different kind of thing than a 
table, but the Judge believes both are similar in that they are causally necessitated to do what 
they do. He states that in his immediacy, the individual who lives esthetically "develops with 
necessity, not in freedom; no metamorphosis takes place in him, no infinite internal movement 
by which he comes to the point from which he becomes the person he becomes" (E/O II: 225). 
With "a development just like that of a plant" (E/O II: 225), his actions, attitudes, and desires are 
determined by natural necessity, without him stepping in to alter the natural course of things 
through higher-order volitions guided by reflective judgment.277 Consequently, the self does 
have an essence in being eternal (E/O II: 160), but this essence is originally minimal and not yet 
actual. The person must flesh this out for itself and actualize the potential to be eternal by 
deciding on what he must do to live ethically, and willing this into being.  
 Since the individual living esthetically is entangled in life in the world, which consists of 
contingent products of creation, the Judge believes that everything is equally accidental for him, 
even if he believes that certain traits or characteristics belong to him essentially. These things 
exist by chance and could just as easily have been otherwise, even though they are subject to 
natural necessity in being created by God. Insofar as this individual exists amid the transient 
conditions of the temporal, and defines himself solely by them, his life is "totally inessential" 
(E/O II: 260). However, this is not the case for the individual living ethically, who has become 
conscious of his spiritual essence, along with his need to realize his essence in existence by 
becoming what he is. The Judge explains that, for the person who is determining himself 
ethically: "Everything that is posited in his freedom belongs to him essentially, however 
accidental it may seem to be; everything that is not posited in his freedom is accidental, however 
essential it may seem to be" (E/O II: 260). We have seen that this is a step that the reflective 
esthete does not make in seeing his whole life as a cosmic accident. In becoming highly 
reflective, A had realized how contingent and inexplicable the human condition is. He admits to 
feeling like a child out in the middle of the ocean who is supposed to learn to swim, without 
knowing what is supporting him, what had put him there, or where he is headed (E/O I: 31-32). 
Not only do such realizations terrify him, but they also contribute to a form of alienation that is 
characteristic of despair.  
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 The individual who has decided to live ethically, however, has a way of coping with his 
contingent existence that takes him out of a helpless state of passivity. In wanting to be himself 
in his concrete situation, he chooses to take responsibility for his life, and wants to support 
himself in the ethical project. By becoming responsible for himself and his actions, he "possesses 
himself as an individual who has these capacities, these passions, these inclinations, these habits, 
who is subject to these external influences, who is influenced in one direction thus and in another 
thus" (E/O II: 262). In directing his life autonomously in the ethical mode, he does not conceive 
of his life as the product of alien forces, or as something that merely happens to him, but instead, 
thinks of it as being of his own making. He is, after all, the absolute, and in finding himself in 
essential agreement with God, who had originally created the world and human life ex nihilo, he 
no longer perceives the things he stands in relation to as being alien to him. In choosing what 
concrete qualities belong to him essentially, the individual reconciles himself with himself, the 
world, and ultimately with God, whom he trusts will continue to support the ethical project.  
 The Judge's choice to make what is already and necessarily given in his life essential to 
him would seem to be evidence that he only pretends to rule himself, while recognizing that he is 
ruled by his physical and psychological constitution, together with events unfolding in the world. 
The Judge indeed makes himself vulnerable to such criticisms, but he is not saying that the 
autonomous person cannot go on to make significant changes to his life to convert to the ethical 
mode, or that these changes would be the product of necessity rather than free choice. Rather, his 
claim is that the person who has chosen to become autonomous accepts full responsibility for the 
person he is, and for the changes that he will go on to make. On his libertarian account of 
freedom, the choices he makes as an autonomous agent are not determined by natural, logical, or 
historical necessity, but are determined by him alone (E/O II: 174). As the absolute, he 
transcends any finite system that would contain him. The Judge explains that the "interior deed" 
that corresponds with his choice to become autonomous "belongs to him and will belong to him 
forever; history or world history cannot take it from him; it follows him, either to his joy or to his 
despair" (E/O II: 175). He can, however, decide that certain elements within a given system 
belong to him essentially, and he must do this with the specific features of his life to recapture 
the joy of life in the world and defeat despair.  
 On the Judge's libertarian conception of freedom, freedom does not come to the human 




raises the question of how someone could choose himself into this if he did not already have this 
freedom by nature. It would seem that one must already be free to make the choice to become 
free. In response to this worry, one can recall that on the Judge's view, the individual living 
esthetically has the potential to become free, but is not yet actually free. However, as a spiritual 
being, his ultimate aim is freedom, and he is in the process of actualizing this potential in the 
world as his reflective and volitional capacities develop. These capacities require the right type 
of physical and psychological constitution for their realization, but they also require a period of 
social conditioning in which the individual acquires language and is educated on the norms and 
practices of his culture. As these capacities develop and are exercised in the habits and routines 
of daily life, freedom gradually emerges in his life, and the individual matures as a spiritual 
being. As this happens, he begins to think for himself, and will likely challenge some of the 
beliefs and values he has inherited from his culture. He might also be experiencing detachment 
after dealing with suffering or loss, or from feeling unfulfilled, and this would lead him to 
critically question his purpose and the greater significance of things. Hence, there is a sense in 
which such individuals who are on the precipice of despair are free, but they have not used the 
freedom they have achieved to resolve to take control over their lives by choosing themselves 
absolutely. They remain bound by external conditions in pursuit of transient pleasures or 
contentment, even though these bonds have loosened or disintegrated, and their knowledge of 
themselves is inadequate. A is an example of a person who has come to the position where he can 
choose to take control of his life and restore the unity with the world that he lost through 
heightened reflection, but because he resists becoming conscious of himself in the fullest sense, 
he is not yet autonomous. He can become free in the absolute sense only if gains this awareness 
and carries through his development by choosing himself apart from anything external.  
 The Judge's account of human freedom prefigures the anti-essentialism of later 
existentialists like Sartre, but it is important to note that the Judge does not believe that the 
human being has no essence, or has the freedom to create his own essence and set his own ends 
in whatever way he wants. “The person who chooses himself ethically has himself as his task, 
not as a possibility, not as a plaything for the play of his arbitrariness" (E/O II: 258). As a 
reflective esthete and ironist, A had attempted to imaginatively invent himself in a whimsical 
fashion, exploring different identities without making anything definite of himself or establishing 




done without external compulsion, but this unprincipled use of freedom is not true freedom, on 
the Judge's view. However detached and independent the individual has become in reflection, 
and however crafty he might be in his scheming or role-playing, these arbitrary "free acts" of 
self-creation are in thrall to empty sensuality, and are performed for the sake of transient 
pleasure. The reflective esthete lives in an episodic and even chaotic manner, without having 
earnestly collected himself through the eternal element in him. Without maintaining consistency 
and coherence in his life through a principled commitment to live ethically, he cannot maintain 
his composure in the process of reflecting and willing. If he cannot do this, he cannot be said to 
truly make his own decisions, and so is not truly free, however much he claims to be.  
 True freedom, on the other hand, requires integrating oneself with oneself and the world, 
and thereby eliminating the despair that characterizes the ironist. It is therefore subject to certain 
constraints that significantly narrow the possibilities for what one can genuinely choose to be. 
The Judge explains: 
 
...this distinction [between the essential and the accidental] is not a product of his arbitrariness so that he 
might seem to have absolute power to make himself into whatever it pleased him to be. To be sure, the 
ethical individual dares to employ the expression that he is his own editor, but he is also fully aware that he 
is responsible, responsible for himself personally, inasmuch as what he chooses will have a decisive 
influence on himself, responsible to the order of things in which he lives, responsible to God...essentially 
only that belongs to me which I ethically take on as a task. (E/O II: 260)  
 
The only rational outcome of the absolute choice once it is properly implemented, he believes, is 
the ethical way of life. While the individual does not originally choose to be a human being in 
the natural world, his specific, concrete characteristics become essential to his identity when he 
appropriates them in freedom. Since they become of his own making, he holds himself 
accountable for them all. In accepting responsibility for himself, for the people he is related to, 
and for the contingent features of his life, and embracing it all as an ethical task, he sincerely 
affirms that he wants to be the particular human being he is, and to be a part of the milieu that he 
resides in. He cannot endeavor a wholesale revision of social conditions or the natural world, 
which largely determine his concrete situation. So long as he does not decide to accept himself in 




 This change of attitude is a dramatic reversal of course, given that his earthly condition 
had been the occasion for his despair when he was living esthetically. If we follow Anti-
Climacus on this point, we must conclude that in recoiling from this condition through reflection 
in the esthetic mode, the individual who has now chosen himself ethically did not want to be 
himself in a concrete sense. Instead, he sought freedom from his earthly condition by detaching 
himself from it, and used his imagination to experiment with his life in whatever way he fancied. 
It is strange that he would change his mind so drastically by deciding to live ethically, but the 
Judge thinks he will be liable to do so once he recognizes how deep in despair he is. One need 
only consult a ghostly figure like Johannes the Seducer, who lives entirely out of his imagination 
without truly relating himself to others, to appreciate how horrible the isolation of inclosing 
reserve can be, and how desperate one might be to find a way out of it. As Climacus puts it in 
reflecting on the main theme in Either/Or, "With the passion of the infinite, the ethicist in the 
moment of despair had chosen himself out of the terror of having himself, his life, his actuality 
in esthetic dreams, in depression, in hiddenness" (CUP: 258).  
 By learning the truth about himself in choosing himself ethically, however, the individual 
realizes there is no need to despair after all, and that his previous attitude had rested on a 
mistaken conception of himself. Not only can he attain the freedom he longs for as spirit, but in 
uniting with the eternal God, he will also be able to open himself to the world, to others, and to 
himself, while nevertheless thinking for himself and being in firm command of himself. His 
position is similar to those in the immediate esthetic or public modes in that these individuals 
also enjoy an intimate connection with the world, but since they do not know themselves as 
spirit, they do not possess these qualities, and so are underdeveloped as selves. In becoming 
independent by liberating themselves from their primitive earthly condition, reflective esthetes 
like Johannes and A have reached a stage of personal development in which they can realize their 
latent spiritual capacities in existence if they will it. To carry it through and overcome despair, 
however, the Judge believes they would need to return to the reality of life in the world, and find 
ground beneath his feet again by affirming it wholeheartedly. 
 
5.3.3 Restoring One's Bond with the World Through Repentance 
 On the Judge's view, choosing to make the many contingent features of one's existence 




being has isolated himself in despair to the extent that a reflective esthete has, and becomes 
acutely aware of his freedom and responsibility, he becomes aware of himself as guilty. The 
Judge writes, "only when I choose myself as guilty do I absolutely choose myself, and if I am at 
all to choose myself absolutely in such a way that it is not identical with creating myself" (E/O 
II: 216-217). The ironist believes he can use his imagination to create himself out of the 
nothingness of possibility, conferring his own meaning onto things while heaping scorn on a 
mundane reality that has lost significance for him. The individual who chooses himself ethically, 
however, does not think of this choice as an arbitrary act of self-creation that occurs apart from 
his relations with others, or independently of the concrete conditions that have made him who he 
is. In affirming his guilt, he accepts that there are definite faults in his character, and that the 
mistakes he made in living esthetically have substantially shaped his current condition. 
Recognizing that he cannot start from scratch, and that he is not a blank slate, he does not 
abstract himself from it, or from the errors of his past that have contributed to it, but bears full 
responsibility for it. In admitting that he had been prone to selfish and unprincipled conduct, he 
also admits that his personal history, in which he stands in relation to all of humanity, "contains 
painful things" that he takes responsibility for (E/O II: 216). He therefore recognizes the 
powerful influence that social or environmental factors have had on him, and knows that this 
could occasionally lead to wrongful beliefs, attitudes, or actions, but he admits that he was 
complicit in this. By aiming to live ethically, however, he acknowledges the freedom he has to 
reform his character and perform the right actions in the future. In acknowledging his corruption 
as a member of nature and society, he does not focus on particular actions that made him this 
way, but in despair, views himself as essentially guilty.  
 Although reflection on one's guilt is painful, the resultant despair is a felix culpa, or a 
fortunate fall, because it culminates in the moment in which one can choose to adopt the ethical 
way of life as an autonomous agent. Convinced that this is the highest achievement for a human 
being, the Judge states, "any human being who has not tasted the bitterness of despair has fallen 
short of the meaning of life, even if his life has been ever so beautiful, ever so abundantly happy” 
(E/O II: 208). Fortunately, in seeking atonement for his flaws and misdeeds, the liberated 
individual has recourse to repentance. The Judge claims, "choosing oneself is identical with 
repenting oneself, because repentance places the individual in the closest connection and the 




himself ethically regrets that he did not take ethical demands seriously enough in the past, and 
that he had wronged himself and others in numerous ways, but his remorse binds him to himself, 
and strengthens his attachments to the people around him. For this reason, the Judge states he 
"repents himself back into himself, back into the family, back into the race, until he finds himself 
in God" (E/O II: 216). By reaching out to others and embracing his concrete condition in 
repentance, he affirms that he belongs to the world essentially as a human being, while still 
remaining his own person. This act of repentance is different from ordinary acts of repentance in 
that it has humankind in its purview rather than select individuals, and so is ultimately directed to 
God, from whom humanity originated. However, it is similar to standard acts of repentance in 
that it intends to establish an intimate bond with its target. Through this sweeping act of 
repentance, he opens himself to human life in general, rather than despair over it like the 
reflective esthete.  
 To prevent the ethical way of life from being confused with the religious way of life, it 
should be said that although the Judge proclaims himself a Christian, and views himself as 
essentially guilty in relation to God, he does not seek atonement in Christ. He expects that 
reconciliation with God and the world He created will be achieved not through Christ's death on 
the cross, but through his own efforts. He does not repent out of concern for future salvation in a 
world to come, but because it yields immediate results in resolving despair. Stressing the 
importance of repentance, the Judge acknowledges that if it were an illusion, and failed to unite 
him with what he repents to, he would remain alienated from the world and in despair, much like 
the reflective esthete (E/O II: 238). The Judge hopes that repentance will be met with forgiveness 
(E/O II: 237), but since God is not a particular person that can forgive such acts, this would mean 
living in harmony with the social order. Since he believes the individual living ethically achieves 
this union, he must think repentance is successful if it is undertaken earnestly. In possessing 
himself, and in caring about people and things outside of himself in repenting to them, the 
individual is assured of salvation in the present moment, and does not have to hope that it arrives 
later (E/O II: 216). His religious views are therefore ancillary to the ethical commitment. God 
serves to underwrite the ethical project, rather than making demands that might conflict with it.  
 The Judge believes that repentance is also a crucial expression of personal responsibility 
and freedom (E/O II: 251). By momentarily taking leave of the bustle of everyday life and 




previous actions, including those that led to despair. Because repentance demands that the 
individual examine himself closely, the Judge recognizes there is a sense in which it isolates him. 
This individuating effect might seem counterproductive in overcoming despair, but because it is 
directed outwardly, "in another way it binds me indissolubly to the whole human race" (E/O II: 
239). From such passages, one can see that the Judge values repentance for its paradoxical 
character. Not only does it unite the autonomous individual with the surrounding world, but it 
also maintains a degree of separation between them so that freedom of thought and the will is 
preserved. Since the self is the absolute, this is a separation that actually exists and should be 
acknowledged, although it can be mitigated when he commits himself to the world, to others, and 
to God in repentance. It is not necessarily a one-time act that would permanently cure him of 
despair, but would need to be repeated if he notices the relations that he bears with them 
weakening.  
 An important outcome of repentance is that the individual repenting becomes intensely 
conscious of himself as a free agent, which the Judge believes is essential to living ethically. On 
the Judge's account, the ethical way of life requires a vigilant awareness of one's actions and 
disposition to ensure that one acts responsibly under the given circumstances. While it involves 
external actions with real consequences, these actions are the product of intentions that the 
individual closely supervises, and this makes all the difference in determining whether or not the 
action was undertaken ethically (E/O II: 174). He states: 
 
But to choose oneself abstractly is not to choose oneself ethically. Not until a person in his choice has taken 
himself upon himself, has put on himself, has totally interpenetrated himself so that every movement he makes 
is accompanied by a consciousness of responsibility for himself—not until then has a person chosen himself 
ethically...not until then is he concrete, not until then is he in his total isolation in absolute continuity with the 
actuality to which he belongs. (E/O II: 248) 
 
The Judge believes that in internally monitoring one's condition in this way, and being cognizant 
of those things which might get in the way of carrying out one's responsibilities, one becomes 
self-disciplined, and this is needed to maintain a firm and stable character. In a nod to the virtue 
ethics of the ancient Greeks, he explains that the person living ethically "possesses himself as a 
task in such a way that it is chiefly to order, shape, temper, inflame, control—in short, to produce 




controlling the volatile moods, passions, and desires that arise in him through higher-order 
volitions, the individual living ethically retains his integrity as a person, while the individual 
living esthetically, in his whimsical toying with life, sorely lacks this. Sensuous desires, 
unbridled passions, and appetites rule the esthetic individual in his pursuit of transient pleasure, 
but the ethical individual both rules himself and is ruled by himself as an autonomous agent. The 
conflict one has with one's natural impulses and inclinations indicates division in the self. But as 
Aristotle explains, the individual can overcome this by educating them, so that he has the right 
passions for the right things on the right occasions.278 As he continues to work on himself and 
struggles for sovereignty over himself, his passions and inclinations would gradually become 
aligned with his will.279 Once they have reached equilibrium, psychological conflict would be 
eliminated, and virtue would be attained. On the Judge's view, by achieving unity with God, 
himself and the external world through repentance, and unity within himself through controlling 
his natural impulses, freedom is realized in existence, and despair is defeated.  
 
5.3.4 The Call of Conscience: Integrating the Universal and Particular 
 We have seen that the desire to overcome despair would motivate the reflective esthete to 
adopt an ethical way of life. In realizing how isolated he has become by disengaging from 
everyday life in the world and indulging in reverie, despair reaches its culmination. While he 
learns of his freedom in choosing himself absolutely, the freedom he discovers also makes him 
feel guilty and produces anxiety. The need to rid himself of his negative thoughts and feelings 
spurs him to break from his self-enclosure and open himself to daily affairs, projects, and 
relationships with other people. Anxiety, guilt, and despair can therefore be productive in the 
sense that they are able to rouse individuals to positive action and jolt them back into 
participation in the world. It is true that a reflective esthete like A is highly active in thought, but 
he shuns earthly action in approaching his life as a spectator, and thinks he has lost the ability to 
care about anything. The Judge, however, advises him to translate this activity into ethical action, 
and suggests that nihilistic thoughts and painful feelings in individuals like A might eventually 
inspire him to become passionately concerned about ethical matters. “The crux of the matter, 
then, is the energy by which I become ethically conscious, or, more correctly, I cannot become 
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ethically conscious without energy. Therefore, I cannot become ethically conscious without 
becoming conscious of my eternal being" (E/O II: 270). This passionate energy that fuels things 
like repentance and ethical commitment does not come from thin air, or even from the individual 
conjuring it up out of nothing through the will. It comes from the psychical pressure that is 
released when he resolves to open himself to ethical engagement with the world upon choosing 
himself absolutely.  
 According to the Judge, the decision to channel "the energy of despair" bottled up within 
oneself into concentration on ethical pursuits generates a momentum that allows one to proceed 
through everyday life in the world passionately, and without reservation. This individual 
discloses himself through sincere speech and behavior, and does not conceal his true feelings 
about things in the way that the reflective esthete does (E/O II: 322). For the Judge, true freedom 
cannot lie in ironic detachment, duplicitous dealings with others, or in a listless refusal to take 
anything seriously. These negative attitudes deprive life of its impetus, and exacerbate the 
conflict between self and world that characterizes despair. Instead, freedom is realized in 
existence when one becomes interested in ethical action, and is directed by the need to eliminate 
the guilt, anxiety, isolation, and despair that would otherwise mar freedom. By committing 
oneself to the ethical way of life, one fits in with the world and society again. 
 The Judge believes that good action comes naturally from those who have become 
enlivened by making the ethical resolution. By willing with energy and passion, the individual 
will come to recognize what the right thing to do is, even if some mistakes are made along the 
way. Because the Judge intends to avoid the pitfalls of reflection, and the paralysis of choice that 
can occur when confronted with too many options, he thinks little time should be spent on 
deliberating about what one should do (E/O II: 164). He writes: 
 
...what is important in choosing is not so much to choose the right thing as the energy, the earnestness, and 
the pathos with which one chooses. In the choosing the personality declares itself in its inner infinity and in 
turn the personality is thereby consolidated. Therefore, even though a person chose the wrong thing, he 
nevertheless, by virtue of the energy with which he chose, will discover that he chose the wrong thing. (E/O 
II: 167) 
 
So long as one becomes intensely conscious of what one is doing, and wills to be oneself 




activity of freedom results in good actions, the Judge adopts Fichte's view that wrongful action 
results from the failure of the agent to exert himself in his willing.280 Fichte argues that such 
laziness arises from inertia or sluggishness that stems from our animal nature, and that this is 
capable of compromising the will by impairing our cognition of what it is we should be doing. It 
is not that this laziness makes us avoid doing what is right when we have a clear understanding 
of what this is, but rather that it obscures or distorts our understanding of it by dulling our 
reflective capacity. The Judge does not elaborate on this idea in much detail in his letters, but it is 
suggested when he refers to the "confused excitement of dark impulses" that affect the individual 
living esthetically (E/O II: 59). It also emerges when he chastises the reflective esthete for idly 
contemplating life rather than participating responsibly in everyday affairs (E/O II: 195). 
Kierkegaard also alludes to it in his later religious works. For instance, in an edifying discourse, 
he compares the temporal to a "parasitic plant" that can entangle the individual in worldly 
concerns if he does not resist this by cleaving to God (CD: 98). On both views, these are signs of 
despair, even if the individual is not conscious of it. 
 Of course, this is all quite vague, and raises questions concerning what the good is, where 
it originates, and how it is determined. Like Kant, who locates the good in the nature of persons, 
the Judge argues that goodness originates in autonomy, and cannot be derived from states of 
affairs or consequences of actions. The Judge defines the good as freedom, and as such, it is not 
dependent on external conditions that would determine it (E/O II: 224). For this reason, the good 
is not to be defined by the adherence to contracts or positive laws, whether actual or idealized, as 
the contractarian claims, or by pleasure as the utilitarian claims (which would be an esthetic 
thesis). Similarly, the good does not exist outside the individual as an object to be known through 
reason or moral intuition as realists would hold, since this would mean that the will is 
heteronomous, and therefore unfree. But his identification of the good with freedom does not 
make the Judge a moral relativist who thinks anything goes when it comes to deciding what acts 
are good. He claims: 
 
The good is because I will it, and otherwise it is not at all. This is the expression of freedom, and the same 
is also the case with evil—it is only inasmuch as I will it. This in no way reduces or lowers the categories 
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of good and evil to merely subjective categories. On the contrary, the absolute validity of these categories is 
declared. (E/O II: 224) 
 
Under ethical considerations, the distinction between good and evil does not arise out of 
necessity, but through the will of the person who has chosen himself absolutely. In other words, 
it is only when one chooses to live ethically that the difference between good and evil truly 
comes to light. Those who live esthetically might speak of things as being or good and evil, but 
since their actions are based on subjective interests and motivated by immediate feeling or 
inclination, "this difference is latent" (E/O II: 223). This does not mean that they are caught up in 
evil, but rather that they are essentially indifferent to good and evil alike, given that they have 
not understood what these are by having realized their freedom (E/O II: 169). By knowing the 
demands of the ethical through an energetic involvement with existence, the self-actualized 
person would hold an objective criterion for judging what things fall into these categories. 
 The Judge claims that the criterion that guides the person living ethically toward the good 
is dictated by the universal, which is an ideal present in all human beings that constitutes the 
formal basis for ethical norms and practices. He states that the presence of the universal in the 
human being demonstrates that there is a "rational order of things" (E/O II: 292), which suggests 
that he offers a rationalist account of the ethical way of life. In being rational, the universal is 
"abstract" and "takes the form of law" (E/O II: 255). On this point, he seems to follow Kant in 
taking reason to be universally valid for human beings, and to supply them with a law that 
regulates their thoughts and actions with necessity. But with his notion of autonomy, he departs 
from Kant's view that the will gives itself a law by which it can judge whether or not a specific 
intention or action is moral (E/O II: 264). For Kant, an action is moral if it can be willed as a 
universal law for all rational beings, where immoral actions are those that cannot consistently be 
willed or conceived of as laws of this kind.281 The Judge, however, suggests that moral 
deliberation begins with a comprehensive assessment of the specific features of one's concrete 
circumstances, and not with a general principle that is used to test the fitness of an action for 
universal legislation. In assuming the form of law, the universal does not command or prohibit 
any particular actions, but only enjoins the individual to become himself. It therefore prescribes 
that he uses the material conditions he is situated in "to transform himself into the universal 
                                                




individual" (E/O II: 261). With an assessment of his particular conditions in hand, he aims to 
follow this prescription in daily life and do what is necessary to realize the universal in existence. 
In figuring out what specific actions he must take to obey this command, his central task in living 
ethically is to become himself through participation in life in the world. 
 In defense of this as the supreme moral imperative, the Judge rejects the formalism of 
Kant, which he suggests denies the self its "living interaction with these specific surroundings, 
these life conditions, this order of things" in treating it too abstractly (E/O II: 262). Criticizing 
the notion of pure rational agency, the Judge explains that the individual actualizes his potential 
to become the universal individual "not by taking off his concretion, for then he becomes a 
complete non-entity, but by putting it on and interpenetrating it with the universal" (E/O II: 256). 
From this, one can see that the Judge appropriates the German Idealist notion that every human 
being is both an individual and the universal. The universal is common to all human beings, 
despite our particular differences as individuals, and initially exists within us as potential to be 
realized (E/O II: 261). In this way, each one of us is essentially the universal individual, and is 
connected with all others. Of course, in emphasizing the concrete dimension of human existence, 
the Judge believes that our specific characteristics and circumstances define us in large measure. 
However, he insists that if we are to live ethically and not egotistically like those who live 
esthetically tend to do, we ought to set aside our differences from others, and not attribute much 
importance to what makes us unique or different (E/O II: 228). By appreciating what makes all 
of us the same, we would value the humanity in every individual, and expand our domain of 
concern beyond the narrow confines of our personal lives. When one's particular condition 
corresponds with universally human values and characteristics, freedom becomes actualized, and 
one's telos is fulfilled. When this happens, one becomes what one essentially is, and despair is 
eliminated. 
 Unfortunately, the Judge does little to explain how one would actually achieve this unity 
in practice, and does not provide an adequate account of the kinds of beliefs, practices, norms, 
and values one would have to endorse to shape oneself into "the universal individual." Since the 
universal has a social basis in being shared by all human beings, it would seem that the 
individual would have to take the customs and norms of his milieu into consideration when 
determining how he should apply the universal in his particular case. However, the Judge never 




being willing to reject beliefs and practices that he deems morally wrong upon reflection. While 
he seems to think reason is pivotal to a proper understanding of right and wrong, his failure to 
elaborate on this point or explain the connection between reason and the universal is a 
shortcoming in his thought. 
 To get a better sense of what the Judge likely has in mind, one can consult the writings of 
Fichte, who also believed that ethics was grounded in autonomy of the will, and that freedom is 
the final end of morality for human beings.282 In contrast to Kant, and like the Judge, Fichte 
argues that moral cognition begins with a careful assessment of one's concrete situation rather 
than with an abstract rule by which to test particular actions for rational consistency. On his 
view, with "absolute freedom from all limitation" as the guiding principle of morality for rational 
beings, the individual must determine how to act given the definite limitations of his situation.283 
As he draws on background beliefs about the natural world, society, history, natural laws, 
empirical regularities, and the like to negotiate this tension in a particular case, a specific 
imperative is produced. This imperative directs him to perform that action that seems best to 
promote freedom from external determination and limitation, both for himself and for other 
rational beings. These specific imperatives will vary based on the unique circumstances that the 
agent acts under. However, they have a universal character insofar as they are ones that would be 
produced by any rational agent who has those background beliefs in those circumstances, and 
whose cognitive capacities have not been dulled by his animal nature.  
 Fichte claims that in this way, the moral law prescribes that we act as if we were 
"everyman," or as any rational agent in our situation would, and this lends objectivity to his 
account.284 We fail to act as "everyman" when we do not cognize our duty correctly, and with the 
right amount of energy. The individual knows that a specific action is in accordance with the 
moral law not by judging whether it could be willed as a universal law for all rational beings, but 
when he obtains a feeling of certainty that it is the appropriate action for any rational being with 
those background beliefs in those particular circumstances. Fichte describes the feeling of the 
universal validity of one's judgment as a subjective conviction of one's duty, or "the voice of 
conscience."285 Since morality is universal to humanity, an agent's intentions and reasons for 
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action can and should be publically discussed and scrutinized, and he might be decide not to act 
on them after such dialogue occurs. However, the conscience of the individual is the final 
authority when it comes to moral decision-making, and the independence of rational agency from 
anything external to it remains the ultimate goal of it.286 It is therefore possible for clashes to 
ensue when one's conviction does not align with public opinion or the standards and practices of 
one's culture. Individuals should take them into consideration in moral reasoning, but this does 
not necessarily mean that they should defer to their culture or custom. In cases where public 
opinion rests on a mistake or deception, or is irrational, this would mean surrendering one's 
freedom and becoming dependent on external conditions. Fichte thereby reformulates the 
categorical imperative of Kant, stating: “always act according to your best conviction of your 
duty; or: act according to your conscience.”287 
 The Judge's views on how to integrate the universal and particular in practice suggest that 
he has a similar position. Both take the specific features of the individual's concrete condition to 
be central to moral deliberation, and the Judge echoes Fichte when he claims that "the secret that 
lies in the conscience" is that "simultaneously it is an individual life and also the universal" (E/O 
II: 255). For the Judge, the "universal individual" that one is tasked with transforming oneself 
into "is not only a personal self but a social, a civic self" (E/O II: 262). This individual is 
therefore committed to the freedom of other people in virtue of them having the universal in 
common. However, while the "universal individual" is civically engaged, one does not become 
certain about what one's duty is by appealing to an external authority (E/O II: 263). Since 
individuals occupy different situations and do not share exactly the same skills, abilities, history, 
or background beliefs, they cannot necessarily tell one another what their duties are. Moreover, 
to decide this for another individual would be to deprive him of his autonomy, which is unethical 
(E/O II: 291). Similarly, because the particular duties an individual has are contingent on his 
concrete situation, they cannot be stated in abstraction from it. Kant rejected this view in denying 
that certain actions, such as false promising, are ever morally permissible, but the Judge has good 
reason to hold it. If a madman tells you he will find your friend and kill him unless you promise 
to do it for him, and you suspect he can carry this out rather quickly, you should tell the false 
promise before alerting the police. In rejecting Kant's formalism, the Judge thinks it is always 
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possible for an individual to determine what his duty is on any given occasion under the direction 
of his conscience (E/O II: 264). Fichte agrees that it is wrong to try to impose the dictates of 
one's conscience on another individual, and that one should let him follow his conscience.288 
However, since morality derives from reason, which provides a universally valid criterion for 
moral judgment, it is expected that consensus on moral issues can be reached. Their agreement 
on this point is additional evidence that the Judge is indebted to Fichte more than any other 
thinker with his account of the ethical life.  
 As the mark of the conscience, the Judge believes that the universal has profound 
spiritual significance, and that it first becomes prominent in the life of the individual when, in 
despair, he comes to know himself in freedom as the absolute. Associating it with the eternal 
power that is omnipresent in existence, or God, he writes: 
 
...the universal can very well continue in and with the specific without consuming it; it is like that fire that 
burned without consuming the bush. If the universal human being is outside me, there is only one possible 
method, and that is to take off my entire concretion. This striving out in the unconstraint of abstraction is 
frequently seen...But that is not the way it is. In the act of despair, the universal human being came forth 
and now is behind the concretion and emerges through it. (E/O II: 261) 
 
By likening the universal to the fire through which God appears to Moses, the Judge suggests 
that it is a divine principle that lends continuity to human life, which is otherwise subject to 
fluctuating moods, feelings, and attitudes in the temporal.289 Because it is abstract, it is "without 
the means for accomplishing the least thing" (E/O II: 255), although one can respond to one's 
"calling" to shape oneself into the universal individual if one wills to follow one's conscience. 
However, one should not answer the call of conscience by alienating oneself from the world and 
repudiating one's accidental characteristics, as some mystics who attempt to align themselves 
with the divine would do (E/O II: 292). Because it is within oneself as a particular human being, 
it exists alongside the concrete, and one answers its call by resolving to "work the accidental and 
the universal together into a whole" (E/O II: 256). Since it is impotent, the universal is not itself 
the eternal, but rather the form that the individual living ethically bears in mind when 
transforming his material conditions as a human being under the eternal, or God.  
                                                
288 Ibid., IV 233 




 However, the individual should not value his particular traits too highly, as those living 
esthetically do when they define themselves by what makes them different from other people. As 
he becomes the universal individual, and comes to respect our shared humanity, he would have 
to reject those accidental characteristics that conflict with the universal. For example, he could 
not have an allegiance to a particular tradition that is prejudiced against other humans based on 
race, class, nationality, or gender, and could not put his private interests ahead of everybody else. 
The Judge contends: "The higher an individual stands, the more differences he has exterminated 
or despaired over, but he always retains one difference that he is unwilling to exterminate—that 
in which he has his life" (E/O II: 228). On the ethical view, then, the real worth of the individual 
lies in his ability to instantiate the universal, and his accidental characteristics are worthless so 
long as he has not assimilated them into it through acts of will. The Judge believes that the more 
that one realizes the universally human, the more spiritually developed one's life is, or as he puts 
it: "The genuinely extraordinary person is the genuinely ordinary person" (E/O II: 328). With 
such passages, the Judge gestures toward the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics, who deemed 
themselves "citizens of the world" based on the common humanity we possess through our 
capacity to reason. As Nussbaum explains, the Stoics believed that in sharing this divine 
capacity, "We should view ourselves as fundamentally and deeply linked to the human kind as a 
whole, and take thought in our deliberations, both personal and political, for the good of the 
whole species."290 This idea is compatible with the preservation of local communities and forms 
of government, and so coincides nicely with the Judge's high estimation of the concrete. It also 
echoes the Judge's point that we should not let accidental characteristics divide us from our 
fellow human beings. 
 The upshot of all this is that, while the individual is free to determine his essential 
characteristics and actions on the Judge's view, he is constrained in this as long as he intends to 
reconcile himself with life in the world by willing the good. To will the good, he must will 
earnestly and with energy, and not succumb to idleness, which excessive reflection in the esthetic 
mode would likely lead to. He must also follow his conscience by determining what the universal 
demands in the particular situations he finds himself in, and acting on these demands. In making 
a principled commitment to become the universal individual by living ethically, human freedom 
is promoted across the board. Evil has the opportunity to arise when the balance between 
                                                




freedom and nature is not maintained in the life of the individual, or when nature inhibits 
freedom by dulling one's reflective and volitional capacities. For instance, individuals who 
perform wrongful or injurious acts are often motivated by natural inclinations or crude desires, 
without them seriously considering the effects that their actions will have on themselves and 
other people. Evil can also arise when the humanity of other people is not respected due to the 
failure of the universal to emerge in the wrongdoer's life. For instance, prejudice results from 
believing that the qualities of one's own group are superior to those of others. In these cases, 
accidental characteristics that are thought to be special are used to justify maltreatment and 
exclusion, while our common humanity is disregarded. Given that the good is freedom, the Judge 
argues that one is not actually free to choose evil, since this would be a contradiction. For this 
reason, he denies the possibility of "radical evil," or that an individual could know what is right 
and freely choose to do wrong (E/O II: 173-174).291 The goal of the ethical, then, is to elevate the 
human being so that his actions are freely chosen with a clear understanding of right from wrong, 
and are not motivated by natural impulses or inclinations, which are liable to lead him into error 
by making him act stupidly.  
 
5.3.5 The Life of Duty 
 Under the Judge's account, duty denotes the responsibility individuals have to transform 
themselves into the universal and achieve unity in their lives. He explains: "Duty is the universal; 
it is required of me...On the other hand, my duty is the particular, something for me alone, and 
yet it is duty and consequently the universal" (E/O II: 263). Hence, the presence of the universal 
within the individual makes certain actions necessary, and duty is the expression for this 
necessity to act in accordance with the universal.292 Because the individual performs her duties 
by willing to do them as a free agent, the necessity of duty is a higher-order necessity that is 
different from natural necessity. It does not compel action by external force or pressure, but is a 
constraint that freedom imposes on itself in virtue of having the universal within it. The 
individual might fail to perform her duties, although she must do them if she intends to maintain 
her freedom, and not allow her actions or character to be determined by natural causes or social 
influences. As an autonomous agent, it would be a mistake to take other human beings or 
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external states of affairs to be the source of one's duties. However, it is also important not to 
conceive of oneself too abstractly, and deny that one's concrete context is essential in 
determining the content of one's duties, along with the person one is. The Judge returns to the 
metaphor of the self having to clothe itself in its concretion when it is navigating the tension 
between freedom and natural necessity in discerning its duties. He states that the individual 
living ethically "has put on duty; for him it is the expression of his innermost being" (E/O II: 
254). In emphasizing the concrete dimension of selfhood, the Judge claims that duty is an 
expression for the indebtedness of free agents to their historical existence, which is originally 
given to them as a product of natural necessity. He states, "since he has not created himself but 
has chosen himself, duty is the expression of his absolute dependence and his absolute freedom 
in their identity with each other” (E/O II: 270).  
 It follows that when the individual aims to figure out what his duty is by following his 
conscience, he does not only aim to learn something about himself, but also about his place in 
the external world. The goal is to determine how best to apply the universal given the specific 
features of one's situation, and this situation includes states of affairs and historical conditions 
that are outside the individual. This might mean that he adopts those duties that are standard in 
his culture based on his specific skills, characteristics, and abilities. However, he might reject 
them if current social practices go against his conscience, and are incompatible with the 
advancement of human freedom more generally. With duty being intrinsic to one's nature as the 
universal individual, it follows that one will have many particular duties to oneself and others in 
society. Because the good is freedom, the individual wills the good amid the necessities of daily 
life by performing these duties with passion and energy as an autonomous agent.  
 Since to be an autonomous agent is to act of one's own accord as the universal individual, 
duty ought to be the principal motivation in human action, rather than desires that are satisfied by 
external goods, which stem from one's animal nature. Although the Judge disagrees with Kant 
about how reason legislates morality, he appears to borrow Kant's notion that actions that have 
moral worth must be motivated by duty towards universal law. For the Judge, however, this law 
prescribes that one transform oneself into the universal individual, or that one diligently 
maintains this state insofar as one has actualized this ideal and become that. Each one of us is 
essentially the universal individual, but we not do not exist as the universal individual until we 




oneself, and accepting one's obligations as a self, one takes full responsibility for oneself and 
one's actions. In having a sense of purpose and direction through the performance of duties, and 
finding happiness through free action, the world comes to seem like home again, and life takes 
on new meaning. One's capacities of thought and volition are therefore brought into agreement 
with nature and society as one lives to fulfill one's obligations toward them. 
 Because the universal is abstract and internal to the autonomous person, the Judge tries to 
refrain from telling anyone what his or her specific duties are as an external authority (E/O II: 
264). Although it is generally up to the agent, as his own authority, to determine what his duties 
are, the Judge invokes a few core duties that he believes are necessary for resolving despair. The 
duty that he has the highest regard for is marriage (E/O II: 302), which "provides the universal" 
as the highest expression of love in the human race (E/O II: 89-90). He argues that marriage is a 
duty for those who have been through despair because it is the purest action one can take to free 
oneself from the trap of self-enclosure that ensues in the reflective stage of the esthetic mode. 
Marriage is a result of loving another person deeply, and this means going out of oneself to give 
oneself to the beloved (E/O II: 109-110). The dutiful acts of self-giving that occur in marriage 
include paying attention to the needs of the beloved and having concern for him or her, or for the 
family both are raising, and such devotion to others is incompatible with excessive self-
reflection. In his inner reserve, the highly reflective individual tends to hold himself back from 
social engagements, concealing his thoughts and feelings about things and refusing to dedicate 
too much energy to his relationships with others. Marriage disrupts this pattern of action and 
promotes true freedom by requiring "honesty, frankness, openness, understanding" in an intimate 
relation to another person (E/O II: 116). The lover will naturally have erotic feelings that stem 
from an immediate desire for his or her partner, and so marriage includes an esthetic element. 
However, marital love transfigures erotic love by being an act of will, rather than a passing 
feeling or desire for pleasure (E/O II: 31-32). The married person does not simply have this 
desire for the other person, but wants to go on having this desire for the person. As long as the 
marriage is exclusive, he will resist erotic desires for others that might crop up in him.293 
Because the marital bond entails a stable commitment to a husband or wife that is to be fulfilled 
in everyday life in the world, the Judge states it is an expression for the unity of the eternal and 
temporal in existence (E/O II: 94). It is therefore a symbol of the union the individual living 
                                                




ethically would maintain with the world in repenting toward it and appropriating the specific 
features of his situation in freedom.  
  The Judge contends that it is every person's duty to become open to others in maintaining 
a fellowship with the community as the universal individual. As a result, friendship is another 
basic duty for those living ethically (E/O II: 322). He argues that if a friendship is to have ethical 
significance, it cannot be rooted in emotions like sympathy, or passive feelings that spring up 
naturally in those living esthetically (E/O II: 321). As marriage shows, love for others can be 
volitional, and must be so if friendship is to have more than esthetic significance. Love that is 
volitional also tends to have a permanence that the more immediate form of love lacks in 
originating in lower-order desires and affects. For instance, the Judge explains that a friendship 
that rests on ethical grounds lasts even if the friend dies, since the deceased friend is likely to be 
recollected by one who has committed to the friendship (E/O II: 321-322). Friendships held by 
those in the esthetic stage, however, are likely to end when interaction with the other person is no 
longer pleasurable, or when he no longer stands to benefit from him. These friendships are also 
likely to depend on accidental traits that the individuals have in common with one another, such 
as their interests, hobbies, looks, background, or class. If they no longer share much in common 
along these lines, then the friendship ceases. When the friendship is the product of an ethical 
commitment, however, these accidental traits will not matter much. They will not be ignored, but 
one will be able to look past them by focusing on the common humanity in the other person (E/O 
II: 256). By attaching oneself to others through marriage and friendship, and affirming them as 
particular duties one has, one transforms oneself into the universal individual through practical 
involvement with the world. As the individual integrates with the world after a period of 
heightened reflection on it, and acknowledges his duty to love people in it, despair is eliminated. 
 Lastly, another important duty on the Judge's account is that of working for a living (E/O 
II: 282). Only rarely does a human being not have to work to get what she needs, and in this 
sense, work is an action that expresses the universal in human life. Consequently, if one intends 
to be the universal individual, and to be "essentially on the same level as all other human beings" 
(E/O II: 293), one should make work one's duty. The Judge argues that work signifies our 
capacity to control nature through our own activity, and so evinces human freedom. "It is 
precisely by working," he writes, "that a person liberates himself; by working, he becomes 




this sounds like a rather idealized conception of work, and the Judge recognizes that work is a 
necessity for most of us, who have no choice but to work if we want to survive. In this respect, 
we do not really seem free, and seem to be subject to nature in the same way that other living 
things are. However, the Judge explains that plants and animals are different in that they do not 
have to exert themselves through work like we do in actively taking control over our situation as 
civilized persons. Natural forces alone control them, but this complete lack of freedom is an 
imperfection that shows they are without the dignity that we possess as free persons who can 
direct our own lives amid nature's flux, however limited we might be in this project (E/O II: 282-
283). As the Judge puts it: "It is beautiful to see a providence satisfy all and take care of all, but it 
is even more beautiful to see a man who is, so to speak, his own providence" (E/O II: 282). 
While a reflective esthete like A languished in idle contemplation, and considered himself 
powerless in the face of nature, making work one's duty empowers the individual so that he can 
become aware of his freedom as a willing participant in civilized life. 
 In finding beauty in the performance of duty, whether it is marriage, work, friendship, or 
something else, the Judge insists that the ethical view of life does not do away with the esthetic, 
but ennobles it by seeing it under the aspect of the universal. In assigning duties like work and 
marriage that bring out the universal in existence, the Judge believes that the ethical view 
"conceives of the human being according to his perfection, views him according to his true 
beauty" (E/O II: 288). Those who have not adopted the ethical standpoint can appreciate beauty 
in nature or art, but this beauty depends on the sensuous, and so they are limited to finding it in 
contingent conditions. They are not able to appreciate the highest form of beauty, which 
transcends the fleeting moment of sensuality, and this is to endure as the universal individual. In 
answering the call of conscience by realizing the universal, the Judge believes that the ethical 
cast of ordinary life will captivate the individual with its beauty, and that this will reconcile him 
with existence in a way that art cannot do for more than a brief period of time. He says to A:  
 
As far as poetry and art are concerned, may I remind you of what I mentioned earlier, that they provide 
only an imperfect reconciliation with life, also that when you fix your eye upon poetry and art you are not 
looking at actuality, and that is what we really should be speaking about. (E/O II: 273)  
 
By rousing our intellect and capturing our imagination through sensuous means, art has the 




The harmony that obtains between the imagination and our lived condition when we are 
provoked by artistic beauty generates pleasures that are highly desired by the reflective esthete. 
But if esthetic contemplation is pursued to radical lengths and for extended periods, it yields 
diminishing returns, and can have negative consequences. As we have seen with A, who attempts 
to turn his life into a work of art, it can produce a perpetual state of detachment, inspiring a 
plethora of ideas but leaving the individual with no firm bearing in reality. These poetic 
individuals are lost in the sphere of possibility, dreaming their life away without paying heed to 
the necessities of everyday life, which they cannot reconcile themselves to. In this state of 
imbalance, which the Judge conceives as despair, it is difficult to gain pleasure from ordinary 
life. The ethical, however, bridges ideality and reality by issuing normative demands that are to 
be met through participation in the world. According to the Judge, the beauty of performing one's 
duties as the universal individual draws one into existence, and produces the consistent happiness 
one yearns for while living in despair.  
 The Judge believes that the ethical way of life rejuvenates the individual by reintegrating 
him with a world that he had become alienated from due to the development of reflection. It also 
reintegrates him with himself as an embodied inhabitant of it. This form of integration is superior 
to the type experienced by the immediate esthete or the conformist in the "public" mode. These 
individuals are indeed integrated with the world or society, but they are neither free, nor aware of 
themselves as eternal under the guidance of the universal. Without knowing themselves 
adequately, they are driven by their immediate inclinations and desires, or by the beliefs and 
attitudes they have adopted from their culture, without much critical reflection on them. As a 
result, they drift from one moment to the next without comprehending their lives as a unified 
whole, and are disintegrated as selves. This begins to change as freedom emerges in the 
individual. The reflective esthete has started to think for himself and make his own choices, 
questioning his inherited beliefs and values, and not letting other people dictate his actions. 
However, this break from the established order leaves him detached, and without any stable 
principle to govern his conduct or give him direction. The individual living ethically recognizes 
that these ways of life are signs of personal disintegration, and in coming to know himself, 
discovers "what is the most inward and holy in a human being," which is "the binding power of 
the personality" (E/O II: 160). He believes that through an effort of the will, he can finally 




which sends him back into the world to fulfill his duties as a human being. While meaning in life 
had been lost when despair had surfaced in the reflective esthete, the ethical project gives life 
new meaning and purpose through its emphasis on personal responsibility. The duties the 
individual performs ground his freedom in worldly action, and his earnest dedication toward 
realizing the universal in his life makes the world appear to him in its full beauty. In this way, the 
ethical way of life heals the division between self and world that had occurred through the 
emergence of freedom, and makes the world home again by restoring the attachments one 
originally had to it. 
 
5.4 The Inability of The Ethical to Resolve Despair 
 While the Judge argues that despair can be defeated through the ethical way of life, it is 
clear that Kierkegaard believes that it will prove to be a failure if it is carried through without 
self-deception. He does not stage a dedicated attack on the ethical way of life in the manner that 
the Judge does with the esthetic way of life, but his criticisms can be extracted from works 
following Either/Or. The most general statement of his critique is given under the pseudonym of 
Climacus, who argues that the individual who has isolated himself from the world in despair 
cannot reconcile himself with it without divine assistance (CUP: 257-258). The thought seems to 
be that when the individual becomes an autonomous being, he will have attained a degree of 
reflection that makes it impossible to return to life in the world without feeling alienated from his 
earthly condition, or even his lower nature as a psyche-body unity. He intends to rely on his own 
powers to achieve balance and harmony in his life, but he is unable to curb reflection once he has 
actualized this capacity to the extent he has. Similarly, once he knows himself in having chosen 
himself absolutely, it is impossible to get rid of this knowledge that has liberated him from 
external influences. As a result, he remains a self-enclosed individual who has taken flight in the 
imagination, without being able to devote himself wholeheartedly to worldly enterprises, or to 
people or states of affairs in existence. As Thomson puts it, the Judge's letters "do not bear 
witness to a character firmly anchored in the concrete through action, but to an extravagant 
bourgeoisie who has substituted a romance of the commonplace for the aesthete’s diary of 
seduction."294 Throughout Kierkegaard's works, this state of disintegration is characteristic of 
despair in its advanced stages.  
                                                




 Of course, there are questions concerning what reason Kierkegaard has to conclude that 
the individual would not be able integrate with the world or himself of his own will, assuming 
that he embraces the human condition as a free agent under ethical obligations. Commentators 
often take him to be posing a single compelling objection to the ethical, but I believe that his 
attack is multi-pronged. In this section, I argue that there are three different lines of criticism that 
emerge from Climacus' objection to the ethical as a solution to despair. First, the individual 
living ethically will be unable to fully recover from despair after discovering himself in this 
condition. Second, he will be constrained by the monotony of everyday life, and will likely 
become bored with his tasks and unfulfilled by preoccupying himself with ethical duties. Third, 
he will be guilty for his failure to meet the strict standards that he attempts to live in accord with, 
and will be disquieted by the corruption and vice he finds within himself that he cannot remove. I 
argue that the first two lines of criticism are rather weak, but that the third has more force. For 
Kierkegaard, these problems within the ethical should motivate a conversion to the religious way 
of life. 
 
5.4.1 The Indelible Mark of Despair 
 As I mentioned at the end of section 2.2, in the way that Kierkegaard describes it through 
the pseudonyms, there is an internal conflict present in the ethical mode that would suggest 
despair remains an issue in it. The individual who has chosen to convert to an ethical way of life 
does so after despairing over the world as a whole, and after having lost a sense of meaning and 
direction in life in the esthetic mode. As Anti-Climacus describes it, in recoiling from his earthly 
situation, which has brought great hardship and suffering on him, he becomes detached from 
ordinary events, and does not want to be himself. According to the Judge, when he chooses to 
live ethically, his basic disposition changes, and he begins to view the world as a venue for 
personal growth, love, and renewal, rather than as a hostile environment that is not conducive to 
his happiness. In approaching life with an ethical purpose, he now wants to be himself, and to be 
a contributing member of the community that he resides in. This radical change of heart is not 
inconceivable or contradictory, but it would seem that it would be difficult for a person to affirm 
the goodness of life in the world after seriously calling this into doubt. The negative attitude he 
had previously maintained toward it would likely have left a lasting impression on him, leading 




unreservedly in the way that the Judge describes, without him being unsettled in doing so. 
Hence, there is a worry that the individual living ethically has reached the point of no return in 
despairing, and that it lurks within him, even though he does his best to conceal this from 
himself. He cannot restore himself to spiritual health of his own powers, but must depend on 
divine intervention for this. As a result, he would turn to a religious way of life that disavows 
participation in worldly life, without deceiving himself about being satisfied with it.  
 This objection to the ethical way of life might ring true for those dealing with the 
repercussions of major depression, but the notion that despair is a prerequisite for ethical living is 
not entirely convincing to begin with. Throughout the pseudonymous works, Kierkegaard 
suggests that a thoroughgoing depression is necessary for coming to know oneself and willing to 
be oneself in truth. If a person does not endure a prolonged period of suffering that makes her 
raise serious questions about who she is or what significance life has for her, while doubting that 
the cultural narratives handed down to her suffice to answer them, then she has not realized that 
she is free. Consequently, she cannot commit herself to the ethical project, and remains in the 
esthetic mode. Kierkegaard suggests that the emergence of freedom in her life will be attended 
by melancholy, since in no longer being unreflectively absorbed in worldly affairs, she will feel 
alone and without guidance in existence, with infinite possibilities having opened up before her. 
Even if we concede that this process will generate painful emotions, it is unclear why it has to be 
triggered by great suffering, or why it must involve a negative attitude towards life or the world 
in general, or even why it must result in a lifestyle like that of the reflective esthete. Any human 
life will contain episodes of sorrow, anxiety, guilt, and doubt with respect to a variety of issues, 
without these states having to be grave or long-term. It might be that the pain experienced after 
the more profound realization of one's freedom is also short-term. In other words, perhaps one 
can live ethically without having to deal with the internal conflicts that are likely to linger after 
an intense period of despair, and in such cases, the objection is unfounded.  
 It would seem, for instance, that a proper moral education could facilitate a transition to 
the ethical mode, without the individual needing to endure intense despair or to adopt the 
standpoint of ironic detachment to reach this stage of personal development. As the Judge 
describes it, there are not likely to be enormous differences between the ethical way of life and 
ordinary ways of living that involve adherence to a customary form of morality within a stable 




and values without understanding the metaphysical basis for this, and without taking control of 
their own lives to a remarkable degree, the individual living ethically understands why an ethical 
orientation is important to maintain. In learning about the capacity for human beings to transcend 
their natural condition as free agents, and about the universal that lies within us as rational 
beings, the individual living ethically has reflected on the reasons that people tend to act in 
accord with rules and values in society. Yet as an avowedly ordinary human being, he is different 
from them only in doing more consciously what they do without thinking too much about it. 
Because he has a heightened awareness of his freedom, he would work harder on perfecting 
himself morally, and would be more diligent in performing his duties and sticking to ethical 
principles. But unless his community is seriously corrupt, or he lives in an inhospitable 
environment for human freedom due to war, an oppressive government, or the like, he would 
likely adopt the same sort of standards and practices as common people. The ethical way of life 
is therefore a fuller realization of a morality of custom. The proximity of these ways of living 
would suggest that a good upbringing and an education that encourages critical thinking might be 
enough for a person to arrive at an ethical standpoint much like the one the Judge describes, 
without her having to discover her freedom in a state of depression or despair.295 Since a change 
of heart is also conceivable for those who have been through an intense form of despair, we 
should look for reasons that the ethical way of life is one of despair that do not rely on 
individuals having a previous history of it.  
 
5.4.2 The Longing For Relief From Boredom and World-weariness  
 In his letters, the Judge explains that the reflective esthete would regard the ethical way 
of life, or any conventional form of living, as despair because he deems the tasks and routines of 
ordinary life to be an impediment to freedom. The individual living ethically convinces himself 
he is free, but he is in fact subjected to necessities like work, raising a family, and fulfilling 
obligations to his community or spouse. He therefore deceives himself about his freedom. Of 
course, he thinks that these actions are freely chosen, and dignifies them with the title of duty, 
but this a polite way of ignoring that he has submitted to circumstances beyond his control. The 
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Judge remains unfazed by this criticism, admitting it is noble to submit to duty (E/O II: 128). On 
his view, the ethical way of life demonstrates that freedom and necessity can be united in a 
human life, without this relationship being discordant. The esthete disputes this easy unity and 
raises a deeper problem for the ethical when he describes the ethical way of life as tedious, and 
as a dubious glorification of the mundane. "Is there anything more boring than this straitlaced 
conformity that suppresses everything and clips its wings" (E/O II: 206). The suggestion is that 
the individual who resolves to fulfill his duties might be enthusiastic about it initially, but his 
satisfaction is not likely to last for long. His spiritual longing will not cease so long as he is stuck 
with the repetitive and predictable tasks of daily life, and he will eventually find himself going 
through the motions while becoming conscious of his bondage to the world.296 Content with 
being just like everybody else, he is settled in his existence as the universal individual, but this is 
a mediocre existence that offers little adventure or excitement, and he knows it. The esthete 
decries "the unavoidable habit" and "dreadful monotony" of marriage, which he thinks cannot 
preserve the splendor of the first moment of falling in love, however much it seeks to recover 
this magic (E/O II: 125). In short, the individual living ethically does not really want to live like 
this. Freedom cannot find its home in the world, which confines with its familiarity, sameness, 
and lack of mystery. As a result, the individual living ethically is in despair, ultimately desiring 
an escape from it. 
 The Judge, however, thinks beauty, love, and happiness can also be found in the tasks 
and routines of everyday life, and so is unconvinced by the esthete's callous objection. Certainly 
there are people capable of loving their children, family, or spouse over the years, without this 
love fading or going stale. People also can take pleasure in their work, without finding it dull or 
wearisome most of the time. In defense of marriage, the Judge argues that the duties, rituals, and 
repetitive tasks that the esthete detests are a way of preserving love in its originality throughout 
the passage of time, and that a commitment to them shows it has something eternal within it (E/O 
II: 137-139). If the eternal was not there to elevate love through its presence in the inwardness of 
consciousness, it would be momentary and capricious, and could not endure through changing 
conditions in themselves or the world. For this reason, love in the esthetic stage is inferior to love 
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that has been sanctified by ethical commitment. Needless to say, it is novelty and variation that 
the esthete seeks in his effort to regain the joy of experiencing things for the first time, and so he 
cannot fathom that it is possible to take satisfaction in the continual performance of duties. For 
the Judge, he does not point to a weakness in the ethical position with his criticism, but only 
betrays his immaturity as a human being.   
 The Judge concedes some ground to the esthete, however, when he admits that there are 
times when he feels "desolate and lost" after completing his duties for the day. Recalling 
Kierkegaard's sentiment that he was "an eternity too old" to be moved by the success of 
Either/Or among the gossipy public of his time (POV: 36), the Judge writes: 
 
It sometimes happens to me—to be sure, very rarely now, for I try to counteract it...that I sit and settle into 
myself. I have taken care of my work; I have no desire for any diversion, and something melancholy in my 
temperament gains the upper hand over me. I become many years older than I actually am, and I practically 
become a stranger to my home life. I can very well see that it is beautiful, but I look at it with different eyes 
than usual. It seems to me as if I myself were an old man, my wife my happily married younger sister in 
whose house I am sitting. In such hours, time almost begins to drag for me... (E/O II: 307)  
 
Fortunately, these episodes of detachment are brief for him, and he claims to be able to snap out 
of them and become an enthusiastic participant in time again by watching his wife busily take 
care of things around the house. Needless to say, he could be doing things that are less creepy to 
occupy himself, like reading a book or tending the garden, but there is a worry that similar 
episodes will come more frequently, and that the life of duty will prove to be uneventful and 
unsatisfying to him. If he becomes listless, and is consistently alienated from his life in the world 
in the way that the reflective esthete is, this is a sign that his despair was never resolved properly, 
and that he had been concealing it from himself by preoccupying himself with duty.  
 Still, periods of unhappiness, boredom, or weariness should not have to be a real concern 
for the person who has committed himself ethically. Some vacillation in moods and attitudes 
should be expected over the course of any human life, and it would be odd for a person never to 
experience bouts of unhappiness. Perhaps this person is generally happy with the ethical way of 
life, and in this case, the esthete's objection is unconvincing. However, if the ethical way of life 
becomes too boring or wearisome for the individual, or if he becomes terribly unhappy in it, it is 




despair. If we assume that he has moved beyond the irony and romanticism of the reflective 
esthete, then it would have been played out, and he will recognize that the esthetic is also 
despair. Having experienced the shortcomings of both stages, he recognizes that neither can 
satisfy his longing for freedom as spirit. It is at this point that Kierkegaard proposes the religious 
way of life as an alluring option for the individual that seeks escape from the suffering of human 
existence. On his interpretation of Christianity, Anti-Climacus states that faith is the terminal 
stage in the development of despair, and occurs when the individual eliminates despair by 
wanting to be himself before God (SUD: 14-15). In his account of the ethical, the Judge 
conceived of the person living ethically as having a relationship with God, but this occurs within 
an ethical context rather than a religious one, and is expressed through his relationships with 
other people. Like Kant, the Judge believes that the will of God does not defy human 
comprehension, but that we know it when we understand what reason demands of us morally, 
and that this takes the form of universal law. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, takes the ethical to 
be incongruent with the religious, given that God's will has to be discerned through biblical 
revelation and taken on the basis of faith (JP II: 1273). If God, as an external authority, did not 
reveal his will by means of historical conditions, it would be incomprehensible to us, and in this 
sense: "Faith is against understanding" (FSE: 81-82).  
 Under the pseudonym of Johannes de Silentio, Kierkegaard uses Abraham as a model of 
faith, with the aim of showing how ethical and religious obligations can collide, and how strange 
and inscrutable God's demands on us can be. In Genesis 22, God tests Abraham's loyalty, 
commanding him to offer his son Isaac as a burnt sacrifice on Mount Moriah. Abraham obeys his 
orders, binding Isaac and laying him on an altar he builds there. At the moment Abraham draws 
the knife to slaughter him, God rescinds the command and blesses him, having seen that he 
rightly fears Him. de Silentio argues that Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son demonstrates 
that the "knight of faith" will undertake a "teleological suspension of the ethical" in prioritizing 
his duties toward an omnipotent God (FT: 54-60). In preparing to murder Isaac for the sake of 
pleasing God, Abraham rejects the father's ethical duty not to kill to his son. As an individual, he 
thereby occupies a lonely position outside of the universal, or indeed, the human community in 
general. In choosing to suspend the ethical, the knight of faith adopts a standpoint similar to that 
of the reflective esthete, who had dissociated himself from ethical constraints for the sake of his 




Silentio's interpretation of the story, in his love for people and things of this world, Abraham did 
not stop with resignation, but had faith that God would not ultimately require Isaac of him, or 
that he would restore him to life after he was sacrificed. In getting Isaac back after divesting 
himself of him, de Silentio imagines that Abraham joyfully returns to everyday life in the 
community, and loves his son just as much as he did before (FT: 36).  
 de Silentio argues that this happy reconciliation could only happen if God willed it "by 
virtue of the absurd", and that if a person were to try to achieve it of his own will after such a 
harrowing ordeal, he would have to resign himself to being "a stranger and an alien" in the world 
(FT: 50). "To exist in such a way that my contrast to existence constantly expresses itself as the 
most beautiful and secure harmony with it––this I cannot do" (FT: 50). The individual living 
ethically desires this unity between the infinite and finite aspects of the self, but as we have seen, 
he might admit of weariness, boredom, and continued suffering in his effort to establish it on his 
own terms. For de Silentio, this harmony between contradictory elements that he tries to forge as 
a reflective person is paradoxical, and so could only come to exist by virtue of the absurd. 
Consequently, one must depend on the grace of God for its realization, and this could motivate 
someone living ethically to turn to religious faith, where what is impossible on human criteria is 
believed to be possible for God. If God intervenes to bring the free person into accord with his 
surroundings, so that he handles the necessities of daily life with joy and ease, then despair is 
eliminated. 
 There is obviously something repellent about the religious way of life as de Silentio 
conceives it, and it was certainly his intention to draw this out. He thinks we should approach 
Abraham with a "horror religiosus" (FT: 61), rather than assume faith comes easily like so many 
in his generation had been accustomed to do. On the other hand, it might be alluring for those 
who have become disenchanted with the ethical way of life because it holds out the prospect of 
happiness and relief from suffering where human efforts to achieve this have failed. Kierkegaard 
states that for a Jewish knight of faith like Abraham, faith is concerned with happiness in this 
life, while for a Christian knight, it is only concerned with an eternal happiness in a world to 
come, and will involve continual suffering in this life (JP II: 2221).297 Kierkegaard concedes that 
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the truth of Christianity is uncertain (JP II: 1154), and that in requiring faith, it offers us no 
guarantees about our future happiness. This would seem to be a strike against it, but in the way 
that he describes it, the life of faith is not tedious or boring, and this is another reason why it 
might appeal to an individual living ethically. He refers to it as a "venture" that unsettles the 
individual in his everyday existence, creating conflicts with other people and even initiating "a 
struggle with God” (JP VI: 6385). Because Christianity demands that the individual renounce 
worldly goods, and insulate himself from the greed, lust, selfishness, and materialism that 
prevails in the world, Christians believe: 
 
...truly to keep close to God definitely means suffering in this world…for them the mark of the sign of the 
God-relationship is the opposition of the world…But in dull and lackluster moments they sink down from 
this high intensification—and now the change takes place—it seems to them that the world’s opposition 
perhaps proves that they are wrong, it is perhaps arrogant of them to have ventured out this way, so that 
they almost repent and regret as guilt what was their most honest enthusiasm. This, you see, is spiritual 
trial. (JP IV: 4379) 
 
For Kierkegaard, "spiritual trial" [Anfægtelse] denotes the anxious periods of doubt about what 
God's will is, or whether it is His will that one endeavors an intimate relationship with Him.298 
The Judge thinks the individual living ethically would have a relationship with God, but this is 
mediated through the universal, and finds expression chiefly through human institutions like the 
family, state, or community. However, with his new understanding of God, the religious 
individual has renounced all this in deciding to enter into "an absolute relation to the absolute” 
(FT: 55). While the Judge identified with God, or the absolute, in choosing himself in despair, 
the religious individual does not, and instead conceives of himself as a free person in relation to a 
transcendent God that freely established him. In suspending the ethical through his acts of 
                                                                                                                                                       
essentially, however subtly, other-worldly" (The Human Embrace, p. 16-17). He goes on to claim that for 
Kierkegaard, faith requires that “the whole of the finite world, every inch, is embraced at the very dialectical 
moment when the possibility of giving it up is existentially (in fear and trembling) realized" (Ibid., p. 27). 
Undoubtedly this is what many Kierkegaard commentators wish he would have said about the Christian faith, but 
throughout his writings on this topic, Christianity is marked by voluntary renunciation, and even a disdain for the 
naturally human. Hall's misreading of Kierkegaard's conception of Christian faith demonstrates the confusion 
readers can get into when they do not heed Kierkegaard's admonition to not attribute the works of the pseudonymous 
authors to him.  
298 This experience is also described by Luther, who considered such severe trials [Anfechtungen] central to the 
Christian faith. For Luther, trials can arise when it seems to the believer that God is contradicting Himself, or that 
He is playing a game with the faithful, or when he or she questions the meaning of suffering. See von Loewenich, 




renunciation, and devoting himself to God in prayer and supplication, the individual takes 
himself to be higher than the universal, much like Abraham did. Since the Christian approaches 
an awesome God of his own free will, and at his own peril, Kierkegaard admits there are 
dreadful periods where he feels "as if he were venturing too boldly in literally involving himself 
personally with God and Christ” (JP IV: 4372).299 While he fears that he might be transgressing 
his boundaries as a finite human being in aiming to get close to God, he has faith that God sends 
spiritual trial to humble or test him, and not to frighten him back into his old ways of living. He 
therefore advises those who experience it not to avoid it by lapsing into worldliness, but to "go 
straight toward it, trusting in God and Christ" (JP IV: 4023).  
 The Christian experience that Kierkegaard describes is appalling, and it is natural to ask 
why a human being would ever choose to endure such an ordeal. There is of course the promise 
of an eternal happiness free of all suffering if one passes the test God puts him through, which 
might sound attractive, but Kierkegaard also suggests that the religious life is fascinating in a 
way that the ethical life is not. The individual living ethically is content with being an ordinary 
person who lives the same kind of life as everybody else, but the religious individual thinks of 
his own life as extraordinary in choosing to relate himself personally to God, outside the confines 
of the universal. He recognizes that approaching an unknown God in this manner might be a 
terrible mistake, but his simultaneous attraction and repulsion is part of a mystical adventure that 
excites him, even though this consists in anxiety, uncertainty, and insecurity. These dark and 
unsettling feelings might sound undesirable, and certainly contribute to even more suffering, but 
they are enlivening with respect to one's inner life, spurring the imagination, passion, and 
volition. Recalling the notion of inverted vitality that I explored in the third chapter, Kierkegaard 
writes, "a human being cannot in the deeper sense live without relating himself to the 
unconditional; he expires, that is, perhaps goes on living, but spiritlessly" (POV: 19). The 
individual living ethically relates to God, or the unconditional, through his commitment to 
perform his duties, but given its proximity to the public mode, there is a worry that it will 
degenerate into an impoverished form of spiritual life. There is "peace, safety, and security" in 
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the ethical, which instructs us to settle into ordinary conditions in the world (E/O II: 323), but as 
a result, it is not likely to energize us or generate much passion in us like religion can. Since we 
risk sinking back into worldly life by pursuing the ethical, thought and volition risk being dulled, 
and to live in this state of imbalance is to be in despair. 
  Kierkegaard believes that Christianity is capable of drawing a person's interest and 
raising his awareness by instructing him that what he is seeking is not here in the world, but is to 
come after death. He writes:  
 
Oh, whoever you are, even if you feel ever so grievously trapped in the lifelong confinement of suffering, 
alas, like a trapped animal in its cage—see, this prisoner paces around the cage every day, measures the 
length of the chain in order to have movement—so if you also measure the length of the chain by 
proceeding to the thought of death and eternity, you gain the movement enabling you to endure, and you 
gain zest for life! (FSE: 100) 
 
On Kierkegaard's view, the Christian life produces tremendous suffering for a human being, but 
this is a testament to his longing for God, and is even pleasing to Him. Perhaps there is 
something masochistic about the God-relationship, yet Kierkegaard insists "to want to suffer and 
to choose sufferings...is a wish that never arose in any human heart" (UDVS: 250).300 As a 
Christian, Kierkegaard desperately seeks an end to his suffering, but given that God is absolutely 
different from anything of this world, it is an inevitable consequence of seeking a close 
relationship with Him while being ineluctably situated in the world. If one loses a sense of 
meaning and purpose in life after getting worn out with ethical tasks, and feels like one's life has 
stalled, Christianity gives meaning to one's suffering, and assigns the task of completing one's 
spiritual development through union with God. It is unlikely, however, that anyone would take 
up a life of angst and renunciation simply because they might get bored with their staid and 
predictable lifestyle. It is also prima facie plausible that a person could be content or happy with 
this lifestyle, without thinking that he is in despair. We should therefore look for a more 
convincing reason for holding that the ethical way of life is despair. 
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5.4.3 Guilt and Moral Disquietude 
 One common interpretation of Kierkegaard's criticism of the ethical standpoint is that it 
offers no good remedy for the guilt that the individual will have for not living up to ethical 
standards. Mackey eloquently defends this criticism, stating: 
 
Of course the Judge is no stranger to guilt. But he takes his guilt as a moral challenge, when in fact he 
would be better advised to see it as moral defeat. For the affirmation of guilt does nothing to get rid of it, 
and this is the tragedy of the ethical life. If a man is to achieve selfhood by freedom, he must shoulder 
responsibility for the past…But he is incapable of eliminating or reforming that past and therefore barred 
from meeting the absolute demand of duty…In any case, freedom, which is potent to make a man guilty, is 
impotent to remove guilt.301 
 
The Judge would object that he has recourse to repentance in alleviating guilt for wrongs he had 
committed while living esthetically, and for his personal flaws, but this is a meager solution for 
someone who admits to being essentially guilty. The type of repentance that he describes is not 
directed toward anyone in particular, and does not concern any particular wrongs, so forgiveness 
is impossible. Even if other people did forgive him for particular misdeeds, this would not rid 
him of the mental burden of having done them to begin with, or repair the damage to his 
character that they have contributed to. As Mackey notes, repentance "is a confession of ethical 
insolvency" that "declares the bankruptcy of him who repents," and so cannot adequately resolve 
the guilt that the individual experiences.302 Because he would have isolated himself in guilt, with 
no possibility of remission, he remains in despair.  
 Kierkegaard suggests that those who live ethically do not only have to deal with guilt for 
mistakes they made in the past, but also for their present failure to conform to ethical demands. 
At the same time, these are too rigorous for any human being to successfully meet, which leads 
to tension in the ethical standpoint. Under the pseudonym of Vigilius Haufniensis, Kierkegaard 
introduces an idealist conception of the ethical that sounds more exacting than the one the Judge 
offers, while remaining Kantian in spirit. He states: 
 
Ethics proposes to bring ideality into actuality. On the other hand, it is not the nature of its movement to 
raise actuality up into ideality. Ethics points to ideality as a task and assumes that every man possesses the 
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requisite conditions. Thus ethics develops a contradiction, inasmuch as it makes clear both the difficulty 
and the impossibility. What is said of the law is also true of ethics: it is a disciplinarian that demands, and 
by its demands only judges but does not bring forth life. (CA: 16) 
 
If we modify the Judge's position so that boredom and clemency are out of the question, then the 
claim is that it is impossible for anyone to fully transform himself into the universal individual 
due to human limitations and deficiencies, which stem from existing temporally. However, in 
issuing from the eternal component in the human being, the universal requires that we 
continually meet this standard in everyday life, and to the extent that we do not, we are 
responsible for this failure. Consequently, the individual living ethically is guilty for not 
realizing the ideals that govern his life satisfactorily, and this discrepancy generates the kind of 
internal conflict that is characteristic of despair. Since repentance cannot resolve this conflict, the 
individual fails to integrate his life as the universal individual, and so cannot achieve his telos of 
his own powers.303  
 The limitations that hamper the realization of ethical ideals would include character flaws 
and imperfect behavior from the past that has irrevocably influenced us, but Kierkegaard 
discusses additional limitations that arise from the temporal character of human existence in 
other pseudonymous works. Climacus, for instance, argues that ethical action requires that we 
spend time deliberating on our actions, but this results in wasted moments that could be used for 
other ethical tasks (CUP: 526). Derrida raises a similar worry when he argues that by dedicating 
our time, energy, or resources to certain people, we are neglecting others who would benefit 
from our attention.304 These are not wasted moments per se, but it means that as finite beings, we 
are forced to make sacrifices that are problematic on ethical grounds. Along with competing 
obligations that need adjudication, there is also the worry that regardless of how much we exert 
ourselves in deliberation, we are liable to err when determining what action is appropriate in a 
given situation, or who should benefit from it. Not only are we susceptible to being misled by 
selfish inclinations or psychological quirks, but our earthly situation can also leave us with too 
many variables to take account of, resulting in an obscured understanding of our duties. 
Moreover, if human beings are not to collapse under the weight of ethical demands, they need 
time for rest and diversion, but this too leads to wasted moments, and the individual will never 
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know how much time is acceptable for these purposes (CUP: 495). Since there are innumerable 
problems in the world that we could be working to resolve, ideally we would not have to take 
any time off for leisure, but since we are physically and psychologically incapable of enduring 
this, we have to make compromises. But as Haufniensis puts it: "Ethics will have nothing to do 
with bargaining" when insisting that the individual perfect his conduct and character (CA: 17). 
Because the individual living ethically will be beleaguered by human imperfections while trying 
to achieve his aims, he will be burdened by guilt, and an awareness of his impotence to do 
anything about these things. For Kierkegaard, this spiritual conflict leads to despair.   
 I believe these are serious worries for those who are sincere about living ethically, but it 
is not clear why they have to be racked with guilt or anxiety upon recognizing their 
imperfections and limitations, especially since they have no real control of this. Kosch objects to 
this as a convincing criticism of the ethical, stating that it is a duty not to allow oneself to be 
paralyzed by guilt in a manner that would threaten ethical action. She also argues that if one 
cannot eliminate guilt for one's past, then one would have a duty to put the past behind and start 
afresh.305 I agree that it would be wrong for those who live ethically to let guilt interfere with 
their ability to carry out their duties, but even so, it might still remain a psychological burden for 
them. Hence, one can imagine someone living in despair while doing her best to respond to 
ethical demands. Against Kosch, I am sympathetic to the Judge's concern that it is impossible to 
put the past behind us, and to change the way we think about ourselves and move on.306 As 
human beings living concretely in time, our identity is irrevocably linked to our past, and events 
in the past leave a lasting impression on us, shaping our present understanding of the world and 
ourselves. Our past follows us, impacting what we do, how we feel and think, and the attitudes 
and beliefs we have. We cannot just slough it off at will, and any commitment to modify one's 
character will be met by psychological resistance in these domains that we must constantly 
struggle to overcome. Those who think we can convert to the ethical easily make the mistake of 
conceiving of the self as an unreal abstraction, or altogether infinitely, when in fact it has infinite 
and finite components that need to be integrated. To understand the self as making a clean break 
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from its past is also to deprive it of its unified character, and consequently, its integrity. If one 
does not admit continuity with the past, one's life lacks coherence and wholeness over time, and 
to live in this fragmented state is to be in despair.  
 Given that the past is part of us, and that this inevitably contains faults and mistakes, I 
believe that some remorse is in order if we are to live ethically, but it is not obvious that this has 
to lead to despair. It is true that ethical ideals will exceed what we can actually hope to realize, 
but we have probably not done all that we could to realize them, and an acknowledgment of our 
shortcomings is appropriate. Nevertheless, it would be pathological to allow oneself to be 
consumed by guilt, and to insist on bringing it to mind all the time. Not only would this seem 
forced, but the crippling effects of it would also get in the way of performing one's duties, and 
lead to more moral failure. The ethically committed person should instead use his energies to 
look toward the future and strive for continual moral improvement. It is tempting to suggest that 
he should be satisfied if he does his best in carrying out this task, but as Climacus points out, this 
maxim is problematic, and is likely to be asserted by those who have not truly experienced the 
anxieties and difficulties of this way of life. “Where, then, is the boundary for the single 
individual in his concrete existence between what is lack of will and what is lack of ability; what 
is indolence and earthly selfishness and what is the limitation of finitude? . . . Let all the 
dialecticians convene—they will not be able to decide this for a particular individual in 
concreto” (CUP: 490). The person living ethically will likely have lingering doubts about his 
moral character, and question whether he is doing all that he can to improve himself in this 
regard, which would be a source of guilt as well. Such doubts can be productive, and push him to 
do more to better himself in his daily life, but they can be paralyzing if he focuses too heavily 
them. Perhaps the proper balance can be attained if he remains critical of himself, but does not 
let it get to the point that it brings him to despair of his efforts. If he puts his heart into fulfilling 
his duties while allowing for moments of doubt, it would seem he would be establishing 
harmony between the infinite and finite aspects of himself in the way the Judge describes. 
 Kierkegaard suggests, however, that this task is easier said than done, and that the Judge's 
optimism that it can be achieved ethically is unfounded. I believe that on the account of human 
psychology he provides, the most serious problem for those of us who are sincere about living 
ethically is not a guilty conscience, periods of dullness or boredom, or a previous history of 




results from having to anxiously battle what is base and unruly in us, which he interprets as sin in 
his religious writings. The Judge does not consider this a major obstacle, arguing that the ethical 
way of life will yield happiness by integrating the self with itself and the world. In support of this 
claim, he proposes a eudaemonistic theory in which happiness arises from virtue. Virtue requires 
that a person be in firm command of himself, and that he act in accordance with rational 
principles in transforming himself into the universal individual. However, happiness and virtue 
can arguably come apart, and are even likely to if one aspires to a change of heart by living 
ethically. The reason for this is that the ethical individual maintains an intense form of self-
awareness to keep check on himself and improve himself morally after acknowledging past 
wrongdoings, but this disrupts those pleasures that are produced through the satisfaction of 
earthly desire or appetite. Many of these desires are selfish, and not all of them are morally 
approvable on reflection, so this person will either find himself suppressing them or repudiating 
them through higher-order volitions. As a result, he will have to renounce many of those 
pleasures he previously enjoyed in the esthetic mode, and will need to engage his critical 
capacities to discern which of his passions, feelings, and desires are consistent with an ethical 
life. If he is not vigilant about maintaining the right sort of conduct, feelings, and attitudes at the 
right moments following his conversion to the ethical, he risks giving up self-control and 
regressing to the esthetic, where he lacked autonomy and was unmotivated by duty. As we have 
seen, this condition is capable of yielding pleasure or contentment, but it is also despair. Because 
the ethical way of life is not generally favorable to integration with one's lower nature as a 
psyche-body unity, disquietude and despair remain an issue in it. 
 As a eudaimonist, the Judge would object to this by saying it is not pleasure from 
external goods or internal goods that are beyond his control that the virtuous person seeks, but 
happiness, and that this originates within him when he performs his duties as a free agent. It is 
doubtful, however, that happiness could be produced through the self's own activity, or that it is a 
state that one can bring on oneself. As Anti-Climacus puts it, "happiness is not a qualification of 
spirit" (SUD: 25). If an individual could will his own happiness or imagine himself to be happy, 
whether it is through performing his duties or some other practice, everyone would be doing this, 
and people would not have to battle protracted mental illnesses like depression. When happiness 
arises in human life, it is a sentiment that comes upon us like a gift of fortune. It typically arrives 




well, or when we are having success with our projects, or when we are in good health. 
Unfortunately we do not always have much control over conditions like this, and when things are 
not going well for us, or we have bad luck, we tend to be unhappy. Of course, we might want to 
do things or see people that make us happy, but happiness in these cases depends on being in a 
situation that affects us, and this is different from it originating in the will. The Judge might 
respond by saying that this conflates the state of happiness with the feeling of pleasure, and that 
because happiness arises from the proper exercise of the self's reflective and volitional capacities, 
it is a state of flourishing of the human being that might not be pleasurable. But if happiness is 
not necessarily pleasurable, then it should be admitted that it is compatible with all sorts of 
painful feelings and terrible misfortunes, and then it hardly seems worthy of the name. Hence, 
ethical engagement is not guaranteed to resolve despair or bring happiness. 
 The transformation from the esthetic to the ethical is difficult to accomplish in practice 
not only because it limits pleasure and sets a standard that is impossible to meet, but also due to 
intractable vice, which is a problem both for persons and society in general. The esthetic mode 
provides the conditions for a rather unreflective, pleasurable life in harmony with nature and 
society, but both tend to indulge the sensuous element in the human being, which is indifferent to 
ethical ideals. Although there are social standards in place in a morality of custom, which 
precedes a genuinely ethical way of life, much of what is often tolerated in society, such as 
greed, lust, domination, exploitation, conceit, and consumerism, cannot hold up to moral 
scrutiny. In fact, our current social structures support and even encourage a great deal of selfish 
and vicious behavior that people derive pleasure from, and in refutation of the Judge, some of the 
worst offenders would claim to be happy with their lives. On the Judge's account, these actions 
are vices when they demean human freedom, either in oneself or in others, and behavior like this 
is ultimately detrimental to us. As Kierkegaard explains, we might think we are free when we are 
in possession of worldly goods like wealth, power, status, and so on, but these frequently end up 
possessing us as we struggle to secure them, thereby enslaving us to worldly desire and vice 
(EUD: 164-165). Regardless of where our vices originated, whether it is in our animal nature, or 
through social conditioning, or in prior choices we have made, we all have them, and we all have 
to continually struggle to overcome them to do our best in realizing ethical ideals. The effort to 
transform oneself into a virtuous person is therefore likely to require intense reflection on oneself 




naturally would. Unfortunately, these disruptive acts foster internal division in the self rather 
than promoting happiness. On top of the corruption the ethical individual must confront in his 
own heart, which he is unable to get rid of through his own efforts, he will also have a harsh 
awareness of the world's cruelties and injustices, and the preventable suffering occurring in it. As 
a result, he will be alienated not only from himself, but also from the world and society, and this 
too is a source of despair.  
 Following Aristotle, virtue ethicists would object that the state I have been attributing to 
those living ethically is characteristic of continence rather than virtue. They would argue that 
psychological conflicts of this sort can be eliminated through the attainment of virtue, or 
mitigated as one approaches virtue. Through moral education, training, and disciplining of 
sensuous desires and appetites, the person would act virtuously immediately and by inclination. 
He does not have to exert himself to override inclination or purge himself of vice and impurity. 
After transforming his disposition and character so that they accord with ethical ideals, he would 
eventually become inclined to act out of duty, or from rational deliberation.307 However, 
Kierkegaard suggests that this is a pipe dream of speculative philosophers who have not tried 
earnestly implementing the ethical. It would be impossible on the tripartite view of the self that 
he offers, which posits a gulf between the spiritual and the natural, which we are embroiled in as 
a psyche-body unity. For psychology harmony to occur, earthly desires and appetites would have 
to come into essential agreement with the will after freedom becomes actualized. But since these 
belong to two fundamentally different orders of activity that are conjoined while existing in 
opposition in the self, a robust harmony should not be expected, and even seems impossible.  
 A skeptic of eudaimonism can concede to the virtue theorist that inclinations or lower-
order desires are obedient to the will, given that they need the person's consent before they move 
him to act. Nevertheless, it is implausible that this obedience is analogous to the relationship of a 
father to his biological son who is eager to cooperate and learn from him like Aristotle 
suggests.308 It is more like the relationship of a man steering a wild horse to get to his final 
destination. The horse desires to explore the terrain and do its own thing, even if it leads the man 
off course or into trouble. As a result, it causes him all sorts of frustrations and difficulties as he 
tries to keep it under control. For those living ethically, who have to combat pernicious desires 
                                                
307 See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapter 8 & Book III, Chapter 9 




and attitudes that they have inherited from nature, society, or mistakes and experiences in the 
past that have irreparably damaged them, it is unlikely that the conflict between their higher and 
lower nature will resolve properly. Because the individual living ethically has curbed sensual 
pleasures, and is disquieted by the corruption he finds in himself, which has made it impossible 
to realize the ideal he aspires toward, unhappiness and despair remain an issue in the ethical 
stage. His predicament is much like the horseman who might have made strides in taming the 
horse, but who despite that, cannot reach his destination, and is now stuck wandering the terrain.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 As Kierkegaard represents it through his pseudonyms, the ethical way of life is supposed 
to bring balance and harmony to the lives of those who commit to fulfilling their daily duties. 
The Judge claims that ethical living has made him happy to be a participant in the world, but 
there are concerns that it might get tedious, and that it might be unable to restore those who have 
despaired in the past to health. More worrisome is the fact that his personal transformation must 
remain incomplete, since he will be unable to attain the ethical ideal that governs his life. He will 
be disquieted by the errant ways of his heart, and will have guilt for not being able to rectify it. 
Because of his mistrust of himself, he will remain self-enclosed, and withdrawn from existence 
in a state of heightened reflection. If he continues to seek a solution to despair, de Silentio 
suggests that faith is a way to abolish this internal conflict and attain psychological harmony 
with himself and the world. However, this is different from virtue, and would involve breaking 
ethical commitments if God demands it. The reconciliation with existence the ethical person 
aims at can only occur by virtue of the absurd, or if God willed what is impossible on any human 
criterion through an act of divine grace. Unlike de Silentio, Kierkegaard endorses a Christian 
interpretation of faith, which promises the forgiveness of sins and spiritual liberation through the 
Atonement.309 The Christian believes that through Christ's sacrifice, his guilt and suffering will 
                                                
309 In arguing against the view that Kierkegaard criticizes the ethical for being unable to deal with guilt, Kosch 
claims that divine grace and forgiveness cannot be solutions to guilt for those living ethically. She notes that on his 
view of Christianity, forgiveness does not eliminate past guilt, and grace does not make ethical demands easier to 
fulfill, or reduce the psychological burden of not fulfilling them (Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and 
Kierkegaard, p. 165). Consequently, these cannot be incentives for ethical individuals to adopt the religious way of 
life, since it would then be subject to the same problems as the ethical way of life. I agree with Kosch that 
Kierkegaard believes Christianity offers no reassurance that sins will be forgiven, and that the true practice of 
Christianity would involve ever-greater psychological strain for those trying to fulfill its rigorous demands. 
However, she ignores the reason that a person would incline to Christianity after despairing of the ethical project. 




be eliminated after death, although he must endure continual tribulation and temptation in this 
life due to his sins.310 Rather than attempt to reconcile with the world like the ethical person 
does, he should renounce it, and view worldly pursuits as an obstacle to his relationship to God 
(UDVS: 228). If he rejects Christ's offer of redemption, then despair will continue, and he risks 
facing perdition after death. If he accepts it, then he has faith that Christ will satisfy his longing 
for freedom by ushering him to heaven, where he will attain blessed union with God. To 
conclude my assessment of despair in Kierkegaard's work, in the next chapter, I return to Anti-
Climacus, who examines despair while presupposing the truth of Christianity. He claims that 
those who will to be themselves without depending on God are in despair, regardless of whether 











                                                                                                                                                       
of sins, but in the afterlife, where his eternal welfare is at stake. In faith, he believes that despair will be permanently 
cast out after death through the grace of God. The hope is that spiritual purification will resolve despair, and this is 
something we cannot accomplish of our own powers, as we have seen through the shortcomings of the ethical way 
of life.  
310 In an evocative depiction of self-alienation that must have inspired Kierkegaard's account of despair, St. Paul 
explains the problem that the Christian will experience in trying to attain the Christian ideal of his own accord. "For 
we know that the law is spiritual, but I am of the flesh, sold under sin. For I do not understand my own actions. For I 
do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. Now if I do what I do not want, I agree with the law, that it is 
good. So now it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells within me. For I know that nothing good dwells in me, 
that is, in my flesh. For I have the desire to do what is right, but not the ability to carry it out. For I do not do the 
good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I keep on doing. Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I who 
do it, but sin that dwells within me. So I find it to be a law that when I want to do right, evil lies close at hand. For I 
delight in the law of God, in my inner being, but I see in my members another law waging war against the law of my 
mind and making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my members. Wretched man that I am! Who will 
deliver me from this body of death? Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then, I myself serve the 
law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin." See Romans 7:14-25 (ESV). While the 
Christian has faith that he will be delivered from this miserable condition, the ethical person senses it, but has not 





The Self in Rebellion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 Throughout his works, Kierkegaard suggests that the spiritual activity of reflection 
disturbs the primordial unity that the human being enjoys in the earliest period of life. In this 
state of raw immediacy, he is integrated with his natural condition as a psyche-body unity, with 
his natural drives and inclinations prevailing over his spiritual nature. Reflection occasions a 
break from the life of immediacy, separating him from objects and events in the natural world 
while bringing them to comprehension. The state of disintegration that ensues within the self 
creates a host of internal conflicts between his spiritual capacities and the natural capacities he 
shares with other animals as a psyche-body unity. As we have seen in the case of the reflective 
esthete, at the culmination of spiritual transcendence, the individual becomes self-enclosed 
through the intensification of self-consciousness. In inclosing reserve, he conceives of himself 
altogether abstractly, in opposition to the contents of his psyche, external objects, and even the 
whole world. Although this state of isolation produces great suffering and despair, it enriches 
one's inner life, and has the potential to lead to a higher unity centered on the person and his 
relationship with God.  
 According to Anti-Climacus, the spiritual unity of the person does not come smoothly or 
naturally like the psychical unity of the animal or mere human being does, and mere knowledge 
of one's transcendence does not suffice to achieve it. It must be forged in one's concrete existence 
in a practical way through ideals and commitments that one has chosen as authoritative after 
thinking for oneself about how to live. Anti-Climacus believes that most of us imperfectly realize 
this higher unity because we let other people dictate our thoughts, beliefs, and actions, or are 
absorbed in worldly matters in an uncritical way. Not using the medium of temporality to 
develop ourselves spiritually, we only take half measures in the process of self-actualization, and 
lack integrity and coherence as selves. Without a significant degree of inwardness, we are either 
ignorant of ourselves or do not want to be ourselves in truth. 
 While the conscious forms of despair can be painful, when the self takes flight or recoils 
from its earthly existence through reflection, it will have benefitted by beginning to learn of its 




not have become reflective enough to induce the “total break” with immediacy that entails full 
knowledge of himself as absolutely distinct from any externality (SUD: 55), or in other words, as 
free. This break from the temporal, which is necessary for a genuinely spiritual way of life, 
becomes immanent as despair worsens, and the self goes on not wanting to be itself in the face of 
existence. If reflection leads to this break, and the individual does not use his freedom to will to 
be himself before God in faith, Anti-Climacus claims that despair becomes even more 
aggravated, and is likely to turn into a form of defiance. The person who despairs in defiance 
wants to be himself, but the self he wants to be is not the self he was made to be by the greater 
power (or powers) that brought him into existence. Anti-Climacus therefore rejects the self-
positing thesis that the Judge endorsed. The thought seems to be that because the self did not 
establish itself in its existence, it is not its own ground, but depends on something else in 
existence to ground it and provide it with its identity. On this view, the kind of absolute freedom 
the Judge describes is vacuous, and the self cannot provide itself with rules for action that have 
determinate content. As a human being, it needs to regulate itself by a criterion that would have 
authority over its life, and it cannot supply itself with empirical rules that would aid it in 
navigating the particular conditions of its existence. Before it became conscious of its freedom, it 
would have sought such direction from its natural drives and inclinations, family, society, 
culture, the state, or the like. But in discovering its freedom, in defiance, it breaks from its 
origins, and wants to choose its criterion for itself. While what brought the self into existence 
might be given a secular interpretation, as a Christian, Anti-Climacus understands it as God. He 
believes that as despair intensifies, and the individual increasingly finds himself on his own in 
existence, he comes closer to acknowledging that God has ultimate authority over his life. When 
this happens, he will look to revelation for positive guidance on how to live.  
 Anti-Climacus assumes the truth of Christianity throughout his account of despair, but 
uses this position to generate reasons for thinking human autonomy fails on its own terms. 
Accordingly, he distinguishes between active and passive forms of defiance. These differ with 
respect to the basic attitude the individual has toward the world and the greater powers that shape 
his life. In section 6.2, I explain that the self in defiance is active when it intends to overcome 
despair through its own efforts, neglecting its relation to external factors that would constrain it 
by focusing on improving itself in an abstract sense. This individual might believe he has 




Anti-Climacus believes he will fail. He will still have problems finding meaning and significance 
in life due to how detached he has become from his own life, and will achieve little success in 
changing himself in a concrete way. However, I argue that important objections can be raised 
that would challenge his hyperbolic account of the defiant individual, and that these demonstrate 
that this individual is not necessarily in despair. In section 6.3, I explain that the self in defiance 
is passive when it realizes that it is unable to remedy its suffering of its own accord, but is still 
free to rebel against the powers that afflict it in its concrete existence. This rugged individual 
might take satisfaction in his rebellion for some time, but I claim that Anti-Climacus has good 
reason to think that he is in despair. If an individual intends to achieve integrity and overcome 
despair, it would be best for him to will to be himself through an active form of defiance that 
rests on rational principles and ethical ideals that govern the concrete conditions of his life.  
 
6.2 The First Form of Rebellion: The Self That Acts in Defiance 
 As Anti-Climacus describes it, when the individual is active in defiance, he continues to 
keep his distance from his concrete existence in inclosing reserve, indulging in abstractions and 
fantasy rather than opening himself to earthly engagement. But instead of not wanting to be 
himself, in a self-aggrandizing way, he wants to be himself, and to contend with the world or the 
greater power or powers that sustain him in existence as a way of life. To a great extent, he 
retains his identity in this opposition, and depends on it as a source of meaning in his life. Rather 
than fall deeper into despair through his knowledge of the break with immediacy, he adopts this 
basic attitude in an effort to defeat despair on his own, and to resolve existential problems like 
the loss of enjoyment, value, and meaning that plague the reflective esthete. Despair in defiance 
best illustrates Anti-Climacus’ contention that despair is not an emotion that affects us, but is a 
condition that we bring upon ourselves. Because the individual who acts in defiance assumes 
autonomy and self-sufficiency in willing to be himself, Anti-Climacus describes it as the “misuse 
of the eternal within the self” (SUD: 67). While freedom gradually emerges as a reality in the 
human being as he transitions through the different forms of despair, in defiance, it reaches its 
crowning moment as the individual becomes conscious of his eternal aspect. He might not grasp 
his eternal aspect altogether theoretically, but it will become an active presence in his life as he 




 In becoming acutely self-conscious by means of his infinite component, he gains freedom 
by detaching himself from his finite aspect that is entangled in life in the world. As inwardness 
intensifies, he transcends the powerful flux of the sensuous, which had formerly controlled him 
without him having any say in the matter. Of course, since the self consists of finitude, the 
sensuous continues to influence his thoughts, emotions, and desires, which move him to act in 
the temporal realm, although it has lost much of the power it previously had over him. In 
becoming capable of thinking for himself from a detached point of view, the defiant individual 
can deliberate on which of these should constitute his character and move him to act. He can also 
decide who or what he will care about and what will be meaningful to him. Frankfurt believes 
that as persons, most of us earnestly shape our lives by working through the immediate contents 
of consciousness in this manner, but Anti-Climacus believes that most people are not very 
reflective, and so only do so occasionally. In his view, the will and critical self-examination only 
become prominent in the stage of defiance, when the person is no longer absorbed in worldly 
affairs, and will not allow external powers to determine his identity. Until we reach this stage of 
development, our sociocultural milieu and natural predispositions predominantly influence who 
we are and what we care about. Even if we believe we are making our own choices in these 
matters, we are much like automatons, drifting through life without really knowing ourselves. 
 With an intensified self-consciousness, the defiant individual would not only enter into 
conflict with his natural drives and inclinations. He would also have set himself apart from the 
social order and its directives, rejecting the uncritical conformism of those in "the public mode," 
whose beliefs and values are largely determined by others. In transcending the world, he refuses 
to let himself be possessed and controlled by natural forces or the will of others in society, even 
though he remains bound to the world through his temporal aspect. At this point, rather than 
admit its dependence on an even greater power that brought it into existence as a self, and that 
dictates how it should live and what it ought to become in temporality, the defiant self “wants to 
be master of itself or to create itself” (SUD: 68). Jealous of its freedom and independence, it also 
refuses to yield to a greater authority than itself, or more specifically, to God, who has endowed 
him with an essence that he ought to actualize. Without being willing to receive guidance about 
how to approach his life from the greater power that established him, the individual "does not 
want to see his given self as his task" or telos, which he should aim to bring into existence (SUD: 




values, stubbornly making of himself what he pleases. In gaining possession of himself, he takes 
full responsibility for himself and his actions as an agent, despite the external conditions that 
largely determine his identity and form of life. 
 By exploiting the freedom that accompanies being clearly aware of oneself as an "infinite 
self," the defiant individual wants to transform the concrete conditions he has inherited by 
necessity. Anti-Climacus explains that as an embodied human being, the individual has a specific 
character, predispositions, natural capacities or talents, and also belongs within a certain social 
context with standards and norms in place. But upon negating this aspect of its existence through 
reflection, the defiant self “wants first of all to take upon himself the transformation of all this in 
order to fashion out of it a self such as he wants” (SUD: 68). At first glance, it might seem he is 
suggesting that the self-reflective individual should not use the freedom he has through his 
infinitude to extensively reshape himself if he intends on overcoming despair, but should sit tight 
and be satisfied with the kind of person he is already through his cultural upbringing or natural 
necessity. The Judge articulates a position much like this with his account of "esthetic 
earnestness" (E/O II: 225). The esthetically earnest individual has a certain natural capacity, 
disposition, or talent that he decides to concentrate on developing to the exclusion of other 
possible projects he might take on. In reflectively endorsing the person he is already, without 
choosing to make significant changes to his character or lifestyle, it would seem that he would be 
willing to be himself, as opposed to remaining ignorant of himself or not wanting to be himself 
by fleeing from his earthly situation. Without wanting to transform his situation like the defiant 
individual does, it might be thought that he would be able to defeat despair by achieving a kind 
of balance between the infinite and finite aspects of himself.	
	 This cannot be the way to become spirit in actuality and defeat despair, however. The 
reason for this is that those living esthetically or in the public mode are in despair in acting 
mostly out of their natural spontaneity, and the esthetically earnest individual lives much like 
them. He differs from them only by being self-reflective, and by resolving to do what already 
comes naturally to him. By embracing a worldly lifestyle, he forgets his eternal aspect and 
ignores his essence as spirit, which it is up to him to actualize. Anti-Climacus therefore suggests 
that the individual ought to abandon this way of life and use his freedom to spiritually transform 
himself in existence en route to defeating despair. As a Christian, he does not believe that 




under the constraints of his own ideals. The Kantian view that there is a moral law that we give 
to ourselves as rational agents, for instance, would not pass muster on his view. The individual 
should bind his freedom by depending on normative guidance from a higher authority, or more 
specifically, from the power that brought him into existence. However, by assuming that it is in 
full possession of itself as an agent, the defiant self severs itself from this power, or from the idea 
that there is such a power that constrains its freedom and sustains it in existence (SUD: 68). In 
the next section, I explain why he believes human autonomy results in despair, before going on 
to pose objections to his view. 	
 
6.2.1   Why the Self that Acts in Defiance is in Despair 
  Anti-Climacus argues that the individual will invariably come up against obstacles in 
rejecting a heteronomous orientation, and will not be able to defeat despair by asserting 
unqualified autonomy. The first reason he gives is that, much like the reflective esthete, the 
defiant individual relates to himself mainly through "imaginary constructions" in the realm of 
possibility, exaggerating its infinite aspect and not making much contact with the reality of its 
situation (SUD: 68-69). In paying close attention to himself in his self-enclosure, he might think 
he is capable of making great advances in transforming himself to his liking, but this is a 
pretense. He can never get far in changing himself concretely in the way he wants, since the kind 
of person he intends to be does not accord with the kind he was established to be. He is indeed 
free to fantasize about the person he wishes to be and the kind of world he wants to inhabit, 
which he might strive to bring into being. But since he has little power to change his condition to 
reflect the idealized state he has imagined, and will not admit his concrete limitations as part of 
himself, Anti-Climacus states, "this absolute ruler is a king without a country” (SUD: 69). 
Because his lofty aspirations do not coincide with the reality of his situation, he is disintegrated 
as a self, and so remains in despair.  
 The defiant individual will likely occupy himself with imaginative pursuits and 
abstractions to avoid the experience of earthly suffering, and by extension, the suffering of being 
conscious of oneself in the midst of this. Defiance therefore has much in common with despair in 
weakness, which is the form of consciousness that precedes it on the path of personal 
development. Like despair in weakness, it can be characterized as a kind of flight from one's 




embroiled in the world as a human being. The defiant individual consequently despairs for many 
of the same reasons as the reflective esthete. Unlike the individual who despairs in weakness, 
however, he will have a more positive outlook on himself in wanting to be himself, even if he 
does not choose to view conditions in the world in the same light. He gets satisfaction from being 
in command of his own life, deciding what will have meaning and importance for him, choosing 
his goals and projects, and determining what he will value. Rather than partake in the ironic play 
of a figure like A, who would rather experiment with different identities and frolic with 
possibilities at whim, the defiant individual cares about making something definite of himself, 
and maintaining a coherent set of beliefs and stable patterns of action. He recognizes the vanity 
of a profligate lifestyle like A's, and intends to avoid such pitfalls that would bring him to 
despair.  
 The defiant individual might believe he has defeated despair in gaining control over his 
thoughts and emotions and earnestly shaping himself into the person he wants to be, but on Anti-
Climacus' view, he would be in denial. Because he cannot ultimately make his concrete existence 
correspond with his ideals, or perfect himself in the way he would like to, there is a deeper 
conflict occurring within the self that he has repressed from conscious awareness. He wants to 
live with integrity, but he cannot ultimately achieve it. Hovering over the world in inclosing 
reserve, which earthly suffering and hardship had originally forced him into, he overestimates his 
autonomy and self-sufficiency, and is now likely to overlook or even forget about such suffering. 
Of course, he has become well aware of the turmoil and danger that lurks within the temporal 
through the advancement of reflection, unlike the individual in immediacy, who remains mostly 
ignorant of it. But rather than distract himself from existential suffering by immersing himself in 
worldly affairs and material consumption like those who are ignorant of being selves, he distracts 
himself through fantasy and preoccupation with himself. This is similar to the strategy adopted 
by the reflective esthete, although the reflective esthete will not care so much about his personal 
development or taking responsibility for his life, and so will not be as true to himself. However, 
the reflective esthete will likely be more honest in confronting his existential crisis, whereas the 
defiant individual has the mistaken impression that he can overcome this on his own by working 
on himself and perhaps even changing the world for the better, without depending on a greater 




 It should be noted that if the self has freedom of will as he suggests, Anti-Climacus offers 
a remarkably weak position that undermines itself. He assumes that the individual will 
necessarily fail in her attempt to direct her own life in the world, not only due to death and 
misfortune subverting her endeavors, but also due to the impossibility of changing her concrete 
condition in the way she would like to. In the case that she can only imagine that she is free to do 
this, it is difficult to see how she would be free at all. It certainly seems plausible that she might 
succeed in putting her ideas into practice and making them a reality through her free choices, 
reforming her character or lifestyle in remarkable ways. Even a botched effort might seem to be 
evidence of free acts. However, let us assume for a moment that Anti-Climacus is correct that it 
will be unable to transform itself in a real and definite way. He provides no reason to think it 
might still succeed in changing itself to reflect what this greater power wants it to be, so long as 
this requires shaping oneself in a manner that contradicts its original propensities and 
predispositions, many of which arise immediately by natural necessity. He might claim that a 
power like God could offer the self the leeway it needs to depart from its natural or cultural 
framework and transform itself in existence according to His liking, but not to its own liking. But 
in this case, a divine type of necessity would delimit freedom, and so the self would once again 
not seem free at all in relation to the power that brought it into existence. I claim that on his 
view, freedom is either illusory or epiphenomenal, leaving us hopelessly detached from our 
concrete condition and unable to interact with it at all as selves. But in this case, it would be 
more appropriate to abandon the idea of freedom altogether, rather than use it as a guise of fate.  
 Fortunately, Anti-Climacus provides a stronger reason to think that the self in defiance is 
in despair that admits of the possibility of human freedom. The second reason is that the 
autonomous self cannot ultimately take itself seriously in the norms or ideals it upholds, the 
projects it chooses to adopt, or the people and things it decides to form attachments to. Once the 
individual attains a heightened awareness of his freedom, he needs to have things in life that he 
cares deeply about, lest he despair by not maintaining a meaningful connection with the world, 
society, and himself as a human being. If there were little that he cares about, there would be 
nothing to bind him to circumstances in life, and he would remain self-enclosed like the 
reflective esthete. But since the defiant self does not recognize itself as answerable to a greater 
power beyond itself that has a profound claim on who it will be or become, and regards itself as 




appearance of earnestness, even when it gives its utmost attention to its imaginary constructions" 
(SUD: 68). As the sovereign of his own life, there is ultimately nothing else in existence that 
compels him to act in the ways he does. If he understands himself as having duties or 
obligations, it is because he wants to have them, and not because they are imposed upon him by 
an external source, whether it is God or other people. Others might believe they have a claim on 
him, but he is free to regard this as illegitimate, and does not have to let it affect him. In adopting 
a self-sufficient standpoint of this type, he will remain detached from his life in the world.  
 Furthermore, because reflection requires detachment from one's concrete condition, and 
the individual in defiance has become highly reflective in attaining freedom, his earthly cares 
will not consume him like they do with the individual who is ignorant of being a self. Due to the 
isolating effects of reflection, and its tendency to cast things into doubt, this individual will 
continue wondering what the point of it all is, what meaning things have for him, and why he 
bothers doing what he does or caring about the people or things he does. Even if he resolves to 
participate in life in the world, in being intensely self-conscious, he is liable to assume a point of 
view that makes him feel alienated from the world and other people, including himself. As a 
spectator of his own life, he might be apt to survey himself "with that detached amazement 
which comes from watching an ant struggle up a heap of sand."311 He might attribute great 
significance to his ordinary engagements, but in the background of his consciousness, he harbors 
questions about whether his finite concerns are important, or are basically fleeting, trivial, and 
arbitrary in the grand scheme of things. This awareness brought forth through his infinitude will 
continue to haunt him, even though he might take efforts to combat it by renewing his resolution 
to have these concerns. This discrepancy between viewpoints that occurs due to his infinite and 
finite aspects puts him in a paradoxical position, and compromises his integrity as a self. It is 
therefore a source of despair in his life. 
 Just as in the case of a reflective esthete like A, the nihilistic thoughts and doubts that 
hound the defiant individual are a consequence of his freedom, and arise regardless of how 
seriously he takes himself and his projects. Such ideas are unlikely to surface in the individual so 
long as nature and society predominantly condition his attitudes, beliefs, and desires. In the 
earlier and less reflective phase of personal development, these forces automatically lend 
meaning and importance to objects and events in his life, and motivate his actions without him 
                                                




having to decide on any of this for himself. But in shaping itself by means of its infinite 
component, the self must momentarily liberate itself from its local situation to assess the bigger 
picture and think critically about its life from an abstract vantage point. This act of reflective 
distancing establishes the conditions under which it can make deliberate decisions about its 
character and actions, and consider different possibilities that it might realize in existence. This 
can create internal conflict and unrest in the self by calling the importance things currently have 
for it into doubt, and by leading to questions about the meaning that things have for it. By 
repeatedly disengaging from its immediate situation through acts of reflection, and then re-
engaging with it in the next moment, the self persistently undermines its concrete position 
throughout the procession of time. This dialectical pattern of activity occurs in anyone who is 
reflective, but it intensifies as one becomes more self-conscious. As a result, the self in defiance 
is particularly susceptible to the disturbances reflection inflicts on natural processes occurring 
within the psyche-body relation, which can lead to difficulties in making sense of things and 
deciding how to conduct oneself. Without coping with the threat of nihilism, however, we are not 
aware of ourselves as free persons. 
 As Anti-Climacus puts it, in thinking and willing as a self that contains infinitude within 
it, "the self exercises a loosening power as well as a binding power; at any time it can quite 
arbitrarily start all over again, and no matter how long one idea is pursued, the entire action is 
within a hypothesis" (SUD: 69). The defiant individual might indeed approach the things he 
cares about in life with confidence and enthusiasm, and takes pains to maintain his integrity and 
identity by renewing his commitment to care about them. If he allows ideals or principles to 
constrain him, whether they are his own or borrowed from his culture or society, he will aim to 
rigidly adhere to them. At bottom, however, the freedom he exercises in shaping himself by 
means of his "negative form" persistently unsettles him, making him question his life, his 
identity, and what he truly cares about (SUD: 69). This spiritual negativity would account for the 
"troubled and restless uncertainty about how to live" that Frankfurt recognizes as a problem for 
us. Frankfurt believes that rather than despair, we should be confident that we clearly understand 
ourselves, and are caring about the right things and living in the right way.312 We should not 
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become disoriented and entertain doubts about the meaning and importance that things have for 
us, at least on a broad scale. 
 Anti-Climacus would agree with Frankfurt that in having a will through which we engage 
with our lives in the world, our cares and interests are essential to the basic structure of the 
self.313 The self exerts a "binding power" in wanting to care about things, since the cares and 
interests it retains in its finitude help it establish its identity and foster coherence and continuity 
in it. However, as a thinking being marked by infinitude and negativity, the self has a "loosening 
power" as well. The capacity to disengage from its life and call things into question is just as 
essential to its structure, and this disrupts the unity it cultivates in caring for things. In becoming 
detached from our concerns, we are liable to raise doubts about what is important to us. This 
abstract movement of reflection undermines the attachments that we form in caring about things, 
and consequently, our sense of our own identity.314 Detachment is therefore the obverse of care, 
but it attends care as care comes into being. To the extent that the self is balanced and imposes its 
will in its concrete existence, it will return to its cares and interests after reflection, although it 
might form new ones or renounce previous ones after questioning. Any act of thinking involves 
detachment from the immediate contents of consciousness, but this does not mean that we cannot 
reflect on something while also caring about it, since these elements can be held in dynamic 
tension in the self. But since we are subject to imbalance as a synthesis of paradoxical 
components, it might be the case that we care about things without adequately reflecting on 
them, as in the case of the immediate esthete or those in the public mode. We might also reflect 
too much on things without really caring about them, as in the case of the reflective esthete.  
 Paradoxically, both caring and detachment occur through the exercise of freedom, and 
this makes the self an enigma to itself. However much it thinks it understands itself and has 
attained a firm standpoint from which to approach its life, "in the final analysis, what it 
understands by itself is a riddle; in the very moment when it seems that the self is closest to 
                                                                                                                                                       
on itself and its concrete condition, bursting any limitations its volitional character might impose on it for the time 
being.  
313 Ibid., p. 17. Frankfurt writes: "Caring is indispensably foundational as an activity that connects and binds us to 
ourselves. It is through caring that we provide ourselves with volitional continuity, and in that way constitute and 
participate in our own agency. Regardless of how suitable or unsuitable the various things we care about may be, 
caring about something is essential to our being creatures of the kind that human beings are.” 
314 Our ability to put various facets of our lives into doubt or raise questions about the way thing are being handled is 
not altogether lamentable, and might be used for good or ill. We should not be so cocksure that we care about what 
we ought to and have the right priorities. Some restlessness in our lives is good, morally speaking. We need to 




having the building completed, it can arbitrarily dissolve the whole thing into nothing" (SUD: 
69-70). The indifference or disinterest that accompanies heightened reflection undermines the 
interest one takes in things, and makes the defiant individual vulnerable to nihilistic thoughts 
about his life. His infinite component thereby presents a continual obstacle in his effort to take 
himself and the things he cares about seriously, which he needs to do in order to retain harmony 
with his finite component, and by this means, to avoid despair. At the same time, however, these 
are inevitably the complications that ensue in developing as a person, who is in the process of 
surmounting his natural condition from within it as spirit in actuality.  
 Nagel makes essentially the same point as Anti-Climacus in writing on the absurdity of 
the human condition. He argues that human beings have to deal with "the collision between the 
seriousness with which we take our lives and the perpetual possibility of regarding everything 
about which we are serious as arbitrary, or open to doubt."315 The absurdity of is that, in addition 
to the earnest perspective we maintain as individuals situated in an earthly and finite context, 
"we have always available a point of view outside the particular form of our lives, from which 
the seriousness appears gratuitous."316 Nagel does not think such absurdity is cause for despair or 
disquietude as Anti-Climacus does, but rather for approaching our lives with irony and 
resignation.317 As we have seen, the reflective esthete adopts this strategy in response to his 
absurd predicament, which suggests that Nagel's recommendation cannot be much different than 
his. For Anti-Climacus, a carefree attitude ought to be avoided if one is to live with integrity and 
sincerity. He would also disagree with Nagel that we are able to attain a point of view beyond the 
particular form of our lives, although we do retain a perspective on the universe as particular 
individuals through our capacity to think about it, which can lead to this mistaken impression. 
The self that thinks objectively about itself and the world is the same self that lives as an 
embodied and emotional creature, although these two aspects of the self contradict one another 
and are difficult to integrate effectively.  
 Anti-Climacus believes that through faith, the individual can achieve stability and 
balance between the infinite and finite aspects of himself that cause this gap between 
perspectives, driving out despair and absurdity. By integrating these perspectives in inwardness, 
the man of faith applies his thought to his life, understanding himself as a particular individual in 
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the matters he thinks about. He does not stand aloof from his particularity by thinking about 
himself or his life in an objective, disinterested way like a scientist would, with his own person 
as just one of the world's contents.318 Instead, with passion, he thinks with the purpose of 
understanding who he is as an individual, and what significance the world and its objects have 
for him in his relationship with God. While it is "the good health of faith that resolves 
contradictions" (SUD: 40), a complete reconciliation with existence is impossible for any human 
being to achieve in this life as a consequence of reflection. We are thereby prone to raise doubts 
about what we believe, who or what we care about, and whether we are acting in the right way. 
 The human being is not only unsettled by his freedom as spirit. Along with being 
destabilized by nagging questioning and doubt that arises from his infinitude, the nothingness 
that his existence rests on in being finitely situated in the natural world also threatens him with 
dissolution at any moment, without him being able to control this. As a result, the self in defiance 
"is always building only castles in the air" in fashioning a way of life for itself on its own terms 
in the temporal (SUD: 69). On the one hand, these "castles" might be destroyed at any moment 
by forces of nature, which comes into being in its own right while temporarily supporting the 
human being in the process of becoming spirit in actuality. On the other hand, in drawing on 
natural elements to build these "castles," the self might quickly pulverize them if, upon 
reflection, it decides to pursue alternative possibilities that entice it with a different way of life. 
Suspended in the nothingness of possibility, with dangers emerging both from his infinitude and 
finitude, this state of impermanence and uncertainty generates anxiety and despair. Anti-
Climacus suggests that concerns about the annihilation of himself and everything he cares about 
could be alleviated if the individual resolved to ground his life in the Eternal, which is. However 
stable his approach to life in the temporal is, without having a timeless criterion by which to 
configure his life, this individual is not "eternally steadfast" like the individual who pursues a 
relationship with God (SUD: 69). Since the self has an eternal component within it, this is 
something one requires if one is to gain security in existence, and to forget the eternal by 




                                                




6.2.1.1 The First Objection: The Defiant Individual Might Take Himself Seriously 
 Anti-Climacus raises a deeper worry when he claims that the self in defiance will not be 
able to take itself seriously in its autonomous project, conferring meaning and value on things in 
whatever way it likes while recognizing the ultimate insignificance and futility of its efforts. To 
defend his view, he contends that the individual would need to admit his dependence on a greater 
power beyond himself that exerts normative pressure on him in order to strengthen his 
commitments to his ideals or the people and things he cares about, and to properly justify them. 
This individual, he states, is especially likely to become earnest if he acknowledges that God 
pays close attention to him and has an eternally valid claim on him (SUD: 69). Presumably this is 
due not only to the majesty of God, but also to the threat of eternal punishment for failure to 
obey His commands, and the prospect of eternal reward for fulfilling them. To his credit, it does 
seem that an external authority that one deeply respects and feels obligated to would lend 
significance to one's undertakings, and bring one into closer engagement with what is beyond 
oneself. To prevent its undertakings from being mere "imaginary constructions," or mere 
experiments in living that one might abandon at any time, the defiant self would need to be 
engaged in its earthly existence to reconcile its infinite and finite aspects and bring harmony to 
the self. For Anti-Climacus, this is necessary for defeating despair.  
 However, Anti-Climacus does not explain why the individual must accept the authority 
of God if he intends to be earnest in his engagements. The autonomous individual understands 
himself as having sovereignty over his life, but he does not have to conceive of himself as the 
sole authority in existence, or as a god-like entity arbitrarily deciding on the terms of his 
existence in the way that Anti-Climacus suggests. He can acknowledge that there are authorities 
other than God that constrain him, and determine how he will act or understand himself. For 
instance, after critical reflection, he might regard certain cultural or legal norms as imposing 
valid restrictions on his actions and character. Kantians would say that although we are 
autonomous, there are rational constraints on our actions that keep our exercise of freedom from 
being arbitrary, and independent of respect for other rational agents. It might also be case that the 
defiant individual, who has reflected on injustice and suffering in himself and the world at large, 
regards other persons as having authority in their own right, making claims upon him that he 
must acknowledge. In his daily encounters with others, he might become earnest out of a sense 




have upon people who suffer like himself. He might use his freedom to work on becoming an 
altruistic person that will consistently treat others with compassion or benevolence, which 
unfortunately, does not come naturally for so many of us. He does not have to do this out of fear 
that God will punish him for his misdeeds, or for not being the kind of person He wants him to 
be. In this case, it would be presumptuous to charge him with not being able to take himself or 
those he cares about seriously, or arbitrarily deciding what will have significance for him. These 
individuals would not be like the ironist or reflective esthete, who take pleasure in toying with 
their circumstances or other people. In recognizing the dignity and intrinsic worth of persons, 
and valuing our shared humanity, they would have good reasons for caring about what they do.  
 In response to this objection, Anti-Climacus would likely argue that if the defiant 
individual regarded anything or anyone other than God as making demands on her that she is 
responsible for meeting, this would still not be enough to motivate serious existential 
engagement. However self-disciplined and resolved she might be in carrying out her project, she 
would still be liable to undermine her efforts by calling their significance into doubt. But why 
not think that the person of faith might similarly undermine his relationship with God by 
doubting that He exists, and that he is meeting His expectations? The same problems would seem 
to arise for both individuals, meaning that in this regard, the person of faith is no more stable and 
secure in his position than the defiant person. The individual who believes she is in relationship 
with God can just as easily step back and question whether her beliefs about God are true, or 
whether it even matters to God that she intends to build a relationship with Him. Moreover, an 
individual can easily doubt God's existence, but it is hard to doubt the existence of others, 
including their need for compassion and justice, which we are capable of addressing in a way 
that has tangible consequences.319 Indeed, questions about the existence of God are likely to 
gnaw at those with faith, which Kierkegaard acknowledges in stating that the struggle of faith 
occurs when "doubt assaults faith with many wild thoughts" (UDVS: 273). Kierkegaard suggests 
that such doubt is not incidental to faith, but a persistent element that must be combatted to 
sustain it. The defiant individual, however, can view any doubts he has about the ideals, 
concerns, and projects that define her in the same way.  
 Kierkegaard believes that the proper way to overcome doubt is not through more 
reflection, since reflection can go on endlessly interrogating an issue once it gets started without 
                                                




making headway. It is rather through resolution, or an act of will, that one can bring reflection to 
a halt and persevere in one's standpoint (JP I: 776). With a will to believe in the truth of 
Christianity, for instance, the passionate individual can power through the whirlwinds of doubt 
when they occur and renew his commitment to his faith. Yet in this case, the defiant individual 
should be able to overcome doubts about whether she ought to go on living in the way she is in 
the same manner, with both being confident that they are handling things in the appropriate 
manner. She might conceivably do this without depending on other people to give her life weight 
and significance. Assuming that she maintains confidence in her beliefs and actions, and 
passionately commits to them despite doubts and insecurities that arise, it is not clear why she 
must be in despair, especially if she does not feel miserable or hopeless. So long as her approach 
works and she maintains it over time, then it would seem that her infinite and finite aspects 
would be largely in keeping with one another, stabilizing her and fostering unity and coherence 
within the self. The world would meet her pressing needs and accommodate her with the 
meaning she seeks, she would be pleased that her efforts are met with some success, and her life 
would be going relatively smoothly.  
 
6.2.1.2 The Second Objection: The Defiant Individual Might Be Fine With His Mortality 
 In willing to be herself, the defiant individual meets one of the two principal conditions 
necessary for defeating despair on Anti-Climacus' view. So long as she is satisfied with who she 
is, and intends to bear any earthly burden she has, it would not seem that she is likely to be in 
despair as he claims. Anti-Climacus does not think she is out of the woods yet, however, since 
she does not meet the other condition, which is to admit her dependence on God in faith. 
Consequently, she wants to be someone who she is ultimately not. In taking pride in her 
independence and autonomy, she has an inaccurate conception of herself, and refuses her 
obligations to her Creator. This distortion affects her entire way of life, contributing to despair 
even if she remains unconscious of it or intends to repress it. A problem with all this is that she is 
endowed with the eternal by nature but does not admit it as a driving concern in her life, even 
though she takes advantage of it in retaining a stable set of ideals, commitments, and values, 
which lend coherence to her life. However unwavering and resilient she is in her position during 




herself is destined to end so long as her goals are only temporal ones that she does not 
understand herself as pursuing before God.  
 In objection to the idea that the impermanence of human life is grounds for despair, one 
could argue that the individual can readily accept the transient nature of his endeavors, or be 
content with his mortality rather than despair over this. To prevent an injustice or alleviate the 
suffering of another human being could be considered an event that will not endure throughout 
the passage of time, but this would have plenty of significance for the time being. Kierkegaard 
never makes it clear why the eternal has to be present in order for things to have the value that 
they have. Additionally, for those who conceive of their existence as a burden to them, death in 
the sense of non-existence would offer release, and would not be something to be feared or 
shunned. Anti-Climacus, however, thinks that because the self contains an aspect of the eternal 
within it, its bodily death is not the end for it, and it in some sense has an intuition of this. He 
believes we should diligently prepare ourselves for eternal life in our earthly existence by living 
with an eternal purpose as God intends for us, rather than evade the task of actualizing ourselves 
spiritually before Him by pursuing the impermanent goods of the temporal. Hence, when despair 
intensifies as one's inner life intensifies, and one does not surrender to God, one is tormented not 
by the prospect of death as the objector might suppose, but by "this inability to die" (SUD: 18). 
Because this individual cannot succeed in stamping out the eternal, Anti-Climacus likens the 
agony of despair to a “cold fire” through which he realizes that he “cannot consume himself, 
cannot get rid of himself, cannot reduce himself to nothing,” however much he wants to (SUD: 
18-19).  
 Many would reject the notion that the self is immortal out of a lack of sufficient evidence 
for it, and so would not accept that this has to be a problem that brings the individual to the point 
of despair. Kierkegaard nevertheless refuses to offer exacting proof for the unbelievers. Under 
the pseudonym of Haufniensis, he writes: “There is only one proof of spirit, and that is the 
spirit’s proof within oneself. Whoever demands something else may get proofs in 
superabundance, but he is already characterized as spiritless” (CA: 95). Of course, he thinks that 
the phenomenological evidence obtained through human experience suggests that the self has an 
eternal component, as I have explained throughout this work. He also believes the individual has 




 His remarks on the self being tormented by its immortality are puzzling, since it would 
mean there is a sense in which the self in defiance despairs by not wanting to be itself, which in 
chapters three and four, was described as a form of weakness rather than defiance. This might 
lead one to question whether weakness and defiance are essentially different forms of despair at 
all. As I previously mentioned, for Anti-Climacus there is a close relationship between them. He 
claims that each of the two conscious forms of despair can be resolved into the other form (SUD: 
20). The thought seems to be that there is an element of defiance in weakness, just as there is an 
element of weakness in defiance. If the individual does not want to be who she is, she is 
implicitly defying the power that brought her into existence as the individual she is. If she boldly 
defies this power by wanting to be someone she is not, she betrays a weakness in not wanting to 
be the individual she was made to be. Although he claims each of these forms can be resolved in 
the other upon analysis, he believes there are nonetheless differences between them, as we have 
seen. In his view, neither of the two forms is more basic than the other.  
 On closer scrutiny, it is true that despair in defiance can be resolved into despair in 
weakness, since in wanting to be someone it is not, the defiant self withdraws from its earthly 
condition and retreats into the imagination, exaggerating its infinite aspect in inclosing reserve. 
Because the self retains a finite aspect that is situated in the world through the relation between 
psyche and body, this is to not want to be who it is, although here there is the qualification that it 
wants to be itself in its infinitude. Anti-Climacus, however, is not justified in claiming that 
despair in weakness can always be resolved into despair in defiance. If one withdraws from one's 
earthly condition due to suffering or hardship occurring within it, it is not the case that one must 
thereby will to be oneself in one's infinitude, as a reflective esthete like A shows. One might 
decline to adopt an autonomous project and will to do away with oneself entirely, as in the case 
of the self that wants to die completely but recognizes it cannot due to its eternal aspect. This 
means that the basic form of despair must be to not want to be oneself, contrary to what Anti-
Climacus claims. Theunissen agrees in his criticism of Anti-Climacus' notion of despair, stating, 
"while in despair to will to be oneself is inconceivable without its opposite, in despair not to will 
to be oneself can occur independently of its other. It constitutes the original form of despair."320 
As different types of weakness, both conscious forms of despair are testament to suffering that 
                                                




befalls one in one's earthly condition, and which prompts heightened reflection upon oneself, the 
world and its contents, and likely God.  
 In chapter four, I argued that in contrast to what Anti-Climacus states, it must be the case 
that despair in weakness emerges spontaneously in response to a disagreeable state of existence, 
and not because an individual originally chooses to be in despair. The suffering of the human 
being only worsens if he gets the sense that he cannot bring an end to his existence, however 
much he would like to, due to having been established by a greater power that compels him to 
exist eternally. But if defiance is originally a form of weakness, then the defiant individual could 
not be bringing despair upon himself as Anti-Climacus claims must happen in all cases of 
despair, even if he might choose to end it by wanting to be himself in faith before God. Since the 
individual in ignorance is also in despair in his earthly predicament even before he can properly 
employ his will, it would seem to be the original state of the human being, and an occurrence 
which can only be surmounted subsequently by an act of the will. His insistence that despair is 
always one's own fault leads to a glaring inconsistency in his account of despair.  
 
6.2.1.3 The Third Objection: The Defiant Individual Might Be "Eternally Steadfast" 
 Although the defiant self will be burdened by its temporal component, it does not seem 
that Anti-Climacus believes the self in despair must necessarily be bothered by its eternal 
component. Consequently, he undercuts his position that one despairs when he realizes that he 
has an aspect of the eternal in him that he cannot rid himself of. Describing a second variant of 
defiant action, which he refers to as resignation, he claims that there might be ascetic individuals 
who affirm the eternal and infinite component of the self, while curbing their desires and 
disavowing what happens to them in time. These individuals are contemplative by nature in their 
refusal to care about external conditions all that much, or to admit that they are in the throes of 
earthly suffering. In a state of resignation, they will to be themselves in abstraction, and to "make 
the eternal suffice” without accepting the tenets of Christianity, which emphasizes the 
inevitability of earthly suffering in its offer of salvation (SUD: 70). Finding solace in the thought 
that earthly suffering will vanish in eternity, and is ultimately illusory, the self in resignation will 
not attach itself to anything temporal, nor admit its temporal component as a crucial part of itself. 
As Anti-Climacus puts it, in defiance, it “will not in faith humble itself under it" (SUD: 71). This 




remain serene even in terrible circumstances. The most extreme example of this would be the 
person who believes he would be unperturbed even while being tortured on the rack.321 Instead 
of being in touch with his concrete aspect, which is inevitably under stress in its earthly 
existence, he is preoccupied with thinking about himself in an effort to attain wisdom or virtue. 
He might believe that he takes himself seriously, but he will not really succeed in this unless he 
takes his earthly condition seriously.  
 Despair in resignation would seem to have much in common with Stoicism, which Anti-
Climacus proposes as a paradigmatic example of defiance (SUD: 68). To attain happiness, the 
Stoics dissociate themselves from earthly passions and emotions that are excessive and 
disobedient to reason, since these are external powers that one undergoes or suffers rather than 
things that one does. To extinguish these disturbing feelings, which are kindled by objects and 
events in the external world, they aim to be in firm command of themselves, so that they can 
consistently act in accordance with the internal activity of reason.322 If they succeed at this, they 
become apathetic to what is outside of their control. Marcus Aurelius, one of the great Stoics of 
antiquity, gives succinct expression to this position when he writes: "Outward things can touch 
the soul not a whit; they know no way into it, they have no power to sway or move it. By itself it 
sways and moves itself; it has its own self-approved standards of judgment, and to them it refers 
every experience."323 The stoical or resigned individual would therefore appreciate the eternal 
aspect of the self in his own way, arguably remaining "eternally steadfast" without a relationship 
with God of the type demanded by Christianity (SUD: 69).  
 Anti-Climacus claims that the self in resignation might believe it has achieved spiritual 
integrity in divesting itself of its passions and withdrawing from worldly life, but who it 
imagines itself to be does not correspond with who it actually is (SUD: 69). Ruminating on 
virtue in inclosing reserve, and professing wisdom about existence, this individual has taken a 
stance that is not in accord with his concrete existence in time, and so he remains disintegrated as 
a self. By taking his existence as an embodied human being lightly, he is unable to effectively 
unite the two aspects of his nature in passion. Such passion would require him to bear his 
suffering in his finitude and concentrate on a goal that he wants to realize in existence in his 
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infinitude. But with his disinterested attitude, he refuses to honestly face up to existential 
suffering, and instead wants to philosophize in an attempt to rise above it. But by fleeing into the 
lofty regions of his imagination, he builds his worldview upon the nothingness of abstractions 
rather than existence, and has a misconception of the reality of his situation (SUD: 69). Rather 
than depend on God for help in his earthly plight, he believes he can save himself by perfecting 
himself, but he deceives himself. By exaggerating his infinitude, he is in despair, even if he is 
unconscious of it.  
 The Stoics would reject the dualistic conception of the self that this objection rests on, 
along with the notion that they are unable to apply their thought to their life in practice. The 
abstractions that the Stoic bases his worldview on are not empty figments of the imagination, but 
have rational content, and are believed to guide him in living well. Similarly, they would 
disagree with the claim that they are indulging in idealizing that bears little relation to reality 
(SUD: 69). On their monistic view of the mind, in acting under the command of reason, the sage 
acts in agreement with nature, since it is governed by principles of reason. He does not act in 
defiance of the power that established him, but rather in conformity with it, and so achieves 
harmony and integrity in his existence. Not only this, but supposing he achieves serenity by 
controlling or eliminating his emotions and passions as a rational agent, it is unclear why his 
condition must be regarded as despair.  
 Nevertheless, it is indeed possible that the Stoic has an inaccurate conception of himself 
and the rationality of the natural world, and so is off-kilter as Anti-Climacus suggests. On his 
view, if the human being succeeded in living in agreement with nature and its vital processes, he 
would not become wise or virtuous. Spiritual activity would cease, and he would regress to an 
unreflective state like that of the immediate esthete, or what Frankfurt refers to as the wanton. 
This individual is not self-possessed or rationally guided, but is enslaved by earthly passions and 
appetites that move him to act without his oversight. He is indeed free of psychological conflict 
as the sage intends to be, but at the cost of being submerged in the temporal like an animal. 
When reflection has advanced to the extent that it has with the Stoic or the defiant individual, 
nature is difficult or even impossible to live in total agreement with, since in becoming active as 
spirit, one has thwarted one's natural spontaneity and contested external powers that move one to 




capable of gaining control over one's life, including the inclinations that arise from one's lower 
nature, which do not originally obey the intellect or the will.  
 The Stoic would not believe that this theory, which draws a strict separation between 
internal acts of the self and external acts of nature, accurately represents our moral psychology. 
Through self-discipline, and by adopting the right habits, the sage would have transformed 
himself in his natural condition such that rational action becomes spontaneous for him. In other 
words, he knowingly does the right thing in any given situation by natural inclination, or through 
first-order desires which he has trained to align with reason. On Anti-Climacus' view, however, 
this view fails to recognize the discrepancy between the natural vitality of animals (or the mere 
human being) and the spiritual vitality of persons. Reason entails reflection, which is an activity 
of the self that involves a different form of spontaneity entirely. The process of reflection 
disrupts the immanent flux of nature, which affects the self through the psyche-body relation, by 
negating it so that its contents are apprehended formally in consciousness. However much 
control one has over one's inclinations, so long as one exists in nature, any act of thinking or 
willing involves psychological conflict of the sort that the sage intends to do away with, even if 
such conflict can be minimized, and the two processes be brought into general agreement. This 
conflict is due to the paradoxical nature of the self, which clutches the psyche-body relation in 
caring for people and things in this world, even as it holds it apart from itself in detachment. This 
is a source of unrest and often dissatisfaction in human life, but it also means that the self is free 
from the shackles of natural necessity in an important respect.  
 I believe that broadly construed, the paradoxical conception of the self that Kierkegaard 
offers throughout his works is plausible, even if important modifications need to be made to 
correct it. In this project, I assume that his dualistic account of the human being is correct in 
broad outline, and the individual needs to reconcile the eternal and temporal components of his 
nature to maintain stability and balance in his life. On his account, the Stoic sage would not 
accomplish this since he does not endure his concrete existence with passion, which Kierkegaard 
thinks is necessary for the task.324 He would, however, have succeeded in alienating himself 
from himself and the surrounding world, and consummating inclosing reserve as a "pure 
thinker," which would seem to be an unlikely way of defeating despair. In renouncing emotional 
attachments to anything external, including objects and other people, the Stoic might claim that 
                                                




he could not be alienated from them. Not only would he have divested himself of such feelings, 
but upon having severed attachments to anything outside of himself, there is also no longer 
anything he could be alienated from. If we accept that he is ineluctably situated in the world as a 
human being, however, we must admit that he is only deceiving himself. Nevertheless, while he 
might be repressing despair and feelings of alienation from conscious awareness, it is difficult to 
say he must be in despair if he insists he is happy in his solitude, just as it is in the case of the 
ignorant individual. If he is, it is likely only in the technical sense used by Anti-Climacus, which 
has come well apart from its ordinary usage in a dubious way.  
 After all that has been said, it would seem that Anti-Climacus' criterion allows for the 
possibility that there is a defiant individual who, like the resigned individual, accepts the eternal 
component in the self without being fazed by it, but who commits himself to his earthly projects, 
relationships, and engagements with confidence, while living in accord with ideals or principles. 
Rather than keeping himself closed off from life in the world, out of passion, he resolves to open 
himself to it and shoulder any burdens he has. It is extremely difficult on his account to conclude 
that this individual is in despair in his technical sense, since it seems he would have attained 
balance and integrity in willing to be himself. To claim that he is in despair simply because he 
lacks faith would seem like an ad hoc maneuver within the context of the rest of his thought, 
which attributes despair to a lack of balance and integrity that arises from the misuse of the will. 
The only way he could be misusing his will is by not accepting Christian ideas about God or how 
to live a good life, but it would seem that he would have achieved this of his own powers without 
needing to adopt the Christian faith. In the last chapter, I claimed that Kierkegaard depicts such 
an individual in Either/Or through the figure of Judge William, who undertakes an ethical 
transformation of his life while paying lip service to Christianity. There are certainly 
complications in this way of life, but Kierkegaard fails to show why it has to be despair in any 
sense other than the technical one Anti-Climacus provides. In the next section, I briefly explore a 
stronger form of defiance that Anti-Climacus believes the individual might assume in grappling 
with his existence, which does not fare well as a solution to despair in either the customary or 







6.3 The Second Form of Rebellion: The Self That Is Acted Upon in Defiance 
 Anti-Climacus suggests that the self that acts in defiance might lose itself in abstractions 
as a result of becoming acutely conscious of its earthly troubles, but eventually it might reach the 
point that it cannot circumvent its suffering through its idealizing any longer. If despair in 
defiance progresses, the individual will no longer bother making a pretense of being able to 
overcome suffering of his own accord. When this occurs, defiance would assume a passive form, 
as the defiant self finds itself overwhelmed by the greater forces in reality that encumber it. In 
this phase of defiance, "the self in despair is acted upon . . . encountering some difficulty or other 
while provisionally orienting itself to its concrete self, something the Christian would call a 
cross, a basic defect, whatever it may be" (SUD: 70). This individual is even more self-conscious 
than the self that acts in defiance, but instead of abstracting himself from his earthly suffering in 
the way that the reflective esthete does, he angrily shoulders it, willing to be himself while using 
it "as an occasion to be offended at all existence" (SUD: 71). Rebelling against the powers 
beyond his control that dictate his fate, whether they be of the gods or of the world, he wants to 
bear his affliction out of spite, and to retain his dignity and what little freedom he has by refusing 
to buckle under their pressures and demands. Although this individual has become more concrete 
by admitting his finite aspect as an essential part of himself, he remains in inclosing reserve; out 
of pride and dogged passion, such an individual would prefer to be alone with himself “with all 
the agonies of hell” than have faith that God, for whom anything is possible, would answer him 
by relieving him of his misery (SUD: 71). To maintain this hope would require accepting one’s 
impotence and submitting to Him, but the defiant individual is obstinate, and will not humiliate 
himself before anyone in this way. He would rather remain conscious of his suffering of it so that 
he can hold it as evidence against the goodness of existence, which he regards as the product of a 
“second-rate author” (SUD: 73-74). 
 The self that is acted upon in defiance closely resembles the absurd hero Camus describes 
in The Myth of Sisyphus. On Camus' telling of the Homeric myth, to punish him for his love for 
things of this earth, the gods assigned Sisyphus the task of rolling a heavy stone to the top of a 
mountain. Upon reaching the top, it would fall down, and he would have to roll it up again, 
straining endlessly against its weight. Sisyphus is fully aware that his labor is pointless, and can 
adopt a detached point of view toward his life at any moment to recall this fact. However, he will 




and meaning in persevering in his efforts, and this makes him absurd on both Camus and Nagel's 
criteria. For Camus, his tenacity in a task that the gods thought would break him is an act of 
rebellion. He writes: 
 
Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods, powerless and rebellious, knows the whole extent of his wretched 
condition: it is what he thinks of during his descent. The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the 
same time crowns his victory. There is no fate that cannot be surmounted by scorn.325 
 
Although he suffers immensely under this burden, Camus thinks we should regard Sisyphus as 
happy in his rebellion against the gods and his cursed fate, and not as someone in despair. "The 
struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart," and there will always be those 
rare moments in which Sisyphus can look out from the top of the mountain and glory in his 
accomplishment, which has great personal significance for him.326 While Sisyphus occupies the 
realm of myth, absurd heroes might be found in everyday life. These individuals might be 
beleaguered due to the loss of a beloved, health problems, a miserable job, and so on, while 
wanting to persist in their struggles, without counting on relief or harboring any illusions about 
the wider significance of their actions. It is questionable, however, whether the earnestness of the 
absurd hero can be sustained for a whole life without it culminating in an obvious form of 
despair. Camus thinks it can, and recommends this to anyone who intends on living a good life. 
"The theme of permanent revolution is thus carried into individual experience. Living is keeping 
the absurd alive. Keeping it alive is, above all, contemplating it."327 The individual should not 
forfeit his inner vitality by ignoring the absurdity of his existence, or by refusing to rebel against 
the greater forces that crush him.  
 In fairness to Camus, it is certainly possible that one might respond to existential 
difficulties with tenacity and passion, but his account arguably suffers from a lack of foresight. 
This basic attitude toward life might work for some time, but it would seem difficult to sustain 
passionate rebellion out of sheer force of will for a long period, especially if this is thought to be 
an eternity as in the case of Sisyphus. One would have to come to terms with one's miserable 
condition eventually, which would likely mean becoming desensitized to one's suffering in a 
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state of resignation. The numbness that gradually ensues from extended bouts of suffering is 
likely to lead to the sleep of consciousness that Camus wants to resist through his continual 
awareness of life's absurdity. This would produce a form of detachment that undermines 
passionate involvement with existence in a way that is characteristic of despair. Without a belief 
in God, salvation, or a greater purpose or ideal beyond the act of rebellion, his position is 
ultimately hollow and untenable. This individual would eventually be struck by the utter 
meaninglessness of his suffering and the futility of his toil, even if he continues go on living in 
spite of it. He cannot give his life meaning simply by wanting it to have meaning for him, since 
the human will alone is simply not powerful enough to create meaning out of thin air. While he 
might believe that he is happy rebelling initially, with his troubling knowledge and continual 
suffering, he is only repressing despair. We should therefore agree with Anti-Climacus that the 
self that is acted upon in defiance is in despair, and would be better off approaching life with less 
resentment, bitterness, and hostility. This is not to say he does not have good reasons for 
approaching it in this way, or for making rebellion the purpose of his existence. If he decides to 
rebel against the gods or the forces of nature that overwhelm him, it would be wise to do so in a 
more subtle and idealistic fashion, like those who adopt the first form of defiance. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 Anti-Climacus concludes that the autonomous self is in despair, and is at fault for relying 
on its own resources for direction in life rather than depending on God for this. This self-willed 
individual cannot overcome his self-enclosed condition without faith that he will be redeemed 
from it through Christ's sacrifice. His arguments for this have a distinctly Christian flavor, but 
are not supposed beg the question. The basic worry is that the defiant individual will not be able 
to take its projects or aims seriously, since it fashions these for itself without recognizing a 
higher authority that would obligate it to act as it does. Criticizing Kant's conception of 
autonomy, Kierkegaard writes: 
 
Kant held that man was his own law (autonomy), i.e. bound himself under the law he gave himself. In a 
deeper sense, that means to say: lawlessness or experimentation. It is no harder than the thwacks which 
Sancho Panza applied to his own bottom. I can no more be really stricter in A than I am or than I wish 




anything higher than myself, and if I am to bind myself, where am I to acquire the severity as A by which 
as B, I am to be bound, so long as A and B are the same?328 
 
The defiant self might act according to principles that he has decided to adopt, and have his 
reasons for doing so, but this decision is ultimately arbitrary, since there is nothing compelling 
him to adopt those principles rather than others. Because he is free, he knows he can choose to 
change his attitude and behaviors at any time, without depending on anything external for 
justification, and this power unsettles him. His life might come to feel like an experiment that he 
conducts in which nothing is really at stake, and this would prevent him from connecting with 
his situation on earth in a heartfelt way.  
 Moreover, his awareness of being free involves heightened reflection on his earthly 
condition, and this contributes to a state of detachment that can cause him to doubt whether the 
people or things that he cares about are worth caring about. Suspecting that his concerns and 
interests are transient, groundless, and insignificant in the grand scheme of things, he is prone to 
internal conflicts that undermine his confidence and keep him from being passionate in his 
engagements. If he becomes too disquieted by this discrepancy in his attitudes, he might decide 
to approach external affairs with Stoical indifference and retreat inward. By aligning himself 
with his infinite aspect, and divesting himself of his emotions and passions, which often produce 
suffering and psychological conflict, he would try to find a point of rest in himself. But since he 
exists as a human being on earth, Anti-Climacus believes that this would be a sign that he is 
imbalanced as a self, and in despair. In faith, he would eliminate despair by passionately 
devoting himself to Christianity, where an event in time determines his eternal salvation. 
Following the example of the incarnate Christ, who instructed us to bear our crosses in the world, 
the person would shoulder his suffering in hopes that he will eventually be healed of internal 
division by finding rest in God.329 The Christian is similar to Sisyphus in persevering through his 
wretched existence instead of abstracting himself from it dispassionately. But rather than rebel 
against God or resent Him, he blames himself for the sins that brought him to this state, and 
expects God will relieve him of the burden in eternity, which is of ultimate importance.  
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 I have argued, however, that the defiant individual can achieve personal integrity on his 
own, without devoting his life to God by renouncing the world as Kierkegaard claims. It might 
be true that the self needs an ideal or criterion that would support its identity over time, and 
function as an organizing principle over the course of its life, but this does not mean that God is 
the sole candidate for this. Neither does the severity through which the autonomous individual 
rules himself have to originate from himself as Kierkegaard claims. He gives no reason to think 
that the person cannot acquire it from his interactions with other people in society when he 
recognizes them as making pressing demands on him that he is obligated to fulfill. Because he is 
free, he might think that he can ignore claims they would have on him, or view these as 
illegitimate or insignificant. On the other hand, if he has empathy or concern for others like 
people often do, he would freely accept that other persons are authorities in their own right, and 
understand that he has tremendous responsibilities to them. Sociopaths, immoralists, and the 
staunch ironist might not think this way, but fortunately these standpoints are not psychologically 
viable for most people. Hence, the defiant person Anti-Climacus describes can engage with other 
people earnestly, without needing God or any other external power to compel him to care about 
them, love them, or view them as significant.  
 In fact, if a person would do this only if God demanded it of him, while threatening him 
with severe punishment for disobedience, his character would not seem much different from the 
sociopath or immoralist who acts out of sheer self-interest. This attitude sits uneasily with the 
altruistic form of love for one's neighbor preached in the Gospels, but Kierkegaard claims that 
Christianity prescribes egotism when it comes to securing one's own salvation. He writes:  
 
Does not Christianity make me into an enormous egotist, or does it not abnormally develop my self-
awareness in that by terrifying a man with the most terrible horror it brings him to be concerned solely and 
only for his own salvation, completely oblivious to the possible frailty and imperfection of everybody 
else?…To this one must answer: “The truth” cannot act in any other way. (JP II: 2053) 
 
As long as the Christian is saved from eternal damnation, it does not matter to him that some of 
his neighbors, or even those dearest to him, might not be. In this case, the motives of the defiant 
person who cares for his fellow human beings autonomously, and who would protest vehemently 
against such horrific treatment of them, would be much purer than those of the Christian. Not 




Christian would practice a conditional form of love that would approve of the beloved being 
consigned to hell if God willed it. The Christian's callous tolerance of infinite punishment is far 
from what one would expect of true love.  
 Additionally, the defiant individual might cull from norms and ideals in his culture when 
deciding how to live and what kind of person to be, or make a stable commitment to refined 
versions of them, without partaking in the caprice of the ironist. If he accepts these as 
authoritative, he would not be indulging in fantasy, or arbitrarily inventing his own meaning and 
values as Anti-Climacus suggests. This person might have a profound knowledge of his freedom 
while being anchored in worldly engagement, which would mean that his infinite and finite 
aspects are united. If he is passionate about his ideals and projects, it would seem there would be 
no doubt he would be living with integrity, even if he does not believe in God and does not 
accept the truth of Christianity. If the worry is that these ideals or principles do not adequately 
prepare him for eternity or are not objectively valid, he might consider them to be timeless truths 
of reason, or Platonic forms, such as the form of the Good, that compel him to unswerving 
commitment.330 Anti-Climacus would object that he lacks integrity because he is not 
strengthening his relationship with God, who he ultimately relates to as the power that 
established him, but this is question begging, and will not convince anyone who does not already 
accept the truth of Christianity. This person might assume that he has been brought into existence 
as a free agent through language acquisition, his familial or cultural upbringing, and the 
education he has received within society, and might conceive of himself as indebted to other 
people for his freedom instead. He might also believe that these sources have eternal merit 
insofar as they are governed by reason or the Good, rather than by an inscrutable God who might 
command violent acts like he did with Abraham, or subject persons to infinite punishment for 
unbelief. The integrity that this person would achieve would seem to be a quality of 
psychologically or spiritually healthy persons who are not in despair, whether it is in the ordinary 
sense or in Anti-Climacus' technical sense. 
 I also do not believe that reflection needs to have the devastating and exaggerated effects 
that Anti-Climacus claims it would have absent of faith, even if it does foster internal division in 
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the self that characterizes despair in Anti-Climacus' sense.331 It is true that as thinking beings, we 
are able to view our lives from a detached standpoint, and doubt whether we have good reasons 
to care about the people or things we do. We might also have questions about the significance of 
our lives, or whether the ideals or commitments we have are worth maintaining. This can pose a 
problem for secular individuals, but it is equally a problem for those with faith. In this respect, 
reflection is a negative power that can disrupt our lives, and especially our naive happiness, but 
this is by no means always a bad thing. It is what separates us from the brutes, which have no 
conception of morality in acting on impulse rather than for reasons. In this way, it creates the 
conditions for an orderly society. As free beings, we can indeed let reflection bring us to the 
brink of nihilism, endlessly asking about the reasons for our existence or actions. However, we 
can also decide to terminate it when it is no longer fruitful, and choose to put it to the service of a 
higher good by using it to improve the character of ourselves and society.  
 It goes without saying that doubt and critical questioning can be productive for the moral 
and intellectual progress of civilization, and for human discourse in general. These thoughts 
might disrupt the pleasure that we get from everyday activities and make us uneasy, but where 
everyday action consists in oppression, coercion, exploitation, egotism, and all sorts of injustices 
that seem to come naturally to us, but which we are often oblivious to or do not care about, it 
might lead to crucial transformations that benefit other persons and ourselves. In recoiling from 
the violence and injustice we discover in the world and in ourselves, and trying to mitigate them 
with heartfelt conviction, the negativity of reflection undermines itself, and we return to our 
concrete engagements with a better understanding of what we ought to be doing. Additionally, 
we cannot realistically call into doubt the significance of certain people or things, such as our 
loved ones, and arguably morality insofar as we want to continue to live in society. To be 
impartial toward good and evil is to already be on the precipice of falling into evil. Reflection is 
a double-edged sword that is an indispensible tool for human agency, but which can cripple us if 
we do not counteract it with existential action through the exertion of will, or more vividly, love 
and concern. To this extent, one can agree with Anti-Climacus or any of Kierkegaard's other 
pseudonyms.332 
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 Despair in Kierkegaard's work is essentially a problem of human freedom in its 
emergence from the natural world, where freedom contributes to disintegration and imbalance in 
human existence. The expansion of freedom can be witnessed in the fragmentation and division 
that occurs in modern liberal society, as rapid advances in science and technology have 
weakened traditional bonds and narratives that furnished us with a definite place in the world.333 
These conventional frameworks had regulated norms and beliefs in tight-knit communities that 
we were actively involved in, and gave us direction and meaning that we did not have to seek on 
our own. While this constrained our will and limited our possibilities and understanding of our 
situation, it also made us feel that we belonged to a greater whole, and that this whole was an 
important part of our identity as individuals. Where we previously inhabited a shared universe of 
mutual concerns in our prescribed roles, we are increasingly becoming disengaged from them, 
and retreating to our private universes with the assistance of personalized technology. We spend 
much of our day in front of screens, gazing at virtual environments that are products of human 
imagination, while dedicating less attention to our physical environment. What was once the 
stuff of fantasy now features in everyday reality, and as a result, it has become increasingly 
difficult to find our footing, or to make sense of the world and our place in it.  
 The contact of different cultures in our globalized age has also produced a plurality of 
belief systems that brings us to doubt the validity of our own interpretation of the world. We 
used to look to family, religion, or the local community for guidance, but it is increasingly left up 
to us as individuals to discover our purpose and identity, and determine what roles and attitudes 
we will adopt from the innumerable options available. If we occupy a position that we feel 
forced into, such as a tedious job, we are likely to do so ironically, without truly identifying with 
it. Kierkegaard is less interested in social developments, and more concerned about the 
development of the person in these insecure and alienating times, which seem to have borne the 
atomized society of reflective individuals he predicted.334 His goal is to determine how best to 
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integrate the infinite and finite aspects of our nature, or our freedom and limitations, given that 
this discrepancy can produce so much personal and social conflict. 
 In his pseudonymous writings, Kierkegaard claims the development of the person begins 
in the esthetic stage of life, when the human being is integrated with nature and focused on 
external objects. The central aim of the individual living esthetically is enjoyment, which often 
involves sensuous pleasures that she experiences as a psyche-body unity. So long as the 
individual is absorbed in worldly affairs with a minimal degree of reflection, and is well adjusted 
to society, there is synchronic continuity in her life, but not a great deal of diachronic continuity. 
Anti-Climacus claims she is not in despair in the strict sense, since she is ignorant of being a self, 
and her spiritual capacities have not been actualized to a significant degree. Because it is her 
essence to be spirit, however, he believes that she is in despair at an unconscious level. She 
becomes conscious of being in despair once the primitive unity that holds between her and the 
world begins to break down through the intensification of reflection. This is likely to occur 
through a particular earthly suffering that she recoils from, such as a loss, trauma, or hardship 
that leaves her confused, and questioning the significance of things that she previously took for 
granted. Since to be spirit is to engage in reflection, and to use one's imagination and will in a 
way that is not simply in service to lower-order desire, inclination, or social dictates, this reaction 
facilitates the actualization of her spiritual capacities. When she turns inward to reflect on her 
life, the first signs of self-enclosure become evident, as she confronts a wider world that begins 
to seem hostile. If reflection intensifies, and the suffering that afflicts her becomes 
overwhelming, she will despair over the world in general, and not just over some particular thing 
in it. Not wanting to be herself, she withdraws from the concrete conditions of her existence and 
retreats into the imagination, where she experiments with her life in a capricious manner by 
taking an interest in a wide range of things, and choosing what will have significance for her at 
any given moment. The ironist, the poet, and the romanticist are figures that encapsulate this 
form of despair, which consists in a highly active spiritual life that is detached from ordinary 
engagements in the world, without being stable or ethically motivated.  
                                                                                                                                                       
enthusiasm and prudentially relaxing in indolence” (TA: 68). Without much to unite them historically, and with the 
weakening of traditional bonds in local communities, individuals conceive of their relation to society in thin, 
abstract categories like "the generation" (TA: 84). These categories might seem to unify them, but for Kierkegaard, 
this is a deception that conceals the fact that they have become detached from the network of concrete relations that 




 The pseudonyms offer two alternative ways of combatting the forms of despair which 
occur in the esthetic stage that do not require one to attribute religious meaning to one's life. In 
the ethical stage of life, the person acknowledges that she has become alienated from the world 
through reflection. She aims to reconcile herself with her concrete condition by living in 
accordance with rational principles that are universally valid. In deciding to take responsibility 
for herself, she repents for the mistakes that led up to despair, and commits to duties that are 
performed in daily life, such as work, marriage, and friendship. By expressing her freedom 
through ethical action undertaken in passion, she believes that she has actualized her spiritual 
essence, and transformed herself into the universal individual. Assuming that she has achieved 
her telos, she considers herself to have gained personal integrity and won happiness, which she 
had been seeking while in despair. The success she claims in her battle with despair is 
problematic, however, since she must deal with guilt for her errors and shortcomings that cannot 
be eliminated. She will also be disquieted by the corruption that she finds in her heart, which she 
must struggle to overcome, and cannot ultimately remove through her own efforts. As a result, 
internal conflict is a persistent feature in her existence, which for Anti-Climacus, is despair.  
 The ethical stage of life the Judge describes is a type of defiance according to Anti-
Climacus' typology of despair. In defiance, the person wants to be herself, but who she wants to 
be does not correspond with the person she essentially is, which has been determined by the 
greater power that brought her into existence. The defiant person, who is intensely self-
conscious, exercises her autonomy by living in accord with ideals and norms that she has chosen 
upon reflection. However, since she acknowledges no higher authority that constrains her actions 
and tells her how to live, and does not believe that she has an essence that she is tasked with 
realizing in it, there is nothing to compel her to take herself or her projects seriously. The choices 
that she makes and the tasks she sets for herself are arbitrary, and she can easily call everything 
she has built her life on into doubt, or question the significance of it. Because of this, she is 
basically experimenting with her life on her own, and will remain detached from her concrete 
existence in a state of self-enclosure.  
 I claimed that this is a weak argument, and that defiance is not necessarily a form of 
despair, just as ignorance is not. The person in defiance takes control of his own life in 
heightened reflection, but this does not mean he has to be dispassionate or withdrawn from 




projects to fruition, or out of concern for other people, such as his friends and loved ones, or 
those who make demands on him as independent authorities. He might also live in accord with 
ideals or principles that are drawn from his culture, or that originate in reason. In this case, they 
would not be arbitrary, and he would have good reason to take them seriously. It is true that he 
might call his commitments into doubt, or question their importance, but the religious individual 
who believes that she is subject to a higher power can do this as well. Because persons in 
defiance can be stable individuals who have integrity and a decent character, it is wrong to 
assume this is a form of despair. They might have to struggle with inclinations, attitudes, 
feelings, or desires that are contrary to their ideals, and diligently work at reforming their 
conduct so that it is better aligned with them. However, this does not have to be a debilitating 
process that leaves them consumed with guilt, but can give them a goal to aim for, even if it 
exceeds what they are able to achieve on their own. Additionally, unreflective individuals who 
are ignorant of their freedom as selves do not have any of the traits typically associated with 
despair, such as hopelessness or self-doubt. If they are in despair, it is in the technical sense 
denoted by Anti-Climacus, but in that case, it would have no obvious relationship to the 
customary notion. It would have been more apt to use a different term for such individuals 
instead of using a common term improperly.  
  For Anti-Climacus, the problems of these forms of life are supposed to motivate a 
conversion to the religious way of life, or more specifically, Christianity. To have faith, on his 
view, is to rest transparently in God in willing to be oneself after reflection (SUD: 131). By 
relating himself to God in faith, the person believes that he will be healed of his internal conflicts 
and contradictions, and purified from the wickedness in his heart, which he had brought upon 
himself by misusing his will. Through the grace of God, he would be forgiven for his sins, and 
would achieve self-actualization by coming into existence as eternal. With divine assistance, he 
would become what he essentially is as spirit, rather than being blocked from achieving this due 
to his imperfections as a human being in time. Kierkegaard does not intend to provide a positive 
argument for the truth of Christianity for the unconvinced, but rather to persuade them to become 
Christians by showing that those ways of life outside of Christianity are despair on philosophical 
grounds.335 Hence, we should have faith that it is true for practical purposes, even though we 
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cannot know this. If Christianity is false, then there is no remedy for our sickness, and we are 
without hope of spiritual fulfillment. We would be destined to remain fallen creatures in 
wretched contradiction with ourselves as a synthesis of the eternal and temporal. 
 Where other life-views come up short in providing liberation from human suffering that 
stems from being encumbered by the world, Climacus claims that Christianity is particularly well 
suited to serve this existential need that persons have upon attaining the highest pitch of self-
consciousness. Although he does not think a proof for Christianity can be given, he argues that it 
has something to say in its favor, since it turns out to be "a perfect fit" for the person who has 
arrived at the final stages of his development with a longing for spiritual freedom. "Subjectivity 
culminates in passion, Christianity is paradox; paradox and passion fit each other perfectly, and 
paradox perfectly fits a person situated in the extremity of existence” (CUP: 230). The "absolute 
paradox" of Christianity is that a transcendent God, who is in essence actually eternal, comes 
into existence in time, revealing Himself to us in human form in the person of Christ (CUP: 217). 
To save us from our fallen condition, Christ offers to usher us into an eternal happiness, forever 
secured against the ravages of time. Unlike God, we are essentially eternal but not actually 
eternal, and are finally unable to become eternal of our own powers, even though our 
development tends toward achieving this. Consequently, it is as if we were designed to come to 
recognize the truth of Christianity.  
 As we have seen with the Judge, rather than depend on outside help from Christ for 
reconciling his eternal and temporal components, the individual living ethically might attempt to 
achieve correspondence with the eternal through his own efforts by performing his duties in daily 
existence. Due to the collision between his ideals and the reality of his situation, however, he 
eventually recognizes that he will unable to realize his telos. The ethical way of life is therefore 
likely to lead to continued suffering and moral discontent, and does not effectively resolve the 
paradox of living spiritually in time. Not everyone will conceive of his or her telos ethically, and 
some who seek their ultimate purpose in life will venture into the religious way of life to resolve 
their internal conflicts. They might aim to approach the divine through intellectual means by 
fleeing into abstractions, or engaging in mystical contemplation, speculation, meditation, or 
                                                                                                                                                       
Negative philosophy paves the way for a philosophy of revelation by presenting a riddle: in the absence of revealed 
religion, the ethical standpoint is despair, and existence is futile. But negative philosophy cannot provide the answer 
to this riddle itself. Revelation is an answer to the riddle, but it presents itself, if at all, as an underivable fact.” See 




rational inquiry. They might also do so volitionally through ascetic practices, including 
renunciation of earthly desires.  
 Climacus claims, however, that our finitude impedes our access to the divine, and we 
cannot abandon our earthly condition to unite with it. Regardless of how passionate the 
individual is about expressing his relation to the absolute, or God, he will eventually realize that 
while he is situated in the world, "he cannot make the finite commensurate with it" (CUP: 484). 
His failure to fulfill his telos of his own powers through an immanent union with God will lead 
to great suffering, since he will not attain what he so passionately desires, and has closed himself 
off from the world while still remaining in it as a human being. Climacus compares this inwardly 
detached individual to a fish living out of water to describe the kind of alienation he will 
experience after getting struck down in his lofty attempt to approach God (CUP: 483). But if he 
exhausts himself working out his salvation on his own, and becomes a Christian in humble 
response to his defeat, he has faith that he will be liberated from the finite after death, and will 
enjoy an eternal happiness in union with God. The contradiction that mars his nature will then be 
resolved by an act of grace that originates from an external agency. As Haufniensis puts it, the 
Christian believes that in eternity, “all contradiction is cancelled," and "the temporal is 
permeated by and preserved in the eternal" (CA: 154).  
 By identifying despair in Kierkegaard's thought with spiritual disintegration, which 
requires forgiveness and grace to remedy, I hope to have shown that despair is a product of 
human agency as it emerges in existence. Agency requires that the person separate himself from 
psychical-physical processes and his worldly environment to think for himself and make his own 
choices. This separation occurs through reflection, in which the person detaches himself from his 
concrete situation to relate himself to himself. In his infinitude, he takes steps toward 
overcoming his limitations, wresting himself from finite constraints by imagining alternative 
possibilities for action that he can choose to actualize. Without this capacity for abstraction, his 
actions and character would be determined solely by external causes, such as vital processes 
occurring in nature. He would then be unfree like the animals, and would not be conscious of 
himself as an individual set apart from the totality of nature. There is a sense in which his 
confrontation with nature is liberating, but he knows that it will soon overwhelm him with its 




impending demise as a free but mortal being, his life is tragic in a way that the life of an animal 
is not. 
 One might think despair is simply a brute fact about our nature that we must cope with as 
finite agents, but Anti-Climacus insists that this is not the case. In Part Two of The Sickness Unto 
Death, he argues that despair is sin when the person understands their actions as taking place 
before God (SUD: 77). On his view: "The category of sin is the category of individuality" (SUD: 
119). The idea throughout the text is that we are not originally in despair or a state of sin as 
Augustine claims, but are at fault for bringing this upon ourselves by disobeying God's will.336 
We become spirit in desiring freedom and independence, but this ends up causing painful 
separation in our lives, rather than promoting harmony with existence and making us happy. The 
desire for agency apart from God is therefore the source of sin, which Kierkegaard seems to 
conceive as a fall from nature and into infinitude, rather than a fall into nature or the sensuous, in 
an additional departure from Augustine. In his biblical exegesis, he argues that the Gospels point 
toward other living things, such as the lilies in the field and the birds of the air, as models of 
obedience rather than fallen beings that are in bondage to sin.337 He states, "the bird and the lily 
continually will as God wills and continually do as God wills," and because of this, the bird 
"enjoys all its freedom without care" (CD: 61). Moreover, the bird "exists only to God’s honor, 
sings to his praise, does not demand at all to be anything itself. So it is with everything in nature; 
that is its perfection" (UDVS: 205). However, in a dialectical turn, Kierkegaard states that it "is 
also its imperfection, because there is therefore no freedom. The lily standing out there in the 
open field and the free bird of the air are nevertheless bound in necessity and have no choice” 
(UDVS: 205). The suggestion is that human freedom is a perfection, but one which comes at a 
great cost. As Anti-Climacus puts it, the possibility of despair "is man's superiority over the 
animal," which indicates the "infinite erectness or sublimity" of spirit, but on the other hand, "to 
be in despair is not only the worst misfortune and misery––no, it is ruination" in occurring before 
God (SUD: 15). 
 One might infer from such passages that we fell into sin and disturbed God's original 
creation by obtaining a kind of divine freedom that other living things do not have, and which 
God prohibited us from having. Yet strangely, Anti-Climacus claims that according to 
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Christianity, it is our telos to become free in a way that animals are not by actualizing our 
spiritual capacities, namely reflection, imagination, and volition, and coming into conflict with 
the world. It might sound like he believes God wants us to become sinners, and to bring despair 
upon ourselves so that we eventually realize our desperate need for Him in faith. However 
tempting this reading is, he is not claiming that human freedom necessarily results in sin or 
despair, or that to be an agent is to be a sinner. If we use our freedom to do what we want to do 
instead of what God wants us to do, we sin, but if we use it to do what God wants, we have faith, 
which is the opposite of sin as St. Paul states (SUD: 82).338 God wants us to be spirit, but on His 
terms rather than our own. As free agents, we are supposed to separate ourselves from psychical-
physical processes and worldly things so that they do not move us to act without our reflective 
endorsement, but we are not supposed to separate ourselves from God. To do that is to sin, and 
consequently, to be culpable for being in despair. 
 This appears to be a solution to the worry that God intends for us to sin, but it has 
untenable implications that show it is unsound. To avoid making the fall and becoming a sinner, 
it would seem that we would have to either remain like animals, or be perfect like God is perfect 
from the very beginning by having faith, without ever losing our innocence.339 For the Christian, 
however, neither horn of this dilemma seems viable. Because it is our telos to become spirit, we 
would be at fault for living like animals if we could somehow remain like them throughout our 
development, so that is no way to avoid sin. On the other hand, spiritual perfection would be a 
tall order for any human being other than Christ, who has an eternal union with God, and who 
lived without sin. Since Christ is God, we can assume he continually willed as God willed and 
did what God willed like the lily and bird, while suffering in ways that the bird does not due to 
the conflict of existing in the world as spirit. But it would be blasphemous for a Christian to 
think of this as a real possibility for human beings other than Christ, who is unlike us in having 
an exclusive claim to perfect divinity. On this point, Anti-Climacus claims that there is "an 
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understand himself as existing before God (SUD: 81). While the ignorant pagan can be said to be innocent in 




infinite qualitative difference" between the human being and Christ, and to believe otherwise 
would be pantheism (SUD: 126). Since both horns of the dilemma are implausible, his claim that 
we choose to bring despair upon ourselves, and so are responsible for our own fall, is incoherent 
on his own account. His premises commit him to the conclusion that separation from God is the 
fate of human beings other than Christ, rather than a free choice we make.340 In other words, God 
established us as sinners in allotting us freedom of thought and will, and intends for us to pass 
through despair as independent persons before acquiring faith at a later point in our development. 
Only at that point could we be said to be doing His will.  
 In previous chapters, I gave different reasons for thinking that on Anti-Climacus' 
premises, it is inconceivable that despair originates in a free act if it is understood in his technical 
sense. Reflection does not start itself, but is elicited by external causes in the temporal, which 
includes the natural world and society. On top of this, spiritually ignorant individuals who are 
not reflective are in despair due to being entangled in the nothingness of temporal flux, without 
having integrity as selves. Because God wants us to suffer in despair, and created us to live like 
this, it is universal to the human condition. Since He is omnipotent, he could change our 
miserable fortune in an instant if He wanted to, but He evidently does not, and would prefer that 
the darkness play out before he miraculously intervenes to offer grace. As von Loewenich puts it 
in his exposition of Luther's theology, which bears a remarkable similarity to Kierkegaard's, 
"God does his alien work when he leads us into suffering. But thereby he aims at his proper 
work, even when we do not recognize it."341 This conclusion calls into question the justice and 
benevolence of God, and is likely unpalatable to many Christians, but it is a logical consequence 
of his account.   
 Regardless of whether despair is inevitable or a choice we make, as a Christian, Anti-
Climacus believes we do not have to remain in despair, but can overcome it through faith. In The 
Sickness Unto Death, he reserves his discussion for despair, and does not elaborate on what it 
would mean to have faith. However, a rich account of the Christian way of life can be pieced 
together from content found elsewhere in Kierkegaard's corpus, especially in his upbuilding and 
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Christian discourses, Works of Love, and Anti-Climacus' Practice in Christianity. Unfortunately, 
his writings on this topic are not always unequivocal, and it can be difficult to find consistency 
throughout these works. Those who study them will soon realize that major interpretive puzzles 
arise from the wealth of religious ideas that Kierkegaard has left us with. As a result, it is 
difficult to determine how he thinks those with faith should live, and how we should understand 
ourselves in our relation to God if we are deeply passionate about this relationship, and have a 
tremendous need for grace to relieve our suffering. But perhaps this ambiguity was what he 
intended, since it leaves room for his readers to think for themselves about what God wants from 
them. Kierkegaard suggests as much in the preface to several of his upbuilding discourses, when 
he insists that he does not have authority to preach, and will not claim to be a teacher.342  
 Perhaps the most important question anyone could ask about the life of faith is what God 
wills that we should do as agents, given that this is the source of sin and despair. One tempting 
interpretation of Kierkegaard's notion of faith that has been advanced in recent times calls for the 
total annihilation of selfhood.343 If we no longer conceive of ourselves as separate persons in 
relation to God or the world, and are no longer struggling against our lower nature, then this 
would seem to solve the problem of despair entirely by liberating us from ourselves. Agency will 
not be preserved after death, anyway, so the thought is that those with faith would get a head 
start on this by losing their agency in time, and thereby relieving themselves of the suffering of 
self-consciousness in the present. The human being in this condition could go on living, but as a 
wanton rather than a person in Frankfurt's sense. This means that he would have lower-order 
desires but no higher-order volitions, and so would not care about which of these lower-order 
desires move him to act.344 He would neither commit to sustaining any of these desires, nor 
determine which of them he would identify with in cases where they conflict.345 Like the bird the 
Gospel speaks of, he would be free of all cares in obedience to God. The wanton does not 
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necessarily have to live like an animal, but might retain the capacity of thought and reason. 
Frankfurt explains that a wanton could deliberate on ways to achieve his desired ends, or think 
rationally about states of affairs in the world, but he would not consider whether his desires are 
desirable. "He ignores the question of what his will is to be. Not only does he pursue whatever 
course of action he is most strongly inclined to pursue, but he does not care which of his 
inclinations is the strongest.”346 Based on outward appearances, he might seem like an ordinary 
human being, but since he is not consciously divided against himself, he would not have to deal 
with despair, or the state of self-enclosure that it involves. 
 This is a radical reconception of the human being that should startle many, but 
Kierkegaard makes claims throughout his religious writings that would suggest that it 
characterizes those with faith. In Christian Discourses, he argues that the problem with human 
beings who do not live religiously is that they are puffed up with self-will, and do not recognize 
their debt to God, who has wondrously created them from nothing. Attacking the pagans who 
live in ignorance of God as he revealed Himself in Christ, he writes: 
 
The life of every human being is God’s possession; the human being is his bond servant. But one cannot 
kill God; on the other hand, as is said, one can certainly kill the thought of him ... When a person has 
succeeded in killing the thought of God and every feeling and mood that like his emissaries bring him to 
mind, then that person lives on as if he were his own master, himself the architect of his fortune, himself 
the one who must take care of everything but also the one who is entitled to everything—that is, he cheats 
God of what is due him... (CD: 66-67) 
 
Kierkegaard states that God creates persons as "something" in relation to him, but it is too often 
the case that the person "selfishly wants to be this something" that God made him by trying to 
take control over his earthly situation instead of admitting his dependence on God (CD: 129). 
This would be true of those living esthetically, who pursue worldly goods like wealth, power, 
and eminence with eager concern. It would also be true of those living ethically, who strive to 
perfect themselves so that they live in accord with the ideals or principles that they have chosen 
autonomously. Such individuals want to govern themselves instead of being governed by God, 
and thereby separate themselves from Him, which creates the conditions for despair.  
                                                




 As we have seen, Kierkegaard believes some individuals might exhaust themselves with 
these efforts as they develop as persons, and realize they are in despair after experiencing earthly 
hardship or suffering. When conflict in the world arises, and they start to appreciate their 
spiritual nature, they are likely to recognize how powerless they are to secure their own 
happiness or prevent suffering. Without being able to help themselves, they might be ready to 
look to God for support during their time of tribulation, and to abandon their previous mode of 
living, in which they had turned away from God in self-reliance. Kierkegaard writes: 
 
If, however, a person himself gives up this something, the independence, the freedom to go his own way 
that love gave him … if God perhaps helps him in this regard by hard sufferings ... then he is weak ... but 
God is strong. He, the weak one, has totally given up this something into which love made him, has 
  wholeheartedly consented to God’s taking away from him all that could be taken … There is only one who 
 can hinder God, him who indeed is eternally strongest, in becoming the strongest––this one is the person 
 himself ... There is only one obstacle for God, a person’s selfishness, which comes between him and God 
 like the earth’s shadow when it causes the eclipse of the moon. (CD: 129) 
 
Kierkegaard believes that in His love for us, God creates human beings as free and independent, 
but this means we are able to flee from His presence and seek satisfaction apart from Him, 
without Him being able to do anything about it. In revolt against God, we selfishly want to 
assume his role and become authorities over our own lives while gaining status in the world, or 
obtaining earthly pleasures, including those of sensuality. Although certain individuals will gain 
worldly riches and success by following this path, and might appear to be happy, strong 
individuals, the Christian who has despaired is aware of the deeper poverty and dissatisfaction of 
this way of living, which they conceive as sin. In deciding to give it up, and to seek their riches 
within, they surrender their freedom and independence to God unconditionally in worship (CUD: 
64).   
 Kierkegaard says things that would suggest that this act culminates in the forfeiture of 
agency, or becoming a wanton that acts on direct behalf of God. On his view, the individual 
living religiously stops believing he has any of his power of his own, or that he himself is 
capable of anything. Instead of caring about being something in the world like the pagans do 
(CD: 44), he accepts that he is "nothing before God" (WOL: 336). Kierkegaard explains that this 




world and its goods, selfish desires, and any autonomous project that they have, and submits to 
the mockery and ridicule of others who would despise him for this (WOL: 188). He might not 
give up his possessions in a literal sense, but would change the way he relates to them by no 
longer letting them control him, or allowing them to dictate how he understands himself and his 
obligations to God. He might be wealthy, honorable, professionally successful, and appear like a 
normal person to others, but he would be essentially indifferent to conditions in the world, and 
ready to deal with gains, loss, or changes in fortune without this affecting him spiritually (EUD: 
165). In describing the Christian who is engaged in self-renunciation, Kierkegaard writes, 
"without wishing to waste any time or any power on elevating himself, on being somebody, in 
self-sacrifice he is willing to perish, that is, he is completely and wholly transformed into being 
simply an active power in the hands of God” (WOL: 260). He also describes this as "being an 
instrument in the hand of Governance" (WOL: 94). With that said, it would seem that there is no 
room left for the will of the person on Kierkegaard's account of Christianity. He states that in 
surrendering himself unconditionally, the Christian "has no self-will whatever" (CUD: 64). In 
interpreting these passages, one might think that he is suggesting that the person would be 
liberated from himself by surrendering his agency to God. By living on the most intimate terms 
with God, he would have fulfilled his telos and eliminated despair.  
 Kierkegaard suggests that self-renunciation would involve exertion of the will initially, 
during the transition to the religious way of life, but once the individual becomes practiced in it 
and has disciplined himself accordingly, he would no longer have to rely on his own efforts to 
sustain it. He would have prepared himself for God to swoop in and take possession of him to 
use him as He wills. Kierkegaard writes, "spiritually understood it holds true that precisely when 
a person has strained his spiritual powers as such, then and only then can he become an 
instrument. From this moment on, if he honestly and believingly perseveres, he will gain the best 
powers, but they are not his own; he possesses them in self-renunciation” (WOL: 333). 
Kierkegaard states that this process results in "the annihilation of a person," which is "his truth" 
(EUD: 309). On his view, it is not God who acts upon the person to annihilate him. Because He 
has created human beings as free, He refuses to intervene in our lives without our consent, and 
before we have prepared ourselves to receive His blessing by developing our capacities as selves. 
When a person voluntarily engages in self-renunciation, "he himself is indeed the instrument of 




and advances His will in existence without impeding it through his own stubborn and selfish 
willing. Individuals who have not undergone the process of self-annihilation conceive of 
themselves as the source of their actions, powers, and capacities, but after this, Kierkegaard 
explains that they will have finally accepted their impotence in relation to an omnipotent God 
that created them from nothing. By shrinking from worldliness and “sinking down into your own 
nothingness” (EUD: 307), you become weak, but God becomes strong in you. When the 
individual has emptied himself of self-will, he achieves the mystical union with God that he 
longs for as spirit, and admits his utter dependence on God. 
 In suggesting that despair can only be overcome through the annihilation of the self, and 
declaring this as an essential part of the Christian faith, Kierkegaard appears to betray the 
existentialist principles that are widely considered to characterize his thought.347 He is commonly 
understood to champion the value and dignity of the individual, along with the freedom she has 
to think for herself, make her own decisions, and take responsibility for her life. But what kind of 
freedom and dignity can she have if she makes herself nothing before God, renounces her earthly 
cares and possessions, denies herself completely, and wholly submits to being His instrument? Is 
Kierkegaard offering a quietest conception of faith, in which the person must surrender her 
agency to God so that she is possessed by an external agency? Or is he proposing a voluntarist 
conception in which the person retains her agency while executing God's will? And if those with 
faith are supposed to remain persons after all, why would Kierkegaard use such bold language 
that invites one to interpret him as saying personhood should be eliminated, and is some kind of 
hindrance to God's master plan? 
 If the quietest interpretation of Kierkegaard’s project is correct, it would suggest that 
individuality ought to be renounced in the religious stage of life, along with everything else in 
the world, which consists of finite beings that only distract the human being from God, who is 
the source of all being. After carrying out his annihilation, the self would no longer possess a 
will, and would cease to delineate itself from things external to it to identify itself as a separate 
entity. In existentialist fashion, Kierkegaard affirms the importance of going one's own way and 
developing oneself as a single individual in his pseudonymous works, but one might read him as 
ultimately calling for an abandonment of this project, which is despair, in order to properly relate 
                                                
347 In a survey of existentialist thought, Solomon writes: "It is generally acknowledged that if existentialism is a 




to God in faith. Perhaps the journey toward self-actualization demands that the individual realize 
his spiritual capacities in existence to the greatest extent possible before surrendering his hard 
won individuality to God, so that He has possession of these higher capacities, and uses the 
human being as His instrument. This would be a sophisticated wanton who would retain thought, 
imagination, and desires, while being evacuated of personal agency. He would come full circle to 
the carefree state of immediacy he enjoyed as a child, but with intellectual capacities that the 
child, in its innocence, does not yet have. Kierkegaard seems to suggest this when he asserts, 
“faith is immediacy or spontaneity after reflection” (JP II: 1123). Similarly, he writes: 
“Immediacy or spontaneity is poetically the very thing we desire to return to (we want our 
childhood again, etc.) but from a Christian point of view, immediacy is lost and it ought not be 
yearned for again but should be attained again” (JP II: 1942). The suggestion is that it is 
impossible to regain the outlook on life that the child has, but we can experience the wonder and 
delight of the child anew in faith, which would incorporate reflection in exuberant passion. In 
this condition, we would no longer be in despair.  
 In support of this interpretation, it should be noted that Kierkegaard was careful to 
emphasize that the views expressed through the pseudonyms were not always his own, and that 
he intended to distance himself from them by disavowing authorship.348 He also did not hesitate 
to admit that he used them as bait to lure the individual into the truth, which he thought was 
encapsulated in Christianity. He even conceived of himself as a deceiver in this regard. "What, 
then, does it mean "to deceive"? It means that one does not begin directly with what one wishes 
to communicate but begins by taking the other's delusion at face value" (POV: 54). The strategy 
of his authorship, he explains, was to meet his readers where they were currently at, whether it 
was in the esthetic or ethical stage, and then gradually lead them into religion by getting them to 
recognize their need for God. One might think that in conveying this message indirectly, he uses 
the pseudonyms to encourage the self to build itself up, only to have it break itself down and 
transfer its powers to God in faith. Individualism would therefore be a means to an end, or a 
ladder to be thrown away once one has climbed it and reached the goal of union with God.349 
                                                
348 For instance, in 'A First and Last Explanation,' where he discusses his intentions as an author, Kierkegaard writes, 
“...in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me. I have no opinion about them except as a third 
party, no knowledge of their meaning except as a reader, not the remotest private relation to them” (CUP: 625). 
349 I am borrowing this metaphor from Wittgenstein, who used it to describe the activity of those who would 




Perhaps this is the grand movement that Kierkegaard attempted to orchestrate through his 
tortuous authorship, with the aim of facilitating a divine seduction that ends in transcending one's 
humanity, or becoming inhuman. As one of God's henchmen, perhaps he wanted to bring the 
reader to a weak position that God could exploit, even though He is supposed to be omnipotent 
and should have no trouble doing this on His own. Without regard for morality, he would 
deceive them and lead them into error to get them to finally discover the truth for themselves, a 
truth which he believes could not be directly communicated but must be lived first-hand. Such a 
God resembles the sensuous genius that possesses Don Giovanni, rather than a righteous leader 
who wants us to use our higher capacities to combat what is ignoble in us.350   
 I believe there are resources in Kierkegaard's writings to resist a quietest interpretation of 
his notion of faith, and some commentators have convincingly argued that this is not actually his 
view.351 Nevertheless, it is perhaps the most natural reading after examining his notion of 
despair, which he believes is the upshot of human freedom when it is not in service to God. I 
would like to end this work, however, with an admonition for those who are enticed by his 
arguments, as someone who is concerned about the moral implications of Kierkegaard's work. 
While he thinks he is reawakening the age to what it means to be a human being, there is in fact a 
grave inhumanity that lurks within his writings. Kierkegaard believes that Christianity requires 
unconditional surrender to the will of God, and regardless of how you interpret him on the notion 
of faith, it is clear that this might involve violence, whether it is an act of self-negation or 
something else. de Silentio argues that faith requires a suspension of ethical concerns, and 
Kierkegaard says nothing in his authorship that would challenge this view. As we have seen with 
Abraham, unconditional surrender might mean sacrificing another human being, or even a loved 
one, as a person loses his inhibitions to become an instrument of God. We have also seen this 
position play out in modern times in horrendous acts of terrorism, in which innocents are 
slaughtered by religious devotees who believe they are performing God's will. de Silentio 
                                                                                                                                                       
them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them." See Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, p. 189 
350 See section 2.2.1. 
351 In Kierkegaard, Religion, and Existence, Sagi offers a voluntarist interpretation of Kierkegaard's religious 
authorship that should stand as a benchmark in the field. Sagi argues that Kierkegaard struggled throughout his life 
to determine what God's will for him was, and was engaged in a continuous project of self-interpretation to decode 
the religious demand. For instance, he could not decide whether faith required him to remain in the cloister, or 
whether it required him to re-engage with the world along ethical lines. His confusion about what it means to have 
faith, and his evolving position on this matter, would explain the ambiguity and lack of coherence in his religious 




explains that Christianity, too, professes a suspension of the ethical for the sake of obedience to 
God (FT: 72). In Luke 14:26, Christ says: "If any one comes to me and does not hate his own 
father and mother and wife and children and bothers and sisters, yes, and even his own life, he 
cannot be my disciple." de Silentio understands this literally, and even says it is pride to not be 
willing to do this for God (FT: 73). Christians who tolerate the punishment of eternal damnation 
for decent human beings who are not Christian hardly seem more justified in refusing to protest 
this tenet of their faith.352 If these actions or inactions are ways to be initiated into the mystery of 
God, then out of concern for themselves and other human beings, those inclined to religious faith 
should consider whether "the terror" of the religious way of life that Kierkegaard describes is 


















                                                
352 In his discussion of the problem of evil, David Lewis argues that the evils the Christian God perpetrates, such as 
the infliction of infinite punishment on those who have committed finite wrongdoings, vastly outweigh the evils that 
he fails to prevent on earth. Consequently, he condemns Christians for worshipping a tyrant. Lewis challenges those 
who admire people who believe in such a God, writing, "since they worship the perpetrator, endorsing his judgments 
about the propriety of eternal torment for some...the perpetrator's evil extends to them. They admire evil and are 
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